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Abstract 
This research explores how groups make the transition from having strongly held 
beliefs, to having strongly held beliefs that legitimate violent action: the move to 
violence. Working from a number of case studies, I have produced a matrix of 
markers that helps us theorise about the causes of violent potentialities within 
groups. The case studies include Aum Shiru·ikyo, al Qaeda, the Red Army Faction 
as well as some non·violent counter·examples; Agonshu, Hizb ut·Tahrir in 
Uzbekistan and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. 
Through analysis of their statements, I have coded data into a numbe1· of market'S 
that aim to capture information about the sacred boundaries of these groups. 
These boundaries refer to the non·negotiable beliefs and values of the g~·oups, 
which they use to define themselves and their 'Other', and are developed out of a 
neo· Durkheimian discussion of society and the sacred. Mapping these sacred 
boundaries helps us to understand the nature of beliefs that gt·oups will fight to 
defend. Concentrating on the sacred, which I argue can be located in secular as 
well as religious groups, ensures that the exploration of the move to violence in 
1·eligious gt·oups is not trapped in essentialised or dismissive accounts of definitions 
of religion and the causative role it plays within modernity. 
Together, the operationalisation of the sacred and the use of markers to locate it in 
the statements of gt·oups form the model- the matrix - that I have constructed for 
this study. There are. then. two principal outcomes from this research. The first is 
a set of findings coming out of the exploration of the move to violence. The second 
is a model which I have demonstrated in use and which I suggest can be used in 
future research exploring the role of the sacred in modern society. 
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l.lntroduction 
This thesis examines the 'move to violence'. Taking the statements (interviews, 
prcss·releases, manuals and other primary material) of selected groups I map out 
instances of the sacred in the ideas and beliefs expressed, and use these to 
understand the move from strongly· held beliefs to strongly· held beliefs that justify 
violent action. 
In the chapte1-s that follow 1 set out a model the matl·ix - which I use as a method 
of ana lysis of this move to violence and which I apply to six case studies: three 
groups known to have committed acts of violence and three groups that have not 
committed acts of violence. In my fmal analysis of the data I evaluate both this 
model and the findings from the case studies. 
In this opening chapter I will summarise the context of this project, before 
outlining the centra l research questions and the aims and objectives. I will 
conclude by laying out the structure of the thesis. brielly explaining the content 
and purpose of each chapter. 
Context 
In2006 a team (of which I was a part) from the Department of Theology a nd 
Religious Studies at the University of Leeds undertook a six month literature 
review for the British Government's Home Office. submitting a report entitled 'The 
Roots. Practices ond Consequences of Terrorism: A Literature Review of Rcseorr:h 
in the Arts & Humanities (Knott eta!. 2006). The findings of this report, most 
notably those highlighted in sections 5.2 and 6.1, fo1·med the basis of the research 
proposal that led to this thesis. 
Section 6.1 of the literature review (37) stated that, within the fields of the Arts 
and Humanities, the following areas were in need of further study: 
• Further case studies relati ng to the stages of development of 
'extremist' or 'radical' ideological or rel igious movements, plus 
a more focused review of existing case studies (e.g. Reader, 
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2000: Hall. Schuyler and Trinh. 2000: Almond, Appleby and 
Sivan, 2003): 
• More research on the relationship between belief and 
behaviour in general, and on religious belief and behaviour in 
particular: on causality, agency, and the explanatory power of 
t·eligious beliefs and practices: [. .. 1 
• Research which tests markers of 'extremist' views in light of 
the transition to violence. 
Taking these highlighted omissions in the literature as its starting point, I 
proposed to respond to them through a case study· based project examining the 
move to violence in religious groups. However, dUt·ing the early stages of the 
project it became apparent to me that the idea of 'religion' in many explanations of 
v1olence was problematic. varying from it being completely absent as a causative 
factor. to an overreliance or simplification of the role that religion plays in the 
move to violence. In addition, I queried whether, by focusing on 'religion' as a 
causative factor. I would not be in danger of excluding similar characteristics in 
non·1·eligious groups, thereby questioning the efficacy of this approach. Therefore, 
having considered the complex role that religion played in the literature in the field, 
I shifted my focus to using the concept of the 'sacred' to illuminate the problem. h 
IS my contention that the sacred can be found in both religious and secular groups 
and that it is a useful concept which can be operationalised through the matr1x. 
The problematisation of'1·eligion' within discussions of violence is discussed in 
gr€'ater depth in Chapter Three. as is my decision to usc the 'sacred'. To 
summarise the latter part of that discussion here. I use the concept of the sacred as 
a border category to refer to the non-negotiable beliefs of groups. whether violent or 
non-violent. Instances of the sacred being transgressed or threatened with 
transgression are where we see the potential for violent responses. Therefore. 
usmg the matrix. I map out these beliefs (the sacred), providing an explanation of 
theit· values and an understanding of how they can lead to a move to violence. 
In addition to the above call for more research. the Home Office report (Section 
5.2.2) also compiled a list of markers that were suggestive of extremist views 
(Knott ec a/. 2006: 34): 
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The literature suggests the following set of markers as strongly 
associated with terrorist action. These have been noted in groups 
and individuals post facto in studies which interrogate the factors 
leading to known terrorist events. Hypothetically, it could be said 
that the more markers found, the more likely the move. to violence, 
though this needs testing in further research. ... . . . We are 
conscious ... that this set of markers is highly suggestive of the 
ways in which a religious frame of reference can intensify the felt 
legitimacy, urgency and moral transcendence of terror. 
The following markers may be present: 
• A deep and incontestable sense of conviction: 
• An oppositional and dichotomous world·view (cosmology); 
• Worldview justified by appeal to legitimating authority 
external to/transcending the situation (Cod, religious 
scriptures, traditions. fundamental human rights or values): 
• The present condition/field of action is situated in the cosmic 
struggle between good and evil: 
• A sense of urgency and symbolic import is given to action in 
the present: 
• The field of present action takes on the character of an 
emergency situation. in which normal moral codes regulating 
and limiting action are suspended and emergency forms of 
action legitimated or even demanded; 
• A conflation of the fields of human and divine agency (this is 
God's action) which further removes action from normal moral 
and legal restraints: 
• A sense of some basic injustice. which is non-accidental (i.e. it 
expresses the core values. true nature of society and is 
irredeemable). and which reinforces the sense of 
opposition/dichotomy- 'clash of worlds': 
• An absence of common ground with 'others' allowing 
meaningful dialogue with other world views: 
• A sense that a ll members of the 'other' group are involved and 
implicated in the opposition to the good. and so legitimate 
targets: there is no 'innocence'. 
This set of indicators reflects the significance we have detected in 
the literature of the nature and strength of attachment to beliefs. 
This list formed the initial basis of the markers that composed the matrix, the 
analytical model which r applied to the case studies. 'l'hese markers and thcit· 
function ru·e properly intt·oduced in Chapter 'l'wo. but at this stage it is useful to 
list them in their earliest form. not least to acknowledge the impact they had on 
the direction this project took. • While the above list concentrated on reli1,.-jous 
'frames of reference', this was amended so that data relating to non·religious 
• A list of the markc•·• used in this research is provided in Appendix 1. 
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beliefs could also be captured, reflecting the development of the aims of the project, 
to which I now turn. 
Aims and Objectives 
As suggested by its roots in the Home Office t•cport, the aim for this project was to 
provide a case study driven matrix exa min ing the role of belief in the move to 
violence. In light of this. my objectives were: 
• To provide a case study based analysis of statements (and other 
primary materiaO from selected groups, with a particular focus on 
issues of collective belief and the move to violence: 
• In light of the current literature and case studies, to present a matrix 
of causal markers suggestive of the move to violence apparent in the 
relevant cases; 
• To pt·ovide a theoretical explanation of the markers and how these arc 
determined by belief and can s uggest violent potentialities. 
Followmg work on developing the markers into a coherent model. or matrix. the 
following objectives were added during the course of my research: 
• To develop the matrix such that 1t might be applicable to further 
studies, both within the present field (of violence and religion) and in 
the broader subject areas of the Sociology of Religion and Religious 
Studies. 
• 'l'o develop the matl'ix as a tool for usc outside of academia, by 
governments, law·enforcemenl agencies and other organisations.' 
These additional objectives reflected the shift from the original intention of the 
project. to understand the move to violence. to two key aims: to understand the 
move to violence in religious and non·religious groups: and to define an analytical 
model for mapping instances of the sacred in society. 
2 'l'her~ arc ethica l considerations of the i>Otential uses of the matrix in this way, which t 
di.cuss further in my concluding chapter. 
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In order to achieve these aims and objectives, I compiled the following list of 
research questions: 
• What can we tell from the statements of groups, about their potentia l 
(or past) move to violence? 
• What does the current literature tell us about the relationship between 
religion and violence and, more specifically, the sacred and violence? 
• How do the findings from analysis of data developed through the 
matrix of markers build on and/or support the theoretical framework 
hypothesised for this project? 
• What ma rkers are there, within the context of the sacred, which are 
indicative of the move to violence? 
• How can these markers be critically analysed and tested for adequacy? 
As a corollary to this question. what capabilities will the matrix of 
markers have for quantifying the violent potentialities of a group 
before violent actions are known to have occurred? 
• Can these markers, capturing links between beliefs and violence, 
uncover informative data from non·violcnt groups. and if so what key 
factors are necessary (and are any sufficient) in the move to violence? 
These research questions gUided my approach to the topic. and the attainment of 
my aims. Kumerous studies have analysed violence and religion. as well as the 
violent groups I chose to research for this project <Aum Shinrikyo. al Qaeda and the 
Red Army Faction)? '!'here have also been attempts to uncover common sets of 
characteristics that identify the cause of a motivation to violence. This project 
differs from these previous studies in that it approaches the problem within a 
framework that posits the centrality of the sacred to society. It is within this 
framework that I am conducting a comparative study of these groups to map out 
the role of the sacred in the move to violence. 
Whilst a clear conclusion of the thesis is that no one marker can be seen to 
represent a trigger for violent action, the matrix docs demonstrate patterns of 
violent potentiality evident in the data. This thesis sets out the theoretical and 
practical framework for this tool. providing a clear evaluation of its uses and 
'' As I argue in Chapter Seven, 1t is difficult, if not misleading. to label a group 'violent' or 
'non·violcnt'. In this study, I usc the label 'violent' to •·efer to groups known to have acted 
violently, and 'non·violcnt' to those that are not bclicv~d to have acted violently. 
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potential development for further use. The following chapters demonstrate how 
these aims are met, and it is to an overview of these that I now turn. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two- Methodology 
Chapter Two will introduce the methodology used in this research. The matrix will 
be outlined first, in order to give the reader an initial understancting of it, though it 
will be further developed later. The standpoint of the researcher will be defined. 
before moving onto the difficulties of collecting primary data. I will then address 
the strategies applied for the collection of the data: the choice of groups: and the 
process of analysis. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the markers and 
the function that they perform within the overall matrix. 
Chapter Three - Key Themes 
The third chapter is broken down into two sections: the first addresses the current 
literature on terrorism. violence and rehgion and the second on society. religion 
and the sacred. 
The first section will open with a discussion of the current literature on terrorism 
and v1olence, including the problematic place of religion within this field. From 
absence to over·emphasis, the concept of religion will be shown to be problematic 
and in need of mOt·e nuanced treatment. '!'he second section will address this issue. 
starting with an explanation of the centra lity of •·eligion to a Durkheimian 
understanding of society. Exploring the themes of the sacred as developed in neo· 
Durkheimian thought through authors such as Robert Hertz and Georges Bataille, 
I will look at taboo and transgression. sacrifice and the central role of violence to 
these concepts, and will demonstrate their relevance to the present ctiscussion. 
Durmg this discussion the term ·religion' will also be problematised and the 
concept of the 'sacred' will be introduced as a means to bridging the perceived gap 
between religious and secular ctiscourses. 
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This chapter unpacks the theoretical context of the matrix. Placing it within a 
discourse of modern society and the role of the sacred in violence, it provides the 
context for the analysis that follows. 
Chapter Four - Case study of Aum Shinrikyo 
The first of the case studies will focus on a new •·eligious movement: Aum 
Shinrikyo (henceforth. Aum), the Japanese group that in a short space of time went 
from being a yoga class to. in 1995. a multi·million pound organisation that killed 
innocent civilians in a poison·gas attack on the Tokyo subway. The chapter will 
take the same format as the following two. The first part will comprise a case 
study, and in the second part I wi ll apply the matrix of markers to the data, 
providing an analysis of the group and its move to violence. 
In each of the case study chapters I will use the first part to explore key themes 
through the discussion of the histo•·y and development of the group and its actions. 
In the Aum chapter, I begin by focusing on Aum's •·esponses to, and development of, 
violent actions. showing how beliefs can change in reaction to unintentional events 
as well as through strategic choices. I will then address some issues on the 
differences between leadership and followers, an important consideration as. just 
because certain leaders espouse violent beliefs it docs not necessarily entail that all 
followers take the same position. 
In each of the case study chapters a short conclusion will summarise the key points. 
which will be picked up again in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Chapter Five -Case study of at Qoedo 
The fllth chapter will focus on al Qaeda. Within the context of al Qacda the first 
part will also address themes •·elating to Tslamism and the turn to violence in a 
global context. The second part. of the chapter will focus on an analysis of the 
markers in relation to the data gathered during this case study. 
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The section on Islamism and the turn to violence will addt·ess some of the history 
and themes of the context of violent Islamist belief before and leading up to the 
creation of al Qaeda. The following section, focusing on diasporas and the turn to 
violence, looks at the spread of Islam into contemporary Europe and the issues that 
have led to support for al Qaeda from small numbers of Western Muslims.• 
Chapter Six - Case study of the Red Army Faction 
The Red Army Faction. also known as the Baader·Meinhof Gang (but hereafter 
abbreviated to RAF) , provides a non·religious example against which to test the 
matrix. Whilst drawing out the context of the development a nd actions of the RAF, 
the fhst part of the chapter will focus on three different themes. The firs t is the 
application of the idea of the sacred to a non-religious group where, dt·awing on 
many of the theorists discussed in Chapter Three, T will demonstrate how these 
ideas can be applied in practice. 
The second section looks at the turn from protest to violence, particularly within 
the context of 1960s West Germany, bu t also takes the opportunity to focus on the 
individual's turn to violence, as a contrast to the concentration of the thesis on 
beliefs at a group, not individual, level. 
The third section addresses the role of revenge, a motif particularly apparent in the 
name of the RAF's commandos (the groups that carried out individual attacks). 
Following this. in the second part of the chapter , T undertake an analysis of the 
data. 
Chapter Seven- Case studies on non-violent groups 
In order to properly test the matrix, I have also undertaken case studies into non· 
violent groups a nd these will be presented in this chapter. Unlike the other case 
study chapters. there will be three groups discussed: Agonshu, a Ja panese religious 
group; Hizb ut·Tahru· in Uzbekistan, an Islamist group in Centra l Asia: a nd the 
• As suggested in this paragraph. 1 make a distinction between 1slamist belief and violent 
1slamist belief, as well as acknowledging that 1 am arguing from the exception, not the 
norm. 
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Student Non·violent Coordinating Committee. a grass·roots Civil Rights movement 
from the United States of America during the 1960s. 
I chose these groups because they had similar contexts to the violent groups 
discussed previously. The selection process is discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter Two. 
The fu·st part of this chapter is divided into two sections. the first of which will 
provide a brief outline of the three groups in order to correctly set the context for 
the analysis of the text through the markers. The second section will examine bow 
these groups fall within a broader discussion of the problems of labelling groups 
'violent' or ·non·violent'.• After this section, I will concentrate on an analysis of the 
data. In this case the data arising fi'Om all tlu·ee groups will be discussed together. 
The key points will be summarised in the conclusion and flagged up for discussion 
in the evaluation chapters. to which I now turn. 
Chapter Eight -Evaluation of the themes 
There are two evaluation chapters. reflecting the dual objectives outlined above-
the move to violence and the development of a model to investigate the sacred. 
Chapter Eight will build on the ana lysis undertaken in the case study chapters and 
discuss and evaluate the key themes emergent from them. The first part of the 
chapter will concentrate on the markers that had the most data coded into them 
and the range and differences of data coded in each case study. 
The second pan of the chapter will focus on the major· themes that became 
apparent du1·ing the analysis of the markers. Specifically I will focus on the 
differences between religious and secular groups and the role of the sacred in 
highlighting those differences; the distinction between violence and non-violence 
and what we can learn from the data that the matrix generated; and finally I will 
address the theme of change over time - the move to violence- and how the matrix 
suggests we might be able to recognise violent potentialities in the beliefs of groups. 
• Indeed, I note that including some of these groups as 'non-violent' exam1>lcs could be 
considered contentious and will also discuss these conccms. 
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Chapter Nine - Evaluation of the matrix 
This chapter provides an evaluation of the model I set out in Chapter Two- the 
matrix. It is divided into two parts. The first part evaluates and discusses all of 
the markers. It presents a summary of the data coded into them as well as an 
assessment of their function within the overall matrix (for example, whether they 
highlighted useful information and how these findings related to those coming out 
of other markers), for this study and for future applications. 
'l'he second part of the chapter add1·esses some broader reflections regarding the 
application of the matrix, including issues around the interpretation of the data; 
the nature of the source material the matrix was reliant on; the coding process, 
including the selection and use of the markers a nd concluding with some comments 
about the validity of generalising from the matrix. 
Chapter Ten - Conclusion 
Drawing together the key points, both from the discussion around the move to 
violence and the functionality of the matrix, this chapter examines how these 
answer the aims of this project a nd contribute to the present academic debate. I 
also set out some policy recommendations based on my fi ndings. 
I then build upon the discussion about the usefulness of the matrix. a nd suggest 
future avenues for research and how this model can be a pplied beyond this 
particular topic. 
Bibliography 
The bibliography is divided into two parts. 'l'he first half is a standard list of 
references for the sources used a nd quoted in this resea1·ch. 'l'he second half is a 
table that lists all the primary sources which had been coded into the markers. 
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2. Methods and Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the issues around developing a suitable methodology for 
supporting the model introduced in the opening chapter. In this chapter I will 
discuss the process by which I collated a nd analysed the data from Lhe caso studies. 
After this I will set out the methodological approach and then the matrix which I 
am applying to my case studies. I will then deal with my standpoint as the 
researcher before moving onto address the data for this study. including problems 
with gathering it. how I selecLed the groups and colleeted and analysed the data. 
In the final section I will introduce the market·s that make up the matrix, 
discussing what kinds of data they generate and their function within the overall 
matrix. 
Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach I undertook was qualitative in nature. There are 
several reasons for this. F'it·st, qualitative approaches are the most conducive to 
the social realist paradigm within which I am situating this study, which I oulline 
in greater detail later on. There are also important issues about the colk>ction of 
source material and its translation. which would affect the reliability of 
quantitative approaches. I discuss issues about translation later on. 
The issues about collection of material and tmnslation would have affected 
approaches such as quantitative content analysis. Defined by Neuendorf (2002: 1) 
as "the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics", this 
method provides the researcher with a quantifiable and statistically valid means of 
analysing text·based (and other mediums. such as audio and visual) messages for 
characteristics that could shed light on the research questions. 
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This method can provide sound data (if used correctly) and is replicable by other 
researchers. It is also a popular and valid means of analysing text. However, 
because of the natm·e of the source material in this research (much of which is 
translated, and by different linguists), it was not necessar ily appropriate. Applied 
in a strictly quantifiable manner such a method would be hindered by the differing 
translation strategies employed in my source material. 
The quantity of source material! was able to collect also varied significantly for 
each case study, with, for example, significantly more material available for the al 
Qaeda case study than there was for the Agonshu case study. Where I have 
provided some quantitative summaries of data I have accounted for the differing 
a mounts of data collected. However. coupled with the translation issues, these 
differences suggested that providing a quantitative content analysis of the texts 
would be problematic. 
Whilst a limited quantitative analysis has proved helpful - for example if a lot of 
data is captured by a marker which suggests that there is something of interest to 
investigate there- the fact is that the opposite of this example does not necessarily 
hold true (as seen in the discussion of the External Legitimating Autho1ity marker 
in Chapter Nine). My qualitative approach has meant that T could provide a 
sufficiently rich analysis of the data and so only where these summaries prove 
helpful have I provided limited quantitative discussions to supply the reader with 
an indicator of what the markers captured. 
The a bove explanation should not serve to denigrate the usefulness of a qualitative 
analysis, which has strong merits in its own right. The nature of the matrix 
focuses the attention of the researcher to consider both the broader context of the 
statement around the coded·text which differing market'S captured, as well as the 
wider historical, socio-cultural context that the group operated within. This leads 
to a richness in the analysis that, whilst allowing for comparisons of particular 
elements of the groups. also ensures that these comparisons are made within the 
bigger picture of their fields of operation. This richness is a benefit of the 
qualitative approach. which connects meanings and contexts, and, while Mason 
(2002: 1) acknowledges that some critics of the approach suggest that it. provides at 
best anecdotal knowledge. she also counters that such arguments tend to overlook 
the importance of context and the development of knowledge in any explanation of 
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social life. These latter points are important to my approach and are strongly 
evidenced throughout the case studies. 
Bt·uce (2009) is one of the authors who raise concerns with the validity of pt·oducing 
generalised conclusions from qualitative reseat·ch (see also Bryman, 2004: 284·5). I 
disagree, but instead state that such conclusions must have caveats attached. 
In using the matrix. I have applied a model that has a transparent methodology. 
and provides all the information which future researchers would require to assess 
the validity of my conclusions. This addresses one common concern (Bryman, 2004: 
284·5; Bryman and Burgess. 1994b). Furthermot·o. I have been careful to make 
what Williams (2000) refers to as" moderatum generalisations", whereby my 
observations "can be seen to be instances of a broader set of recognisable features" 
(215). These qualified generalisations do not belie a lack of confidence in my 
conclusions. but rather takes the sensible step of admitting that this field is a 
complex one, rarely helped by simplistic and nart·ow theorising. 
Mason (2002: 7·8) provides some useful statements about what she believes 
qualitative research should be. which I have summarised here. It should be: 
• systematically and rigorously conducted: 
• accountable for its quality and claims; 
• strategically conducted, yet flexible and contextual: 
• involve active reflexivity on the part of the t·escarcher; 
• produce explanations or arguments which are generalisable; 
• demonstrate awareness and understanding of other methodological 
approaches: 
• and be conducted within and with awareness to its political context. 
Throughout this research I have endeavoured to meet these criteria and Twill show 
in this chapter howl achieved this. starting with an explanation of the matrix that 
is central to this project. 
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Research Model -the Matrix 
The model suggested by this research is the collation of data relating to a specific 
group (defined as a cohesive network of beliefs) into a neo-Durkheimian theoretical 
framework,• from which will be derived a matrix of factors demarcating the violent 
potentiality of the group. In this sense the matrix is both part of the model and the 
attendant research process, and also an outcome of it. 
The matrix forms part of the model in a structural capacity. It is delineated by a 
set of markers that is used to classify the data according to their relevance to the 
reseru·ch problem; understanding the move to violence. The matrix, in its final 
arrangement (the outcome), provides a demarcation of the factors involved in this 
Jnove. 
However, the matrix is also pt·ocedural because the markers need to undergo 
constant evaluation a nd revision in the light of the available data. This is 
necessary to ensUl·e that they are relevant to the topic being researched and valid 
in terms of the explanatory requirements placed upon them. In light of th is, when 
T talk of the fmal ru-rangement of the matrix I say 'final' only as delimited by the 
bounds of this project; this iterative process is central to the methodological 
approach I am taking and indeed there is potential scope for further development 
of the matrix in future evaluations of data about the same or other relevant groups. 
Further components of the model in addition to the structural/procedural matrix 
are the theoretical framework. discussed in Chapter Three, a nd finally the process 
by which the data is selected. Together these components help to a nswer both of 
the central aims of the project, understanding the role of the sacred in the move to 
violence. a nd the related research questions that were set out in Chapter One. By 
means of my choice of groups I also explore questions that follow on from the 
central aims, such as if the matrix cou ld be falsifiable by finding groups with the 
same market s, but no violent tendencies. 
The matrix is, then, both a method and a form of analysis. By systematically 
applying the model to data it allows the reseru·cher to repeat the analysis on 
6 Set ou t in greater depth in Chapter 'T'hree. 
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multiple groups, as well as other researchers to clearly understand what steps 
were undertaken. As an analytical tool that utilises a particular understanding of 
the sacred it enables a systematic approach to these different topics. However, 
there is flexibility through the iterative development of mru·kers, a nd the variation 
of individual researchers' assessments as to how statements should be coded into 
these markers. 
The issue about replication between researchers, even on the same topic. needs to 
be addressed. Whilst it is possible to reduce variations in coding decisions through 
clear definitions of mm·kers (as I have undertaken, see Appendix One) and through 
example coding, it is clear that there can still be differences. One method to 
highlight differences is to compare coding across the same documents. This can be 
done physically through comparisons of coded texts or. over a greater number of 
texts and researchers, can be achieved through tools such as 1\\Tivo's coding 
comparison report.' This report calculates a Kappa coefficient for inter· (or intra·) 
coder reliability by compat·ing the number of similarly and differently coded 
passages (of text or other units) with the probability that these 
similarities/differences would have occurred randomly (Van Haaster, 2008). Tools 
such as these enable researchers to compare coding consistency. However. it is also 
worth pointing out that differences between coding approaches are not necessarily 
a problem. as they can open up new lines of enquiry. and as long as these 
differences are explot·ed and explained they can add value to the research. 
The application and output of the matrix will hecome more apparent to the reader 
through the rest of this chapter. but at this stage it is perhaps useful to visualise 
the matrix. The output (and completed matt·ix) is a textual document with data. 
taken from the statements of groups. coded into markers that highlight significant 
areas of the group's beliefs. The coded data withm these markers is then further 
analysed and samples are pt·esented in the final output. accompanied by 
explanations of the significance of the themes that they represent. As is suggested 
above, this document must be placed within a broader contextual study of the 
group in question, to ensure that the matrix is applied in a contextually sensitive 
and accurate manner. The reader will find this model set out and repeated in each 
of the case study chapters, which are each applications of the matrix. 
1 NVivo 7 and, later, NVivo 8 were the software applications that 1 used to code my data. 
They arc qualitative data analysis software provided by QSH international. 
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Reflexivity 
In the course of this project I utilised qualitative methods of investigation. 
However, owing to the epistemological ramifications of taking this approach I was 
also aware both of the social reality that informs my world view, and those of the 
groups whose beliefs I analysed. 
From the viewpoint of social realism it appears impossible to participate in any 
study of society or the social from a completely disinterested position. Rather than 
abandon all hope here, my aim was to proceed whilst demonstrating awareness of 
the cultural influences directing my own views, and those of the groups I studied. 
In this reflexive path I took heart from Hufford's (1999: 296) statement that: 
We must learn to tolet·ate uncertainty and ambiguity, while holding 
the reduction of uncertainty and ambiguity in our knowledge as 
primary goals (a lways sought, never completely achieved.) That is 
not a contradiction ot· a paradox. It is a fact of life. Certainty is a 
direction, not a goal. [Emphasis mine) 
The goal of this project is the intention to locate the motivation within a group's 
move to violence. In seeking this, I established the correlated hypotheses that the 
move to violence may be found within the beliefs of the group Oabelled by the 
markers I established at the beginning of the research and developed throughout). 
In so doing I conducted a deductive study, precipitated by a preliminary list of 
markers and a theoretical model within which to place them. These deductive 
hypotheses would not have been seen to have rigorous justifiability if I did not 
undertake some form of falsification of its central proposition. It is for this reason 
that I have tested these markers against groups which could reasonably be 
asserted to have characteristics in common with those examined in the case studies, 
excepting that these additional examples were not, at the point in time examined, 
known as violent groups. In Chapter Seven I discuss some of the problems in 
labelling a group 'non·violent', but these issues aside, these groups provide further 
data to both develop and challenge the matrix. 
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Nature of the Problem and the Data Available 
The original aim of this research was to understand the role ofi)elief in religiously-
motivated violence. Through development of the theoretical framework for the 
matrix (as mentioned in the previous chapter and developed in the following one). I 
modified this aim to understanding the move to violence in the beliefs of religious 
and non-religious groups. The intended outcome remained the same, a series of 
markers which can be used to demonstrate the potentiality for violent action 
within a particular group. with the additional outcome of a model -the matrix-
which can be used to explore the presence of the sacred in society. In order to 
ensure a valid focus on the role of belief, I chose groups from both sides of the 
commonly understood religious/secular divide. The 'violent' groups in question 
have all committed acts of violence which fall within a common conception of 
terrorism (namely. they caused terror within the intended targets and /or the wider 
community- although this definition is by no means accepted within the field of 
terrorism studios, wherein many studies of organised violence are found) . 
However, the parameters for choosing these groups presented a number of 
obstacles to sourcing accurate data. Most obvious was the legal status of the 
groups in question. By committing acts of violence these groups all placed 
themselves in violation of the laws of the states they operated within. This makes 
contact with those involved in the violence difficult as they are eithet· subject to, or 
avoiding, incarceration. In the case of the Red Army Faction, the group had 
disbanded. Whilst the group was no longer active. I could have reasonably 
expected a similar reaction to effons to contact any former members as I got when 
I tried to contact J\.lcph (the successor group to Allin Shinrikyo) who did not 
acknowledge my attempts to make contact. 
Given the difficulty in obtaining my own primary data I turned to other sources. 
and on this front at least there was more readily accessible information. There are 
difficulties associated both with the use of this data and in ensuring that what I 
extracted from the study was valid and could be applied in a meaningful fashion, 
and 1 wm address these difficulties as I assess the types of data available below. 
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Types of data available 
The primary source of data for this project was textual, mostly in the form of 
translated statements made by the groups. However, I considered a number of 
other channels for obtaining data which, a lthough not successful, are worth 
mentioning. 
One potential source of data I looked at was biographies. However, these were 
generally the result of commercial endeavours to cash in on the terrorism 
phenomenon, ranging from the tenuous (e.g. bin Lad in, 2004) to well-written but 
still not first· hand accounts (e.g. Moussaoui, 2003). 
Meeting with those involved with violent attacks could also have been a valuable 
avenue for obtaining further data, though the most probable means to arranging 
this would be through the prison service. Previous research (Knott and Francis, 
2004) in prisons has suggested that should access be gt·anted then prisoners are 
often agt·eeable to being interviewed.s This may be due to the break in routine and 
also for their views/experiences to be heard by someone from outside 'the system'. 
However, this research was not carried out in a high security prison with high· 
profile prisoners convicted of acts against the State. In these cases such prisoners 
could well be suspicious of the motives of the interviewer and it would in any case 
have been difficult to imagine there being the time to build up a relationship of 
trust to surmount this issue. An initial approach to the British Home Office, made 
when planning this project. was unsuccessful and so this avenue of data collection 
was not available. In addition, even for non-incarcerated participants of violent 
groups, the identity and location of these people is difficult to find out. 
The likely si?.e of any such cohort would have been unable, on their own, to yield 
results with any statistical validity, given the probable numbers of known and 
available respondents versus those known and unavailable. That said. the matrix 
could be applied to any data obtained through these methods and future research 
could always, potentially. succeed in this aim. 
Another important consideration in all of the above discussions was how to gather 
information on beliefs from any of the different methods. In talking ahout 'beliefs' 
8 This repo•t was also reproduced in part in Home Office Faith Communities Unit. 2004. 
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in this study. I needed to be sure of what I could get information on. The first 
problem is that a belief is an internal propositional attitude that, as a researcher, I 
would not have first· ha nd access to. 1 follow a commonsense theory of psychology 
that we can indeed ascribe beliefs to each other, such that beliefs can be seen to 
influence actions (see Tye (2001) and Segal (2001) for concise summaries of a large 
volume of literature on the subject). As evidence for these beliefs, I looked for 
statements that either directly claimed a belief about a subject/object or that 
suggested propositional attitudes towat·ds such things (people, ideas, places, etc.> 
In this study, I have focused on groups rather than individuals, partly because the 
belief·structures of groups are seen to create a framework of values within which 
individuals make decisions to act. and also because in these cases the evidence for 
beliefs is arguably clearer. Aside f1·om clear statements setting out propositional 
beliefs about certain situations. places. ideas and values 1 have also delineated 
beliefs through references to myths. symbols. rituals as well as implied values. In 
doing so. I have utilised indicators of belief that arc found within the Durkheimian 
traditions that I explore in the following Chapter. 
Data Collection 
Choice of groups 
History is full of groups which have acted violently and there are numerous 
examples still extant. Narrowing down the choices for this study was important in 
order to ensure that the project was viable. In orde1· to apply the matrix to the 
broadest poss ible examples, I selected the violent groups from clearly different 
cultw·al and re ligious backgrounds. 
The studies of these groups are snapshots in time as, at the moment at which I 
gathered the sources and applied the matrix to them, I was taking the data out of 
the ongoing development of the much broader society of which they were all a part. 
For example, the Red Army Faction was a reaction in part to Nazi Germany (Varon, 
2004: 34). which was in itself a reaction to the Weimar Republic, and so on. 
Therefore. when I talk about the move to violence I am not suggesting that these 
groups are necessarily the end·point within the constant evolution of their 
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particular society, nor indeed of the more specific movements of which they may 
form a part (for example the 1960s student protest movements). In addition, I am 
not saying that there could not also be a move from violence to peaceful action, and 
even back to violence again. 
In choosing these groups I have, therefore, also had to make some decisions about 
where, for the ptU·poses of this study, the groups start and finish. These decisions 
are detailed in the case studies, and briefly summarised in the following discussion. 
Aum Shinrikyo 
Aum Shimikyo (hereafter referred to as 'Aum') was chosen for a case study because 
it provides a non·Abrahamic religion to assess the matrix against. Frequently the 
debate around religious violence is framed within a discourse limited to Islamic 
identity and if the model proposed in this study is valid it needs to have 
explanatory power beyond this narrower discom·se. Aum is also an example par 
excellence of a group which experienced this move to violence. In addition. it has 
been the s ubject of a number of studies, notable amongst them those by Ian Reader 
(1996; 2000), but also by other authors. ensuring that there is a sui table discussion 
from which to learn and against which to contrast my findings. 
The problem about how to obtain useful data for such case studies is neatly 
demonstrated in this instance. as unsurprisingly a large proportion of works by 
and about Aum are written in Japanese and few are translated into English 
(Susumu Shimazono• (1995) is a rare example). Some works written by Shoko 
Asahara I Aum Shimikyo have been translated into English. though Tan Reader 
(2008) questions the quality of some of these translations. to However, at least the 
• This thesis was not written for a specialist language audience so. where I have included 
foreign names or words, I have not used diacritical marks and I use Western naming 
conventions. This is particularly apparent in the Japanese cases where family names are 
normally foUowed by given names. for example Asahara Shoko becomes, in this thesis, 
Shoko Asahara (given name I family name). This ensures uniformity throughout the thesis. 
which deals with groups operati ng in several different languages. 
•o Reader, 2008. is listed in the bibliogt·aphy and refers to private email correspondence 
following a request made to hirn for advice •·egarding sou rce materials on Aurn in the U.K. 
and Japan. '!'he difTiculty in ascribing authorship tc sorne Aum works is also alluded to by 
Reader (2000: xv). Whilst Asahara is named on the front of the book. ascription of 
a uthorship with the publication details often refers tc an Aum editorial committee or 
simi lar group. All the Aum books in this study reflect this discrepancy. However. given 
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translations were countenanced by Aum itself and so. whilst the published results 
may not display the best English. they are the most authentic representation of 
Aum's beliefs available to this study, as they have not been through any other 
editorial processes. These works contained many statements by Asahara and also 
some short auto-biographical statements by membet·s of Aum. 
For the purposes of this study. I made a distinction between Aum Shinrikyo prior 
to the Tokyo Subway gas attacks in }.larch 1995. and after. The majority of the 
data refers to the pre·gas attack period and this is the focus of the case study in 
Chapter Four. Howevet·, I also collected some data from after this period. as a 
means to concentrate the matrix on the issue of the transition from, as well as to. 
violence. Some further t•eference to this distinction is made in Chapter Pour, and 
the comparison of the data is discussed in Chapter Eight. To simplify the text that 
follows. Aln-la refers to the period up to and including the gas·attacks and Atn.lb 
refers to Aum Shinriyko (and Aleph, as it was later re·named) after the attacks. 
Appendix Two lists these labels and the divisions to which they apply, for all the 
groups. 
The material for the AUMb data came from two sources. The first was a collection 
of interviews in Haruki Murakami's (2000) UnderiJI'Ound: The Tokxo Cas Attock 
nnd the Japanese Psyche. m the second half of which he interviewed former and 
current members of Aum Shinrikyo. The process of finding willing interviewees 
was difficult a nd the natut·e of Mmakami's involvement in the interviews 
problematic. However, whilst he did play an active role in the interviews -
debating points or ensuring the conversation was kept on track- he does 
acknowledge that he is not an expert of religion. and does not try to be so in the 
interviews. He also allowed the interviewees to view the transcripts of the 
interviews (each three to four hours in length) and they were allowed to t·emove or 
add material before he then proceeded with publication. As such there are obvious 
issues with the data in that it only contains the views that the interviewee is happy 
with the reader seeing, and has therefore been through at least two editing 
processes. However, as t.lurakami (2000: 213·216) openly describes the above 
procedure in his preface before the interviews. we are at least allowed some 
that the majority of the statements in the books arc made by Asahara I have attributed the 
books to him in the bibliography 
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understanding of this process, a nd are able to frame our understandings of the 
limitations of the data accordingly. 
The second sow·ce of material for AUMb was found in a couple of documentaries, 
by Tatsuya Mori, A (1998) and A2(2001). These were the only non-textual sources 
I used in this case study. This led to a different approach to coding the data, which 
is discussed below. The interviewer (Mori) lived with Aum Shinrikyo as it 
struggled with the immense political, financial and media fall·out following the gas 
attacks. As such he had unprecedented access to the group and its members which. 
given the failure of my own approaches to Aleph (as it had become by the time of 
Mori's second film), was an excellent source of material. However, within this I 
was also aware of the mediating influence of Mori as director, interviewer and 
cameraman. This simple production approach perhaps lessened the obstructive 
influence of the filming process, but it is also clear that Mori's personal stance, very 
much in opposition to the mainstream media's vilification of all Aum members. is 
stamped firmly on the films. 
While the material for the AUMa study was located primarily in the U.K., I did 
also follow this up with searches in Japanese libraries dUl'ing a short period spent 
living in Tokyo. It was during this time that I attempted contact with Aleph and 
also discovered the Mori documentaries. The library research in Japan also 
contributed some further secondary material which contributed to the 
understanding of the background to Aum (e.g. Shimazono, 1995 and Kisala, 1998). 
A/Qoedo 
AI Qaeda was chosen because of its relevance to much of the contemporary 
discussion on religious violence. However, it is different to the other two violent 
groups in that it might be better described as a network. or even recruitment drive. 
Each of the three groups represent different kinds of affiliation. but a! Qaeda's is 
arguably the weakest, with differing members often alleged never to have met, 
operating instead as autonomous cells (Congress subcommittee. 2004: 1·2). 
However. from my research there is definitely something sufficiently tangible to be 
recognised as a group, even if it has morphed through several different 
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incarnations, and as such I track its inception from the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan up to the present day. Representative of an ideologically motivated 
membership spanning international boundaries, it finds its roots in anti·colonia list 
rhetoric during the time of the British Raj. right through to the ·complaints of 
disenfranchised youth in modern multi·cultural Europe (Roy, 1994). That said, I 
must stress that. as with the Red Army Faction later on. the ideas and themes that 
spokespeople for al Qaeda have chosen to highlight O\lt of their religious and 
historical heritage are by no means representative of the much broader and richer 
history of these movements as a whole. 
The data came from a number of translated sources. principally during library 
research undertaken during an Arts and Humanities Research Council scholarship 
at the Library of Congress in Washington. DC. In addition to much secondary 
literature contributing to my study for the context of a! Qaeda, T also used this time 
to work on the main sources of materials for this study, principal amongst them: 
Raymond Ibrahim's (2007) The a/ Qoeda Reader. Gilles Kepel and Jean· Pierre 
Milelli's (2008) AI Qoeda in its own words and Bruce Lawrence's (2005) Jl!fessnges 
to the World. Where statements were repeated amongst these sources J was able 
to compare particular translators works and to be more aware of potential 
deficiencies. This process meant that I did exclude some other sources. 
Whilst at the Library of Congress I also managed to access a recruitment video 
purportedly produced by a) Qaeda (2001 a) and complete with its own translation. 
As with the audio· visual source for the Aum case study. this led to a slightly 
different approach to the coding process. but was nevertheless an excellent and 
unrnediated source of a! Qaeda statements. 
Because of the high·profale actions of a l Qaeda across a number of different borders, 
the focus on them has been much greater than that on Aum Shinrikyo ever was. 
Therefore. there was a much greater pool of sources from which to draw the 
material for this study. 
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Red Army Faction 
The Red Al·my Faction (hereafter referred to as the 'RAF'), also known somewhat 
disingenuously as the Baader·Meinhof Gang (after its two highest profile founding 
members, Andreas Baader and the journalist Ulrike MeinhoO, started life in 1970 
and undertook a number of bank robberies and bomb attacks against U.S. army 
installations and other prominent tat·gets. As with al Qaeda they were part of a 
wider movement, in this case the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s that 
was anti-capitalist, anti-industrialist and anti· U.S. 
The RAF was chosen as a non-religious example for the application of the matrix. 
In this way I could test the hypothesis that sacred boundaries apply in both secular 
and religious groups. It went through several distinct incarnations, which meant 
that it was a good example through which to track the development of beliefs. The 
case study on the RAF, therefore, sorts the data into four time periods: before the 
group formed (this period is labelled pRAF) and each of its three generations 
(labelled RAFl, RAF2 and RAF3). 
The material for the pRAF stage came from the columns of Ulrike Meinhof in the 
leftist publication Konlu·et which, for a time, was a popular mouthpiece for the 
movement out of which the RAF developed. The material for the RAFl-3 stages 
came from translations undertaken by sources broadly sympathetic to the aims of 
the RAF. These were found in Moncourt and Smith 's (2009) The Red Army Faction, 
a DocumentaJy Hist01yand internet archives. Moncourt and Smith (2010) and 
Agustin (2010). The translators were clear about the areas and limitations of their 
sympathy and the translation process was also discussed. There was further 
material available, but I did not select it as the translation was of poor quality. 
Non-violent groups 
One of the issues facing case study based research is the question of its validity 
within the wider population (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000: 98; 
Haralambos a nd Holborn, 2004: 898). To test the credibility of the matrix in its 
aim to highlight violent potentialities within groups, T also selected several groups 
which displayed similar characteristics or came from comparable contextual 
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backgrounds to the groups selected for the three case studies, but which had not. at 
that point. acted violently. 
Selecting good examples to contrast with the violent groups was difficult, but the 
following groups were the best available choices. The groups are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Seven, I have only summarised the reasons for selecting them 
below. 
ln comparison to Aum Shinrikyo, I chose Agonshu. This gl'Oup is another new 
religious movement from Japan, marginally older than A urn. There was some 
overlap in their beliefs and aims. which is not surprising considering that Shoko 
Asahara, the founder of Aum, had previously been a member of Agonshu. As with 
Aum, English translations of their works were hard to come by. The majority of 
the material comes from their website (Agonshu, 2002) and secondary studies 
which I researched during my time in Japan. 
ln comparison to al Qaeda, T chose Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan (het·cafter, UHiT). 
This group was based in Central Asia, and indeed had contacts with the Tali ban in 
neighbouring Afghanistan at the time that they were hosting al Qaeda 
(Karagiannis, 2006: 271). It is also part of a global organisation. but for the 
purposes of this study T concentrated my research on material coming from 
Uzbekistan, which allowed for a more concise examination. In addition, whilst 
there have been questions about whether Hizb ut·Tahrir internationally is a non· 
violent organisation (e.g. Baran, 2004). studies into the Uzbekistan branch strongly 
suggest that it is (e.g. Karagiannis and McCauley. 2006). and so UHiT provided a 
useful comparison in this regard. 
The search for a contrasting group to the RAF was much harder, as it was difficult 
to find a well·defined group, within the broader student protest movement of the 
1960/70s in West Germany that was non-violent. I chose the Student I'\ on-violent 
Coordinating Committee <hereafter t·cferred to as SNCC) as it came from a similar 
epoch as the RAP. and was also involved in a struggle to challenge the nature of 
important social institutions of the day including the government of its own 
country. 
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Gathering the sources 
There were many other groups that could also have been studied. I discussed 
above why I chose the groups I did, but serendipity also played a role. Available 
material, and more importantly available translated material, was at a premium 
for many groups. Therefore, whilst I made conscious decisions as to what kinds of 
groups I wanted to include in the study, the final results were influenced by how 
much material I could gather on those groups. 
The primary method for gathering these sources was library-based research. 
Through searches in university libraries (Leeds, SOAS, LSE) and national libraries 
(British Library, Library of Congress) I identified primary sources as well as 
locating further primary material through secondary studies into groups. In one 
case, the relative amounts of material led to me changing which group to study, 
from the Animal Liberation Front to the Red Army Faction. Both were violent 
secular organisations, but I could not find sufficient material on the former. 
Data Analysis 
Methodological strategies 
My primary method for analysing the data was qualitative content analysis of the 
som-ce material. This could have taken many forms, for example, analysing the 
meaning in the text (semiotic analysis) or the structure and style of speech 
(rhetoric analysis). To break down how this method was useful to me it is also 
helpful to consider discourse analysis and documentary analysis and what they can 
contribute to the process. 
Discourse analysis is described by Mason (2002: 57) as "an analysis of the ways in 
which discourses - which can be read in texts and talk - constitute the social 
world." We can understand this better by looking at an example. O'Halloran (2003) 
looks at the influence culture can have on the meaning in texts, and is specifically 
interested in the de-mystification of news texts. His work in itself is a useful 
insight into how critical discourse analysis works and suggests some applicable 
lines of enquiry for this project. For example. in accessing examples of primary 
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texts, such as those published by Aum Shinrikyo, it is important to consider the 
impact of the cultural influence of Aum on the text and therefore on the 
information retrieved. Additionally, the analysis undertaken by Chilton (2004: 
174·193) provides direct evidence of how this approach can enrich the data, in this 
case on speeches by Osama Bin Laden and George W Bush. 
Documentary analysis develops this approach by seeking the characteristics of 
meaning within the text. Within this study I focused primarily on documentary 
analysis of textual sources. Whilst this approach is generally suggested where the 
documents under study are generated by the researchers themselves (for example, 
in Hodson's (1999) account of this method in which he deals mainly with 
ethnographic sources) it is still a useful addition to the set of tools utilised in this 
project. For example, documentary analysis in this research required an 
understanding of the contexts in which the material was collected, sorted and 
analysed. as well as the reasons for this process, the intended audience and indeed 
a contextual sensitivity to my approach to the texts. 
Undertaking this process in a consistent and structured approach was necessary to 
ensure the reliability of the findings. This will be addressed later, but at this stage 
I will summarise how this approach contributed to my research. The translated 
collections of texts had already been compiled with ontologies. research strategies. 
political biases and aims that were not necessarily synonymous with my own 
po·oject. and the primary texts had been created on the basis of deliberate sto·ategic 
decisions. Qualitative methods of analysis were essential to unpack how these 
innuences impacted upon the material! had collected. Understanding discourses 
within the texts and applying a hermeneutic analysis of the frames of reference in 
the production of them helped further clarify the data I was interested in and how 
to extract it in a meaningful fashion. 
Issues of translation 
As mentioned. the nature of my data collection meant that there were a number of 
influences brought to my source material that I could not control. The range of 
languages used in the original texts. including Arabic. German, Japanese and 
Uzbek. none of which To·cad nuently. meant that l was reliant on a number of 
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different translators who utilised differing terminologies and master narratives. 
For example, Kepel and Milelli's (2008) collection of al Qaeda statements was 
translated from the Arabic into the French by Jean·Pierre Milelli and from the 
French to the English by Pascale Ghazaleh. As expected in a scholarly work. they 
both left statements as to their techniques, which is how I know that it is Ghazaleh 
who substituted 'God' for 'Allah' and removed "many of the repeated pious 
invocations" (Kepel and Milelli, 2008: xiii - xiv). Ibrahim (2007: xvii), however, 
states that 'Allah' is a t·eal name, as well as referring to 'the Deity' and so he 
retains its use. 
These differences represent a wider issue in translation studies. which is that there 
is no neutral method of translation (Muller, 2007). Muller (2007) argues that 
translation involves the collapse of meaning in the source language and its 
reconstruction in the target language. We see this in the choice of the translators 
in Law1·ence (2005: ixl, Kepel and Milelli (2008: xiii- xiv) and Ibrahim (2007: xvi) 
to remove phrases such as 'Peace be Upon Him', 'Allah be pleased with him' and so 
on, from the translated texts. Decisions such as these have ethical and 
epistemological implications (Temple, 2005), as Ibrahim (2007: xvi) notes when he 
points out that in this case this removes some of the inherent religiousness of the 
text. 
Temple (1997) argues that one way to sUI·mount this process is to involve the 
researcher in a conversation with the translator, so that the meanings and contexts 
of the decisions made and words used are better understood. T n my case, as 1 did 
not commission these works myself, this was not possible. However, I have used 
works where there is some awareness (and s tatement oO the translator's impact 
and have avoided others. For example. I rejected Laura Mansfield's (2006) 
translations of some of a! Zawahiri's s tatements. as her impact. and lack of 
awareness of it, on her translat ions is unclear. 
I compared translations of the same material where possible and used this 
comparison to make judgements as to the validity of some sources. In working 
from a variety of sources I also sought to minimise the effect of any one translator's 
influence on the data. These strategies, whilst not perfect, at least attempted to 
ensure that J did not assume the translation to be a value· neutral and concept·free 
process (MUller: 207; 211) and that I was alert to its potential impact on my work. 
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Coding 
Coding was accomplished through the use of the qualitative data analysis software, 
NVivo. I entered the preliminary list of market'S (as outlined in the previous 
chapter) as codes and the source materia I as text documents and then proceeded to 
use the software to analyse the documents. I kept memos (within NVivo) of 
interesting or pertinent points and where these became more significant themes I 
created new codes. At times I also created 'tree·codes' whereby new categories 
were added to capture nuances within the main markers. 
As major new codes or amendments were solidified I would re·work back through 
all the previously coded material and re·analyse it in the light of the new codes. An 
example of how this led to the amendment of some of the markers is given in 
Figure 9.1 and the accompanying discussion in Chapter Nine. This iterative 
approach ensured that I applied a relevant set of markers to the analysis in the 
most consistent manner possible. 
The use of NVivo made this process of coding and re·coding less onerous than it 
might otherwise have been, and I was able to use additional feattu'es to aid in the 
analysis. For example, T kept research journal notes (within NVivo) in order to 
ensure the work was undertaken in a logical and consistent manner. I was able to 
store characteristics of the source materials, which enabled me to later produce 
reports that separated the material by each case study, group and particular 
details of the group, including who authored the source (where known) the date it 
was produced, the generation of the group it was produced by Gn the case of the 
RAF and Aum) and so on. The benefit of these approaches was that I was able to 
more swiftly undertake a comparative analysis of a number of different criteria. 
On some occasions, where I felt that such analysis elucidated a point I was making, 
I also used some more quantitative tools within !\'Vivo, such as word counts. to 
demonstrate the strength of particular themes (e.g. Table 5.1). However, my main 
focus remained the in·depth discussion, by marker, of the data. My distinction 
between 'source material' and 'data' is made through the above coding process, 
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whereby the data is generated through application of the matrix to the source 
material. 
When coding the source material into the markers I took into account the context 
of the overall message and the particular sentences and words used. I took the 
same care when analysing the data in the case s tudies, when I looked at all the 
data captured by a particular marker and subjected it to further analysis to 
determine any fUl·ther themes. This context·sensitive approach should allay 
potential concems about coding in qualitative methodologies leading to text being 
taken out of context (Bryman, 2004: 411) and also allow for the connexions between 
data and theory to be explored. 
The above discussion focuses very much on how T coded the textual data but, as 
mentioned above, I did also code three audio· visual sources. I think that using 
audio·visual sources is as valid as textual. a nd indeed a strength of the matrix is 
that it is equally applicable to both formats. However, there were some additional 
issues to take into account when coding the a udio·visual material. 
In NVivo 8. I was ab le to add audio·visual material as source material for coding. T 
transcribed relevant sections of the material (both came with English subtit les, the 
a! Qaeda material of mixed quality in terms of spelling) a nd I could then a pply my 
codes to both the source video and also to the transcript. When listening to 
statements in the films. I was also able to directly view some of the background 
mater ial, which was another source of rich data and which I also captured in the 
transcripts. For example, I captured non·verbal data. such as the presence of 
many pictures of Asahara in the Aum Shinrikyo/Aleph prayer rooms, even after the 
presence of these images in this kind of usage was made illegal. 
Capturing the statements made in these film s (where they were directly importa nt 
to one of the markers) as well as non·verbal data meant that in some cases I was 
able to capture much more data than I could from a similar length of text from a 
book, for example. As with all the coded data, references are provided to the source 
mater ial where it is discussed in my a nalysis, and fot· the audio·visual sources I 
used time· lines. 
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Before I move onto the markers. I need to explain how I have referenced the data. 
Many of the texts were authored anonymously or collectively and therefore using 
the Harvard system to cite them would have led to a bewildering array of 'Anon' 
sources. Therefore, in the text I have used abbreviations of the group's names and 
numbered all the coded sources consecutively. A table showing these sources 
follows the standard bibliographic list in the Bibliography. As an example. ALQ69 
refers to the document titled 'Messages to the People of Iraq I' which can be found 
in Raymond Ibrahim's (2007) The aJ Qaeda Reader. pages 242-249. Where author 
information is known this 1s also listed in the table. Where the source statement is 
longer than one page, the page number for a particular quotation is inc luded in the 
in·t.ext citation as per usua l. 
The Markers 
The initial list of marke•·s was highlighted in the p1·cvious chapter, but in this 
section I focus on the list as it stood at the end of my period of research. As 
mentioned above. the process of developing this list was an iterative, ongoing 
development and I do not claim that the current list is set in stone. Indeed. as 
discussed in Chapter Nine. I would e><pect that some markers would be changed 
and others developed as the matrix is applied to new subjects and projects. 
There is a list of the markers provided in Appendix One. with the titles (for 
example. Basic Injustice), their abbreviations (fo•· example, B]), both of which are 
used throughout the text, and short definitions (for example. "A sense of some basic 
injustice. which is non·accidental. i.e. it expresses the core values, true nature of 
society and is irredeemable. and which reinforces the sense of opposition/dichotomy 
'clash of worlds~). The markers are listed alphabetically. This Appendix is 
provided for ease of reference. The following section expands on this list by adding 
further expla nations of the kinds of information Lh(' ma1·kers are intended lo 
capture and how they relate to the overall matrix. 
Against Violence 
Actual statement renouncing violence. 
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All of the markers are applied to all of the groups. However. I recognised during 
the study that whilst many of the markers would pick up on themes overtly 
supportive of, or referencing. violent beliefs I did not have a simple marker for 
capturmg the opposite. Therefore. this marker was included purely for the purpose 
of capturing any statements renouncing or denouncing violence. 
Basic injustice 
A sense of some basic injustice. which is non-accidental (i.e .. it 
expresses the core values. true nature of society and is 
irredeemable). and which reinforces the sense of 
opposition/dichotomy- 'clash of worlds'. 
r.Jany of the markers deal with themes that are closely inter-linked. as one would 
expecl. The values and beliefs captured by this marker are echoed in the 
Dichotomous World View as well as the Violent '/}·aditions marker. In the case of 
the Bn.oic Injustice marker. I am parliculal'ly interested in drawing out and 
examining the motif of injustice within the gt·oup's beliefs. 
In some cases this sense of injustice may well have been brewing for many years. 
Lcwts (2003) draws attention to major fault' lines between Islam and the West over 
thirteen centuries oflslamic history. Esposito (2002) refers to the struggle of Islam 
w1th modernity and considers the political and economic causes of the current 
unrest in Islamic societies. 
Perceptions of difference can also be 1·einforced through the media. For example, 
the influence of negative language rcf01·ring to Islam in the British media could. for 
the Bt·itish Islamic diaspora, confi rm negative feelings about the treatment of 
Islamic culture by the West. Baker (20 LO) looks at how Islam is represented in the 
British press as does Poole (2002). who investigates the homogenisation of an 
Islamic identity separate from a British nat1onal1dentity. a process which creates 
an environment where British Muslims arc placed in a negative category of 'other' 
within public discourses. In Chapter Four. on Aum Shinrikyo. I mention similar 
negatiVIty from the Japanese media towards Aum. and how this can be seen to lead 
to g1·eater perceived differences, along the lines of values and beliefs. 
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Context of Group's Internal Development 
Evidence of confrontation within the develop men~ of the group, 
either accidental or intentional. 
After I included the marker Context of Group's Origins/Development I saw a need 
to distinguish between internal and external contexts. Whilst the following marker 
concentrates on the host society the group is based within. this marker explores 
themes particulat· to the group. This captures everything from internal debates. 
and differences regarding leadership styles to the development of ascetic practices 
that legitimated violence (for example. in Chapter Four I note how the death of a 
renunciate within Aum led to a change in doctrine ('poo')). As this case illustrates. 
it is important to note that this market· can focus on the considered response to 
accidental, as much as intentional. events. 
Context of Group's Origins/Development 
Evidence of confrontation wi~hin the wider society within which the 
group originated and with which it interac~ed. 
Whi 1st the Bnsic Injustice and Violent 'lraditions markers also capture external 
influences, this marker specifically focuses on the contex~ of the group's origins and 
or development. For example, Huntington (2002: 26:1) refers to the violent ol'igins 
of Islam from Bedouin tribes, and within the case study on Aum I made reference 
to several confrontations with authorities. This data doesn't have to be about 
violence. but in this study I have used it within the context of looking for potential 
sources of violent action. 
For example, Aum was founded within the context of a Japanese society that has 
numerous groups vying for the attention of potential members (Backing. 1989) and 
so its nature could easily have developed from competitive to confrontational in 
order to survive the exceptionally crowded religious mnrketplace. 
Conviction 
A deep and incontestable sense of conviction. 
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It seems reasonably logical to assume that a believer undertaking a task such as 
suicide bombing requires a more than average level of conviction to the aims and 
beliefs of their cause. However. for actions such as those undertaken by Aum, 
where the perpetrators were not expected to die during the course of carrying out 
the attacks (although there was a significant risk to health) it could be argued that 
the sense of conviction could be considerably lower. 
What this marker is designed to examine is the idea that for groups where violent 
action is considered/undertaken there has to be an unwavering belief and loyalty to 
the group and its aims in order for such actions to be possible. 
Desire for Social Change 
The intended aim of actions for social change. either in a specific 
area or globally (this does not mean the end of the world. but could 
mean global conversion to a particular faith or way of ruling.) 
This marker was included to capture statements that didn't focus on violence or 
power·struggles as such but, rather, suggested that the group saw its aim as an 
improvement on existing ideologies. This could range from the desire of Agonshu 
to bring about world peace through spiritual means, or that of the Student Non· 
violent Coordinating Committee to ending apartheid in the American South. 
Dichotomous World-View 
An oppositional and dichotomous world·view (cosmology). 
This marker could be explained as a 'Them and Us' mentality. It suggests a 
world view clearly demarcated between opposing forces/groups: for example, God vs 
the Devil, Good vs Evil, Enlightened vs Unenlightened. Believer vs Non· Believer, 
and so on. The group in question is always on the side of good, and the distinction 
between those within the group and those without is clear. For example, in 
Muslim groups those not 'within' may be stated to be 'kam1 (unbeliever) and as 
such worthy of punishment. The Red Army Faction had a number of terms they 
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applied to those outside of the group (generally derogatory) but the point is that 
they still made a clear distinction between members and their 'Other'.11 
These distinctions are evidence of the idea of the sacred working as a border 
ca tegory, the theory of which I will develop in the following chapter. However, 1 
mention this now to serve as a reminder that, whilst the mru·kers were tested and 
developed in relation to the data, they were also strongly influenced by my 
theoretical research. 
Emergency Situation 
The field of action lakes on the character of an emergency situation. 
through real or a conflation of symbolic and real pressures. leading 
to the suspension of normal moral codes which regulate and limit 
action and the JUStification of emergency forms of action. 
The stress in this marker is on the suspension of 'normal' moral codes and the 
justification of action, in this case violent action which is legitimated and indeed 
even necessitated by the emergency situation. 
Frequently. violent action takes place within a context of struggle. so. whilst an 
emergency situation is not necessarily declared, it is presumed. It is also often the 
case that the 'character of an emergency' takes the for·m of a declaration of war, 
such as bin Laden's dechu·ation in 1998 (see Juergens meyer (2003: 148) for one of 
many discussions on th is) or Ian Paisley's launch of a magazine ca lled The 8t1ttle 
Standani (Juergens meyer. 2003: 150). 
External Legitimating Authority 
Worldview justified by a ppeal to legitimating authority external 
to/transcending the situation (God, religious scriptures, traditions, 
fundamental human r·ights or values). 
Whilst some works point to how religions in general justify war or violent actron 
(e.g. Burns. 1996; Cole, 2002). it is not too difficult to find justifications attributed 
"'l'hroughout this thesis, I will capitalise 'Other' to signify where it is used as a contextual 
pro1>er noun depicting t he people whom are seen. by the grou p in question. to be outside of 
(and perhaps a lso against) the group. 
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to God or another legitimating authority in justifications of violence. For example 
bin Laden's speeches frequently reference Allah as a spiritual justification for the 
actions of a! Qaeda. Paul Ch.ilton (2004: 166) points this out when he quotes from a 
bin Laden speech: 
(5) God Almighty hit the United States at its most vulnerable spot. 
(6) He destroyed its greatest buildings. 
(7) Praise be to God. 
However, this marker was deliberately worded so that it would also pick up 
legitimisation from non·religious sources, such as through interpretations of the 
works of Marx, for instance. The legitimating authority of a source external to the 
group is a motif repeated in many group's actions and was important to include 
here. That said, in the analysis of this marker it was demonstrated that this 
function was not picked up in the statements of the non-religious groups and the 
discussion of this difference of the data led to some interesting conclusions 
(discussed further in Chapters Six and Eight) 
Followers Differ from Leader 
Where a follower consciously (or otherwise) expresses an idea that 
differs from a leader (or disagrees with). To show where beliefs 
expressed by leaders are not necessarily all taken on by followers. 
One important point to note about using the statements of groups to explore the 
beliefs of the group is that they tend to be made by official sources. That is, either 
the leader or someone authorised to make statements are often the ones most 
likely to be interviewed. release press statements. write books and so on. This 
marker acknowledges that this does not necessarily mean that all members of the 
group will agree with these statements and aims to catch evidence that suggests 
followers might be disagreeing with the leaders and/or official ideology of the group. 
Involvement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence 
A clear awareness of the need and/or desire to frame actions within 
a discourse of'revenge'. 
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Building upon the concept of mimetic rivalry (Girard, 2005). which I will discuss in 
the next chapter, this marker seeks to capture those statements where the group 
has clearly decided that revenge is an appropriate response to a perceived wrong. 
Revenge and violent revenge are deliberate responses which are believed to be 
justified within certain circumstances. 
We see strong evidence of this in my discussions in Chapter Six on the Red Army 
Faction, especially in the naming conventions of the commandos (small groups) 
that carried out particular attacks- these were generally named after comrades 
who had been killed. It is also evidenced in the statements of al Qaeda and I 
discuss these in Chapter Five. 
Believing in the justification of violent revenge is a clear indicator of the non· 
negotiable character of a group's beliefs, and in conjunction with the Basic Injustice 
marker could be useful to see where certain connicts may arise. 
No Common Ground 
An absence of common ground with 'Others' allowing meaningful 
dialogue with other world views. 
The absence of common ground can be represented in a spatial sense as well as 
ideologically. An ideological example is found in H izb ut·Tahrir's (2002) The West:S 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Colonialist F'oreign Policy which demonstrates 
to some extent the lack of understanding between the U.K./U.S. governments and 
the concerns of at least one section of the British Muslim community. 
The Jack of physical common ground is also a major issue in some groups' 
development. For example. within Aum Shinrikyo the separation from society was 
considered an important step in the spiritual development of the group member. 
and Reader (1996: 25) refe•·s to the strong pressure placed on members to become 
rcnunciates. 
The Jack of common space to discuss differences of world·views can detract from 
the questioning that may otherwise take place during the development of a 
particular group's ideology and can also lead to increased entrenchment in the 
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beliefs of individuals. It also reinforces the lack of mutual understanding as inter-
belief dialogue fails due to the absence of a common language. 
No Innocent 'Others' 
A sense that all members of the 'Other' group are involved and 
implicated in the opposition to the good, and so legitimate targets: 
there is no 'innocence'. 
The idea that everyone is involved in a spiritual struggle is implicit within the idea 
of a dichotomous world-view, mentioned as one of the earlier markers. What this 
marker develops further is the notion that passivity is not an option in this 
struggle. If you are not 'for' the side of good, then you must be on the side of evil. 
This idea finds resonance within some non-violent branches of mainstream 
religions, such as Christianity, but is more explicit in the ideas of violent groups, 
for example in bin Laden's justifications for declaring war on the U.S. (Davis, 2004: 
94). 
This is a powerful idea, as it justifies the use of action not just against an enemy 
consciously acting against the b>roup in question. but extends the field of conflict to 
all those outside of the group (whether or not they are conscious of their 
'Otherness'). Juergensmeyer (2003: 115) surmises that this idea was developed 
with Aum to suggest that those not in the group could be better off dead -their 
lives being spiritually poor and a lready beyond redemption. 
No Justice Available in the System 
Statement claiming that the group has no recourse to judicial 
protection. 
If a group clearly believes that there is no justice available in the system which 
governs it, or that the system is illegitimate, then this leaves open the potential for 
extra-judicial action. This action need not be violent - it could take the form of 
protest - but this area of belief and indeed the positions taken in response to it 
have potentially interesting things to say about how a group negotiates its 
relationship with dominant power-structures Qegal systems, governments, 
international bodies, etc.) 
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Personal Benefit 
Explicit statement of benefits for followers- such as heightened 
physical or mental abilities, salvation, sense of righteousness, etc. 
A strong motivation for joining many groups is the benefits to the believer. 
Understanding what benefits the group advet·tises can tell us a lot about what they 
deem to be important. For example, Aum Shinrikyo mentioned the benefit to 
withstand nuclear assaults (AUM97: 91) and this suggests that they thought such 
an attack would be likely. 
Personal benefits can motivate in different ways as well. for example in the offer of 
a better existence in the afterlife than is experienced presently. An example of this 
might be the suggestion of spiritual safety for one's family and personal access to 
virgins, as suggested in some of al Qaeda's texts (ALQ62: 143·4: Ibrahim, 2009). 
Question of Authority 
Dispute within an ideology over who has the authoritative view of 
its historical and contemporary practice. 
Some groups. for example Agonshu, focused a lot on questions of authority and how 
their particular ideology was a perfection of an earlier or other form of the same 
branch of ideas. in this case Buddhism. After noting this theme being repeated in 
other case studies I included a marker to captut·c it within the matrix. This 
market· could also be seen to show us how two gt·oups from a similar ideology could 
have differing approaches towards violence, for example in how Hizb ut·Taht·ir in 
Uzbekistan's use of Islamic teachings differed from al Qaeda's. 
Recognition of Innocence 
Recognition that there ARE innocent 'Others·. and that they should 
not be targeted. 
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The No Innocent 'Other:S'marker, above, caught data from a very particular point 
of view, rather than allowing for a number of differing values to be captUl'ed by the 
same marker. Therefore. I included this marker in order to see if any beliefs 
expressing the opposite view were expressed. 
Recourse to Socrificiol 1 Judicio/ Processes 
Evidence of an attempt to conclude a cycle of violence through a 
sacrificial/judicial act. 
This marker relates to the presence of sac1·ificial rituals or submission to judicial 
processes within the group. I briefly mentioned Rene Girard in the previous 
chapter and in the next will expand upon his theory on the role of sacrifice as a 
mechanism to stop the cycle of reciprocal violence. In modern societies, he argues, 
this task is undertaken by the state through a system of justice, whereby the state 
intervenes to remove the requirement for vengeance (Girard, 2005: 16). Through 
this marker I looked for evidence of an attempt to conclude a cycle of violence 
tht·ough a sacrificial/judicial act. 
I developed this marker because it became apparent during the Aum case study 
that the law of the land was frequently ignored, from illegal land purchases to the 
mmder of opponents (Reader, 2000). There does not appear to be any evidence of 
Aum attempting to preclude or halt the cycle of violence through judicial or 
sacrificial process, and so perceived injustice (as highlighted by the Basic Injustice 
marker) cannot be avenged without recourse to violence. Given this finding, it 
seemed that assessing a group's attitudes towards the prevalent judicial system 
would provide an indicator of the likelihood of the group deferring to the system to 
avenge injustice, or to avenging it themselves. Following a Girardian theory of 
revenge, if the proclivity of the group is to self-justified vengeance, then a 
reciprocal course of violence is likely to follow. 
Symbolic lmportonce 
A sense of symbolic importance given to the present action. 
41 
Symbolic importance features strongly in most groups' justifications for their 
actions. It could be that the action is set against the backdrop of an impending 
apocalypse: Reader (1996: 55) refers to the increasingly pessimistic prophecies 
about Armageddon within Aum Shinrikyo from 1989 onwards, and Juergcnsmcyer 
(2003: 28·9) and Harding (J 994) look at millennia list ideas in various Clu·istian 
movements. As well as being laden with symbolic importance these deadlines also 
lend a real sense of urgency to the required action. 
The above examples link in with the Emergency Situation marker as well. Whilst 
the symbolic importance of an action captured in this marker can contain a sense of 
ut·gency, it does not have to. For example, the action could be compared/linked 
with a fabricated symbolic event: Karsh (2000) looks at the creation of a revisionist 
history of Israel that seeks to place it as a source of all evil in order to justify 
actions taken against it, and Eickelmann & Piscatori (1996) also discuss issues of 
invented symbolism within Islam. Kakar (1996) addresses similar issues in 
relation to religious tensions between Muslims and Hindus in India, especially in 
Hyderabad, and how symbols and memories wct·c created (or re·invented) to suit 
the needs of differing groups. Kermani (2003) considers the history of martyrdom 
in Islam and its recent increase in its symbolic influence within Islam. 
Possibly the most relevant theoretical work to this issue is found within Daniele 
Hervieu·Uger's (2000) book Religion as a Chain of Memory which looks at the link 
between religion and memory which invokes in believers a shared ideology and 
symbolism thus invoking a social community. 'rhis work is discussed in mot·e 
depth in the following chapter, but the above discussion demonstrates the broad 
range of possible uses of symbolism. 
Violent Traditions 
Evidence of specifically violent traits/influences (imagery/myth) 
within the traditions/beliefs of the group. 
As with the other markers, this marker in itself cannot act as a necessary indicator 
of a move to violence. For example, many Christian groups claim a common 
textual tradition, and yet some have acted violently and some have not. However. 
this marker does allow for a focus on the violent influences specific to a group and 
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draws on some of the data which, for example. Mellor (2004: 165) referred to when 
he spoke of the role of recent discussions and interpretations of jihad wtthin 
contemporary Islam. 
This marker specifically focuses on references to violent imagery/myth within the 
beliefs of the group and in doing so allows us to explore the ways in which these 
traditions are interpreted and the differences between these and potentially non· 
violent interpretations. 
Wider Struggle 
The present condition/field of action is situated within a wider 
struggle infused with normative value (good vs. evil: right vs. 
wrong). 
This marker can overlap w1th the Dichotomous World View marker but focuses on 
a more nuanced understanding of the wol'ld view and even of the legitimating 
authority and connects this with the immediacy of the struggle within the present 
context. For example. 11 dichotomous world view need not necessarily be 
represented in mom I terms, those of a political conflict related as such could just be 
between opposing VICWS. However. this marker suggests the presence of a moral 
interpretation of the conflict in hand. where 'right' and 'wrong' are not merely 
opposite ends of a discourse of difference, but rather have received a normative 
interpretation. 
Evidence of this is found in the co·option of people outside of the group (but 
perceived as sympathetic or in a similar position). For example. the Vietnamese 
people were seen as on the ·same side' as the Hed Army Faction. as their struggle 
had a moral correlation with the RAP's struggle against the West German and U.S. 
governments (Vai'On, 2004: 34·5). 
Tt might also be found in the ascription of a reli~rious dimension to political 
struggles in many theatres of conflict around the world: al Qaeda especially has 
used this powerful tool in numerous cases. But nor is its use limited just to non· 
state actors as even governments such as the U.S., in which religion and state are 
formally separated, have seen their country as on the side of good (God). Chilton 
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(2004: 174) quotes both Presidents Clinton and Bush (Jnr) in invoking God's 
blessings upon America. 
Summary 
This project started from a hypothesis that it is possible to identify markers 
pertaining to violent action within a clearly defined group and. furthermore, that 
the presence of these markers can demonstrate a necessary and sufficient causality 
of a move to violence. During the research process this aim has been broadened to 
include the development and later assessment of a model - the matrix to the 
study of the sacred in modern society. 
Through an iterative process of qualitative analysis the markers that together form 
the matrix have been tested and modified accordingly. The outcome of a content 
analysis of primary sources is a case study centred t1·eatment of both the markers 
and the underlying theory. It is not assumed that all of the markers have Ul be 
necessary to lead to violent actions. nor indeed that any marker by itself is 
suggestive of violent action. Understanding and illuminating the factors that the 
markers highlight is part of the purpose of this project. However. I suggest that 
some combination of the markers will demonstrate a n~ocessary causal influence on 
the move to violence. and that together these reveal a pattern which will become 
further apparent as more case studies are undertaken. These findings arc fu1·ther 
tested when considered nga inst groups which display s imilar beliefs but do not 
have a history of violent action (in Chapter Seven). 
In this chapter I have outlined the assumptions. methodological approaches. 
processes of data collection and analysis employed in the research, and introduced 
the markers. In this final section. I have intimated where and how the markers tie 
into the broader literature and social theory, and it is Ul a fuller discuss ion of th is 
that 1 now turn. 
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3. Key Themes 
Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the key themes and literature relevant to this thesis. I 
start off by examining the field of terrorism, as this is where much of the 
contemporary discussion into violent groups is to be found. However, I highlight 
the relative lack of investigation into the topic of religion and question why this is 
the case when the actions of contemporary 'fundamentalist' groups are so often 
used as evidence of a ·return' of religion to Western society.'2 I then go onto query 
how the term 'religion' has been used in some discourses of violence. 
Rather than using 'religion' as the independent variable in my investigation of 
violent ('religious') groups I problematise this term and suggest instead that we 
should use a concept which, in the neo·Durkheimian tradition within which I 
situate this discourse. is called the 'sacred'. Therefore I start my second section by 
outlining some of the pertinent areas of Durkheimian discourse as they relate to 
this investiga tion and also how I develop these ideas, bringing in other theorists to 
clarify how the sacred can be seen to be a useful tool in the investigation of 
contemporary society and beliefs. 
I conclude the chapter by summarising how 1 have used these ideas to 
operationalise the concept of the sacred for this study. 
12 As Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003: 15) note, "the extravagant use of the term 
·fundamentalism' encourages nonspecia lists to make facile generalisations". In the main I 
have used the term LO refer to groups who claim a return LO the 'fundamentals' of their 
faith, however, in this sentence I use it in the populist sense- whereby so many groups 
that a re visibly different are often conOated with a negative association with 'violent 
fundamentalists, or, extremists'. I also question whether indeed it is right LOsee the 
increasing profile of religious groups in contemporary society as a ·return', something I 
discuss here and also in Francis and Knott (2011). 
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Terrorism, Violence and Religion 
Terrorism 
The starting point for my research into this field was to look at the literature 
relating to terrorism. The main aim of this research is to understand the role of 
the sacred in the move to violence, and not terrorism per se. However, the 
exploration of causal attributes leading to violence is a key issue within terrorism 
studies, and therefore it is important to examine the wider discussions in this field. 
To this end, whilst I am not directly concerned with the definitional problems 
SUl'rOunding the term 'terrorism', I will draw attention to them. 
In 1988 Schmid and Jongmann (1988) surveyed active researchers in the field of 
terrorism studies and from this data managed to compile a list containing 109 
different definitions of 'terrorism'. Andl·ew Silke (2003b: 2), in the introduction to 
his edited collection on researching terrorism, provides some explanation for this 
proliferation of terms: 
Most books on terrorism, and certainly almost all with an academic 
or research focus, start with a discussion on how terrorism is 
defined. Or, to be more accurate, they discuss the peculiar and 
long-running failure to reach an agreed definition. 
It is not my intention to re-invent the wheel in this regard and therefore I will not 
commence with another lengthy investigation into the term 'terrorism'. However, a 
brief analysis is in order given that I situate this thesis, to some extent, in relation 
to work coming out of this field. 
In The Teuolism Reader Whittaker (2003: 3·4) provides a short list of nine 
definitions of terrorism from a variety of sources from state actors such as the FBI; 
the U.S. Department of Defense; U.S. State Department; U.K. Government; to 
academics s uch as Walter Laqueur and Brian J enkins. 13 In this list ideas and 
words are repeated. A concise analysis of these could be best categorised by the 
phrase, 'Who does what to whom and why?'14 Under these headings I have listed 
I3 Whittaker cites the following website for t his list, however the page no longer exists: 
www.terrorism.com/terrorismlbasics.html. Attempted access last on 9•h February 2011. 
" In asking this question I am loosely following the 3·step model suggested by Bergesen 
(2007) who argues that terrorist violence differs from other forms of violence by separating 
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the key words/ideas that appeared. along with the number of appearances if more 
than once: 
Who: Subnational groups: clandestine agents: 
Does what: unlawful, illegitimate: intimidate (2), influence (2), coerce (2). threat 
(4); force (3); fear (3); violence (7); murder: maiming; menacing. 
To whom: government (2): the innocent (2); civ ilian population: societies: non-
combatant targets: any person or property: public at large. 
And why: !objectives] political (8): social: religious (2): ideological (2) 
The 'Who?' in this list noticeably excludes state actors, the inclusion of which is an 
area of contention within terrorism studies which Ranstorp (2007a: 7·8) briefly 
alludes to in hi s mapping of the fie ld. The groups in the case studies chosen fot· my 
t•cscarch are all non·state actors, though the matrix. as it focuses on the role of 
bel ief, wou ld be equally applicable to terrorism practised from 'above'. This 
hypothesis would require further testing. but for the purposes of this project I have 
concentrated on violence enacted by non·govcrnmental actors. 
'Does what?' contains a similar theme even if the words used themselves vary 
widely according to their emotive content. The legality of actions is contested 
(although this dependent on the position taken by the relevant legislative bodies) 
and. whilst in this context it is meant in a judicial sense. it could also easily be 
broadened to a mora l context. The intention of coercing or influencing is common 
to all the definitions, and that such coct·cion is violent is a lso a common factor. 
In contrast to acts of war, the targets ('To whom?') are usually seen as non· 
combatants, suggesting an innocence of those under attack. The use of 'innocence' 
~uggests a normative dimension to the actions. As with the morality of any aclton 
thts brings into focus the moral compass of the active group- how does it compare 
to that of mainstream society? Do their conceptions of ·good/right' align with those 
of the wider social network? 
the roles (spccilically the latter two) of Pet·pctratot· (p): Victim (v) and Target (t), whct·cby 
person A, docs violence to victim B. to get at target C: A.-B. -C. 
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The motivating factor behind the reasons is always assumed to be ideological: 
taking an understanding of "ideological' that is broad enough to incorporate 
religious. social and political objectives. Kot wishing to get mired in the debate 
around legality/morality, state/non·state actors and the many other issues that are 
tangential to this project. what I am interested in within the field of terrorism are 
those violent actions motivated and justified by beliefs. I focus on violence a nd the 
justi fication by belief because these qualities are at the hear t of this project. 
However, throughout the study I remained mindfu l of the effects of the widm· 
issues mentioned above. 
The next significant problem highlighted within literature of terrorism studies is 
that of its overreliance on secondary data. Silke (2003a: 60·3) draws attention to 
this when he points out that his own study mirrors the results of the earlier 
Schmid and Jongman (1998: 138) survey in that 73~. of the data used by 
resear-chers in the field was from secondary sources. 
Th is can lead to a circulation of theories and data accepted without new 
investigation. In my research I have avoided working from other researcher's data, 
instead applying a new model (the matrix) to original material (the groups' 
statements) in order to generate my data. In the main. I have also avoided using 
media sources which could. as Silke (2003a: 62·3) states. lead to problematic 
questions about accuracy. bias and audience context. The exceptions to this are the 
Mori (1998, 2001) documentaries which. whilst not produced by the mainstream 
media. still raise some of the same concerns. 
Violence and Religion 
It is fair to say that the majority of texts relating to contemporary terrorism either 
marginalise or ignore the role of religion - even where the groups in question have 
avowed religious aims (e.g. al Qaeda). Works such as Whittaker (2003), Crenshaw 
(1995). Zulaika and Douglas (1996). Sinclair (2003) and Primoratz (2004) all deal 
with terrorism in interesting and useful ways. but either fail entirely to deal with, 
or sideline the role of religion and belief. 
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Whittaker (2003) for example, provides an edited work looking at characteristics of 
terrorism, including thirteen case studies and also strategies for the possible 
prevention and control of terrorism. However, even in the case studies of al Qaeda 
(41·50) or Northern Ireland (101·119) religion is absent both as a possible cause of 
conflict, or even as a point for discussion. Rather, a historical analysis of events is 
filtered through a discussion of political issues, although themes such as myths and 
memories are also developed as ways of understanding the solidarity and support 
for the various groups involved in the Irish Troubles (106·115). 
Ranstorp's (2007b) edited volume Mapping Terrorism Research also largely ignores 
religion. with mention only being made under the generic heading of ideologies (e.g. 
Horgan, 2007: 113) or as by·Unes within listings of research strategies (Ranstorp, 
2007a: 9). In Wilkinson's (2007: 316·328) article on subject a1·eas contributing to a 
multi-disciplinary approach to the study of terrorism, religious studies and/or 
theology is not mentioned once, nor are any academics from these fields. The 
absence of a discussion of religion from a major conference addressing the root 
causes of terrorism (Wilkinson. 2007: 316·7) further reflects the generally poor 
consideration of its importance within this subject area. 
Further, works that address the move to violence through stages of radicalisation, 
such as a draft version of a National Policing Improvement Agency's (NPIA) 2008 
report, neglected religion. 15 Additionally, in Taarnby's (2007) discussion of the 
recruitment of Islamist terrorists, religion is mentioned only as the cover for socio· 
political motivations (176). Others, like Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004 and 2005) in 
Islamic Activism and Radical Islam Rising use Social Movement Theory (SMT) to 
explain the move to violence, with religion merely one amongst many causal factors 
in a rational process. 
Wiktorowicz's theses (2004; 2005) fit within a broader theoretical approach to 
religion, that of Rational Choice Theory (RCT), which promotes the idea that 
humans are rational actors and that all choices made, including those leading to 
violence, at·e the result of rational choices. This individualistic view of society, 
16 It should be noted that the role of religion was discussed with the authors of the repor t 
and the final draft provided a more rounded approach. From the opposite point of view. in 
the July 2010 Digest (NPIA, 2010: 38) the House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Committee was quoted saying that there was too much focus on the theological 
causes ofradicalisation. echoing the point I shall make later. that in addition to the lack of 
a focus on religion too much emphasis is also unhelpful. 
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proposed by theorists such as Becker (1976), Iannaccone (1997) and Stark 0997) 
lends greater strength to the assumptions supported in the !\'PIA's report and the 
ideas encompassed within SMT. 
Where earlier RCT work discusses religious involvement, it is within the guise of a 
transference of decision making to a corporate actor (in this case a religious 
organisation) which is trusted as providing the best possible outcomes for the 
individual actor (Coleman. 1990). Within the current discussion RCT finds a home 
within SMT as Wiktorowicz (2004: 300) points out, and is developed further to 
apply to radicalised Islamic activists (298): 
[r)ather than viewing lslamists as grievance·stricken reactionaries, 
recent research has reconceptualized Islamic activists as strategic 
thinkers engaged in cost-benefit calculations. 
This use of economic decision making models leads Wiktorowicz (2005: 15) to claim 
that non·material incentives such as a sense of belonging and purpose help explain 
why people are happy to sacrifice themselves for radical Islamic groups. His theory 
suggests that religion. RS with any ideology, is only of interest for potential 
research when sufficient numbers of rational actors choose to join these movements 
due to a deficiency of opportumty or positive options within their lives (especially 
in comparison to the more attractive benefits on offer for the next life (209)). 
Wiktorowicz's understanding of the role of religion strips it of the fundamental 
importance Durkheim (2001) argued it had to society. My objections to this will 
become apparent during my discussion of religion and society later on, but 
Wiktorowicz is not the only author who downplayed or. I argue. misunderstood the 
role of religion within contemporary violence. 
There are, of course, scholars (e.g. Bruce. 2002: Voas and Crockett, 2005) who 
argue that religion is declining in its societal inOucnce generally. Not wishing to 
be seen to ignore the secularisation thesis (which •·cccives a thorough historical and 
ideological analysis by Beckford (2003: 30·72)), I will nevertheless restrict myself to 
acknowledging the comments by Peter Berger, himself a former advocate of the 
thesis (1967: 107), who has since argued that the near·uncontested acceptance of 
the idea of secularisation within academia led to many theorists being wrong· 
footed by the apparent revival of religion (1999a: 2: 2001: 339). Arguments against 
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this thesis can be found in those who state that the paradigm is only relevant to 
the European context (Warner, 1993); that religion has been privatised, not 
declined (Davie, 1994); or that it has undergone a transformation in terms of 
popular denominations (Berger, 1999a). As with the reduced role that Wiktorowicz 
(2005) affords religion, the secularisation thesis is countered by the Durkheimian 
approach I adopt, in which religion had an enduring significance to society, 
regardless of the demise of particular faiths (Dm·kheim, 2001: 322-3). 
In contrast to accounts which downplay the role of religion in modern society and 
conflict, Huntinbrton's (2002) The Clash of Civilisations thesis of civilisational 
conft·ontation groups societies together along cultural, mainly relib>ious, fault lines. 
For example, he discusses the boundaries of expansion for the E.U., and suggests 
these will fall along the borders between Roman Catholicism and Eastern 
Orthodoxy /Islam in Eastern Europe (155-163). Huntington's argument is 
contested, not least in relation to his claim that Islam has uniquely violent sources: 
''Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword" (263), and "Muslim 
bellicosity and violence are late-twentieth-century facts which neither Muslims nor 
non-Muslims can deni' (258). \'lhilst these arguments at least draw attention to 
and discuss the role of religion within society and cultural identity it also portrays 
a monolithic vision of Islam that ignores centuries of peaceful inter-cultural living 
within Muslim lands. 
A more nuanced account of the role of religion in violent groups is found in the 1'he 
Fundamentalism Project. This mammoth, ten-year project directed by Martin 
Marty and Scott Appleby (1991: 1993a; 1993b: 1994: 1995) at the University of 
Chicago produced five major works all with a focus on the role of religion within 
fundamentalist movements. 
However, the authors of this project focus on a very specific definition of 'religion'. 
Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003: 15-6) state that only religious movements which 
postulate an ultimate concern such as a God or eternal reward are authentically 
religious. Those (mainly Eastern) religions, for example, Buddhism and the Hindu 
religions, which do not believe in a personal God, are "synthetic" religions for the 
purpose of their study and groups with strong belief indicators but no reference to 
"ultimate concerns" are not considered religious at all. Whilst this narrow 
definition of religion enabled the project to further delineate a set of parameters 
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that otherwise would have been unmanageably broad." it excludes groups and 
criteria that are commonly held to be religious. 
Mark Juergens meyer's (2003) Terror in the Mind of God is another work which 
considers seriously the role that religion plays in violent movements and he 
undertakes several case studies of violent religious movements. In so doing 
Juergensmeyer argues that violence is an inherent part of religion, but setting this 
point aside for the moment, I argue that perhaps he places too much emphasis on 
the role that religion plays in these conflicts.l1 
Juergens meyer (2003: 10) suggests that there arc characteristics of religious 
violence (transcendent morality, ritual intensity, struggle and transformation as 
indicative of a cosmic war) that separate religious violence from other, secular. 
forms. Although he states that all religions have violence at their heart (6·7). he 
acknowledges that religion docs not necessarily lead to violent action (10). Other 
sets of circumstances need to be present for religion to lead to violence, such as in 
the case of Sikh separatism, where he (85) mentions that this is an example where 
"religion has been fused with political separatism." 
The problem with this approach is that it tells us little about what is uniquely 
religtous about these forms of violence. Juergensmeyer (2003: 220) is aware of this 
issue: "Much of what I have said about religious tct·rorism in this book may be 
applied to other forms of political violence ... " However, his argument (220·1) that 
re ligious violence is especia lly vicious. transhistorica l. that it receives moral 
justification and is supported through absolutist aims with the total commitment of 
followers. are all features that I argue can be present in secular conflicts. For 
example. as I demonstrate m Chapter Six. the Red Army Faction displays all these 
characteristics. 
Juergensmeyer's (2003) woo·k is at the best end of R group of works which overplay 
the role of religion in violent movements. Haar (2005) argues against popular 
opinions that suggest religion is either inherently good (and so violent forms of 
•• The five main tomes of the project are already intimidnung m size and one volume was 
referred to by Peter Berger (1999: I) as a -book-weapon-. 
' ' Juergensmeyer's argumemts based on the v10lence in the teachings of religions, an 
argument repeated elsewhere (e.g. Lloyd Jones (1999) look. at the endorsement ofviolenc~ 
in the Hebrew Bible). I Ahnll be dealing with a broadet· dillCussion of violence a~ the heart of 
religion later on, asking why it is there. 
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religion are deviant) or bad (for example. Dawkins's (2007) assertion that inside 
every moderate religious believer a violent fanatic is waiting to get out). I do not 
intend to discuss these polarising works. except to say that, as with 
Juergensmeyer's (2003) book, it seems that they cannot tell us why religion, qua 
religion, can cause violence.'• 
In the above discussion I have set out some of the problems in the field. moving 
from accounts that ignore the role of religion to those that include it. but m 
problematic ways. Jan Reader's (2000) book on Aum Shinrikyo avoids many of 
these problems. in his excel lent study into the religious beliefs of Aum and how 
these led to the transition to violent action. However, for all its positives. Reader's 
(2000) study is only based on one example and he still leaves us with the question 
about what it is about beliefs. qua beliefs. that could cause violence. 
I have introduced some definitional problems above, as well as highlighting my 
search for a concept that can help us understand the move to violence. I do not 
argue that there arc simple answers to be found. but rather that a different 
approach may provide more functionally useful answers. In so doing. I argue that 
religion should play a role in this examination. but not as the independent variable 
in an explanation of the move to violence. 
Society, Religion and the Sacred 
It is at this point that I turn to a neo·Durkheimian explanation of society and 
religion. where the fundamental relevance of the two and the relationship of 
violence to society are explored. Dealing with both these elements together is. I 
aim to show. essential for a proper understanding of violent actions by 
contemporary groups. I say 'neo·Durkheimian' because whilst I start with his 
works, primarily the 1912 (200 1) Elemenlmy Forms of Religious Life, I deve lop 
this beyond his initial theories particularly in t·elation to the polarity of the sacred 
•• In grouping these work> together. I do not mean to m•inuau. that Juergensmeyer's 
(2003) book is not a ..:holnrly and well writu.n thes1s In fact, it is a helpful introduction to 
the field and explores many of the concepts from which the initial list of markers (Knott, et 
nl. 2006) was developed. A similar example can be found in Ruthven (2004) who provides a 
thoughtful discussion or the term and phenomenon of 'fundamentalism·. but fails to argue 
why secular instances are 'analogous' to, but not within the 'family resemblances' of 
properly fundamenta list I(I'Oups. which Ruthven (2004: 33) argues are religious. 
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(Hertz, 1960); the role of taboo and transgression (Bataille, 2001) and the sacred as 
a border category (Anttonen, 2000; Knott, 2005b). At the same time I use the work 
of Mellor (2004) to explore the reality of society (and so also of my use of the sacred) 
and theorists such as Girard (2005), Bataille (2001) and LeBon (1903) in their 
examination of violence and religion. 
In the following discussion, I set out an idea of religion and within this, the concept 
of the sacred, which I argue is more useful in investigating the move to violence. I 
situate this within an embodied understanding of society, which is where I start 
this examination. 
Embodied society 
The social realm, according to Durkheim (2001), is a natural realm (20) arising out 
of the dual nature of humans- homo duplex (18). The duality of our nature roots 
us in the natUl'al wodd as individual agents and also sets up a symbiotic nature 
between us and society - we both create and are created (in a human rather than 
animal sense) by society (18-19). This concept draws attention to the embodied 
nature of society. Because society is emergent from the homo duplex, it is 
necessarily influenced by the way people experience the world which is, first and 
foremost, through their bodies. 
Mellor and Shilling (1997: 5) point out that, whilst the above idea may seem 
obvious, the implications of the embodied foundations of knowledge are "frequently 
ovedooked in ... sociological discussions of culture. belief and ideology ... " Building 
upon these embodied foundations I follow the discussion beyond where Durkheim 
finished, into how conceptualisations of the body influence social forms (Mellor and 
Shilling, 1997) and how physical, mental and social concepts of space arise from 
our bodily experiences (Knott, 2005b). 
These spaces contain the genesis of our social relations (Knott. 2005b: 20-21). For 
example, within a Christian society we 'look up' to our heroes (our role-models) and 
we 'send down' our convicts, we baptise our babies, join our bodies in marriage and 
bury our dead- all in specially defined places. OUl- lives are ordered by 
movements between bounded spaces (places) such as those of work (the office); 
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family (home): leisure (parks): and sacred (churches). Knott (2005b: 21) states that 
"Social relations exist in and through space. and'the spatial is socially 
constituted'."19 
Mellor and Shilling (1997) argue that through the Cartesian separation of body and 
mind within modernity and the basis of modern society on a rationalcontractarian 
understanding we have become divorced from the irrational. embodied constitution 
of society. Writing before the events of 9111 and subsequent popularity of religious 
explanations of violence. they argued that this attempt to rationalise society has 
led to a moral bankruptcy in the contracts that bind us together. The J'esultant 
tension between enlightened moderruty and resurgent embodied socialities could 
lead to the kind of violence that Girard (2005) claims was controlled through 
sacrifice <Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 201). 
I will return to explanations of violence coming from the social shortly but. having 
drawn attention to how this can be linked to the embodied foundations of the social, 
I will now turn to the fundamental relationship between society and religion. 
Society and religion 
I have argued that it is within the embodied characterisation of space that we find 
the socia l bonds that Durkheim (2001: 319·20) describes. This is not an abstract 
space. an epistemological thought·experiment with which to theorise sociological 
constructs. but rather part of the sui generis reality arising from the embodied 
mteraction of human bemgs. 
Durkheim's sociology was predicated upon a priori facts, in this case social facts or, 
as Durkheim's nephew Mauss (2002: 3) refers to them: "total social phenomena". 
Mauss (2002= 100·1) explains that these objects of study are facts that involve the 
whole of society through all its permutations (mom I, judicial, religious. economic 
and so on). These facts relate to a social body that has objective reality in relation 
to the human actors that it influences. directs and 1s emergent from. The 
Durkheimian society is real. as opposed to the abstract concept suggested by social 
constructivism. or the "aggregation and interaction of individual actions" 
10 Italics are Knott's. 
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(Iannaccone. 1997: 26) which according to rational choice theorists constitute social 
outcomes.20 
Building on DUI·kheim's idea of the sui generis reality of society Mellor (2004: 191) 
argues that: 
society is an emergent reality. contingent upon the embodied 
dispositions and potentialities of human beings. and characterised 
by a substratum of hyper·spiritual forces that facilitate the 
emergence of religious forms ... 
Mellor goes onto state that, whilst society is contingent on human beings (53·79). it 
is a necessary outcome of the embodied characteristics of humans (80·1 07). This 
necessity is characterised by its imposition on individuals. not as something that is 
random or can be chosen. but as a reality that acts upon individuals and 
institutions (80·82). Whilst allowing for flexibility in how differing societies are 
constituted this necessity suggests that there will a lways be societies. and the 
embodied nature of humanity means that these societies will have common 
dimensions. 
Religion. signalled by Mellor in the above quotation. is one of these common 
dimensions. But Durkheim (2001) posits that religion is more than a product of 
society. it is the expression of society itself (Ourkhetm. 2001:4). He argues (11) 
that "religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are 
collective representations that express collective realities." Socially constructed 
notions such as time and space are. therefore, the product of religious thought. 
being predicated as they are on collective realities (12·13). 
1'his places (a Ourkheimian understanding oO religion at the centre of society and 
any study of it. Durkheim (2001: 36) argued that a ll religious beliefs pre·supposcd 
11 divis ion of ideas and objects into two classes: the sacred and the profane, the 
sacred being those things set apart and special (46). These classes, sacred and 
profane, underpin the religious categorisations that inform collective knowledge 
(Ourkheim. 2001: 11) and these phenomena fall within two categories. beliefs and 
rites (36). Beliefs define practices and objects that then become the focus for the 
"' It should be noted that SOCIIII constructivism/constructionism does not necessarily 
preclude a realist understanding of society, as argu~d by Engler (2004). Howev~r. the 
justifications for a t·ealist socia l constructionism are somcwhaL tortuous in comparison to an 
embodied account of society. 
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rites. It is the former category. beliefs. which I am concerned with for the purposes 
of this study. Furthermore, I am interested in beliefs beyond a commonly 'religious' 
definition of the term. Not mundane or. in the terminology introduced above, 
profane beliefs, but rather those with a special quality, something set·apnrt from 
everyday worldly concerns. something worth protecting with violence: non· 
negotiable beliefs. 
Mellor (2004: 18·19) argues that ·proper' religion is interested in meaningful 
cosmological questions: the serious life. He points out that religious beliefs are 
those cosmological questions that adse from the embodied nature of humans, from 
our mortality and interdependence. Without diverging from this undet·standing of 
religious beliefs, I am nevertheless interested in beliefs including, but also outside 
of. these teleological foct. 
Mellor's definition. above, could be seen as suggesting that religion is an 
cssentialised concept defined by a family resemblance of·serious questions'. 
However, I follow others. fot· example Fitzgerald (1995, 2001) in questioning the 
t·ole and definition of 'religion' as a concept. It is here that we can sec the 
usefulness of the concept of the ·sacred'. The relationship of the sacred to t·eligion 
is illuminated in Knott"s (2010c) exploration of the boundaries between the 
·religious' and 'secular' and indeed on the role of the sacred in relation to 'religion'. 
The distinction between the religious and secular can be traced back to early 
Christianity (Knott. 2005b: 64) and was further developed through the Protestant 
idea of civil society (Mel lot· and Shilling. 1997: 146: Mellor, 2004: 116·120). That 
the distinction is contained within the same epistemological category is supported 
by a consideration that withm some societies the 1dea of a non·religious space is a 
non·sequitur. such as within some Islamic countrtes (~lellor. 2004: 20). ' 
Because 'religion' is. thet·efore. a label that refers to a class of groups and beliefs 
and is not a concepL encapsulating a real and essential quality, 1 argue that it has a 
pt·oblematic place within the study of violence. For example, the F'undtm1entnlism 
Pt'O)ecc used one definition of religion that excluded faiLhs commonly considered 
religious. Juergensmeyer (2003) used religion ab the independent variable in 
particular conflicts. but without a clear understanding about what was unique 
" Knott (2009b) discusses th~ development of the termR 'religious' and 'secular' within the 
context of public/private religion, further demonstrAting the positioning of the term 'secular' 
within a specifically Western epistemological field. 
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about religion. This is not to say that the label 'religion' is not useful (for example 
in common conversation), but it seems that it is not clear what it refers to nor how 
it can be operationalised in a functional application to the problem of violence. 
J think that the 'sacred' is a term and a concept- which can be operationalised in 
relation to this discussion (and beyond). 1 st-eer clear of using the Lerm 'non· 
negotiable beliefs' for the same reasons that I reject Taves' (2009) 'specialness'. 
These phrases (especially Taves') would carry less baggage than the ·sacred', which 
is often conflated with an essentialised understanding of 'religion'. However, Taves 
(2009) ignores some of Lhe other developments of Durkheim's concept of the sacred 
that I include here (Knott, 201 Ob), as found within the work of Hertz, Bataille and 
Anttonen. for example. In addition, Knott (20JOb) also points out that discussions 
over non·negotiable beliefs. from both religious and non·religious camps, often 
utilise discourses of the ·sacred' (see Knott, 2010c) and so in this respect the 'sacred' 
still seems a more applicable term to use, and it is to this domain. and its 
separation from the profane. that I now turn."' 
The sacred 
My discussion of the sacred finds its genesis within the idea of taboos which. 
Durkheim (2001: 224·227) suggests. are the rules c1·eated by society to separate the 
everyday realm (the profane) fmm the mysterious 'other' realm (the sacred).'" 
'1'1·ansgression is the process by which these taboos aro broken, and through which, 
Durkheim argued, the sacred realm came into contact with the profane.t• 
Durkheim (2001: 341: 232·235) understood that transgression encapsulated a 
violent action (that of breaking a taboo) and that the sacred itself could be violent 
(304) as well as positive. However, this element of Dm·kheim's thought was under· 
developed and it was Robert Hertz (1960) who furt-her elaborated a thesis of the 
t2 Taves (2009) also allows an essentialised notion of 'religion' to creep back into her 
discussion (Fitzgerald. 2010). something I have rejecwd here. and a point she accepts to a 
certain degree (Taves. 2010). 
"' Whilst referring to the •acn-d realm as that of the 'other· 111s worth noting the Creek and 
Lnun roots of'sacrcd' wh1ch Anuonen (2005: 189·190) drawo attention to. The root for 
Slll'<'rdenotes 'to cut' or 'to set apart', and while the .•ncrum referred to the area set aside for 
the fanum (consecrated area of the temple) the pro·fonum (pro denoting 'in front of or 
'outside') related to that area outside of the consecrated space. 
" It is also a factor in the creation of the taboo as it CI'Cates the sacred (spaccl. as Al'gt1cd by 
Mellor (2006= 13·14). 
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dichotomous nature of the sacred. He drew attention to this sacred polarity, but 
went ftu'ther by exploring the embodied characteristics of a s patial understanding 
of the sacred: left-sacred as representative of the dangerous, repulsive sacred, and 
right-sacred as the positive, attractive sacred. In its application to the human body 
He1·tz (1960: 101) states that: "The right [side of the body) represents what is high, 
the upper world, the sky; while the left is connected with the underworld and the 
earth." 
It is important to reiterate the point that the sacred is a social category, and that 
as such Hertz's importance relates to his illumination of the idea of sacred polarity, 
not to the affixation of right-good/left-bad sacred domains. This point is further 
enforced through Granet's (1973: 43-91) study of the Right and Left in China, 
where he builds upon Hertz's theory, but demonstrates how it also fits to a culture 
which does not share the differential of right/left hegemony found within Western 
societies. 
In her application of a spatial methodology to the study of religion. Knott (2005b) 
builds on Hertz's sacred polarity but also utilises Anttonen's (1996) 
conceptualisation of the sacred as a border category. Anttonen (40-3) states that 
the idea of the sacred is ru·awn from the bounded nature of human bodies from 
which we develop the distinction of inside/outside and thus territorialise the space 
around us.25 The sacred is the boundary between these distinctions, through which 
the separate domains are both made and contested <Anttonen, 2005: 191-196). If 
the sacred is a boundary then it is a relational concept, not referring to objects, but 
to the relation of those objects to others (191). 
Jt is within this relational understanding of the sacred that we can include those 
beliefs not concemed with the serious business of teleological questions, for 
example. the beliefs ofleft-wing activists about the dominance of capitalist and/or 
military power. The belief that people have a right to certain political and 
economic freedoms denied them by 'Western Capitalism' is placed within a sacred 
boundary. It is non-negotiable and it marks this belief as separate from and 
unique to. the beliefs of those people who believe otherwise. As a non-negotiable 
boundat·y it is also the site of contestation with confl icting beliefs. 
u The idea of territorializing space through sacred boundaries is also discussed by Smith 
(2004: 101-116) where he points to the examples of the Roman God Terminus and of 
passages in the Old Testament which relate to sacred boundat·y markers around land. 
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Understanding the sacred as a site for contestation further illuminates the linkage 
between violence and the sacred. and this point helps me expand upon how this 
concept crosses the religious/non·religious distinction 1 outlined above. Following 
i\nttonen (2000: 208·1), Knott (2010c: 125) argues that instances of the sacred can 
be found within what would commonly be considered as secular spaces: 
The category boundaries that become the focus of sacred-making 
activities and discourse have the potential to erupt as sites of 
struggle but for much of the time lie dormant and, as such, are 
invisible. Routinely taken-for granted, they have the potential to 
shock us with their capacity to become the focus of deep·seated 
principles and interests and with their powe•· to divide opinion. 
Whilst the sacred is not confined to the religious domain. it is within this 
epistemological category that instances of the sacred are commonly perceived.'" 
Whilst taking on board Mellor's (2006: 11·12) warning not to apply too broad a 
definition of 'sacred' to social phenomena, I argue that issues such as the struggle 
against racism (sec the case study on the SNCC in Chapter Seven) do •·elate to 
'serious' issues. This secular·sacred is still formed by cohesive practises and beliefs 
that relate to ideas and symbols that define the metaphysical outlook of that group. 
Mellor (2004. 2006) follows Ourkheim (2001) in stating that sacred beliefs and 
practices shape our fundamental social structures and precepts. They constitute 
the ontological foundation of all social forms. including those expressed within the 
epistemological domain of the secular. In this case, it is not contradictm·y to speak 
of the sacred within secular space, whilst attributing fundamental importance to 
the ·serious business' of these beliefs. 
Mellor (1998: 90) also draws attention to Durkheim's (2001: 157·161) discussion of 
how sacred qualities can be attached to secular ideas. in this instance in the 
f'rench Revolution. Ourkheim (158) mentions how people (inspired by the snc•·ed) 
can be violent at such times. although his treatment of the violent side of the 
·"' Knott's statement highlighted that the sacred can often be 'mvisible" but wh1lst it mav 
not be perceived this doe• not mean that it is absent from wtdcr society. Thl' idea of an' 
ab.ence·prescnce, raised m n diSCUSSIOn of the body by Shtlling (1993) was used m relauon 
to the sacred by Shilling nnd Mellor (2001= 49) in rclntlon to the College of Sociology and in 
pnrticular Bataille's (l988a: 104) work relating to the pcrtcivcd absence of the sacred in 
modern societies. Building on Bataille, I have explored this absence and how it has nriscn 
in modern society as" resu lt of greater individualisntion (~'rancis, 2004= 66·7 J). 
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sacred is underdeveloped (Graham, 2007: Riley. 2005) and I will now turn to how 
this violence can be seen to be related to the sacred through theorists who 
developed his ideas. 
Violence and the sacred 
Bataille (1985a) refers to the sacred as a relational boundary. for instance he 
improves Durkheim's interpretation of'taboo' and pomts out that the taboo is only 
meaningful in relation to transgression (Bataille, 2001: 38). If the taboo is no 
longer breached, then the sact·ed becomes mundane (and therefore profane). but 
Bataille (1989: 47) also states that the sacred is experienced in the process of 
transgression itself. thereby suggesting that tt ts thts boundary. the taboo. where 
we find the sacred. 
This taboo, according to Bataille (2001. 44), is set up in order to protect humanity 
ft·om violence. This violence is naturally occurring (through death which is 
violence to life, for example) and humanity a ims to contain it through taboos. and 
build a world on the basis oft·eason (Bataille. 2001: 40) where rules can be made 
and kept, and progress achieved. Girard (2005: 233·4) claims that this ts Bataille's 
contribution to his own theories- that taboos are enforced to create a profane 
domain that allows societies to flourish. Without these rules the contagious nature 
of the sacred (Durkhcim. 2001: 237·242: Bataillc. 1985b: 1989: 53: Girard, 2005: 
51·2) could overcome society, leading to outbreaks of violence. 
This contagion is also discussed by Gustave LeBon ( 1903: 36) who points out that 
erstwhile rational. functioning individuals lose intelligence on subsuming their 
individuality to the crowd: 
... by the mere fact that he forms part of an ot·ganiscd crowd, a man 
descends several nmgs in the ladder of civi lisation. Isolated, he 
may be a cultivated individual: in a crowd he is a barbarian - that 
is. a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity. the 
violence. the ferocity. and also the enthusiasm and heroism of 
primitive beings. whom he further tends to resemble ... An 
individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, 
which the wind stirs up at will. 
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This echoes Durkheim's (2001) concept of collective effervescence, although 
Durkheim's concept is more nuanced than LeBon's blunter analysis of the 
stupidity of the crowd,.., While both point to the contagion in collective assemblies 
they also by necessity refer to the profane alternative. of the individual in an 
ordered society. Whilst society appears to be solely rational, it still has this 
irrational social contagion driving it (Mellor, 2000: 277) e ither through the creation 
of the symbols and rules it orders itself by, or th t·ough the occasional 
controlled/uncontrolled outbreaks of the sacred that re·vitalise it. Indeed, Bataillc 
(1997b: 124·5) and Caillois (1959: 21) both argued that society attempting to purge 
itself of these irrational elements, by denying the sacred, could only lead to a 
return of a virulent form of violent (sacred) actions. 
Whilst Bataille argues that this violence is a necessary effect of the natural 
violence of life. Girard (2005) states that tt has a more specifically human origin. 
He argues that it arises through a process of mimetic rivalry whereby humans arc 
instinctively drawn to desire the same object and to violence in order to acquire it 
(154·5). The violence arising from the riva lry is conta~::ious and self-propagating 
(27), "Only violence can put an end to violence", as well as being infectious through 
space: 
... the scene of a violent act, and the objects with which the violence 
has been committed, send out emanations that penetrate 
everything in the immediate area. growmg gradually weaker 
through time and space. 
Violence can only be negated through sacrilicialt·itual. whereby a surrogate victim 
stands in for the object of desire. In this way Cit·ard (8) argues that the role of 
sacrifice is to protect the community from violence. which it does by ending the 
violence llll'ough targeting a victim for whom there will be no reprisals upon its 
death: "The trick of ritual is to 'purify' violence: that is. to 'trick' violence into 
spending itself on victims whose death will provoke no reprisals" (37·8). ln this 
sense ritual violence is ·good violence' (38) ending the cycle of 'bad' reciprocal 
violence. The role of the surrogate victim only works as long as the community 
27 Llobero (2003: 99· tOt) discusses similol"ittCH between Durkheim and LeBon's thoughts 
on collective emotion, albeit with an erroneous understanding of the place of irrationnlity in 
Out·k hcim's thcot·y. Mellor ( 1998: 89·9 t) provides 11 clctu·ct· discussion of the difference. 
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believes the victim is responsible (Girard. 2005: 86). such as with the scapegoating 
of Jews throughout mediaeval European societies (Girard, 1986)."' 
The role of the surrogate victim helps explain how violence could be abrogated, but 
it also draws us back to the reciprocal nature of violence. The mimetic dt·ive is 
found within primitive quarrels over natural resources as well as conflicts ovet· 
territories. The reciprocal nature of these struggles can spill over into inter· 
generational skirmishes at the level of civilisations. The role of mimesis naturally 
involves more than one person, and thus suggests the necessary sociality of desire 
a nd , by inference of the process of controlling the violent outcome of this desire, of 
society. 
Whilst I do not subscribe to Girard's (2005: 32) notion of the sacred (that of forces 
that increase in correlation to human's attempts to control it- such as natural 
disasters and human violence) I thjnk that the role of mimetic rivalry still places 
violence at the heart of the sacred. The non·negotiability. the hat·d boundaries of 
sacred values lead to violence when in conflict with other sacred values. 
Dependent on the context. the violence between these values could lead to the 
submission to the 'Other's' values (by a weaker gl'Oup. for example) or to the 
outbreak of physical vtolence. By placing violence at the heart of the sacred. this 
suggests that the outbreak of violence in the history of human interaction is the 
norm, rather than the exception."' 
In modern societies justice seeks to stop the cycle of vengeance by taking the 
position of the surrogate victim. In taking vengeance upon the perpetrator the 
judicial system leaves no person against which to direct the inevitable reciprocal 
act. thus stopping the cycle of vengeance dead (Girard. 2005: 16·9). ln th1s sense 
JUStice is the modern development of sacrifice. 
Tho·ough the idea of mimetic rivalry Girard demons trates how the sacred helps 
societies police competing value systems as well as what happens when these 
·• Durkheim also recogm><'s th~ scapegoating of .Jew•. this time in the Dreyfus nff111r 
(Lukes. 1985: 345). S<.-e Graham (2007) for a discusston of the limitations of Ourkhetm's 
thought in relation to the >;eapegont and where G1rard bUilt on (but also diverged from) 
Ourkhcim's understanding of violence and the sacred. 
•• Girard (2003) went on to suggest that through C'hrtstiRmty the reciprocal cycle of 
violence can be ended, th•"Ough the ultimate sur.'Ogatc victim - J esus. This theory assumes 
too much about the tl'llth of the Christian message and is not discussed here. 
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systems come into conflict. Further. it gives us an explanation of the reciprocal 
nature of violence and how it may be averted, through sacrifice or a judicial system. 
Conclusion 
Through this brief theoretical journey I have outlined areas of thought that impact 
upon and have explanatory power in relation to the appearance of violent actions in 
contemporary groups- religious and otherwise. 
I started by addressing the lack of 1·eligious discussions in many contemporary 
discourses of violent groups, before problematising the role of religion in some 
works which did pay serious attention to it. Both issues are due in part to the 
problematic understanding of religion and the role it plays in society so I then 
proceeded to highlight how I have approached this issue. 
I defined an understanding of the sacred which I will opet·ationalise throughout the 
rest of this research and explored some linkages between this concept and that of 
the violence that we encounter in society. Sacred thought is ordered and 
constructed through boundaries - which create and maintain the boundaries 
between uncontrollable violence and ordered human society through the use of 
taboos. It creates spaces, metaphorical, social and physical. which are infused with 
'sacred' qualities. The sacred is set apart from the profane sphere of everyday life 
and the values and beliefs of conOicting systems. It is the boundary and the space 
on the other side of it, characterised by the violence of uncontrollable forces -
significant amongst them mimetic rivalry. The interaction of these differing 
spheres. transgression, can lead to dangerous. uncontrolled violence. 
This violence is contagious. from person to person and space to s pace. The 
contagion is d1·iven th•·ough the reciprocal nature of vio lence, whereby violence 
begets violence. In this final analysis violence is not the co·incidentalresult of 
abnormal events, but the essential underpinning of social organisation. Its 
appearance is to be expected where sacred boundar1es are transgressed, and 
through the understanding of the beliefs of groups, which I suggest can be 
accomplished through the matrix. we can better predict when such transgt·essions 
will•·esult in violence. 
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With this understanding of the linkages between violence and the sacred, I now 
turn to my first application of the matrix- as part of my case study on Aum 
Shinrikyo. 
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4. Case Study - Aum Shinrikyo 
Introduction 
Aum Shinrikyo came to international prominence in March 1995 following the 
release of a poisonous gas (sarin) onto the Tokyo underground railway network. It 
is one of a class of Japanese religions known as 'new New Religions', being defined 
as groups which came to national prominence during the 1970s.30 
Aum Shinr ikyo (referred to from this point on as just 'Aum') operated within the 
highly fractional nature of modern Japanese religious movements, where many 
adherents may be members of several different religious movements at the same 
time (Socking. 1989: 144). This rampant pluralism is not a modern development. 
As far back as 1963 McFarland (1967: 18) pointed out that government figures 
accounted for higher numbers of Shintoists and Buddhists combined (the two 
predomina nt religious t raditions in Ja pan) than the total population of the coun try. 
In his own survey McFarland (1967: 19) pointed out that 12.4% of respondents 
claimed allegiance tO more than one religion, and. though only 8.8°o claimed 
affiliation to Shinto, McFarland (1967: 19·21; 26·8) goes on to point out that in a 
significant sense '·every Japanese. no matter his personal profession, may be said 
to be a Shintoist" (20). This is because of the cultural nature of Shinto bel ief. by 
which any member of J apanese society imbib<'S some of its beliefs a nd va lues, 
without necessarily recognising membership of a formal Shinto institution. 
Likewise with Buddhism: "Because Buddhism is so pervasive an influence in the 
culture of Japan and is so closely identified with family life. the individual who has 
absolutely no association wtth Buddhism is a rarity" (20). 
" Shtmazono (1995= 383) •tatcs his preference for the wrm -~'ourth·Period ~ew Rcli~ons" 
relating as it does to the four pertods of growth of Japanese 1\ew Religions- the :\1ei)i era: 
Taisho and early Shown eras: the post·war period: nnd 1970 to the present day. Thi• is 
more specific hut most commentators on these religions are happy to preface the 1970s 
onwards as 'new New', c. f. Reader 0996= 12). ·New Religions' itself is problematic as a label 
for religious movemenu; developed since the late 19•• century, as McFarland ( 1967: 6·8) has 
pointed out. However, for the purposes of this study. 'new New Religions' will suffice to 
explain the position of Aum in the Japanese religious context. 
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Therefore, whilst many people may be influenced by or even undertake Buddhist or 
Shinto practises, they do not necessarily formally associate themselves with these 
beliefs as 'religions'. This identification of belief with culture is supportive of a 
Durkheimian reading of religion, which s uggests that even in the absence of a 
significant membership of religious bodies. religious belief can still be seen to 
influence social mores and traditions. 
This context is important to understand, as it helps frame some of the paranoia of 
Aum and its concern over losing believers within the highly competitive Japanese 
religious market. Japanese religious promiscuity was also reflected in Aum's 
beliefs and leadership: Aum combined a mix of Buddhist, Hindu a nd Christian 
traditions and even Shoko Asahara had experience of another religion before he 
founded Aum."' 
Aum Shimikyo's inclusion in this study is due to several notable factors. Firstly, 
Aum is interesting because of its shor t development from founding to becoming a 
violent group. Falling outside the Western sphere of influence it also gives us an 
insight into a religious background other than the Abrahamic religions that 
dominate contemporary work on fundamentalism a nd violence. In addition, Aum 
is often considered to be a textbook example of a "Doomsday Religious Movement'' 
(Canadian Security In telligence Service (CSIS), 1999) and as a n example par 
excellence of a n extremist movement (FBI. 1999). 
This cha pter will star t with an examination of the move to violence in the beliefs of 
Aum, showing how these changed in response to and justification of, violence. I 
will then tum to addressing an important issue relating to differences between 
believers and leadership of groups through focusing on the hiera1·chical nature of 
Aum. During the course of both of these sections I will provide the reader with 
background information on Aum and its development, so providing some context to 
the final section wherein T will interrogate the data that I gathered, by each 
marker. 
31 Shoko Asahara had previously been a member of Agonshu in 1981 (Reader, 1996: 21). 
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From Yoga to Poa: The Move to Violence in Aum's Beliefs. 
Perhaps the most striking element of the Aum Shinrikyo affair is how swiftly the 
group t ransformed from a small number of yoga practitioners to a large body of 
people preparing for Armageddon. The development of their beliefs in this move to 
violence helps us answer the central research question of this thesis- the move to 
violence, and in this section I will examine this development through three stages. 
covering the early yoga years and the first apocalyptic revelations; the development 
of the idea of'poa', used to justify violence within the group: and finally the period 
when Aum increasingly focused on the need to renounce the world. 
Apocalyptic visions 
Aum was founded by Chizuo Matsumoto <Asahara) and 15 members in 1984 as a 
yoga practice group called Aum Shinsen·no kai.•• Matsumoto had previously 
supported his family through a herbal pharmacy, although had ceased this when 
he was charged with illegal practises.33 During the same period he had a lso begun 
a spiritual journey, joining another 'new 1\ew Religion' in 1981 known as Agonshu 
(Watanabe. 1998: 82·3). During this time he undertook many ascetic practises to 
satisfy his spiritual yearning. but by 1984 was so dissatisfied that he left Agonshu 
to form Aum Shinsen·no kai (Reader. 1996: 21). 
Matsumoto was nearly blind and came fl·om a poor family so when he was young he 
attended a special state school for blind children. Despite repeated failures to get 
into university (Reader. 1996: 19). he possessed charisma and the ability to relate 
to people around him. evidenced in the rapid growth of Aum, which from its 
original 15 members had grown to 1300 members by July 1987. This phenomenal 
gt·owth was continued until 1995 when the g~·oup had 10,000 members in Japan 
and more internationally, though most notably 30,000 in Russia (Reader, 2000: 63) . 
• 12 Reader (1996: 21, fn 181 translates the name as 'Aum Wizards Society' and later (2000: 
62) as 'Aum Mountain Hermits Society' . 
• 1.1 I lardocre (1997: 183, fn 3/}) states that Asahara was imprisoned for twenty dnyK and paid 
a line of 200,000 Yen. 
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This initial period of growth was also marked by rapid spiritual change in 
Matsumoto, who travelled to India and even met with the Dalai Lama.34 In 1987 
Matsumoto changed his name to Shoko Asahara and that of the group to Aum 
Shinrikyo. The beliefs of Aum also went through rapid change during this time. 
Like many 'new New Religions' it saw itself as a pure form of Buddhism (Reader, 
2000: 47·8; 67·8) Along with the influence of1'ibetan Buddhism (Pye. 1996: 266) it 
incorporated elements of Hinduism, and especially a growing connection to the 
Hindu deity Shiva (Reader, 2000: 66). 
The new name, Aum Shinrikyo, can be translated as: 'shimi - truth and 'kyo' -
teaching. 'Aum' was derived from the Hindu/Buddhist chant 'Om' and Reader 
(2000: 61) points to Asahara's explanation of the spelling of this as "A means 
Creation. U means maintenance or continuation. and M is destruction". Further, 
Reader points out that the context this explanation was placed in - that of the 
Hindu god of destruction, Shiva- was limited to the idea of the destruction of evil 
(not meaningless material destruction). So the name Aum Shimikyo in essence 
suggested the creation and maintenance of good and the destruction of evil, coupled 
with the teaching of the truth. 
In these aims themselves there was noth ing to suggest a violent impulse, but as 
the beliefs developed so did the urgency for action and the justification of violent 
action. For example, an increasing Christian influence was felt on the teachings of 
Asahara, primarily from the Book of Revelation at the end of the Bible. Lifton 
(2000: 47·9) points to this influence in Aum as early as 1989 when Asahara quotes 
from Reve lation and predicts Armageddon will occur in 1997 (see also U.S. Senate. 
1995). These predictions about the end of the world began a t rend towards 
increasing millenarian tendencies within Aum and started to create an atmosphere 
in which violence would later flourish. 
To 'Poo' 
In 1989 the group was successfully registered as a religious corporation. allowing it 
greater financial freedoms. Another important point about this registration was 
"' Much was made of Asahara's meetings with the Dalai Lama and photographs of the 
meetings were used extensively in Aum promotions. The Dalai Lama was subsequently 
criticised for his apparent endorsement of Aum (Pye, 1996: 268: Metraux, 1995: 1147). 
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that it gave Aum a certain amount of protection from the law, which is often cited 
as a reason for why the police took so long to take action against Aum when they 
appeared to be perpetrating so many crimes (Lifton. 2000: 235).» 
At the same time an increasingly negative perception of Aum. caused not least by 
members defecting and the increasing number of law suits from families of 
believers and neighbours of Aum faci li ties, creat.ed an embattled nature within 
Aum and deepened the sense of 'Us and Them' (Reader, 1996: 35·53). This 
perceived tht·eat to the movement is well demonstrated in the prefaces to Asahara's 
(1993) book Beyond Life and Death. The first preface, written in 1986, talks of the 
need for a personal journey with suffering. but how there will be eventual 
enlightenment. However, the preface to the second edition. written in 1988 is 
darker ( 1993: xi): 
Another important point to be noted is that several disciples of 
mine have left me due to their at..-ogance. This was a matter of 
great pity. 
Defections by disciples was a cause of gt·eat concern to Aum and indeed Reader 
(2000: I 0) mentions that later on there was increased paranoia about whether 
defections would affect the future of the movement. It is also noted that when 
Asahara writes of members leaving Aum he sees it as "disciples" leaving "me". 
These words suggest people were devoted to Asahara and his teachings first and 
foremost. and also that their defection was a direct reflection on (and insult to) him. 
That he was concerned enough to raise this point in a publicly available book 
suggests that it was indeed a great wony to him. 
During this t ime we also see the deve lo1>ment of the idea of poa, from a piaculat· 
rite to t·emove negative karma from a person after death. to something that could 
be done to a person. including potentially killing them, to help them avoid accruing 
negative karma (Reader. 2000: 16·19: Watanabe. 1998: 84·8). Reader (143·6) 
states that this shift in belief occurred around the time of the accidental death of a 
believer during ascetic rituals and a deliberate murder during the subsequent 
cover· up. However. there is evidence of violent rituals before this time. for example 
Asahara's wife was beaten to persuade her to undergo ascetic austerities (137). 
~~These protections came about due to the U.S. imposed policy of separation of religion 
from state following Japan's defeat in WW II (Header. 1996: 111). 
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From this time on, there were several violent incidents against members, including 
deaths, especially of those seeking to renounce Aum, all of which were covered up 
by the upper echelons of the group's hierarchy (Reader, 1996: 28). 
The development of these violent beliefs also justified actions against non-believers, 
the most famous being the disappearance of Tsutsumi Sakamoto and his wife and 
young child in November 1987. Sakamoto was a lawyer who had been representing 
several disgruntled families and groups in actions against Aum. His remains and 
those of his wife were found after police had seized control of Aum property 
following the attacks in Tokyo (Reader, 1996: 37-41). 
At the same time as the accidental death of the ascetic, Aum also made a bid to 
gain political influence in the 1990 elections. Aum did exceptionally badly and was 
soundly ridiculed by the national media. The humiliation of this defeat affected 
Asahara and the group and their separation from mainstream society became even 
more pronounced (Reader. 1996: 43-47). 
From many to the few 
Four years have passed since the first revision of Beyond Life and 
Death. For Aum Shimikyo, these four years can be compared to a 
ship caught in a raging storm. Of comse. the storm was not bred 
without a cause. But this storm has been a great joy for me. If not 
for this harsh and cruel 'Aum Bashing,' we would never have had 
the new growth and development. In other words, our karma has 
been washed off ... We do not know when the army of death will 
come to defeat us. The only way for us not to be defeated by the 
army of death is to live this moment earnestly in accordance with 
the law of the truth. 
These words <Asahara, 1993: xiiil were written two years after the humiliation of 
defeat in the national elections and the 'Allin bashing' that took place afterwards in 
the media. Whilst Aum had enjoyed a difficult relationship with the media right 
from its first registration as an official religion (Hardacre. 1997: 184-6) this got 
significantly worse during Aurn's political campaign in 1990 (Reader, 1996: 44-5). 
Asahara responded to this humiliation by focusing more on the renunciates within 
the group, and also with some ideological developments, including an abandonment 
of the plan to save all of humanity in favour of saving a select few. For example. 
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Hardacre (1997: 187·8) says that in October 1991 Asahara realised that he was the 
Messiah. which he supported with a quotation from the Bible about the Christ as a 
sacrificial lamb."" He also later reflected about the election defeat and media 
attacks, linking Aum as well to this analogy of the sacrificed lamb. As Hardacre 
(1997: 185) points out, these Christian themes also played a central role when 
Asahara likened Aum's treatment by the media to that of Jesus' treatment, 
Asahara quoting from Matthew 24:9 in support of this view. 
Alongside this increased Christian imagery Reader (2000: 126) also notes a change 
in religious self-identification. from a Jl1ahaynnn Buddhist path which is dedicated 
to he lping all souls to that of the Vajrayann path of esoteric Buddhism which 
focuses around a select number of renunciates. These changes effectively closed 
Aum off from the world. Whilst continuing disputes over land purchases (Reader. 
1996: 46·9) and other issues would drag Aum into the publjc arena, they would 
only serve to reinforce the feelings of paranoia and the justification of Asahara's 
words that the world was out to get them. It was ft·om this time that Aum's 
attempts to make lethal chemical agents began (Lifton, 2000: 39; U.S. Senate, 1995: 
Section 3) and they even tried releasing their efforts in Tokyo (Reader, 2000: 159)." 
These programmes reached maturity when. in June 1994 seven people were killed 
and two hundred injured when sarin gas was released in the city of Matsumoto. 
Aum carried out these attacks primarily to taq::et some court officials hearing a 
case against Aum (Hardacre, 1997: 190·192). During this time Aum also 
put·chased a military helicopter, which was kept in one of its compounds, and in 
December they killed a man using VX, a nerve agent that Aum was working on 
(U.S. Senate, 1995: Section 5). 
In March 1995, fearing an impending police raid. Aum senior members carried out 
the attack on the Tokyo underground system during rush hour. Due to the rushed 
production of the sarin and its means of dispersal the effects were not as bad as 
they could have been - Reader (2000: 23). U.S. Senate (1995: Section 5. Part C) and 
~I Peter }:18-20 
" Reader (2()()(): 97·98) questions the commonly held conception that Aum had acce., to 
numerous experts in chemtcal and biological warfar". Whtlst there were significant 
facihttcs to aid in their research the scientists involved werl! wcll ·educated converts as 
opposed to recruited experts (cf. Daly. Parachini and Rosenau, 2005: 10·11). Leitcnberg 
(1999) also states that, contJ'At'Y to popular opinion, Aum never successfully made biological 
weapons. 
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other sources state that there could have been as many as 10,000 casualties. 
Despite using a weaker form of sarin, there were still 12 fatalities and over 3,000 
people were injured. Aum had moved from desiring to save the many, through 
saving just the few, to at~empting to kill the many. 
A Hierarchy of Believers: In, Inner and Really In 
Another striking feature of Aum Shinrikyo was the stark hierarchical structure of 
the organisation. Whilst Allin was unusually successful at converting lay members 
into renunciates (Watanabe (1.998: 81) comments on th is as does Reader (2000: 63) 
who says that 10% gave up their lives and money to join the movement and live in 
Aum retreats), the majority of members remained living in society and this group 
remained on the bottom rung of Aum's spiritual ladder. At the other extreme was 
the core leadership of Aum Shinrikyo, respected throughout the movement and 
extremely devoted to Asahara. All of the people involved in the sarin attack in 
Tokyo came out of this inne1· cadre of believers. When l talk about a group making 
a move to violence. 1 am not arguing that aU membc1·s will make this move at the 
same speed. or indeed ever. Whilst focusing on this aspect of Aum. this is a good 
place also to consider why some members of a 'violent group' may act violently. 
whilst others do not. 
Guests and Shukkesha 
Asahara reacted to the humiliation of the electton defeat (he wasn't even the 
htghest polling Aum candtdate)" by calling an Aum conference on a small island 
and converting a not instgnificant number of Aum members into full renunciates. 
To this end a number of compounds were built whct·c Aum members would be safe 
physically as well as spil'itually (Reader. 1996: 45·6). Whilst the focus within Aum 
had always been on converting members into shukkcshn (renunciates). after this 
stage the organisation paid much less attention to their lay believers. known as 
'guests' CReader. 2000: 86). 
'" ~\unihiro Joyu. Aum's spok~sperson and a pin-u1> for many Ja1>anese girls won the most. 
votes. Joyu served a short Jlrison sentence for land fraud but avoided charges linking him 
10 the violence (Lifton, 2000: 31). As such he is not in prison now and is the !cadet· of Aleph, 
as Aum is now known. 
73 
There is an importanL disLinction between these two groups. in terms of levels of 
commitment to the group. The shukkesha would have renounced all contact with 
family and friends, sold their possessions and donated all their money in order to 
join Aum. In terms of the markers in my study. we would expect to see this 
commitment strongly represented in markers such as Conviction, and No Common 
Ground. Because they had more contact with general society and less personally 
invested in Aum. the lay members would have been. in most cases, less likely to 
have acted on the violent Leachings of Aum than the shukkesha. 
The data in this study comes entirely from members who were shukkeshtl, as Twas 
unable to find any resources from those members who were guests. This means 
that I am unable to test the above suggestion, and see if there were significant 
differences in levels of commitment evidenced in the markers. However, to a 
certain extent there was an apparent difference between the data from the 
leadership and that of the ordinary level shukkeshtl. 
Hierarchy within Aum 
It IS not surprising that there were some apparent differences in the data coming 
out of the leadership (for example from the official publications from Aum) and the 
genera l shukkesha (f1-om the interviews with Murakami (2000) and Mori (1998; 
2001), for example).3• Whilst the general slwkkc:;htl often lived apparently 
mundane lives, as school teachers, engineers, delivery men (all within Aum) for 
example. the leadership were given lllgh·ranking spiritual titles. reinforcing their 
superiority over the rank and {i}e. This spiritual separation is shown in a table. 
compiled by Reader (2000: 87) which shows Asahara as six 'levels' higher than the 
first level of the higher·1·anked renunciates and ten levels higher tha n the novice 
rcnunciates. The non·rcnunciate members of Aum, the lay members, did not even 
figut·c on the scale. 
• However. it should be noted that I have classed the data from these three sources as 
commg from the post·sarin pcrtod and so. in general, have not used it in this chapter. I 
refer to it in my discussion on the move to and from v1olcnce. in Chapter Eight, and also on 
the reliability of ideology in Chapter Nine. I have donr th•s as all of these interviews took 
place after the sarin attncks and so capture statements expressed with the benefits of 
hindsight. which could distort the findings for this chnplCI', where I wanted to focus 
specifically on the violent stage of Aum Shinrikyo. 
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Renunciates could Gn theory) progress up this scale through ascetic practice. The 
award of a new title was evidence of progress, although it could also be felt through 
the attainment of new 'powers'. Kisala (1998: 155) at·gued that it was because of 
the disillusionment of many followers at their failtt1·e to obtain new powers that 
Aum needed to make more fearful predictions of future calamities than many of its 
rivals- in order to give them another reason to stay. 
The upper echelons of the group needed no such encouragement, as they remained 
totally devoted to Asahara (although this was not necessarily a lways so- I have 
already mentioned that Asahara's wife, la ter convicted for her part in some of 
Aum's crimes, was beaten earlier on in the movement's history). While most 
members of Aum were devoted to Asahara, and this comes across s trongly in the 
markers, some showed higher levels of and even extreme devotion. This is shown, 
for exa mple, through some of the ascetic practices they had to undertake to reach 
the elevated spir itual levels, s uch as being buried in an airtight box with no food 
and water for five days (Reader. 2000: 121·4). These extreme practices served both 
to demonstrate the superiority of those who had succeeded at them and to act as a 
barrier to those desiring elevation from the lower levels . 
The set ting of these tasks and the spiritual rewards for succeeding at them ensured 
that many shukkesha remained diligently focused on their spiritual devotions. 
some even after the sar in attacks and the terrible publicity that followed. •• 
Larimer (2002) reported for Time Magazine on Asahara's court case and mentioned 
that the group still claimed it had 1,186 members (though Japanese police 
reckoned there were hundreds more) some of whom turned up to the trial, s till 
devoted to their guru. By 2005 the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency 
(PSTA, 2006) claimed that Aum had 1.650 members. 
The Elite 
The Aum members involved in the sarin attacks were all at the top end of the 
hierarchy. These include people like Tomomitsu Niimi who, according to The 
'
0 See Watanabe (1997) for a summary of the anti ·cult movement and other measu res taken 
against Aum after the sarin gas attacks. 
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Japan Times (1998), even when speaking ro prosecutors during his trial refused to 
betray Asahara. Whilst some of the elite members of Aum. such as Ikuo Hayashi 
(former Aum Minister of Health). regretted their violent actions <Reader, 2000: 
114·5) even they had previous ly displayed an unquestioning devotion to Aum's 
teachings. Hayashi, for example. was one of those who released the sarin gas in 
Tokyo. 
These members had, variously. been with the group since the beginning or 
displayed both an intense desire and ability to develop spiritually. To this elite. 
Asahara preached the Vtljrtlyana path of Buddhism. which enabled them, as the 
sclcc~ few, to reach spil'ituallevels beyond those of ~he rank and file shukkcslw 
(Reader, 2000: 88). The Va1i·ayana path involved intense devotion to the guru 
(Shimazono. 1995: 406). placing one's life within the whims of Asahara's decisions. 
What we see in the elite members of Aum, is once again an increase in the personal 
investment in the teachings of Aum and. therefo•·e !\sahara. As Shimazono (1995: 
407) notes, Asahara had unrestricted power within Aum, to the extent that Reader 
(2000: 69) commented that Aum could be known as an "Asaharan religion". 
Devotion to the guru was important for all members of A urn but it is clear that 
there were differing level of this devotion and commitment and these were linked 
to whether the member was merely 'in' Aum, was part of the more devoted. mner. 
shukkesha. or was 'really in', displaying such intense levels of devotion that they 
wc•·e prepared to kill for Asahara. 
These levels of commitment shouldn't necessarily be measured in terms of length of 
time with a group, but rather by the degree ro which a believer subordinates him or 
herself to the teachings of the group. Where a believer is intensely committed to 
the teachings (as with the elite members of Aum) and where these teachings are 
violent. then it seems highly likely that we will see the individual act violently. 
Such total submission may take weeks, or years, and we could argue that it is only 
in the minority of cases that someone is prepared to totally bypass their innate 
humanity such as to carry out violent actions against another (although Milgram's 
(1974) electric shock experiments would suggest otherwise), but the end result is 
that we can understand how some individuals within groups make this move to 
violence and others, still believers. do not. 
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The tt·ials of the leaders of A urn are still live issues in Japan, with several awaiting 
execution. The group is now led by one of the elite members, the former Aum 
Shinrikyo spokesman, Fumihiro Joyu, and has changed its name to Aleph (2007). 
Despite publicly renouncing violence and apologising for the actions of its members, 
it is still regarded with great suspicion in Japan and considered as a tlu·eat (PSIA, 
2006). As already mentioned, I also conducted an analysis of statements made by 
this stage of the group, which I draw on in Chapters Eight and Nine, however, in 
the following section (unless mentioned otherwise) I discuss the data coded from 
the violent stage of Aum, in order to better understand how Aum made the move to 
violence. 
Marker Analysis 
In all the case study chapters I will discuss the markers in alphabetical order, 
apart from those which I coded little or no data into and which I will explore last. 
The following are the five markers into which I coded the most data in this case 
study: 
(1) External Legitimating Authority 
(2) Emergency Situation 
(3) Violent Tt·aditions 
(4) Symbolic Importance 
(5) Context of Group's Internal Development 
Basic Injustice 
From early on in Aum there was a sense of some injustice, when their initial 
application to become a registered religious organisation was declined. As Reader 
(1996: 36·37) points out, their response to this, to go on the offensive, typified the 
approach they took to most occasions when they felt they had been unfairly treated. 
Certainly, Aum seemed to treat most opposition to their group with a certain 
amount of hurt naivety and saw such cases as further examples of the injustice of 
society against their group. This reached its peak with the elections in 1990 when 
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Aum received unprecedented levels of negative press in the media, with people 
mocking their campaign to such an extent that one academic even expressed his 
sympathy for Aum (Reader, 1996: 43·5). Inside Aum itself, people asked Asahara 
why it was being persecuted: this is one of h is responses (AUM152): 
Master: They have investigated the prophecies, and they are 
persecuting Aum in order to find out if it will be the religion that 
embraces them around 1996 or 1997. They are persecuting Aum to 
see if it is the real Aum. In the meantime, a fierce battle is 
expected. It will be a battle in which one side will have to patiently 
endure the persecution, remain calm under all circumstances. and 
love others from the depths of suffering. These are also battles for 
those who arc religious. I think our ability to behave in this 
fashion, that is, in a way befitting a god, will detet·mine whether we 
can embrace the Freemasons. 
This sense of injustice fed their view of being separated from society and this in 
turn increased the chances of them feeling slighted in new clashes with the wider 
society. Following the election defeat Asahara blamed vote rigging and aired his 
concerns about a dark conspiracy. involving the media, Freemasons (as briefly 
alluded to in the previous quotation) and other forces all mnged against Aum. 
These sentiments are expressed in numerous statements, such as where Asahara 
identifies the role the mass media plays (AUM 151 ): 
The purpose of their plan is to condition the earth in such a way 
that they can conu·ol everything in the direction they desire. For 
example, we may not feel we at·e being controlled in present-day 
Japan, but we a•·e manipulated by the mass media .... And out· 
way of thinking is manipulated by newspapers. television, and 
magazines. They propagate such ideas as. 'This is delicious and 
that is delicious too.' 'This is a bad man and that is a good man.' 
In addition to the basic injusuces suggested by the leaders. many of those who 
joined Aum felt outside of society before they joined (and indeed joined because 
they felt like outcasts) so the feeling of being betrayed by society was one that they 
brought with them." These 'outcasts' found a home within an organisation that, 
from these feelings of injustice increasingly stated the destruction of humanity 
(and the dominant society the members had left) was necessary because of its 
corrupt materialistic obsession (Reader. 2000: 88·91). 
"The testimonials in Aum's own publications (sec Asnhn•·a, 1993) and in external books 
(Murakami. 2000) often mention a feeling of unhappiness with society before joining Aum. 
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Context of Group's Internal Development 
Because Aum Shinrikyo's lifespan (at least in its p1·e·sarin attack manifestation) 
was so short (from 1984 to 1995) and its growth so dramatic, it is easy to see 
important data in its internal development. Reader's (2000) second monograph on 
Aum provides the best account of the internal changes that occurred in Aum and I 
have referred to key incidents that Reader highlighted in my introduction to Aum, 
above. 
However, even away from Reader's excellent analysis the primary texts that I 
analysed provided plenty of evidence of the development of ideas, not least through 
the extensive prophecies of Asahara (so much of which was relevant to this marker 
that it was the fifth most populated marker in this case study). Here are some 
examples: 
I Asahara have mentioned the outbreak of a nuclear war for the 
first time. We have only 15 years before it. (AUM97) 
I have had a particular vision related to water many times. It 
starts with a scene of Tokyo sinking. Some parts of the Japanese 
archipelago gradually sink, and the surface of the sea surrounding 
Japan suddenly rises and engulfs the land. 
I am sure this will come true. Something unusual will occur either 
in 1995 or 1996. (AUM114) 
I have mentioned the apocalyptic statements of Aum many times in this case study, 
justifiably so as they formed such a central component of their beliefs. The above 
two demonstrate some of the variety of means by which disaster would hit 
humankind, according to Asahara. This element to Aum's internal development, 
the constant refiguring and calculation of the end of their world, cannot be 
overstated. It was this continual escalation of a sense of tension and impending 
doom within the teachings of the b'l'oup's spiritual leader which most clearly 
defined the group's internal development. 
Of course there were also statements which did not refer to any kind of apocalyptic 
disaster. Additionally those that did refer to catastrophes often contained or 
implicitly suggested references to the possibility of salvation through Aum. 
However, the overriding message was certainly that humankind's time on ea1·th (as 
enjoyed at present) was limited, and the centrality of this teaching remained 
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ingrained into Aum's renunciates even after the trials for the attacks in Tokyo." 
The sense of urgency these teachings engendered will be dealt with in the 
Emergency Situation marker. but the way that this was escalated through time is 
also a n important theme within this marker. 
In addition to the development of the sacred beliefs of Aum there were a lso 
significant internal events which had an important bearing on Awn's move to 
violence. I mentioned above the accidental death of a renunciate in a cleansing 
ceremony and the resulting development in Aum's teachings about poa. It is 
important to note that this accident took place within an environment that was 
conducive to violent thought. even if until then it had been limited to extreme 
practices coupled with the increasingly negative beliefs that I have mentioned 
above. It is impossible to predict how Aum would have developed without one of 
these two conditions occurring. but it is reasonable to speculate on the necessity of 
these events to the future violent actions Aum undertook. Aum was already 
committed to a violent path before the death of the believer. but this event 
undoubtedly acted as a cata lyst to the development of these beliefs and sped up the 
occurrence of the concomitant actions. 
Unsurprisingly, this death was not mentioned in the ~;tatements of Aum. but it is 
important to remember that these internal developments have an important 
bearing on the future trajectory of a group. Capturing this history, where possible. 
forms part of the essential contcxtualising that must take place alongside these 
case studies. 
Conviction 
That 1.200 members of Aum renounced the world and gave up all theil· worldly 
belongings to live in Aum communes suggests a deep sense of conviction (Reader. 
2000: 8). However, perhaps the best example of t.hc incolltestable nature of this 
conviction to Aum and Asahara is the number of those who even after the Tokyo 
attacks still maintained a defiant loyalty to the g\lru and his movement. A 
significant amount of data was coded into this marker for the study I cond\lcted on 
42 In answer to a question ns to where they will be in 30 yca•·s, a renunciate of Aleph jokes 
that they will be toughing it out with Armageddon (AUMS: 2:oa: 18.6 - 2:oa:33.6) . 
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Aum statements made after the sarin attacks, and, even after the legal trials and 
the persecution by Japanese society, some members assented that they would still 
have followed Asahara's orders to release poison gas, should he have asked. For 
example the following data was coded from one of Mori's documentaries (A UM9: 
15:29.9 - 17:21.6): 
Question: 'So you have to follow the guru's instructions, even if that 
feels intuitively wrong?' 
Answer: 'That's right.' 
Many members left the group after the police raids (Reader, 2000: 225), but as the 
above quotation demonstrated a few retained an unswerving loyalty to Asahara 
whilst others, although more ambivalent, could still not completely disassociate 
themselves from Asahara's teachings, even whilst accepting the truth of some of 
the chru·ges levelled against him. Asked about Asahara's level of responsibility one 
interviewee replied (AUM71: 246·7): 
If he is responsible then he must be judged according to the law. 
But as I said before there is such a huge gap between the Asahara I 
have in my mind and the Asahara T see on trial. .. As a guru, or 
religious figure. he had something very genuine. So I'm reserving 
judgement. 
Whilst this is not an unconditional proclamation of Asahara's innocence this 
statement should be placed in the context of incredible media coverage of the Aum 
affair and indeed of accusations made against Asahara by senior Aum members. 
Tn spite of this, this believer, no longer living within the confines of an Aum 
commune, still refused to condemn his gu1·u. 
I use the above examples from the post·sarin attacks grou p, partly because this 
data·set provided more information di1·ectly from believers (unmediated by official 
spokespeople). but also because their continuing belief is a clear indicator of the 
conviction that many more must have origina lly felt. As a caveat, we should be 
aware that those who still believed in Aum and Asahara at this stage were likely to 
be amongst the more committed believers before the sarin attacks too. 
However, there was also plenty of data from the violent stage of Aum's 
development as well. There were many references to the ascetic practices believers 
undertook. for example (AUM93): 
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On the same day I was ordered to do single·cell practice for a 
month .... I did the one· month practice from April 2 to May 1. 
The master instructed us to practice Chundnli (meditation) four 
times a day for three hours each, namely twelve hours a day. 
During the above practice the follower remained in a room on his own, for one 
month, living on limited food. I mentioned other extreme practices earlier on. and 
the undertaking of these is further indication of the great conviction that members 
had to the group. This strong sense of conviction was found in the upper echelons 
of Aum as well- the above quotation was taken from a statement by Shigeo 
Sugimoto, part of the inner circle of Aum. 
Dichotomous World-View 
From an early stage in its development Aum had a dichotomous world view, one 
which saw its own believers as working towards the salvation of the 'Other' - the 
rest of Japanese societ.y (AUM46: 158). There was a clear demarcation between 
those within Aum - who were spiritually saved, and those without- karmically 
doomed. and there was also a sense of superiority att.ached to this. for example 
(AUM11J): "And there will be confrontation between the gods and ignorant.. 
doubtful beings." As will be discussed in the marker on Symbolic Jmportnncc later. 
such quotations were redolent with the spiritual superiority of Aum membet·s over 
the it· 'Ot.her'. 
As the group became progressively embattled this dichotomous view of society 
became more oppositional as Asahara increasingly referred to an inevitable 
Armageddon event. These predictions raised the stakes for believers. who saw the 
personal consequences of the distinction between Aum members and non·membet·s 
(AUM97: 91): 
... even if nuclear weapons are used, our Astral Bodies stay alive, 
though our physical bodies will be destroyed. If you want to be 
born in this world again. you can do so with a new physical body. 
An emancipated person can do this. If the earth is so devastated as 
to be hopeless, you can be born in another planet. 
Talking about others. however. we can not look on those who 
are burned in agony. We can not think it is a llt·ight if only we are 
happy. 
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The need to save non-believers was increasingly important, just as the reasons for 
this need simultaneously reinforced the significant differences between the two 
sides. As shown in the above quotation, these differences involve supernatural 
powers, but some statements even went so far as to afford Aum believers the status 
of a superior race (AUMI06): 
However, if a higher ideology is employed, and their wisdom is 
exceeded through meditation, then a race of beings who produce a 
superior kind of energy will be the winners, and the world will 
move in a direction corresponding to the intent of these beings. In 
other words, if souls meditate on the great four immeasurable, and 
develop a mind geared toward the salvation of humanity and other 
souls, this meditation will develop a superior form of energy and 
the world will be transformed into the holy heaven of the truth. 
I have highlighted a lot of statements within this study on concerns about a 
forthcoming war, and these clearly point to a dichotomous world view. Within the 
discussion on this marker, I have focused on some of the more positive statements 
which, while talking about how Aum could save the world, nevertheless reinforce 
both the Al·mageddon message and the dichotomy between the two 'sides'. 
However. as we have seen, from being souls to be saved. those not within Aum 
became lives for whom there was no hope. and in whose death lay perhaps their 
only chance of a favourab le spiritual birth (Reader. 2000: 145·6). 
Emergency Situation 
As mentioned in the previous section the sense of urgency within Aum increased 
during the early 1990s and as it did so too did the feeling of an emergency situation. 
Whilst the majority of rank and file members of Aum were not aware of the illegal 
practises of their leaders. they would have been aware of the spiritual and real 
emergency that Aum was facing and their own fear would have fed into the ever· 
increasing reciprocal fear circulating the communities. The following word·cloud 
created from the data coded into this marker shows the pre·eminence of themes 
such as 'Al·mageddon', 'war' and 'nuclear disaster' within Aum's statements (which 
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were so numerous that this marker had the second highest amount of data coded 
into it):•l 
aree armageddon aum .ovold 
111 japan karma law I Ill< It a! I I Ill 
r .. 
'"" IIIII~ 
war ' world year 
Figure 4.1 - Word cloud from Aum texts 
In the closed world of Aum, without recourse to external sources of information 
thnt may have provided a calming barometer of the actua l state of the s ituation, 
this shared sense of emergency would only have strengthened the resolve of senior 
members that their actions were morally legitimated by the dire situation they 
were in. We do know that there was some. albeit forbidden. contact with the 
outside world as mentioned, for example. by one Aum member in an interview after 
the sarin attacks (AUM49: 226). However. such was the strength of the teachings 
about the emergency situation that what information members received was still 
fi ltered through this paranoid paradigm. 
This sense of fear was tied in with the histOrical context of nuclear attacks on 
J apan by the U.S. at the end of the Second World War (AUM95): 
There will be disasters on the scale of the last stages of World War 
II (e.g. atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
massive air raids on Tokyo. the complete destruction of Okinawa. 
the air raids on Osaka and Kobe). And J a t>nn will be completely 
defeated. 
It is important not to underestimate the impact of the nuclear atrocities at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the national psyche in Jnpan such events were not 
merely the domain of science fiction but were also historical fact within living 
memory. Likewise, AU>n also tapped into fears of natural disasters, s uch as 
earthquakes (Japan has a high level of seismic activity), with Asahara (1995: vii) 
claiming that he correctly predicted the Great Hanshin earthquake. for example." 
" The word·cloud was lim1ted to the top fifty most used wordb in the texts coded mto this 
marker. excluding common English linking words. The size of the words indicates the 
frequency of their use. 
•·• 5,000 people died in the co•·thquakc. which struck on the 17th January 1995, many in the 
largo southern city of Kobe. 
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These events were tied into a persistent rhetoric of the end of the world: the 
followmg is a selection of some of the statements made by Asahara in this regard: 
"Ja pa n will rea rm herself in 1993. Then a nuclear war is sur e to 
break out from 1999 to 2003"- May, 1987 (AUM97) 
•· ... This shows that World War ill will have occurred by 2006." -
1988 (AUM37) 
··According to them. Armageddon will occur in 1997." - March. 1993 
(AUM12) 
"Japan will be destroyed in 1998''- March, 1993 (AUM2) 
"If you are able to survive until the year 2000. you will probably 
yearn for the Japan of today because a scorched wasteland will be 
all that is left" - March. 1994 (AUM58) 
From just this small selection we can see the variety of dates on which Asahm·a 
pa·ed ictcd ter rible events would happen, although the three later predictions all 
talk of something happening before the year 2000. It was this relentless talk of an 
Armageddon event, and the steady bringing forward of its date, which was the 
primary cause of the emergency situation within Aum. ,\s the dates for 
Armageddon were moved closer, so the essentially confrontational nature of Aum. 
that already had a tendency towaa·ds violence. intensified and the urgent nat me of 
the situation created a cycle of necessity and justi fi cation for violence. 
External Legitimating Authority 
More data was coded into this marker than any other for this case study. and this 
h igh rate was maintained for the data of the post·Aum group. Aleph. The 
significance of an extemallegitimating authority to the ga·oup is not surprising 
given the total dominanc!' of the group by. and obedience to. Asahara. 
For the most part Aum depended on the teachings of Asahara who was the 
principal (early on. and sole. later on) legitimating spiritual authority within Aum. 
I explain in Chapter Eight how Asahara could be considered to be an extemnl 
legitimating a uthority for Aum, due to his authority (as understood by the 
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believers) transcending this world and the group itself. He reinforced this notion of 
spiritual superiority to the group through the many self·awarded titles and the 
spiritual practises that only he could undertake, such as Shaktipat." Asahara 
remained the principal external legitimating authority for the group even after he 
had been tried and found guilty of involvement in the sarin attacks. 
However. Asahara did also reference both Lord Shiva (whom he claimed to be 
passing messages on for) and the 16<~~ Century seer Kostradamus. For example. 
Shiva apparently chose the name 'Aum Shinrikyo· and told Asahara that only he 
could save the world. Shiva was an important part of worship and focus for vows 
within Aum and Asahara once (in 1991) claimed that he was a manifestation of 
Shiva (Reader, 2000: 66·7). 
Nostradamus was perhaps a more eye-catching influence on the group. being the 
second most referenced source of prophecies after Asahara himself. When 
Nostradamus's teachings wen! translated into Japanese in 1973 the book was an 
instant hit, with neru·ly 150 printings in the first tht·ee months (IGsala, 1988: 144). 
The way the prophecies were written lent themselves to a variety of interpretations 
(145·8) which explains some of their popularity for leaders of religious groups 
looking to use them to authenticate their own teachings. Asahara was no exception 
in this regard and worked on explaining :>!ostradamus's prophecies. such as the 
following example <AUM112): 
Verse fifty· three of Nostradamus's Ccntltt·ics is an important 
passage which often gets quoted. It states. 'The law of the Sun and 
the law of Venus contend with each other. both appropriating the 
spirit of prophesy. Neither will accept the other. The Messiah 
retains the law of the Sun.' This predicts the advent of the age in 
which the law of the Sun (the law of the absolute truth) and the law 
of Venus (the law of hedonistic things such as making money and 
fulfilling worldly desires) clash with each other. 
While a number of prophecies were taken up by many leaders. the '1999 Pt·ophecy' 
(in Century X. Quatrain 72 (Leoni, 2000: 435)) produced perhaps the most interest. 
Asahara was particularly interested in these millenarian prophecies of impending 
disaster. the following being another example (Atnl2): 
"A practise whereby he would imbibe the negative karmn from a believer. He later 
slopped doing this as he said that taking on all this negative energy was making him ill, 
and he allowed a few senior Allin members to take on the pructice on his behalf. 
86 
1\ostradamus said that there will be a great amount of blood shed 
in Japan, and there will be a severe food crisis and water shortage. 
That is the content of the ninety·eighth verse of the fourth chapter. 
Despite this strong dependence on prophecies and especially on Nostradamus's 
verses, from Asahara's writings we see more significance focused on Asahara 
himself in the comments from followers. who mention Asahara appearing in their 
dreams and guiding their actions. The following quotation, as an example of this, 
is from a statement by Shigeo Sugimoto. later sentenced to death for his role in the 
sarin attacks in Tokyo (i\UM93: 201): 
He [Asahara) said to me. 'Look at yourself in a clear mirror. Don't 
do what you might regret later.' His words persuaded me not to 
take a hasty action. (Several days later he guessed rightly when I 
was planning to leave AUM. He had been reading my mind 
completely through his clairvoyant power.> 
This total preoccupation with Asahara. by his followers, was also reinforced 
through rites which undel'lincd the power of Asahnn1's physical body. as refetTed to 
by Reader (2000: 130·1) who comments on ceremonies where followers drank 
everything from Asahara's blood to his bath water. In this way Asahara ensured 
that he was the only legiumating authority that Aum members could turn to and 
that his influence alone guided their moral compass. Such was the authortty of 
Asahara over the entire world·view of Aum's members that, as previously 
mentioned, Reader (2000: 69) claims that Atlln's beliefs could be known as 
'"Asaharan' religion". 
No Common Ground 
For the core of Aum members. the renunciates. the absence of common ground 
between their values and those of the wider society was exacerbated by a lack of 
physical common space in which to conduct any dialogue. Having turned their 
back on society members often would not even talk t~ their family members. and 
had nothing to do with those who used to form a part of and shape their values. 
Render (1996: 36) states thaL. whilst it may be the cnse that later on Aum 
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prevented members from seeing family and old friends. there is strong evidence to 
suggest that in a lot of cases members would have willingly chosen not to meet 
them. 
In addition to this lack of physical common ground the nature of Aum, inward 
looking towards Asahara, made common ideological !,'I'Ound difficult to find. The 
only way that outsiders could find common va lues with Aum members was by 
accepting the teachings of Asahara and undertaking the aesthetic practices to 
further themselves spiritually. Furthermore, the constant development of the Aum 
belief structure (as discussed above) meant that it would have been difficult for any 
outsider to be able to record and study the beliefs in order to find common ground 
and the antipathy of Aum members to other religions and philosophies meant that 
they were unlikely to try. 
This separation between the outside world. and what was going on in the collective 
Aum consciousness was undoubtedly a major factor in allowing the culture of 
paranoin and violence to be cultivated and sustained within the communes. The 
separation itself was justified through the increasing rhetoric of concepts such as 
Shombhnln. sacred communes where the rcnunciates could take refuge from 
soctety <Reader. 2000: 91). 
The success of Aum in encouraging members to renounce the world undoubtedly 
contributed to its closed nature, where the renunciates focused so heavily on life 
within Aum, and not on life on the outside. ror example. one renunciate had the 
following to say (AUM93: 204): 
I found myself being at ease and looking at worldly desires from the 
outside. which had worried me murh until then. I did not think 
anything but just saw worldly desires. At this point my value 
system changed entirely. I lost interest in what 1 had liked and 
had been interested in, and my mind was not affected by anything 
but what I really needed to do. 
Even those members who did not live in communes demonstrated a lack of common 
ground with the surrounding society. For example. the following quotation is 
taken ft-om a believer reflecting on the last ycat· of her training in Aum, and the 
impact it had had on her relationships with others (AUM89: 115): 
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By the way, what has been the most painful to me in the past year 
is to reflect upon my mind. It was very hard and painful to watch 
my own mind and actions controlled only by egoistic ideas such as 
conceit, envy. anger and adherence which continuously came up 
f1·om myself. l hated myself. I avoided meeting people and had th e 
urge to take myself out of existence. 
The strong emphasis on these physical rites. which reinforced the absence of a 
common ground between Aum and their 'Other'. echoes the Durkheimian 
suggestion that ritual can fortify belief. through ascetic practice believers closed 
down potential avenues for discussion or investigation of shared values. Aum's 
core values were absolutely opposed to those of wider Japanese society, with its 
perceived overwhelming favour ing of materialism. and their beliefs a nd •·itua ls 
served to underline this difference. 
Symbolic Importance 
Symbol ic importa nce was given to the actions unclerla kon by Aum through 
Asahara's references to sc•·iptu•·es ancl prophecies. These references came f•·om as 
early as 1985 when Asahara travelled to a mountain associated with an apoca lyptic 
vision by a pre·war nationalist (Sakai Katsutoki) who said that a leader from 
.Japan would save the world from Armageddon at the end of the century. 
Apparently Asahara met a man who had been with Katsutoki. He informed 
As11hara that it would be a race of 'benevolent shinsC'n people' who would survive 
Armageddon (Reader, 1996: 89). Asahara subsequently adopted 'shinsen' (meaning 
mountain wizard or hermit) into Aum Shinsen no Kai. the name Aum Shinrikyo 
had before 1988. As already mentioned. Biblical references also featured heavily: 
for example. Asahara likened both Aum and himself to Christ (Hardacre. 1997: 185: 
I 87·8). 
Purthcr symbolism came from Buddhists texts such as the Kalacakl·a Tantm which 
Reader (2001: 91} tells us m~ntions a sacred valley called Shambhala from whm·e a 
Buddhist !Gng will triumphantly lead the forces of good against the forces of evil. 
Shnmbhala was the name giVen to the communes that Aum planned from 19 
onwards (Hardacre. 1997: 188), and to which its members were tO retreat to wait 
out the final battle (Reader. 1996: 46}. 
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However. it was apocalyptic imagery which, unsurprisingly. featured most strongly 
in the data coded for this marker (which contained the fourth highest amount of 
data in this case study). In some cases the statements coded related to Asahara 
explaining the symbolic importance of prophecies, fot· example those of 
Nostradamus (AUM108): 
'England will exist without the sea' means that a land bridge will 
be formed between continental Europe and the territory of England. 
Various miracles on a great scale will begin to occur at this time. 
Miracles will begin to happen around 1998. 
Miracles and signs formed a la rge part of this discussion and they acted as portents 
of forthcoming change and disaster. such as the end of England. which is 
prophesied in a statement of which the above quotation is an excerpt. These 
prophecies were often used to state the spiritual superiority of Aum's beliefs 
(AUM117): 
Armageddon will be caused with the aim of creating two separate 
categories of human beings: those who possess the characteristics of 
gods and those who possess the characteristics of the three lower 
states of existence. Armageddon will happen on account of this. 
In this quotation. it is clear to see the symbolism relating to the followers of Aum 
Shinrikyo (possessing the characteristics of gods) and their 'Other' (possessing the 
characteristics of lower beings). lt also gives a purpose for the impending 
apocalypse. Such symbolism would reassure followers of Aum that Armageddon 
was happening with a rcnson, and that they were on the right side. It would fortify 
their conviction that the actions they had taken. and would be asked to take. were 
justified and this is a good example of the efficacy of giving a sense of symbolic 
importance to the present action. 
Violent Traditions 
References to violent traditions within the statements of Aum were common in 
most of the pre·attack documents that I studied, and this marker had the third 
highest amount of coded data. Much of the detail which falls within this mat·kcr 
can nlso be found within some of the other markers, such as the Context of Croup's 
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Internal Development. This is because Aum 'imported' some of its 'traditions' 
during its rapid development. 
This point highlights the fact that traditions, myths and memories do not 
necessarily have to be part of the group's historical development but can simply be 
claimed by the gt·oup. T do not judge whether or not the traditions mentioned here 
are consistent or even validly claimed by Aum. What is important is that the group 
acquired these traditions and in doing so further developed and supported the 
sacred boundaries which shaped the nature of their conflict. 
Aurn accessed violent traditions from a number of different sources. The 
interpretation of Japanese a nd Tibetan Buddhism which Aum largely started with 
was not without some violent tendencies nor indeed were some of the Hindu 
influences. Although Reader (2000: 61) mentions that the idea of destruction in 
Aum's name should be set within the context of the destruction of evil, as opposed 
to wanton destruction, this still suggests violent imagery and of course the 
definition of 'evil' within this context is still open for discussion. 
However, it was the use of Christian imagery which contributed most to the violent 
traditions of Aum. Words such as 'Armageddon', prophecies around the year 2000 
and texts dealing with the role of the 'Christ' all cropped up regularly in the later 
teachings of Asahara. This suggests a deep engagement with the ideas of 
millennialist Ch,;stian ideologies, even if only a selective use of them. For example, 
note that A urn did not bonow from Christian teachings on love and forgiveness, 
but rather purely on At·mageddon. 
Equally, the Buddhist idea of karma was often used quite selecti vely to talk a bout 
the negative results of the curren t actions of individuals and societies (AUM145): 
War occurs periodically. Why? Because of the law of karma. It 
dictates that one can no longer continue living in the human world 
when one's karma s urpasses a certain point. Thus according to the 
law of karma, a great war, Armageddon. will1·esult. 
This selective use of varying religious traditions demonstrates that often what is 
impor tant is not the somce of particular traditions, but how these traditions a re 
interpreted by the group. The concept of karma is not inherently violent, but, as 
shown above, in Aum's interpretation it forms part of the violent t raditions of the 
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group. This violent interpretation betrays the intent and milieu of the group's 
beliefs and is one of the clearest indicators of Aum's violent worldview. 
Wider Struggle 
It is very clear that Aum saw itself as the 'good' half of a cosmic struggle. The 
groups associated with the forees of evil were ranged from the Freemasons. to State 
actors (England and the U.S .. for example). the media and other less well·defined 
factions. This conflict was the outcome of negatively accumulated karma and 
would lead to various calamitous events (AUM98). Aum's members were left in no 
doubt that this was an endgame played out between evil 'Others' and themselves. 
The wider struggle was also played out between other forees which were opposed to 
Aum (AUM105: 306), and in this case Asahara portrayed Aum as an innocent 
bystander to the predicted apocalyptic conflagration. However. in other cases. Aum 
was seen as working in dil·ect opposition to some fo1·ces which represented values 
diametrically opposed to those of Aum. For example. in an interpretation of one of 
Nostradamus's prophecies (mentioned above in the discussion on the External 
/..e[!itimating Authority marker). Asahara pits Aum against those who desire 
hedonistic things (AUMtt2). 
As with all the groups I have conducted case studies on, Aum also included people 
who weren't membe•·s of Aum. as being on 'their side'. for example (AUM 151: 311): 
ln the case of Bagwan Sri Rajneesh. some of his teachings were 
erroneous. but there were good teachings as welL He was 
persecuted and killed because he wanted to unite the world. 
In this case. it is interesting to note that Asahara cites the founder of the group 
behind the only successful bio·terror attack on U.S. so il (Lindholm, 2002). This 
point aside, we see how Aum broadened out both sides of the wider struggle it saw 
itself as a part of. The solution to this conflict was. according to Aum, as follows 
(AUM97: 88): 
If a perfected or nearly perfected person spreads the teachings of 
AUM. saying, ·']'he teachings of AUM is like this,' [sic] and 'The root 
of the truth is AUM,' a conflict will be avoided. 
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For Aum, the simple truth of the situation, the wider struggle that the world found 
itself facing, was that only they and their teach ings could save the world. 
Markers not discussed above 
Some of the markers presented little or no information. These are discussed here. 
No data was coded into any of the following markers during this case study: 
• Followers Differ from Leader 
• Involvement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence 
• No Justice Available in System 
• Question of Authority 
• Recourse to Sacrificial/ Judicial Processes 
However. some data was coded into the Followers Differ from Leaders marker 
when l conducted the case study on statements made by Aum after the sarin 
attacks. These findings are included in my discussion on the reliability of ideology 
in Chapter Nine. This point aside, it is. perhaps. not surprising that I could not 
find any data LO code into the above markers. With its severe focus on loyalty to 
Asahara. l would not expect to find much data in the Followers Differ from Leader 
and Question of Authority markers. 
Perhaps of most interest is that I did not find any data •·elating to the In volvement 
in the Cyde of Reciprocal Violence mat·kcr. C iven that Au m saw itself as on the 
receivtng end of a significant amount of persecution. and as acting within the wider 
symbolism of a struggle between good and evil forces. it is surprising that they did 
not feel it necessary to retaliate against pc•·ccived wrongs. Of course. some of their 
actions suggest that they did feel this way. for example th!.! sarin attack m 
~latsumoto. This. therefore. is a good example of where context (in this case with 
the benefit of hindsight) can be applied to the study of a group. The absence of 
data in this marker docs not detract from what are clenr indications of violence in 
the other markers but. given Aum's actions. I would have expected to have seen 
some indication of a stated desire for revenge. 
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Small amounts of data were coded into the following markers, but either in 
insufficient amounts for decisive analysis. or what was coded appeared of lesser 
significance. I have, however, discussed any notable points below. 
• Against Violence 
• Context of Group's Origin/Development 
• Desire for Social Change 
• ~o Innocent 'Others' 
• Personal Benefit 
There was only one statement which explicitly asserted that Aum's teachings were 
against violence (AUM97: 88): "Their preachments will deny killing, violence, and 
wars." In one other statement, Asahara suggested (but did not claim outright) that 
Aum should refrain from violence (AUM152): 
It will be a battle in which one side will have to patiently endure 
the persecution, remain calm under all circumstances, and love 
others from the depths of suffering. These are also battles for those 
who are religious. I think our ability to behave in this fashion, that 
is, in a way befitting a god. will determine whether we can embrace 
the Freemasons. 
Placed against the violent subtext of the majority of Aum's statements, the above 
quotations do not signify a consistent desire for peaceful action. Overall, I only 
coded th1·ee statements to the Against Violence marker. 
The two significant statements coded for the Context of Croup's 
Origin/Development marker both related to important issues in the history of 
Aum's development. However. these motifs were not repeated as much as I 
expected so. whilst I think they still had some bearing on how Aum's beliefs moved 
to violence, it does not appear to have been a significant issue. 
The first issue was that of media bashing, which as mentioned earlier in the 
Chapter did reach epidemic proportions after Aum's failed election bid. This 
certainly constituted part of the basic injustices A urn felt levelled against them. but 
in the overall context of their statements was not mentioned that often. This 
demonstrates that, to some extent. other issues were more important to their move 
to violence than the media bashing. The other issue coded into this marker was 
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that of the nuclear attack against J a pan during the Second World War. However, 
again, whilst playing a role, this historical context does not (in the overall scheme 
of things) seem to have been particularly significant in Aum's move to violence. 
A disproport ionate a mount of the data for the Desire for Social Change marker 
came from one source (AUM97). This speech by Asahara spoke of the need to 
change the world in to a more positive place through spreading Aum's teachings, 
which he repeats the beneficial aspects of several times. In this instance, their 
desire for social change was to increase the number of spiritually emancipated 
peoples, thus reducing the instances of war and violence. Outside of this 
motivational speech, thet·e were some references to the desire to help others 
overcome personal issues. However, there was no overriding desire for social 
change other than within the context of avoiding the predicted Armageddon. 
Only one statement was coded into the No Innocent 'Othe1:s'marker (AUM58): "It 
is those of you here a nd other Japanese people who have not yet awakened to the 
truth. who are leading Japan to such a state." This ascription of fault to all those 
who weren't in Aum is clear, but there was less data relating to this marker than I 
would have expected given the nature of some of their actions. 
Reader (2000: 151), for example, points out that in the Sakamoto and Taguchi 
killings•• (the first external to Aum, the second internal) Aum had "transformed its 
vision of a sacred s truggle against the forces of evil into a fight against anyone who 
threatened Aum's continued well-being and who therefore was deemed to be the 
enemy." Society itself was aligned with these evi l forces. as they were ignorant of 
the true path to salva tion. and only concerned with greedy. mater ialistic ways and 
therefore they deserved 'posing' (194). 
Practical examples of this point of view can be seen in the sarin attacks in 
Matsumoto and Tokyo which, unlike direct action taken against perceived or rea l 
enemies (such as Sakamoto or unhappy renunciates), were always going to affect 
'innocent' targets. One former Aum member recollected the attempts to release 
chemical agents in 1990, 1993 and the final Tokyo attack in 1995 (quoted from 
Lifton, 2000: 87): 
·•• Sakamoto was the anti·Aum lawyer who Aum murdered, along with his wife and infant 
son. Taguchi was killed following his expressions of anger at the accidental death of his 
friend, Ochi during an ascetic practice (as mentioned earlier in the chapter). 
95 
In this way the guru's salvation changed from salvation by means 
of enlightenment and liberation in this life to salvation in the 
future by the means of poa ... 
Therefore. whilst there was not a significant amount of data coded into this marker, 
the issue of No Innocent 'Others'is still an important consideration within this 
case study. 
The possibility of obtaining personal benefits through spiritual practice was an 
undoubted draw for many believers. However, this did not form a significant 
proportion of their teachings. Where it was mentioned, it was primarily in cases of 
how people could avoid the impending apocalypse, by creating a new physical body 
or being able to seek rebirth on another (unaffected) planet for example (AU}.197: 
91). The lack of data in the Personal Benefit marker probably reflects a desire to 
downplay the possibility of personal benefits in a direct sense, as many believers 
started to become dismayed at their inability to quickly develop new spiritual 
powers . That said, the promised avoidance of destruction through Armageddon 
that Aum promised is. in any t·egard. a profoundly pct·sonal benefit. However, this 
was reinforced less often than expected. 
Conclusion 
The swift development of Aum Shinrikyo, from ostens ibly peaceful yoga group. to 
violent cult. is atypical of a group's move to violence. In many ways this case study 
suggests themes found in the other case studies in this research. but in a mot·e 
concentrated form. These themes will be combined and compared with those from 
the other case studies to form a more rounded analysts m Chapters Eight and Nine. 
However. at this stage it is worth highlighting some of the key themes that have 
arisen during this study. l~irstly. there is the intense focus on Asahara. which ties 
in with some of the characteristics of other l'\ew Religious Movements (NRMs) both 
violent and non·violent (Melton and Bromley. 2009: 32·3) (1\~Rl-ls being a class of 
cult/sect that Aum can be labelled as. outside of the specifically Japanese ·new l'\ew 
Re ligion· typology). Aum reacted against the greater personal freedoms of 
modernity by creating an austere environment which stt·essed harsh physical 
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practices and intense personal devotion to an over-arching meaning system. 41 This 
ties up with a n understanding of religious extremism by Marty and Appleby (1991) 
who state that it is the development of a reaction against modernity. However, 
although they would exclude Aum Shinrikyo from being a proper religious example, 
it is clear that Aum still displays similar characteristics. 
While the teachings of Aum are less cleru· on issues of personal morality than other 
groups I have reseru·ched, there was still a strong emphasis on denial of physical 
pleasures. This was, however, done less on a point of morality and more as part of 
the path to spiritual emancipation. Tn this case, we have a less clear idea of the 
mapping of sacred values in relation to ethical beliefs. Where we do get a more 
apparent idea of the outlines of sacred beliefs is in relation to the areas of an 
Eme1-gency Situation. External Legitimating Authority and Violent Trc1ditions. In 
all three of these markers we saw an abundance of clearly defined violent 
tendencies, examples of which ru·e useful data with which to compare against the 
findings of the other case studies to assess the strengths of the matrix as a tool for 
assessing and predicting violence. With this in mind, I now turn to my next case 
study, another well-known example of a violent religious group: al Qaeda. 
"Dawson (1998) high lights some of the problems with the common tendency to frame 
discussions of NRMs within a limiting relationship to modernity/post-modernity. However 
whilst situating Aum in relation to modernity I do so within a broader context than just ' 
this suggested dichotomy. 
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5. Case Study - AI Qaeda 
Introduction 
With no or little effective central leadership function and rare opporturuties for 
physical interaction between its members. al Qaeda could be seen more as a 
network (or database) than a group (Kepel. 2004b: 6). This issue will be discussed 
latet· in this chapter, but it is important to note at this stage that al Qaeda is part 
of a wider Isla mist movement. and while this chapter will focus on al Qaeda I wi ll 
also be showing the move to violence as a trajectory on which al Qaeda is placed 
towards the end. as opposed to beginning of a wider movement. 
This case study will allow me to address the movement of religious ideology 
through time and space via its relationship with contemporaneous power 
structures within a much bt·oader time·span than my other case studies allowed. 
AI Qaeda's claims for a global Ummah are rooted in a long struggle between the 
Muslim world and Western countries, who seized power from its ruling elites 
during the colorual expansion of the eighteenth century and aided the demise of the 
Ottoman empire in the early twentieth century (Fieldhouse. 2006: 36·66: Lewis, B. 
2002). Nationalist revolutionary movements succeeded the colonialists only to be 
challenged later by Isla mist movements (Kepel, 2004a: Lewis, B. 1994). Thus, the 
Islamic world's relationship to power has seen significant shifts from insider to 
outsider status during these periods. with the cummt violent Islamist groups again 
seeing themselves as outsiders pursuing the right to rule. 
Alongside these power struggles the ideological and geographical space of the 
Muslim world has contracted and expanded dramatically. Whilst less than a 
centut·y after the death of Muhammad Islam's influence reached from Spain to the 
Creat Wall of China (Waines. 1995: 33; 175·184), by the early twentieth century 
the last Caliphate had declared itself a republic and was installing secular values 
(Toprak. 1984: 120-2). Alongside the evaporation of ~luslim borders, the sacred 
boundaries of Islamic ideology were under attack as Christian. Hindu and secular 
identities imposed themselves into previously Islamic places of discourse as, indeed, 
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Muslims found themselves living within secular/Christian countries previously 
understood as Dar el Harb (Land of War).•• 
In all of these changes through time, the underlying structures giving rise to group 
identity and belief remain the same. Rituals and taboos are preserved alongside 
the creation of new mythologies and histories. AI Qaeda has referenced the 
histories of British retreat in Afghanistan (ALQL37: 159), and the sacred histories 
of an Islamic caliphate (frequently in reference to Iraq, as in ALQ70: 254), 
alongside its preservation of commonly-held Muslim beliefs and rituals. 
In this chapter 1 will illuminate some of this detail in t•elation to a l Qaeda through 
a brief treatment of the broader move to violence of which a! Qaeda is a part. '!'his 
discussion will form the first part of the chapter. in which I will look successively at 
the movement through tdentity (the turn to nationalism). religion (the turn to 
lslamism). the expansion of ideological space (the turn to global Islamism). and 
finally the violent actions of the Isla mist movement (the turn to violence). In the 
second part of this chapter I will undertake an analysis of the data, using the 
matrix ofmru·kers to highlight and investigate the significant social forms that aid 
our understanding of the move to violence. 
lslamism and the Turn to Violence 
The turn to nationalism 
It is important not to confuse the discussion of a move to violence with a 
chronological discourse of the Isla mist movement: violence has played a role at 
many stages throughout the history of the Jslamist movement, but in order to limit 
the discussion in this study to a manageable level I am focusing on the acts of 
violence committed by a l Qacda. Lawrence (1991: 142·4) and Donner (1991: 48-59) 
both draw attention to the role violence played in the early years of Islamic 
"Waines (1995: 258) refers to problems from this coii3 J>S~ of ideological borders liS Islam 
hod never dealt with how Muslims were w live as minorities - it was always assumed they 
lived within Dar el l slam (Land of Islam), which did not overlap with its opposite Dnr el 
Hnrb. 
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expansion. and this attention is often replicated in less sensitive treatments of 
Islam which see it primarily as a religion of the sword (e.g. Huntington, 2002). 
Tn India. the advent of British rule meant that large numbers of Muslims found 
themselves out of power and living in minority communities and this led to the rise 
of the Deobandi <Metcalf, 1982: 87·137) and Tabligh movements and also latterly to 
the writings of Maududi, who had so much influence on the Tslamist movement in 
Pakistan and beyond. Tabligh Jamaat was created to help Muslims living in 
minority communities recover their devotion to Islam by living according to a 
literal interpretation of the life of Muhammad (Kopel, 2004a: 44·5). Howevc1·. 
whilst the 'l'abligh movement shunned poli tical involvement. the Deobandis, also 
set up to help minority· Muslims in the Raj <Metealf, 1982: 11) and following a 
conservative interpretation of Islam. were politically active (Repel, 2004a: 44·60). 
Alongside these movements support was gaining for independence from the 
colonial masters and, whilst nationalism could be said to be an un· Islamic 
construct, different nationalist identities were nevertheless being constructed 
(Sa•·da•·. 2003: 82·4). 'l'he newly independent governments oversaw a period of 
significant population Ul·banisation and expansion. and were seen to structmc 
themselves along Western lines (Kepel. 1994: 193·4). 
Towards the end of the 1960's. however. the nationalist governments faced 
increasing opposition, especially following their failures in the 1967 and 1973 Arab· 
Israeli wru·s and the 197 1 su~'Cession of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Repel (2004b: 
60·62) argues that out of this crisis. and coupled with increasing poverty and the 
first post·independence genera Lion coming of age, ls lnmism provided an attmctive 
alternative ideology to nationalism. 
The turn to tslarnism 
The Egyptian Sayyid Qutb sought a radical break with the nationalist government 
of E!,'YPt (Repel. 1985: 53) and has since been recognised as a pre·eminent 
influence on the modern Isla mist movement (Haddad. 1983: 67: Khatab, 2006: 1·3). 
His writings. influenced by Maududi before him. reached the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and encouraged lslamists throughout the region to seek a pan·lslamic, 
rather than national, identity. For example. Qutb (2001: 35) said: 
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The soil of the homeland has, in itself. no value or weight. From 
the Islamic point of view, the only value which the soil can achieve 
is because on that soil Allah's authority is established and Allah's 
guidance is followed; and thus it becomes a fortress for the belief, a 
place for its way of life to be entitled the 'homeland of Islam,' a 
center for the total freedom of man. 
In many ways Qutb symbolises the turn from nationalism to Islamism. He was 
originally an ardent champion of the post· Independence government. but his initial 
support waned and his disillusionment with the nationalist ideals grew even 
further following British policies in the Second World War and a visit to the U.S. 
which he perceived to be gt·catly immoral (Haddad, 1983: 69·73; Kepe l, 1985: 40·1; 
Calvert, 2000). His subsequent s hift towards Is lam ism was marked by a number of 
mflucntial texts focusing on Is lam. culminating in the publication of his most 
significant work. Milestones. shortly before he was hanged by the Egyptian 
government (Kepel. 1985: 42·3).•• 
In his Isla mist writings Qutb increasingly emphasised the purity of Islam as a 
system. He stressed the need to rid Islamic practice of outside influences such as 
those brought in by the Islamic philosophers (who developed ideas of uqh in 
conjunction with ideas gained from Greek philosophy) as well as from the pressures 
of modern Western societies (Haddad. 1983: 76: Kepel, 1985: 51). He (Qutb. 1989: 
14·17) outlined a strong demarcation between the world of Islam (the Ummoh) and 
the world of ignorance (which he termed Jahiliyyn), and labelled every state not 
t·u lcd according to Slwni1 'h as non· Islamic. even if the majority of its citizens were 
Muslims (148·152).110 The duty of every Mus lim was. then, to radically change the 
political system so that it was governed according to the principles of Shario 'h. 
While Qutb (1989: 109·110) did not believe that all people should be forced to 
become Muslims, he did argue that all non· Islamic systems of government should 
be ovet·thrown. This makes a n important point: that Is lam should not just be a 
system of belief. but actually a system of governance of every area of people's 
lives. 
•• 'Mile.9tones was also r>ublishcd ns 'Signposts. 
"' Kepel (1985: 44) says that ';nhiliyyo' is actuaUy more analogous to the word 'barbaric', 
''cfcrring as it does to the state of the Arabic peoples before the Prophet came. when they 
lived in ignorance of God. 
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In 1979 one country managed to realise this goal. The Shia revolution in Iran saw 
a religious leader replace the Western·favoured Shah. The Islamic Revolution sent 
shock waves throughout the Muslim world, and established a religious power that 
shook the Saudi Arabian hegemony over international Islamic identity (Kepel, 
2004a: 118·123). Another important event in the dateline of the Isla mist 
movement occurred in this year. when the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. 
Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries were only too happy to allow their 
revolution· minded trouble makers. emboldened by Khomeini's success, to answer 
the call to jihad against the Soviets (Kepel, 2004a: 137). Among them was the 
young Osama bin Laden (Gunaratna, 2002: 23), and the man who would become 
his mentor, Abdullah Azzaro (Saghi, 2008: 18). 
The two men came from radically different backgrounds- Osama was a scion of a 
billionaire building magnate. who in addition to holding most of the royal contracts 
in Saudi Arabia had also re·constructed Islam's three holiest sites. in Mecca. 
Medina and Jerusalem (Bergen, 2001: 41·5). Azzaro came from northern Palestine 
and had been involved with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation a nd fought in the 1967 war against Israel following the 
annexation of the West Bank (Gunaratna, 2002: 24: McGregor, 2003: 93). He was 
well·versed in Islamic law, having received a Bi\ in Sharia 'h from Damascus 
Umversity. and is considered to be the ideological father of al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 
2002: 15). 
i\ reliable go· between for Saudi funding for the Afghan jihad, Azzam also s pread 
his message to funders on several trips to the U.S. O<cpel. 2004a: 144·5: McGregor, 
2003: 105). Quoting freely from the mediaeval scholar ibn Taymiyya and the 
teachings of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, Au.am popularised the concept of 
Islamic armed struggle and internationalised it, developing it beyond the 
nationalist (Egyptian) model he found in Sayyid Qutb <McGregor, 2003: 92·8) and 
the traditional concerns of Palestine and Afghanistan (Kepel, 2004a: 144·6). 
Between 1987 and 1988 he conceived of al Qaeda as a means of utilising the 
mujahidin who had fought in Afghanistan. to use them as a reactionary force 111 
future conflicts." The plan centred around a database of contacts. called ol Qnedo 
•• S11ghi (2008= 19) states that bin Laden and Azzam devised this r>lan tOgether, whilst 
Cunnratna (2002= 28·29) states that Azzam alone drew up the initial plans. 
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(the [data)base). from which descriptive term the subsequent name stuck (Kepel, 
2004a: 315)."' 
The turn to global lslomism 
Alongside the United States. who put in S3billion to the jihadist effort in 
Afghanistan, another key funder was Saudi Arabia (Bergen. 2001: 68). Private 
fundraising and donations from individuals such as bin Laden (Saghi. 2008= 17: 
Bergen. 2001: 56) were supplemented by donations from the government (Kcpcl, 
2004a: 142·4). The role of the Saudi state as financer of global Islamic issues was 
already well established. as argued by Kepel (2004a: 72) and Birt (2005). Their 
religious ideology. Wahhabism, was a conservative branch of Islamic belief that, 
through financing from petro·dollars. had been exported to Muslim commumties 
throughout the world. Whilst there is some debate about how ·fundamentalist' the 
movement's founder. ibn Wahhab, was (DeLong· Bas, 2004= 193·229). there is no 
doubt that Wahhabism wns a much stricter interpretation of Islam than thnt found 
in many other countries. Keen to suppress internal dissension and cement their 
place internationally as the keeper of Islamic identity. it was this conservative 
ideology that Saudi Arabm exported to mosques and community centres. and that 
spread through debate and d1ssemination world-wide. 
Despite the spread of mo1·c conservative forms of Islam through Wahhabism, 
Tabligh and other Deobandi movements. Islam ism did not enjoy g~·eat success. 
Kepel (2004a: 231·6) points out that their one apparent success was the Tali ban in 
Afghanistan. even though it was a failure as a state with most central government 
functions failing or non·existcnt. Kepel (200-la) and Roy (1994) argue that the 
Isla mist movement is failing. or indeed has failed. Their analysis is predicated on 
how Islamism (defined as a political movement) has failed to connect both the 
pt·oletariat and bourgeoisie within its countries of operation (Kepel, 2004a: 361·3). 
While the movement does seem to have failed to ignite populat· Muslim opinion 
(Sardar (2003a: 85·86) points to its minority status within Islam). Kcpel's (2004a) 
suggestion that the movement is finished seems premature. Further. despite 
Kepel's intelligent and nuanced reading of Islam ISm. it docs seem surprising that 
" 1'hc dat.abase is given various different names. but all contain 'a! Qacda'. for example 
l.awrcncc (2005: xii) refers to it as Sijil!a!-Qaeda (Rcgistct· of the Base) and Saghi (2008: 
19) as Qaedat al·Mo1umllt. 
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his central works have focused so much on Islam without talking about religion. 
Whilst 'lslamism' is commonly understood to be a political movement (Roy, 1994: 
vii). it undeniably draws its central identity from a religious interpretation of the 
world. Although this understanding may well be based on a misinterpt·etation of 
Islam (Sardar, 2003a: 85), I nevertheless believe that these religious underpinnings 
require a richer reading of the social structure of the movement than Kepel's 
analysis provides. 
The turn to violence 
The turn to violence within the Tslamist movement was undoubtedly influenced by 
frustrations with the nationalist agenda of the governments and the effect their 
policies had on the urban poor and marginalised middle·class (Kepel. 2004a: 66·7). 
However, whilst these basic mjustices may well have served as a catalyst. the 
resources for justification and motivation of this violence came from religious 
sources. These issues arc drnwn out in the analysis of markers in the second pat·t 
of this chapter. 
This turn to violence had met with positive results within Afghanistan. However. 
following the withdrawal of the Soviet army. the Afghans were keen to see the back 
of the foreign jihadists - also known as the 'Afghan Arabs' (Raphaeli. 2002: II) -
and they retul'lled to their home countries. They took with them the networks, 
skills and most importantly ideology, which they had Required whilst in 
Afghanistan. Re·establishing these groups within their home countries, they 
became a source of irritation {or worse) to their governments and were pressured 
into exile or underground {Kepel. 200-la: 299). Bin Laden. for example. left Saudi 
Arabia after denouncing the government particularly when Saddam Hussein's 
invasion of Traq had led to a governmental invitation to the U.S. to station troops 
within Saudi Al·abia (Gunlu·atna, 2002: 36·9). 
Working against their governments. the jihadists' violetlt ideologies inspired 
conflicts in Egypt, Algeria. Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Thwarted in their 
intentions to overthrow the 'near enemy' (governments. such as Egypt's, which 
were perceived as nationalist/secularist. as decried by al Zawahiri's Ezyptinn 
lslnmic Jibad(al Zayyat, 2004: 61·2)). they tumed their attentions to the next 
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available outlet, the 'far enemy', the West. Bin Laden in particular encouraged al 
Zawahiri and al Qaeda to focus on the United States (al Zayyat, 2004: 68·70). 
Others focused on Russia as the inheritor of the Sov1et Union (Gerges, 2005: 58). 
Rega1·dless of the target, there was still a common theme amongst global jihadists 
as one branch of the ls lamist movement (Gerges, 2005: 1-3): the 
internationalisation of jihad. and the exportation of violent means to <re)achieve a 
global Ummah. It is to the effects of this international expansion that I now turn. 
Dlasporas and the Turn to Violence 
Move to the West 
I have already referred to a lack of consideration of the religious element within 
d1scussions of the Isla mist movement. Specific attention to religious elements has 
often been absent or supplementary to political and cultural issues in academic 
discourse in many fields a nd McLoughlin and Zavos (forthcoming) note that ca •·ly 
studies of Asian diasporas in Britain also lacked sophisticated accounts of 1·eligion. 
However. this situation has changed and McLoughlin (2009) has recently 
summarised some of the roles religion has been seen to play in accounts of 
diasporic communities. Prev1ous recent examples of authors giving proper 
consideration to religion mclude Cesari and McLoughlin (2005) and Philip Lewis 
(1994). Lewis has later a•·gucd that whilst religion has now been recognised. it is 
incol'l'ectly utilised as an csscntialised concept (2008: xiii), a concern echoed in 
Cagla1· (1997). That caveat aside. the role of religious belief. ritual and identity, 
arc now seen as important factors when it comes to the socialisation of individuals 
within diasporas. 
These diasporas have been formed over a period of time and with different 
motivations. In Britain thc1·e was a n influx of immigrants from all over the 
Commonwealth following the Second World War to meet a labour shortfa ll . 
particularly in heavy industry. and as such the positions were often filled by 
unskilled. poorly waged labourers <Lewis. P. 1994: 16-7). The Muslims amongst 
this movement came mainly from the poorer regions of Pakistan (and what became 
Bangladesh in 1971). The British approach to inumgrant identity was different to 
European approaches. with the British government not forcing assimilation into 
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U.K. culture <Lewis, P. 1994: 3). This could well be because within Britain the idea 
of ethnic identities (English/Jrish/Scottishl\Velsh) co·extsting with state identities 
(United Kingdom/Great Britain) was already firmly entrenched. so the idea of 
Indian British or Pakistani British identity fitted within a pre·existing framework 
(Kepel. 1997: 98·9). 
However. for France the approach towards immigration (for Muslims, mainly from 
the Mahgreb) was substantially different. as they sought the assimilation of all 
incomcrs within a national French identity. The creation of sacred space, symbols 
and identity separate ft·om the typologies provided by the secular state was 
discouraged. Within the U.S. the situation was different again: whilst they 
adopt.cd an approach similar to British multiculturalism. their immigrant Muslim 
communities came from more diverse and. often, educated backgrounds."' 
Consequently this population has not suffered the same level of economic and 
educational deprivation as thctr counterparts in the U.K. and France. The other 
significant development in the U.S. was that of the Black African· American 
Muslim community, which grew out of the history of American apartheid and Black 
povet·ty and which developed a distinctive and separate identity ft·om that of the 
traditionally Islamic countries and related diasporas (Kepel, 1997: 3·5). 
As the second generation of Muslim immigrants have come of age they have 
culturally identified less wtth their ethnic heritage and more with their country of 
birth (Ramadan. 2002: 159· 160). This blurring of cultural and ethnic identities has 
had significant consequences when allied with, in the U.K. and France, a sense of 
separation from the majority ethnic groups who have enjoyed greater access to 
education. wealth and power. It is claimed that institutionalised racism, coupled 
with economic deprivation. has led young Muslims to find their identity prtmarily 
in an affiliation to Islam (Kepel. 1997: 150; Freedman 2004: 9: Werbner. 2004: 906· 
7: Brighton, 2007: 8·9). This intcr·ethnic Islamic identity has been encouraged by 
the s pread of international Mus lim movements, such as the Deobandis and 'l'abligh 
i·Jamaat, which spread the sact·ed ideological boundaries of their interpreta tion of 
'' :lluslim immigration to thc U.S. has had several di.tmct waves but. as Haddad and 
Smith (1994: xx) have pointed out. there was a significant tnflux of professional and skilled 
immtgrants during the 1950s and 1960s. This accounts for •orne of the difference m 
comparison to the relatively un·skilled immigrants that arnved in Europe during the same 
pertod. As such. and contrary to the title of their book. tt ts perhaps more accurate to refer 
to the 'Muslim population' in the U.S. (as opposed to thc 'Muslim community' in European 
countries) as the background and ethnicity of Muslims in the U.S. has historically been 
vct·y diverse. 
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Islam beyond the borders suggested by geogmphical power/state discoUl'ses of Dar 
ellslam/Harb<MetcaJfe, 1996: 110-127: Kepel, 1997: 151). In Britain the 
perception of the state as a secular, or at least non· Islamic, entity (Goulbourne, 
1998: 66; Modood and Kastoryano, 2007), and the role it has played in historical 
and contemporary Western/Islamic interactions (see Hizb ut·Tahrir, 2002), has 
lead to a problematisation of dual British/Muslim identities and the further 
decampment of themselves as 'other' within the national consciousness (Werbner, 
2002b). 
Move to the World 
This move to a global Islamic identity has been made possible in part by problems 
in the inter-generational transmission of Islam. The British ulema (responsible for 
teaching in mosques) have come primarily from the 'sending' countries and in 
many cases have suffered from little or no education in the English language and 
British/Western culture (Lewis, P. 1994: 114). Consequently, they have been 
unable to connect with a youth that has grown up in a radicaUy different culture to 
that of their parents and elders (Lewis, P. 1994: 176·9). This has led to a lack of 
religious literacy among second generation Muslims who. in some cases, have been 
unable to tell the Islam of their parent's faith from that preached by more radical 
elements (Lewis, P. 2002: postscript: see also Moussaoui, 2003). These radical 
elements have often spoken directly to the perceived injustices suffered by the 
Muslim communities and the dislocation of identity that second and subsequent 
generations have suffered both from their elders and host·societies. 
Even within their parents' generations the lines between 'sending' and 'receiving' 
countries have often bltu-red as information, news and issues are passed between 
communities sharing familial and ethnic ties. Werbner (1994) looked at the 
creation of globai·Jocal fabulations in her case study of a Pakistani community in 
Manchester, stressing also the influence of the receiving country on the identity of 
the diaspora in addition to that of the sending country (Werbner, 2002a). These 
trans-local flows of information have brought 'continents' together within Western 
countries where geographically proximate communities live within entirely 
separate religious, linguistic and ethnic worlds supported by sepa1·ate sacred, 
communal and financial networks (Knott. 2009a: 157·9; Massey, 1993: 62-65). This 
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flow of information and social identity is two-way (Werbner. 2004: 896), allowing 
the influencing of communities at both ends of the exchange including, as I will 
address later, areas of conflict between Islamic and Western cultural values. 
Increasingly this glocalisation has been supported and eru·iched by the 
development of new technologies. While the internet is frequently used for 
benevolent purposes, the use of the internet by radical groups has received 
increased attention in recent years (Chen et al 2008: Sageman. 2008a). Some 
authors (Kohlmann, 2008: Kirby. 2007) have argued that a! Qaeda is now 
dependent on digital communities for any possibility of the meeting of individuals. 
Whilst I haven't undertaken this study here, I suggest that there is the potential, 
contrary to Mestrovic's (1997) expectations. for exploring instances of authentic 
digital collective effervescence within these interactions." 
The use of technology to communicate and socialise allows us to see a) Qaeda as 
more than just a movement. but also as a cohesive group. The digital circulation of 
communal values, mythologies, beliefs, rituals and identity allow individuals to 
become socia lised into a community. the members of which they might never have 
met. Whilst this may suggest a more cognitive and less embodied account of 
religious and cultural identity than I outlined in Chapter Three. I would argue that 
the means for socialisation still lie within the embodied characteristics of human 
experience, and that the transmission of social identity over great distances is not 
problematic as long as the basic socialising conditions are met. Sageman (2008b) 
has argued that this socia lisation (in the case he discusses, involving radicnlisation) 
cannot be completed without physical interaction between members. Certainly this 
would seem to apply where co-ordinated actions, including violent ones, are under 
consideration. However, I concur with those authors (Kohlmann. 2008; Kirby. 2007) 
who have argued that the creation of virtual communities has provided the means 
for many individuals to locate their primary identity regardless of physical 
intcl'8ction. These communities need not requim reclassification along the lines of 
networks of fluidity as suggested by Urry (2003: 132), as the underpinning social 
structures remain the same and any change in detail of or loyalty to social groups 
is perfectly possible within the Durkheimian conceptualisation of society I 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
"Hhcingold's (1998) discuijsion of'virtual communities' supports this suggestion. In this 
work, a form of digital anthropology. he describes severa l examples of effervescing 
communities. whilst also discussing limitations and danl(et·s of these in relation to 'real life'. 
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Before I turn to the move to violence within this global Islamic identity. I would 
point out that I have discussed the above specifically within the context of the 
Muslim diasporas within the West primal"ily as a means of controlling the size of 
the discussion. However, I am aware that the •·ole of technology, the inclusion of 
Islamic communities withm a global identity, and the move to violence arc all 
themes that could equally be discussed within non·diasporic communities such as 
those found in South East Asia. Side! (2006: 2007: 2009). Cady and Simons (2007) 
and Liow (2006) have all charted the development of the Isla mist movement in 
these countries, and, whilst I suggest that my analysis is equally valid in these 
contexts. I have not included these accounts with in my •·esearch. 
Move to violence 
The trans·local flow of information does not. in and of itself. lead to radicalisation 
and/or a violent group identity. However. it docs facilitate the sharing and 
t1·ansmission of a sense of injustice. This sense. •·cccived by individuals 
I)Xperiencing a dislocation of identity from their immediate physical community, 
and perhaps also suffenng f•·om a perceived or real personal injustice. can lead to a 
real sense of grievance. In the case of marginalised immigrant communitieb. such 
as many second and third·gcneration Muslims find themselves within, such 
instances can lead to flash· points of anger. 
In Britain a prime example of trans·nationallslamic issues impacting upon British 
news and society. leading to a violent response, is the Rushdie affair (Akhtar. 1989; 
Ruthven, 1990). From the lnd1an sub·contment to Bradford and onwards to Iran. 
the issue united Muslims wilhm an ideological space that spanned non-contiguous 
communities across national. ethnic, linguistic and even denominational divides 
(Bhatt. 1996: IJ 0). For the first time in the U.K. context. the issue of Tslamic 
identity within British subjects was publicly rL'CO!(niscd. In France. the hcadsca..C 
affair (beginning in 1989. but periodically renewed) had a similar effect. as th•·ee 
g1rls were expelled from school for wearing ostensibly religious symbols within the 
;;ecular public space of the school (Freedman. 2004). In both cases the clash 
revealed previously invisible (to the West. at least) fault lines along 
~ecula •·/reli!,>ious, Muslim/Wt>stcrn values (Wcrbner. 2002a: 107:2004 : 905). Fo1· 
some Mus lims, the suppo1t for secular values of f1·eedom of speech and non· 
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religious public space was a clear example of an anti· Islamic attitude, and in some 
cases violence ensued, not least with the issuing of a fatwah on Rushdie by Iran's 
Imam Khomeini (which demonstrated intent to violence, even if the call was not 
successfully answered). 
Outside of the U.K. and France. the conflicts in Bosnia (1992·95) and Chechnya 
(1994·96 and 1999·2009) provided rallying calls for Islamic solidarity throughout 
the i\luslim world, including the Western diasporas (see McLoughlin (1996) on a 
fundraising event for Bosnia held in Bradford). 'I'hcmselves violent conflicts. they 
provided an outlet for the frustrations both of seasoned 'Afghan Arabs' and also a 
new generation of international jihadists (Bergen, 2001: 86). This newest 
generation attended training camps both at the s ites of conflict and also 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, like Isla mists after them, they were 
radicalised at 'home', in the U.K. (Kepel. 2008: 114·120). Whilst action against 
these centres may have lessened the opportunity for training in them. even without 
physical training the latest generation still accesses the 'injustices' mentioned 
above, and uses them as justifications for violent a·esponses alongside othm· issues 
such as the economic sanctions and wars against Iraq, the invasion of Afghanistan, 
and of course the ongoing lsraeUPalestine conflict. 
'!'his move to violence suggests a number of issues that 1 'viii investigate through 
my ana lysis of the markers. First of all. violence has broken out at several stages 
of the lslamist movement: al Qaeda is not an isolated instance. This suggests that 
the move to violence is not chronologically determined nor is it ideologically uni· 
directional: movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood have moved from a violent 
outlook to a non-violent interaction with the state· led democratic process. 
Additionally, whilst violence as often justified with recourse to religious teachings. 
it tends to be triggered by exogenous factors. This brings us back to the 
importance of context, which is why T have provided this brief over· view of the 
movement of which al Qacda is a part. The movement back and forth between 
violent and non·violent action, and the role of factors external to the beliefs of the 
group do not undermine the central role that J suggest the group's beliefs play in 
the move to violence. Rather. they reaffirm the fluadity of sacred boundaries as 
they come in and out of contact with other non-negotiable taboos, creatmg and 
later vacating sites of sacred contestation. J will now turn to the analysis of 
statements of belief relating to these sacred boundaa·ics. 
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Marker Analysis 
In the following section, I discuss evidence for each of the markers and also list 
summary statistics where these prove useful. In addition, I provide quotations 
which are either indicative of the general thrust of the data under discussion or 
which are particularly noteworthy. The five markers which I coded the most data 
mto were: 
(I) Dichotomous World·View 
(2) Basic Injustice 
(3) External Lcgitimatmg Authority 
(4) Violent Traditions 
(5) Wider Struggle 
This case study presents some specific challenges, mainly relating to the s heet· 
volume of available primat·y material for consideration. As a result, whilst I have, 
above, discussed the beliefs and some of the works of some key ideologues for al 
Qaeda and other Isla mist groups, I have not included their works for analysis by 
marker. For this section I focus solely on statements made by al Qaeda. its 
members and associates. This distinction was necessary both in terms of managing 
the volume of data, and because my interest in this chapter is solely in al Qacda's 
beliefs and not in those of the wider Islamist movement (which is covered in depth 
by authors such as Kcpcl (1994, 2004a) and Esposito (1983, 2002). for example). 
In my concluding remarks. I provide some overall analysis and comment, although 
11 more in·depth analysis in the context of the wider discussion. including the other 
case studies, is found in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Basic Injustice 
This marker had a lot of data coded into it: the second most in this case study. 
This is not too surprising given the background to the development of al Qaeda 
which T discussed above. Bin Laden's involvemen~ in the Afghan jihad was cll'iven 
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by a sense of injustice over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addition. many 
.Muslims in the region felt that the Palestinian problem constituted a gross 
injustice visited upon them by the international community. 
ln this context it could be argued that al Qaeda was constituted with its primary 
aim to resolve these injustices, and certainly the communication that could be seen 
as their opening mission statement suggests this (ALQ157: 53·4): 
Today. there is abundant proof of three indisputable facts. on which 
all just men agree .... They are: 
First, for over seven years the United Stat-es has been occupying 
the most sacred of the Islamic lands, the Arabian Peninsula, 
plundering its riches. dictating to its rulers. humiliating its people, 
terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula 
into a spearhead with which to fight the neighboring Muslim 
peoples .... The best proof of this is the Americans' continuing 
aggression against the Iraqi people, ... Second. despite the great 
devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist 
alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which is 
approaching a million, the Americans are once again trying to 
repeat the horrific massacres. As though they are not content with 
the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war. or the 
fragmentation and devastation, here they come to annihilate what 
is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors. 
Third. if the war aims of the Americans are religious and economic, 
they also have the effect of serving the Jews' petty state and 
diverting attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of 
Muslims there. Nothing shows this more clearly than their 
eagerness to destroy Iraq. the strongest Arab state in the region, 
and their attempts to fragment all the states of the region, such as 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, into paper statelets, whose 
disunity and weakness guarantees Israel's survival and 
perpetuates the brutal crusader occupation of the peninsula. 
In this one excerpt. reference is made to all of the most bitterly felt injustices 
claimed by al Qaeda to affect the Muslim world. These are: the ·occupation' by the 
U.S. of Saudi Arabia (and indeed the complicity in this of the al Saud ruling family): 
the continued bombing and embargoes oflraq; the role of a global Jewish 
conspiracy; the Israeli treatment of Palestinian Muslims; and the diminishment of 
the political strength and independence of the Muslim world. 
Table 5.1. below, shows the recurrence of these themes in the data in this marker, 
by li sting their appearance based on the presence of key words. Areas where it was 
felt that Muslims were unjustly under attack were in Iraq. Palestine, Chechnya, 
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Kashmir, Timor and Bosnia. Agents of these attacks were primarily identified as 
American, although J ewish/Israeli conspiracies were also frequently cited. 
Theme Count Search Words 
America 89 'America· 
Iraq 71 'Iraq' 
Israel 57 'Jew' (30); 'Israel' (27) 
Crusade 52 'Crusade' 
Palestine 51 'Palestin' 
Qccupabon 26 'Occup' 
Chechnva 17 'Chech' 
Sauda Arabia 14 'Saud' 
BombonQ 11 'Bomb' 
Kashmir 10 'Kashm' 
Timor 7 'Timof 
Bosnia 6 'Bosn' 
Table 5.1 - Basic Injustice word counta .. 
References to ·bombing' were made in relation to the U.S. -Jed coalition's airstrikes 
over Iraq.>< Mention of'occupat10n' referred to the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, 
typically referred to as 'the land of two Holy Places'. Where Saudi Arabia was 
referred to by its officia l name it related to the complicity of the ruling family. the 
al Saud's, to the sale of oil to the U.S., to the military alliance with the U.S. and the 
failure to uphold Islamic values in lifestyle and governance. 
These injustices typically wanted al Qaeda a right to revenge. Within a mmdset 
expressed by ideas typically congruent with a Girardian analysis of reciprocal 
violence the violent actions on behalf of al Qaeda arc not seen as an escalation of 
the conflict, but a justified •·csponse. AI Qaeda do not foresee an end to this conflict 
whilst these injustices remain unpunished. and as long as further assaults a1·e 
visited on the Muslim world (for instance in Iraq and Afghanistan) they see a 
JUstification for their acuons. 
Within this discussion. it is also interesting to note. as has Kirby (2007: 422·3). the 
vica1·ious nature of a l Qacda's list of complaints. Within its predominantly core 
Arab base and the diasporas in Western countries. few are Palestinian. Bosnian or 
Chechen and yet al Qaeda claims these injustices fo•· its own. and escalates the 
'The search terms were entered open-ended. so that 'Ch~><:h' for example. would return 
results for occurrences of 'Chechnya' as well as 'Chechen', 'Chcchens', etc. 
~· Two additional references to 'bombing' were made which were removed from the count as 
they r·clat.ed to other events. such as the U.S. bombing of Japan in WWTI which wus cited 
not as an injustice, but as un exomplc of U.S. aggression. 
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cycle of violence on their behalf. This reinforces the fact that the perr:eption of 
injustice. as much as the actual reception of any. is as important as the perception 
of a scapegoat in any response. 
This point is highlighted by the following quotation from Mohammad Siddique 
Khan's (ALQ45) video-tape explaining his actions in the 2005 London bombings: 
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world. 
And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as J 
am directly responsible for p1·otecting and avenging my Muslim 
brothers and sis ters. 
Until we feel security. you will be our targets. And until you stop 
the bombing, gassing. imprisonment and torture of my people we 
will not stop this fight. 
As discussed above, these complaints often come from a trans-national flow of 
information between Muslim communities in the West a nd within the 'Muslim 
world'. Regardless of whether the individual, such as Khan. is physically affected 
by these events. they come to form part of his identity as constructed through his 
affiliation to the group. The repetition of these narratives forms part of the history 
and mythology of the group. and informs the beliefs and actions of the members. 
!\ow here is this clearer than in the data for this marker for al Qaeda. 
Context of Group's Origins/Development 
When considering the context of the group's origins I have marked text relating to 
the context of the development of both Islam (as referred to in al Qaeda statements) 
and a lso more specifically of al Qaeda. The violent episodes within Jslam's 
formu lative period that a) Qacda 1·efers to arc key to the shaping of the identity of 
a l Qaeda itself, even if it can be argued that their interpretation of these episodes 
is biased. This is because these episodes also shape. to a greater or lesser extent. 
the identity of Islam in the broader context. of which the fundamentalist movement 
and al Qaeda within that are a part. Jn this case it is also important to see al 
Qaeda's role within the wider turn to violence of Isla mist movements, as discussed, 
for example, by Kepcl (2004a). 
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Within the sampled texts it was perhaps surprising not to see more reference made 
to the violent origins of al Qaeda itself. This issue is discussed within the opening 
section of this chapter and al Qaeda certainly developed its ideologies within a 
violent and conflicted space. But aside from a few references within the texts, to 
the conflicts in Palestine and Afghanistan, most of the data that I have included in 
this category in fact relates to tales of violence in the origins and development of 
Islam. Whilst a lot of data was coded into this marker I was expecting to see more 
repetition and reference to the above conflicts, and others, in relation to the 
development of the group and not just as causes for complaint (as marked up in the 
discussion on the Basic Injustice marker). 
For the purposes of clarity, I have given a couple of examples below of text marked 
into this category. The first is a sample of the data relating to the violent origins of 
Islam itself. I have chosen not to repeat some of the direct quotations within the 
Qur'an, which refer to jihad as a duty or to expected (violent) behaviour towards 
unbelievers, as I have already quoted a number of these within other markers. 
Rather. I have quoted from al Zawahiri's (ALQ62: 143·4) discussion of martyrdom. 
where he refers to a story (apparently from a Hadith. but I cannot find the original) 
including the oft·mentioned virgins as rewards fo1· martyrs: 
Al-Muqadam bin Ma'ad Yak1·ub relays that the Prophet of Allah 
said: 'The martyr is special to Allah. He is forgiven from the fi1·st 
drop of blood [that he sheds). He sees his throne in Paradise, where 
he will be adorned in ornaments of faith. He will wed the Aynhour 
[wide- eyed virgins] and will not know the torments of the grave 
and safe· guards against the greater terror [helll. Fixed atop his 
head will be a crown of honor. a ruby that is greater than the world 
and all it contains. And he will couple with seventy-two Aynhour 
and be able to offer intercessions for seventy of his relatives.' 
Not only does this lesson from the Hadith help cement the (violent) role of the 
martyr, it also glorifies it. 5 7 More specifically to a context of violence in the 
development of al Qaeda, bin Laden <ALQ55: 124) refers to to the reason why al 
Qaeda came about: "Al·Qa'idah was set up to wage a jihad against infidelity, 
particularly to counter the onslaught of the infidel countries against the Islamic 
states." This clearly points to there being a need for al Qaeda due to (perceived) 
violence carried out by other nations. Elsewhere bin Laden refers specifically to 
57 Ibrahim (2009) also points out that it demonstrates some of the violent ends that 
Muslims seek to avoid- namely the 'terrors of the grave'. Avoiding violent afterlives is an 
equally powerful motivation to violent action as plentiful virgins. 
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the conflict in Afghanistan. and also to what he perceives as the invasion of Saudi 
Arabia by the U.S. All of these events provided the troubled background to the 
creation and development of a! Qaeda and helps us understand why it has the 
violent mindset that it does. 
Conviction 
The conviction of al Qaeda members to their cause is demonstrably evident in 
many of the events that have brought them such notoriety. Well·planned. co· 
ordinated suicide attacks rcqui1·e a significant amount of conviction, even if this 
characteristic is not referred to in such detail in the sample texts. Indeed, most of 
the data that falls within this marker would also be present in the markers for 
Violent Traditions, and Context of Group's Origins/De•'elopment. That this data is 
used elsewhere does not exempt it from being used here with validity. For example. 
some of these cases refer to tales of willing martyrs told in the Islamic holy texts. 
Whilst these stories do not 1·efer to examples of conviction wi thin a! Qaeda's 1·anks, 
they were s till chosen as examples both of the conviction that the members should 
display. a nd to inspire such qualities in their members. In this case, these 
examples still point to the level of conviction within a! Qaeda. 
Outside of these refe1·ences to early martyrs, there arc still numerous examples of 
al Qaeda's deep and incontestable conviction. Some of these point to a des ire fo1· 
reform, and the wi ll to chanJlC one's life to achieve it (ALQ32: 248): 
As for us, God knows that we want the reform that we strive for; we 
left our country out of our desire for it, for we did not need any 
worldly goods. all thanks and praise to Cod. I miss my country 
greatly. and have been long absent from it: but this is easy to 
endure because it is f01· the sake of Cod. 
Tho depth of this conviction is further suggested when bin Laden (ALQ139: 225) 
says: ·•r have sworn to not die except as a free [man)" and further claims (ALQ99: 
114) for all of al Qaeda that "We will strive to maintain the fight until victory is 
attained or until we meet God [through martyrdom!." 
This claim that they will fight to the death is borne out by many ordinary members 
of a l Qacda, who have fought in connicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and who a lso risk 
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their lives taking the struggle to other countries. Nor is it a view limited to bin 
Laden amongst all the ideologues or leaders of al Qaeda, al·Zawahiri (ALQ155: 239) 
also echoes the above sentiments: 
Let Bush, Blair, and those that march behind their Crusader· 
Zionist banner know that the honorable mujahidin of Islam have 
made a covenant with their Lord to fight them until victory or 
martyt·dom. 
The difference between beliefs and actions is highlighted within this marker. 
Whilst I have drawn attention to the actions of members of a! Qaeda as 
undoubtedly displaying their conviction. I have not recorded these events within 
the data for the matrix. This is partly because it is not possible to draw up an 
objective scale of strength of conviction on the basis of levels of action, nor indeed to 
conduct a satisfactory survey of actions which display conviction (or otherwise). 
However, primarily I have not included these events for analysis by the matrix 
because I am interested in the beliefs of the groups. and not, per·se, the actions of 
individuals. 
Dichotomous World-View 
In most of a! Qaeda's statements it is clear that they have a very ma1·ked 
dichotomous view of the world and their place in it. This is reflected in this marker. 
which contained the most coded statements in this case study. 
In further ana lysing this data it is possible to see three groupings of words and 
phrases within the texts. One group contains words relating to the language of 
dichotomy (of difference and war, etc.}; another groups together words naming 
what a! Qaeda sees as the two 'sides' CAmerica, Islamic world, etc.); and the last 
grouping is of words ,·e lating to the language of religion (Qur'an, Prophet. belief. 
apostasy, etc) Figure 5.1 shows the groupings of these terms. and also where they 
overlap, whilst Table 5.2 provides a word count of the most· used terms within this 
marker. 
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Dichotomous WOftdVIew-Word CIUS!ei'S 
klllln1 
israel 
american 
•mtrica 
american 
Palestine pakistan 
Figure 5.1- Dichotomous World View word clusters 
Theme Count Search words 
Fight 68 'Fight' (43); 'Battle' (14 ); 
'Struaale' (11) 
America 65 'America' 
Israel 49 'Jew' (30); Israel (13); 
'Zion' (6) 
Crusade 46 'Crusade' 
Umma 24 'Umma' (21 ); 'Islamic 
World' (3) 
Christian 10 'Christian' 
Banner 7 'Banner' 
Britain 5 'Britain' (3); 'British' (2) 
UN 3 'UN' 
Table 5.2 - Dichotomous World View word count 
Some of the texts pointed to a quite straightforward sense of self and other. such as 
when bin Laden (ALQ99: 108) said, for example: 
I say that the battle isn't between the al·Qaeda organization and 
the global Crusaders. Rather. the battle is between Muslims- the 
people of Islam- and the global Crusaders. 
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What is interesting about this statement is that bin Laden sees the conflict not as 
between a l Qaeda and the non-Islamic world, but between Islam and non-Islam; al 
Qaeda is 'merely' the vanguard. In claiming this, he is also dramatically widening 
the battle-lines, to encompass all Muslims, and not just those falling within the 
aegis of his organisation. 
In addition to this statement, it is also very clear to see how firmly this dividing 
line is seen, and within what circumstances, when bin Laden (ALQ69= 248) a lso 
makes statements such as "Let yOU!" reprimand to the Crusaders be as was spoken 
by the poet: 'The only thing between us is gut-stabbings and head· choppings."' 
This sense of dichotomy is not just arrived at through a feeling of injustice, but is 
also supported by evidence from the scriptures, such as the following from the 
Qur'an (4=76):58 
Those who have believed fight in the cause of Allah. but those who 
reject [faith) fight in the cause of evil. So fight the friends of Satan· 
for feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan' 
This point will be further developed in the analysis of the Extemal Legitimating 
Authority marker. At this stage it is important to remind ourselves of the 
discussion in Chapter 3 where I bui lt upon the Durkheimian idea of the group to 
include a discussion of sacred boundaries and how these defined the ideological 
s pace that the group occupied. The evidence within this marker reinforces this 
discussion, a point I will return to in my analysis in Chapter Eight. 
Emergency Situation 
Within the texts that were marked under this category there were a few references 
to an emergency situation of a symbol ic nature, as indeed T alluded to above. 
However, most of the marked text referred to an emergency situation of a 'real' 
nature. These selections were broadly similar to those also found under the Basic 
Injustice marker. However. as an example of some of the concerns falling within 
this category I would point to bin Laden's statement (ALQ5: 68) that: 
ss Quoted by bin Laden (ALQ69= 243) 
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The matter is serious, and if we don't move and the Noble 
Sanctuary is attacked, and the direction of prayer of 1200 million 
Muslims is attacked, when will people begin to stit·? This is a 
momentous matter which requires much effort. 
Directing his concern for the present situation bin Laden (ALQ32: 273·4) also 
addresses the leaders of Islamic communities around the world: 
I also address the following statement to those righteous scholars, 
leaders. dignitaries, notables, and business leaders: You must take 
the necessary steps before it is too late, for things are descending 
with extraordinary speed towards an explosion. Do whatever is in 
your power to defuse the crisis ... 
This concern for the current events comes partly from the contemporary plundering 
of natural resources by Western countries (ALQ41: 182): 
I call upon the mujahidin to focus their campaigns on the stolen 
petroleum of the Muslims. Most of its revenue goes to the enemies 
oflslam. and what's left [behind) is plundered by the thieves who 
rule our countries. This is the greatest theft in the history of 
mankind. The enemies of Islam a1·e consuming this vital resource 
with unparalleled greed. It is incumbent upon us to stop this theft 
any way we can, in order to save this resource for the sake of the 
Muslim umma. 
But it is also important to note that the feel ing that there is an emergency 
situation gripping the Islamic world goes back some way before the creation of al 
Qaeda. The creation of the Deobandi movement in British India was a reaction to 
the loss of power experienced by the Muslim community there and theil· need to 
take urgent action. In fact. it could be argued that since colonia l times the Muslim 
Ummah has felt under threat from Western Christian powers and that this has 
been building up to the prescnt·day situation (Kepel. 200·1a). 
External Legitimating Authority 
This marker was the third·most populous marker for the a l Qaeda data·set. As 
discussed above. there are a number of competing doctrinal positions within 
Islamic theology. and al Qaeda accesses a particular stream of these to provide 
justification fo•· its actions. 
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For example, ibn Taymiyya is cited freely in defence of calls to jihad as are other 
scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. Also. in Justification of actions against Muslim 
rulers (such as the al Saud family), bin Laden (ALQ32: 259) quotes the revered 
scholar Ayad Qadi "Scholars are agt·eed that leadership of the religious community 
cannot be given to an infidel, and that if he becomes one. he must be deposed." 
Fa twas from contemporary experts are also sought and referred to within texts 
appealing to fellow Muslims. 
Outside of expert opinions. frequent reference is made to the holy texts of Islam, 
the Qur'an and Hadith. For example, bin Laden (ALQ69: 248) quotes from the 
Qur'an in his fi1·st message to the Iraqi people: 
And let the Word of Allah Most High remain ever before your eyes: 
·It is not fit for a Prophet to take captives before he bas thoroughly 
subdued the land' (8:671. And the Word of the ~lost High: 'When 
you come upon infidels, smite at their necks !i.e., decapitate them)' 
[4 7:4). 
He also supported an ru·gument fot· martyrdom found in a hadith. in his second 
message to the people of Iraq (ALQ7o: 251): 
And prayers and blessings be upon our Prophet i\luhammad, who 
said [in a hadith]: 'He who is killed for [defending) his possessions 
is a martyr: he who is killed for [defending) hu; blood is a martyr: 
he who is killed for [defending) his religion is a martyr: he who is 
killed for [defending[ his households is a mm·tyr' 
3esides these references to SCI'i i>lurallessons there are also many allusions made 
to stories of the Companions of the Prophet. As this generation of Muslims is 
considered (especially by Salafists) to be the most holy. their actions serve as 
justification for similar violent action in a contemporary setting. In his treatise 
'Jihad. MaJ"tyrdom, and the Killing of Innocellls. al Zawahiri (ALQ62: 143·4) wrote 
that: 
AI·Muqadam bin Ma'ad Yakrub relays that the Prophet of Allah 
said: 'The martyr is special to Allah. He is forgiven from the rli'St 
drop of blood (that he sheds). He sees h1s throne in Paradise. where 
he will be adorned in ornaments of fa1th. He will wed the Aynhour 
[wide· eyed virgins) and will not know the t.Orments of the grave 
and safe· gt1ards against the greater terror (belli. Fixed atop his 
head will be a c•·own of honor, a ruby that is greater than the world 
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and all it contains. And he will couple with seventy· two Aynhour 
and be able to offer intercessions for seventy of his relatives.' 
Now, if martyrdom and martyrs are revealed in such a glorious 
manner. demanding martyrdom and desiring death in the path of 
Allah becomes legitimate. as was spoken by Abdallah bin Jahsh: '0 
Allah! Find me among the idolaters a mighty and furious man, full 
of blasphemy and unbelief, that J may fight him for your sake. Then 
he will overcome me, plunder me, and chop off my cars and nose. 
And when I meet You [Allah]. You will say: '0 Abdallah bin Jahsh, 
why were you mutilated?' And I shall respond: 'For you. my Lord!" 
These references to external somces of authority serve several purposes. They 
ensure an appearance of impartiality (to other members of the group at least) in 
that the appeal is made to something greater than and external to the writer's own 
opinion. In making this appeal. they also reinforce the sacred boundaries of the 
group, through reference to those sacred texts which stipu late both their 'otherness' 
in relation to God. and through their belief to the unbelievet·s. These sacred 
boundaries are. as discussed in Chapter Three. essential to the identity of the 
group and also help us demarcate the non·ncgotiable aspects of their beliefs. 
These references to sacred texts are also supplemented by frequent appeals to God, 
who is further invoked as an external approver of their actions. Such appeals are 
made through prayer, quotation and statement. and as such it is not surprising 
that references to 'God' topped the list of theme counts in the data for this marker 
(see Table 5.3. below). 
Theme Count Search words 
God 420 'God' (267); 'Allah' (153) 
Proohet 68 'Proohet' 
Jihad 53 'Jihad' 
Qur'an 50 'Qur'an' (39): 'K()(3n' (7): 
'God's Book' (4) 
Messenoer 38 'Messenoer' 
Hadith 15 'Hadlth' 
Dutv 12 ·ouw 
Taymivva 7 'T~ivva' 
Sunna 2 'Sunna' 
Table 5.3- External Legitims ting A uthority word counts 
One example of these calls is a straight forward plea for assistance by bin Laden 
(ALQ135: 102): 
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We ask God to help us defeat the forces of unbelief and tyranny, 
and to smash the neo·Crusader-Jewish alliance in the lands of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. 'If God helps you, no one can overcome 
you; if He forsakes you. who e lse can help you?' 
Whilst another is an appeal to a more broadly understood right to revenge 
(ALQ153: 20t): "Allah Most High legislated the permission and option to take 
revenge." In this case bin Laden was addressing himself to a Western audience, 
and the appea l to an external authority raises his claim to revenge beyond a mere 
tit·for·tat reprisal (whilst still alluding to this claim as something the readers may 
understand} to that of an action with sacred authority (and the moral high·ground). 
In addition to references to God and the scriptures, there are numerous mentions 
made of the Prophet. Some of these arc again stories of the Prophet's actions 
which relate to the rights and wrongs of violent action. r discussed these in the 
marker on the Context of Group's Origins/Development as they also relate to the 
initial identity of the group. At this s tage, it is probably sufficient to say that from 
the above discussion it is clear that a l Qaeda makes a broad and frequent reference 
to external legitimating authorities for its actions. in fact doing so in ncat'ly a ll of 
the documents that [reviewed. This strong sense of security in the external 
legitimation of their actions probably also leads to a greater likelihood that they 
will act on their nuns, due to a corresponding dimmishment of doubt. 
Involvement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence 
This marker captures some of the aspects of al Qaeda's activities that relate 
s pecifically to what Girard (2005) terms a cycle of t•cciprocal violence. Most of the 
data represents a discussion of and desire for revenge. Many of these passages are 
repeated elsewhere in the discussion of other markers. and I have specifically 
drawn attention to the revenge motif in al Qaeda statements at several points 
above. However. what is interesting is that al Qaeda also makes reference to a 
more unive(sa l system of justice As app lied by the U.N .. but points out both that it 
is a tool of the West and also that they do not recognise this international system 
anyway (ALQ41: 178). There ts a sense from the text that these two points are 
chronologically stgnificant- rrrst they feel that the U.K would never treat the 
concerns of Muslims fairly and therefore they decide not to recognise its legitimacy. 
However, the other argument they put forward for the U.N.'s illegitimacy is that 
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the rules and laws it polices are not God's laws, and any system of law outside 
Sharia'h is 'wrong' and it is impermissible to apply its judgements to al Qaeda and 
indeed to any Muslims. 
This could lead us into a discussion about whose 'justice' is represented in the 
international courts, a nd how justice is cultUl'a!ly derived. This is not the place for 
that ctiscussion. but it does highlight to us that al Qaeda can see itself as 
implementing justice (through revenge) and also that in this culturally·relative 
context G irar·d's analysis is pat·ticularly useful as it cuts across these boundaries 
and provides us with a category definition that highlights this data regardless of 
cultural interpretations.,. 
No Common Ground 
The above discussion - in relation to the &sic Injustice marker- of Khan. a 
British Muslim born and bred in Leeds, is pertinent to the findings of this marker 
also. The absence of common ground between al Qaeda and its 'Other' (the West) is 
centred round a separation of values in both a religious and political sense. Within 
the marked texts in this category reference is made. for example. to a clear 
distinction between the Is lamic world (the Ummah) and the West (Western 
countries such as the U.S .. U.K .. and others) such as when bin Laden <ALQ99: 113) 
stated that: 
Bush admitted that there can only be two kinds of people: one kind 
being Bush and his followers: and nny nation that doesn't follow the 
Bush government, or the World Crusade. is guaranteed to be 
included with the terrorists.60 
.. In referring to Girard's discussion cutting across different culwral understandings of 
justice, 1 would di rect the reader back to Chapter Three wherc I discuss how the notion of 
sacrifice and later. justice, arc utilised by sociNies as a means to halting a rcciprocol 
violent exchange. These notions are examples of Durkheim's 'social facts', and nrc 
applicable m nil forms of society. regardles.• oft he particular cultural manifestation of these 
'facts'. 
oo Despite bcmg worlds apart. there was a lot of similarity between the rhetorrc of Bush and 
bin Laden, especially in relation to the 'with us /agai nst us' dichotomy. Chilton (2004) 
explores these similarities in his analysis of c.hcir speeches. 
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Furthermore. for bin Laden and al Qaeda. this gulf between the two sides is not 
just a contemporary issue. but rather the manifestation of a historical divide 
between the two cultures, as bin Laden <ALQ99: 127) later suggests: 
Besides disbelief, th is is a war which. like previous wars, is reviving 
the Crusades. Richard the Lionheart. Barbarossa from Germany, 
and Louis from France- the case is similar today, when they all 
immediately went forward the day Bush lifted the cross. 
However, this quotation also points towards the other kind of ideological 
separation between al Qaeda and the West. that of religious values. Bin Laden 
mentioned the symbol of the cross, representative of the Christian faith and for 
much of the data in this market· the lack of common g~·ound is an absence of shared 
t·eligious ancUor moral values. This is important because. whilst respected authors 
such as Kepel focus on the political motivations and aims of the Isla mist movement, 
I argue that they fail to pay enough attention to the religious values underpinning 
the political ideologies. Whilst the struggle withm Islamic countries is 
undoubtedly about power, T question whether this power is sought for its own sake, 
o•· because it fulfils the goals of a religious mission. Certainly bin Laden (ALQ153: 
202·203) seems more focused on issues of morality (and so also on the chasm 
between Islamic and Western morals) when he argues that: 
The second thing we call you to is to stop your oppression, lies. 
immorality. and debauchery that has spread among you. 
A. We call you to be a people of manners, p1·inciples, honor. and 
purity: to reject the immoral acts of fornication. homosexuality. 
intoxicants. gambling. and usury. We call you to a ll of this that you 
may be freed from that which you have become cat1ght up in: that 
you may be freed from the deceptive lies that you are a great nation, 
which your leaders spread among you in order to conceal from you 
the despicable state that you have attamed. 
B. It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization 
witnessed in the history of mankind: 
i. You are the nation who. rather than •·uling th•·ough the sharia of 
Allah. chooses to invent your own laws as you will and desire. You 
separate religion ft·om your policies. contradicting the pure nature 
that affirms absolute authority to the Lord your Creator. 
Within this quotation bin Laden maps out much of the territory which the lack of 
common ground could be said to inhabit. Addressing himself to the American 
peoplE' his discussion of thci1· vices alludes to the monllity gap, but underpinning 
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that he also draws attention to the religious gap. whereby the U.S. fails to rule 
according to Sba1ia'h law and fails to acknowledge the role that Allah should play 
in their lives and governance. Place these statements alongside the American 
declarations of freedom of speech and separation of church and state and it is 
apparent that the lack of common ground between the two positions could not be 
greatel". 
Moreover, these Western ·values· are contagious. in that Muslims can diminish 
their own standing by intermixing with Western society. AI Zawahiri (ALQ62: 169) 
argues that: 
There is no question that those [Muslims) who are mtermixed with 
the infidels, apostates. and their aides, of their own free will, are 
less sacred in the t·eligion than those Muslims who m·e coerced and 
used as shields. 
There are two important points coming out of this idea. the frrst relates to the idea 
of contagion in relation to sacred values. which I discussed in Chapter Three. This 
suggests that it is possible, through physical and ideological proximity, to become 
infected by rival value systems or. in a Bataillean (19888, b) sense, of the negative 
sacred (in thts case the evil. the 'Other'). This feeds into the second point. which is 
that al Zawahiri's statement has important mmifications for Muslims living in the 
West, which brings me back to the opening comments in the discussion of this 
marker. 
AI Qaeda no longer has a national base from which to operate, which in its early 
days in the Sudan or Afghanistan allowed it some degree of physical separation 
from its enemies. Both for the 'inner circle' of al Qaeda. and for the third 
generation of its members in the Western diasporas. the issue of separation is 
increasingly focused entirely on ideological separation, as opposed to the physical 
separation which was possible with Aum Shinrikyo for example. The lack of 
common ground evidenced by this separation of values is religiously innuenced. but 
also leads to social separation. This social isolation is something originally felt by 
Muslim (and ethnic minol'ity) communities in the West, and which has been seized 
upon by al Qacda and other fundamentalist groups. but which has also been 
reinforced by them as a means of preserving and enhancing their group identity. 
In this way. we see that the lack of common ground is both evidence of, and indeed 
part of, the sacred barriers (taboos) erected around the group and over (through) 
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which sites of contestation are found. Therefore, the strong evidence of a lack of 
common ground between the perceived world·views is an important marker of the 
move to violence in this case. 
No Innocent 'Others' 
Whilst there was plenty of evidence within the sampled texts that refer to the 
legitimacy of killing all members of the 'Other'. I will start with a quotation from 
bin Laden (ALQ55: 121) which suggests otherwise: 
... nor do I consider the killing of innocent women. children and 
other humans as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing 
ha1·m to innocent women, chi ld1·en and other people. Such a 
practice is forbidden even in the course of a battle. 
This quotation seems to suggest that ai Qaeda absolutely does recognise the 
innocence of some people who are outs1de of the Islamic world, in this case bin 
Laden was 1·eferring to potentially innocent people caught up in the suicide attacks 
on the United States. In making this statement he is following the teaching of the 
Prophet who reportedly forbade the killing of women and children (Sahib Muslim, 
19: 4320).•• However. in the case of the West it seems that al Qaeda consider 
everyone to be guilty as. following the doctrine of democracy, all citizens have voted 
for their governments and so must be happy with the decisions they take. AI 
Zawahrri (ALQ41: 186) makes this point when he says that: 
They claim to be democratic and to have an elected government. 
This elected govemment kills our children. and our women. and 
desecrates what 1s sacred to us. So if they really oppose it, then let 
them depose it: but if they are satisfied with it. then they should 
pay the price for this satisfaction. 
This argument is backed up with support from the scriplUres. where al Zawahiri 
(ALQ62: 144) quotes from the Qur'an m such passages as: 
Allah Most High has obligated believers to baltle all those who 
reject Him. the Exalted, until all chaos ceases and all religion 
belongs to Allah. The Most High said: 'Fight them until there is no 
more chaos and I all) religion belongs to Allah'[8:391. 
61 See International Islamic University of Malaysia (2005) for nn accessible translation. 
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The killing of innocents is a lso justified in terms of revenge, and in an interview 
bin Laden (ALQ99: 118·9) cited ibn Taymiyya in support of his view that the 
teachings of the prophet on non·targeting of innocents can be overturned: 
TA [the interviewer): So you say that this is an eye for an eye? They 
kill our innocents, so we kill theirs? 
OBL: Yes. so we kill their innocents·this is valid both religiously 
and logically. But some of the people who talk about this issue, 
discuss it from a religious point of view ... 
TA: What is their p1·oof? 
OBL: They say that the killing of innocents is wrong a nd inval id, 
and for proof, they say that the Prophet forbade the killing of 
children and women. and that is true. It is valid and has been laid 
down by the Prophet in an authentic Tradition ... 
TA: This is precisely what I'm talking about! This is exactly what 
I'm IISking you about! 
OBL: ... but this forbidding of killing children and innocents is not 
set in stone. and there are other writings that uphold it. 
God's saying: 'And if you punish (your enemy, 0 you believers in 
the Oneness of God). then punish them with the like of that with 
which you were affiicted .. .' The scholars and people of the 
knowledge, amongst them Sahib aHkhtiyarat [ibn Taymiyya] a nd 
ibn al·Qayyim, and Shawaani, and many others, and Qurtubi 
may God bless him - in his Qur'an commentary, say that if the 
disbelievers were to kill our children and women. then we should 
not feel ashamed to do the same to them, mainly to deter them from 
trying to kill our chi ldren and women again. 
This quotation is important as it establishes both the role of revenge (which I 
discussed in the marker on B.1sic Injustice) and also the legitimating role of 
religious somces. It does so in a way that specifically addresses two gt·oups of 
people generally recognised to be 'innocents' in all cultu1·es and clearly 
demonstrates to us that, for al Qaeda, there are no innocent 'Others'. All the above 
tactics were used in the justification of the suicide attacks in the United States. 
where bin Laden (ALQ99: 118·9) variously pointed to the complicity of those who 
died in New York as they were part of the 'financial power' of the U.S., and also 
that 'innocents' were not specifically targeted in the attacks on the Pentagon. but 
that regardless the deaths of any innocents were justified through the argument of 
retaliation. 
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Question of Authority 
A lot of the data coded into this marker t·elated to how a l Qaeda's interpretation of 
Islamic thought was more accurate than any who held an opposing view. The 
targets for these kinds of comments were predominantly the rulers of Arab nations, 
who were seen as leading un·lslamic lives and regimes (ALQ62: 144): 
And among those needing to be fought at this day and age are those 
rulers who govern the people without the shari.? - they who fight 
against the people of Islam, who befriend the infidels from among 
the Jews, Christians, and others. And Ibn Kathir has transmitted 
the consensus that it is an obligation to battle such rulers. 
Whilst the punishment for such rulers. as suggested by the above quotation, was 
death. there were gentler exhortations to other Muslims to join al Qaeda. In this 
context. al Qaeda's hard· line stance with t•egards to violence was argued to be more 
authoritative through statements such as (ALQu: 37'04.3- 37:16.6). "However. 
the gentle. the moderate. the lenient and the liberal are far from Islam." These 
questions of authority are useful areas to focus on when trying to understand the 
boundaries of a group's beliefs, especially when trying to determine how different 
they are to groups from the same tradition. 
Symbolic Importance 
References to symbolic importance withm the texts surveyed fall within two 
broader themes. One is thnt of an association of the Ummnh with the side of 'good' 
- with Cod and righteousness. 'l'he other is that of the opposing side. the U.S., 
U.:>r .. U.K.. and so on. with 'evil'. 'satan' and 'the devil'. 
Within the contemporary situation references are made to the symbol ic import of 
both sides. fot· example al ·Zawahiri <ALQ41: 178) claims that "the U.N. is part of 
the Crusader kingdom. over which reigns the Caesar in WashingtOn. who pays the 
salaries of Kofi Annan and his like." Staying with the Roman theme. bin Laden 
<ALQ70: 254) warns that "the Romans have begun mustel'ing under the banner of 
the cross to battle the umn111 of beloved Muhammad.'' The analogy of battle lines 
being drawn ts repeated m his <ALQ99: 108) statement that: 
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the battle isn't between the al·Qaeda organization and the global 
Crusaders. Rather, the battle is between Muslims·the people of 
lslam·and the global Crusaders. 
The symbolism of the contemporary struggle against 'the West' is· reinforced when 
bin Laden <ALQ109: 144) says that "What is unfolding now in Mghanistan is one of 
the great wars of Islamic history." He goes on to refer to the unprecedented 
symbolism of the current action (ALQtLO: 16): 
This momentous event is unprecedented both in pagan and Islamic 
history. For the first time, the Crusaders have managed to achieve 
their historic ambitions and dreams against our Islamic umma, 
gaining control over the Islamic holy places and the Holy 
Sanctuaries, and hegemony over the wealth and riches of our 
umma, turning the Arabian peninsula into the biggest air, land, 
and sea base in the region. 
This quotation also suggests to some extent some urgency within the present action, 
as l have already discussed. However, before I do so it is worth highlighting that 
the symbolism mentioned above is used to provide further evidence that the 
struggle in which al Qaeda finds itself is not just a lowly human affair, but has a 
corresponding part to play in a cosmological struggle between good and evil. The 
references to these symbols reinforce the sacred nature of the group's beliefs and 
also encourage the members to action. Therefore, whilst there was not a great deal 
of data coded into this marker, the evidence I have highlighted nevertheless 
demonstrates the important potential it has in a gi'Oup's move to violence. 
Violent Traditions 
The key themes in this marker. which had the fourth highest amount of data coded 
into it for this case study. revolved around references to Holy Texts and especially 
of their inter1>retat10n by ideologues (prmcipally ibn Tayrniyya). There was also 
the recounting of tales of willing martyrs in the times of the Prophet. These 
authoritative texts were supplemented by 1·eferences to modern martyrs (such as 
the London bomb~rs) and also the modern Islamic community desiring jihad. 
Table 5.4 provides a quick guide to the commonly recurring themes. 
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Theme Count Search words 
Jihad 57 'Jihad' 
Kill 46 'K1II' 
Fight 40 'F1ght' 
Martvr 27 'Martyr' 
Conflicts 25 'Afghan' (10); 'Soviet' (9); 
'Russia' 4 ; 'Somal' (2) 
Holy texts 25 1 Haa11n 1 ~); 'Quf (~); 
'Koran' (2); 'Sunn' (2) 
Table 6.4- Violent Traditions word count 
Of the many references to 'jihad' a number of these contained exhortations to jihad 
as a duty incumbent on all Muslims. These readings a1·e typical of the kind of 
interpretation that separates violent fundamentalist Muslims such as those who 
belong to al Qaeda from 'moderate' Muslims. I make this statement because. 
whilst there is some disagreement as to whether 'jihad' refers to a struggle, or 
lighting, or defensive or offensive violent action. wtthm al Qaeda's statements it is 
always implied or directly stated to be violent action. Bin Laden (ALQ139: 225) 
offers one example of how jihad is an arguably violent duty beholden on all 
Mus lims: "Neglecting jih11d. which is prescribed in our religion, is a grievous sin. 
The best death for us is under the shadow of swo1·ds [Pnradise)." In addition. a l· 
Zawahiri (ALQ62: 141) quotes Sura 2:190 from the Qur'an: "Allah Most High has 
imposed jihad on His behalf upon His believing slaves .. ." and later argues that 
( 145·6): 
The best of people. then, are those who are prepared for jihad in the 
path of Allah Most High, 1·equesting martyt·dom at any time or 
place. Whenever he hears the call to jihad he nies to it until Allah's 
authority is established. 
AI·Zawahiri (ALQ62: 14~·5) also refers several times to what happens when this 
duty is taken up - mainly that the Muslim commulllty suffers. such as in thiS 
example: 
When Muslims used to undertake jihad in the path of Allah. they 
wet·e the mightiest of people. But when they abandoned it. Allah 
humiliated them through division and conquest. just like the 
Prophet told: 'lf you take up a domestic hfe, hold on to the tails of 
cattle. are content with farming. and thus abandon jihad. Allah will 
let humiliation lord over you until you return to your religion.' 
In this quotation al·Zawahi1·i clearly suggests that Islam is a violent religion. and 
his understanding of the Qur'an and Hadith form an important part of the violent 
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ideology and mythology of al Qaeda. At this point. it is also important to note that 
the data for this marker was unusually reliant on one particular text from which 
all the above quotations are drawn. This was written by (or under the direction oO 
al·Zawahiri before 9/11 (Ibrahim, 2007: 137) and was titled 'Jihad, Martyrdom, and 
the J(iJJingof Innocents."' However, sixteen out of the tota l thirty·fivc texts 
surveyed for this case study contained references to this marker and their 
contributions suggested that ai·Zawahiri's text was representative of the general 
themes. 
As mentioned above, reference was also made to willing martyrs in Islamic history, 
and these clearly contributed to the violent mythology of al Qaeda's back·story. 
One example, from al·Zawahiri (ALQ62: 153) is given here: 
In the two authentic accounts [Bukhari and l\lusliml. Jabar said: 'A 
man said: Where [do l stand). 0 Messenger of Allah. if I am killed? 
He said: In Paradise. So he hurled the dates that were in his hand 
and fought till he was killed.' And Anas said: 'A man said: 0 
Messenger of Allah, if T plunge myself into the t·anks of the 
idolaters and fight ti ll I am killed-what then, to heaven? He said: 
Yes. So the man plunged himself into the ranks of the idolaters, 
fighting till he was slain.' Ibn Ishaq relays from lssam bin Omar: 
'When the men rejoined on the day of Badr, Awaf bin ai-Harith said: 
0 Messenger of Allah. what about His slave does the Lord laugh? 
He replied: To see htm plunge his hand in battle and fight to 
fatigue. So he threw his shield and advanced, fighting until he died 
a martyr.' 
Al ·Zawahiri put a lot of effort in to the justification of "martyrdom operations" 
(ALQ62: 143), the above quotation being one of the examples he used in suppOt·t of 
this aspect of the jihadist's arsenal. Given al Qaeda's use of martyrs in several 
high-profile actions it is not surprising the desire to le1,<ilimate the nature of these 
attacks. The provision in this marker of violent mythology in support of such 
behaviour is an important indicator of al Qaeda's part in the Isla mist move to 
violence. 
However, it is worth reminding ourselves that the ~xampl es cited above were taken 
from Islamic histOry, not particularly from al Qaeda's history. While there were 
examples of texts that citt>d al Qaeda's battles in Afghanistan. Chechnya and also 
the London bombers, these modern-day violent myths sit alongside the examples 
oz 1 sourced this text from Ibrahim's (2007: 137· 171) abridged translation, the original 
Arabic text being nearly 30,000 words long (Ibrahim, 2007: 140). 
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drawn from an Islamic heritage that is shared with groups that do not act violently. 
In Chapter Seven I look at an Islamic group that has not followed the turn to 
violence, but at this stage the above evidence forces us to consider an important, if 
difficult, point. Within the modern discourse regarding Is lamic fundamentalism, it 
is an unpopular (and brave) person that suggests that Islam is an inherently 
violent religion. Some readings. such as Huntington (2002) suggest this, whilst 
utilising a monolithic understanding of Islam. However. even in more nuanced 
accounts. such as I have undertaken within this chapter. there remains the 
undeniable evidence of a violent back·story which groups such as al Qaeda have 
found all too easy to cite in justification of their own world·views. 
In defence ofT slam (taking as granted the evidence of hundreds of years of peaceful 
co·existence of minority religious groups within the Ottoman and older caliphates. 
and mdeed the majority of non·violent Muslims within the contemporary global 
Ummah) it should be mentioned that Islamic history was codified under 
significantly different circumstances than. for example, Christianity. Lawrence 
( 1991: 142·4) points out that Christianity did not have to contend with issues of 
power until six centt~~·ies afte r its foundation. so it managed to develop a n ethical 
tradition away from the issues of statecraft and govemance. Islam. however, 
codified its first holy texts within twenty years of 1ts foundation. whilst it held and 
was expanding its power base throughout the region. As such the Islamic holy 
texts make reference to far more violent episodes than the Christian New 
Testament (which more directly inOuences Christian thought and practice than the 
ea l'l ier and more violent Old Testament). 
Wider Struggle 
'!'his marker had the fifth most data coded into it. 'l'he terminology within the 
texts coded into this ma t·kcr is subtle and varied. and determining if the text 
relates to wider issues of good versus evil ami/or r ight versus wrong obliges the 
researcher to be sensitive to specialist terminology and the contextual basis of the 
text. For example. there may not be a direct reference to normative values within 
a discussion about whether jihad is an obligation or not. However. th1s debate 
itself is attempting to answer whether it is right or wrong to fight. and indeed 
whether the determining conditions (injus tice aga inst the Is lamic community) have 
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been met. If they have (as al Qaeda asserts they have) then the approval for jihad 
is itself an acknowledgement of a wider struggle involving clashes of right versus 
wrong and good versus evil. One example of such a debate (ALQ62: 170) is found 
in the following text (though there are many other examples of a less direct nature): 
Just as the Sheikh of Islam said: 'Defensive warfare is the most 
critical form of warfare [since we are) warding off an invader from 
lour) sanctities and religion. It is a unanimously accepted duty. 
Mter belief. there is no greater duty than to repulse the invading 
enemy who corrupts faith and the world. There are no rules or 
conditions for this: he must be expelled by all possible means'. 
Whilst some cases in the text ma ke a direct reference to a spiritua l struggle, like 
the one above, others mix this s piritual element with more general 'values', or 
transpose Western non-spiritual values in opposition to Islamic sacred values. Two 
examples from al·Zawahiri (ALQ4t: 182. 184) are provided below. 
Mixing general values (truth/falsity) with spiritual va lues (the return of Allah): 
Jihad in the path of Allah is greater than any individual or 
organization. It is a struggle between Truth and Falsehood. unti l 
Allah Almighty inherits the earth and those who live on it. Mullah 
Muhammad Omar and Sheikh Osama bin Laden are merely two 
soldiers of Islam in the journey of jihad. while the struggle between 
Truth and Falsehood transcends time. 
A wider struggle between Western values and Islamic spirituality: 
He casts doubt upon t.he Divine Entity and the Koran: he calls upon 
Muslims to accept Western values·such as homosexuality .. . The 
British liberties. which permitted Salman Rushdie to insult Islam 
and the ~Iuslims. were not broad enough to include the Islamic 
libraries and Internet s1tes that sympathize with the mujahidin, 
and they threaten to shut them down... Britain's ·sensitive 
conscience' could not tolerate the killing of civilians in the center of 
London yet it tolerated the killing of a million children in the siege 
of Iraq, and the killing of tens of thousands of children in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, due to the bombings of the English and their 
allies. 
Such examples demonstrate the breadth of the struggle as seen by the members of 
a! Qaeda. widening the struggle to what Huntington (2002) would argue is 
evidence of a clash of civilisations. That the positions of the two 'sides' are more 
nuanced than both Huntington and al-Zawahir i would give credit for is not 
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Important here. as the above would suggest that al Qaeda would be happy to 
subscribe to Huntington's thesis. 
In contrast to the above, other instances of coded text are sl ightly more oblique and 
1·cquire greater understanding to facilitate theil· coding into the marker. These 
may often refer to wider debates around the group and/or contemporary situation, 
which require a good understanding of the context of the group's development and 
Situation. Alternatively. they may be part of a wider hermeneutic discussion about 
the meaning of key concepts or themes within the holy tex'ts. such as 'jihad' and the 
obligations present on Muslims today. In these cases the importance of developing 
a contextual a nalysis of the group, as I have done in the first half of this chnpter, 
becomes increasingly clear. 
Markers not discussed above 
There were a number of markers that attracted no data: 
• Against Violence 
• Followers Differ from Leader 
• Recognition of Innocence 
I have not included these in the above discussion. However, with regards to the 
ma t·ker on Recognition of Innocence. I would point out that there was some debate 
about the potential for innocence. and I highlighted this in the discussion on the No 
Innocent ·Others'marker. 
The following markers had small amounts of data coded into them. but of lesser 
Significance to the overall discussion. Some data was coded into the Contexr of 
Group's Tntemal Development mm·ker which suggested that the successes of the 
group (in Afghanistan. and in the attack on the USS Cole, for example) were seen 
as evidence of God's support and encouragement. The Personal Benefit marker 
showed some of the spiritual benefits. especially in relation to martyrdom. for 
example in a particularly enjoyable afterlife. The Desire for Social Change. 
Recourse to Sacrificial I Judicial Processes and No Justice Available in 1 he System 
markers had little data of any significance coded into them. 
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Conclusion 
I have used the data I coded to produce a radar graph showing the amount coded 
into each of the markers in th is case study. This is shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 - Radar graph of al Qaeda Markers 
This diagram provides a useful visual tool to understand where the particular 
peaks and troughs were. However. as discussed in several of the markers. this 
should be used in association with the background discussion in the firs t part of 
this chapter where, for exam ple. I also presented a strong case for the violent 
origins of al Qaeda. Likewi~e. as mentioned above. some of the markers contained 
significant data even though they did not have large amounts coded into them. 
This study has shown how we can determine the violent aspects of al Qaeda's 
beliefs, for example through how it chose to interpret key ideas and historical 
events. It is important to see how this might differ from the results for a non· 
violent group in order to see what is special about the violent aspects of a l Qaeda's 
beliefs, and this will be highlighted through my discussion of a non-violent Islamic 
group in Chapter Seven and my analysis of this theme in Chapter Eight. Before I 
do so, I also want to show how such interpretations are not the sole preserve of 
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religious groups, and so I now move to looking at a non-religious group the Red 
Army Faction. 
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6. Case Study - Red Army Faction 
Introduction 
This chapter is the third of the case studies that I have undertaken into violent 
groups. However, unlike the previous two this case study focuses on a non· 
religious group. The Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Frnktion) hereafter referred 
to as the RAF was formed in 1970. principally by Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader 
and Gudrin Ensslin. The notoriety of the former two led to the oft·used 
designation of the group as the Baader MeinhofGangalthougb this denigrated 
Ensslin's leadership role within the movement. 
The aims of the group, and its formation. arc often seen as arising out of the decade 
of student protest in the 1960s (Varon, 2004). although this claim is not 
uncontested (Cornils, 2008). Increasing fnastration with perceived injustices 
brought about by alleged American imperialism. enacted through libea·al capitalism 
and the Vietnam War, were combined in West Germany with unresolved issues 
relating to complicity/glailt over the actions of their parents' generation in the 
Second World War. 
The first part of this chaptea· is divided into three sections. Initially, because this is 
the first non-religious group l am explormg. l re·visit some of the key points for 
consideration in how I apply the sacred as a border category to a study of a secular 
group. 
The role of non· negotiable beliefs will be highlighted, as an area in which 
discussions of the sacred appear particulal'ly relevant and which seems to suggest 
a bridge between the movement towards violence in religious and non-re ligious 
groups. These issues foreshadow scme of the fmdings in my analysis of the 
markers, which is carried out in the second part of this chapter. 
The inclusion of the RAF a llows for the critical scrutiny of any inherent religiosity 
within the markers. which may or may not bias the findings. By testing the matrix 
against a non-religious group I demonstrate a rigorous examination of its 
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applicability, as well as the broader usefulness of the methodological tools for 
examining sociological questions beyond the category of religion. 
Following on from this, J present two sections addressing the historical context and 
development of the RAF. The first looks at the development of the student protest 
movements and the tum to violence up to the incarceration of the RAF leadership. 
The second section charts the second and third generation of RAF membership, up 
to the official dissolution of the RAF in 1998. Following the analysis of the 
markers is a short conclusion highlighting the key points arising from the chapter. 
Boundary Crossings in the Move to Violence 
In Chapter Three I discussed the lack of cons ideration given to religion in many 
studies in the field of radicalisation and terrorism studies and I also problernatised 
the use of·religion' in some other accounts. In suggesting that the sacred is a more 
useful concept to explore this problem, I also a llowed that it could be found within 
non·religious as well as religious groups. 
I do so because, following Knott (2010c) and Fitzgerald (1995, 2000. 2001), I have 
designated the religious/secular boundary a discursive one. with the two positions 
situated within a single epistemological field. This model (outlined in Knott. 201 Oc: 
121) admits the appearance of characteristics of reli1,>iosity within the secular 
sphere. These churactet·istics a t·e. I suggest. instances of the sacred (building on 
Anttonen (2000: 280·1), they are instances of a category-boundary which setS apart 
things of non-negotiable value). 
The sacred need not have any revelatory symbolism. and this will be highlighted in 
the discussion that follows. The role and use of symbols does not change. They 
continue to motivate. attract and repulse groups and their members but. as 
Durkheim (2001: 165·6: 176) suggested. these symbols can be seen to be (and in 
fact are) created by society. 
Through the above discussion. we can see how the notion of 'sacredness' can be 
applied to any number of non-negotiable aspt>cts of the RAF's values and beliefs. 
such as their beliefs about the immorality of U.S. actions in Vietnam. or the guilt of 
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the German establishment in 1\'azi war·crimes. These beliefs and values can be 
distinguished from those which were importam, but not non·negotiable, such as 
their concerns relating to the treatment of women in Western society (e.g. RAF25). 
It is only those beliefs that were non-negotiable which are designated 'sacred'. 
Whils t creating these non·negotiable beliefs (and the boundaries that produce and 
reinforce this non·negotiability), the RAF also suggested that it had a privileged 
access to the truth or, as I label it here. the sacred. In doing so. the RAF displays 
further characteristics of religiosity as highlighted by. for example, Hervieu·Lkger's 
(2000: 125) discussion of how religions have privileged access to their conception of 
the sacred through their sha t·ed historical lineage. 
Having a non·negotiable belief which others cannot (or have not) shared can lead to 
varying levels of conflict and. whilst the previous two chapters have focused on 
religious groups, the following quotation demonstrates that this is equally true for 
non·religious groups (RAF'43: 239): 
Protest is when T say I don't like this and that. Resistance is when T 
see to it that things that T don't like no longer occur. Protest is 
when I say I will no longer go along with it. Resistance is when I 
see to it that no one else goes along with it anymore either. 
Within this quotation we see that the introduction of non·negotiable elements to 
beliefs and values marks an important stage in the development of the student 
protest movement in West Germany from one of protest to violent resistance. l t is 
to this move to violence that I now turn. 
From Protest to Resistance: The Turn to Violence 
Protest ond its origins 
The Leftist movement in I 960s West Germany, from which the RAF emerged. was 
opposed to 'the establishment' on several levels. The government's support for the 
U.S. war against Vietnam was seen as support for a genocidal campaign against a 
people unable to defend themselves. The young generation of students and othet· 
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supporters of the New Left were determined to avoid the mistakes of their parents' 
generation. which was seen as complicit with the Nazis' actions through their own 
maction during the holocaust. The links between the contemporary West German 
state and the Nazis provided a common cause for concern for German youth: two· 
thit·ds of judges had also sct·ved under the Third Reich (Varon, 2004: 33·5), for 
example. 
Varon (2004) provides an excellent discussion of the development of the New Left 
protest movement in West Germany which developed from University campuses, to 
commune·based activism (33), to city· wide protests (39).63 In June 1967 a student 
(Denno Ohnesorg) was shot by an undercover policeman during demonstt·ations 
organised to protest the visit of the Iranian Shah (39). Anger within the New Left 
movement at this shooting. and the biased reporting of it by the conservative 
Springer Press (group of newspapers). led to increasingly radicalised and violent 
discourse. This was exemplified in the showing of a film The .\faking of o Molotov 
Cockcoil(Varon. 2004: 39).•• and a paper by the leaders of the SDS (Soziolistische 
Deutsche StudemenbwufJ, one of whom was Rudi Dutschke, discussing the 
possibility of more militant protests (Bauer, 2008: 41).•• 
Feelings amongst the student protestors and sympathisers were raised further 
following the April 1968 att<'mpt on the life of Dutschke by a man allegedly 
mfluenced by Springer propaganda (Varon. 2004: ·10). The heightening of tensions 
and escalation of violence is neatly captured by Meinhof (RAF43: 240) who was 
pt·esent at the anti·Springct· t·iots in Berlin (Aust. 2008: 35) and wrote in konkrot:. .. 
' ' Varon's book. Bringinlf tht• IV11r Home. looks at r~volutionary violence in th~ 1960s. 
focusing on the Weather Undf'rlfround and RAFas two exam pit's of groups that turned to 
vtolcnce out of the New Left movement. 
"' ' l'he author of the film was llolger Meins. who went on to become a founder member of 
t he Ri\F'. 
"'The German version of the Studf'nls for a Democmri1· Sodt•ly. Dutschke also co· authored 
an nrticle in konkret(no.6 . . June 1968: 25·26) entitled ·c,•wnl(- meaning 'violence', which 
dtscussed the inevitabtlity of violence in the protest agtunst Capitalism (Varon. 200 1: 13·4) . 
.. The magazine. konkn•t, was wrmen "~thout a capttnllctter m its title. This 1'(!0l>cts n 
style of written protest repented m many ofthe RAF"s statements whereby they 
deliberately used no capttahsatton (which in German is UF('d on all proper nouns). In 
quotations in this chapter I ha''"' retained this style whcr(' I found it in the source matenal. 
However, some statements used standard capnalisauon and as I don't know whether this 
was the work of the original author or the translat<Jr I havt• not changed it. which means 
that the punctuation and capnalisation in quotations will he irregu lar throughout this 
chapter. 
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The protests against the Easter attack on Rudi Dutschke marked 
the first time that people massively crossed the boundary between 
verbal protest and physical resistance .... They crossed it really 
and truly, not just symbolically. After June 2, people merely set 
Springer newspapers on fire. This time they tried to prevent their 
distribution. On June 2, people threw tomatoes and eggs; this time 
they threw stones. 
This brief recounting of the movement leading up to the formation of the RAF 
reinforces several important lessons about the move to violence. First, there is the 
particular history of the broader society out of which the movement arose. In this 
case the relationship between the elites of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the 1\azi regime of the 1930s and 40s was a common trope in anti·establishment 
discourses of the 1960s. The stationing of U.S. troops in West Germany was 
another situation unique to the German context, hut the government's support of 
the U.S. war in Vietnam was something that exercised students and protest 
movements throughout the Western hemisphere.•' 
What we see then are some commonalities with protest movements in other 
countries but also some complaints specific to the German movements, and, as I 
have already argued. the particular context of a situation cannot be ignored if we 
are to further understand the move to violence. Within this broader history there 
are also particular flashpoints which act as catalysts. and in this case we see that 
the visit of the Shah a nd subsequent shooting of Ohnesorg, as well as the later 
attempt on the life of Dutschke, led to escalations of the conflict. 
The RAF was not the only group to come out of the above movement. The 2"' June 
Movement!"' was another violent group that also grew out of this period, but it is 
also important to re member that. for all the protestors and sympathisers, the vast 
majority never committed to violent action . 
.., Varon (200-1: 3-1) points to a 'double·cod.ng· in the discourse about Vietnam due to the 
protestors' feeling that they. too. were occup~ed by a U.S. mthtary force and also that West 
Germa n support for U.S. actions in Vietnam showed how httle Germans had moved on from 
their Nazi past. 
•• Named after the date in 1967 when Ohncsorg was killed . 
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Protestors and resistance movements 
The decision to take this step to move to violence clearly includes a level of 
individual choice motivated by, and framed within, the ideology of the group. 
Whilst I have focused on the development of the group in all my case s tudies. the 
RAF allows for further discussion on the role of the individual within this 
development as more is known about some of the key figures. The parts played by 
Meinhof. Ensslin and Baader are pivotal to this move to violence in the RAF. and 
examining their own ·move· allows us to explore some of the difficulties of locating 
violent potentialities within individuals. 
On the edges of the student activist movement were sympathisers such as the 
Leftist journalist Ulrike Meinhof. Following the death of her mother when she 
was 14 she was bt·ought up by a University pt·ofessor, who had been the lesbian 
partner of her late mother following the early death of her father. Like her foster 
mother (who was now openly gay) Meinhof was a committed Christian Pacifist and 
was ttt home in intellectua lleft·wing circles (Bauer, 2008: 21·4: Aust. 2008: 12·4). 
She later married the editor of the left·wing journal konk!Y!t, and as its star 
columnist she was feted by the press in West Germany, where she was seen as a 
mouthpiece for the New Left (Bauer. 2008:37·8). Enjoying a comfortable lifestyle. 
but supporting an ideology of struggle and connict. she wrestled with the difference 
between her private li fe and her be liefs (Bauer, 2008: 38·9, 42·3). Her columns for 
konlu·et form the basis of the pre·RAF litet·ature assessed for this case study. The 
use of one person as an assumed mouthptece for a whole movement ts problematic. 
but Meinhof is an excellent and accessible vantage point from which to survey what 
became a n increasingly fragmented movement following the assassination attempt 
on its de· facto leader. Rudi Dutschke. Furthermore. as several accounts attest. she 
was a popular and innuential figure in LeftiRt circles and so can be seen an 
appropriate representation of the wider movement (Vat·on, 2004: 41; Bauer, 2008: 
38. 46). 
Gudrun Ensslin was the daughter of a Prolcstant Pastor. A devout Cht·istian s he 
impressed friends in America with her religious passion when she stayed there on 
a year long school·exchange. although she left with a poor opinion of American 
society a nd morality (Aust. 2008: 15), Soon after enroll ing at the Free University 
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in Berlin she was working with the SDS. After meeting Baader in Berlin. she left 
her fiance and baby and moved to Frankfurt where she and Baader firebombed two 
department stores (Eager, 2008: 64·5). Captured soon after , s he was impl'isoned 
for three years, during which time she was interviewed by Meinhof (Aust. 2008:39). 
Worth noting at this time was the attitude of her Christian parents who showed no 
disapproval of her actions. instead welcoming her desire to complement her beliefs 
with action (Aust, 2008: 40·2). 
Andreas Baader was perhaps the least ideologically motivated of the three people 
commonly seen as the leadership of the RAF ... Brought up by his mother, aunt 
and grandmother he was involved in petty crime throughout his teens and spent 
several periods in juvenile detention facilities, especially for stealing cal'S (Aust. 
2008: 8·9). His involvement with the communes in Berlin (where he also left 
behind a child) saw the beginning of his time with the Leftist protestors (18·9). In 
1970 Meinhof agreed to help Baader escape from prison. where he was serving his 
sentence for the arson attacks. During the escape a security guard was shot and 
seriously wounded (59·61). This action was probably the first major c1·iminal 
action of protest by Meinhof and directly led to the formation of the RAF. 
All three of the above defy certain common assumptions made about those who 
become involved in violent groups. Baader. perhaps the most likely by popular 
judgements. s howed no sign of stl'Ong ideological commitment, at least, not st1·ong 
enough to risk his life for. All thl'N' were parents, and Meinhof had successfully 
fought for parenting rights following her divorce.' She also bad a successful career 
which was destroyed following her decision to help Baader. 
Ensslin was brought up in a Christian family. whose teachings (which she adhered 
to into early adulthood) were diametrically opposed to the lifestyle she had 
embarked on prior to the fire-bombings and subsequent life on the run with Baader. 
Nor was she a meek follower of Baader - her role in the movement is often 
ovel'looked and she and Baader (not MeinhoO were joint leaders of the first 
generation (Aust, 2008: 67) . 
.. There is no evidence for strong ideologJcal attachment prior to the arson attacks. indeed 
Eager (2()()8: 65) argues that he did not have a justification for the act until hi' read 
Mnrcuse whilst aw111ting trial. 
10 Although even before her move under11round (which led to the failed attempt to send her 
children to be brought up in a Palestinian refuge camp) Meinhof had •·ealised that the path 
she was taking cou ld lead her away from her family (Aust. 2008: 54). 
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The diversity of their backgrounds, from their childhoods through early adulthood, 
makes it difficult to draw commonalities or mdeed make useful generalisations or 
predictions about their predilection for violence. However, by studying the wider 
movement of which they were a part, and understanding the boundm·ies of ideals, 
injustices, internal and external pressures. we can better see how people within 
those movements may make the move to violence. 
Nor should the role of chance be ignored. It is useless to predict. but important 
nevertheless to consider what would have been the outcome had the security guard 
not been shot dul'ing the libemtion of Baader. Those involved in that opemtion 
went on to form the core of the RAF, but many others who had been part of the 
same movement until then never made this transition to violence. Of course, the 
beliefs that led to that action, and which determined the response to the shooting of 
the guard, are what I shall be looking for and mvestigating in the second half of 
this chapter, but this was 11 good poir.t at which to remind ourselves of some of the 
complexity of the move to violence. 
The Right, What's Right, and Revenge: Changing Reasons for 
Violence 
The turn to revenge 
After the liberation of Baader. the group left for Jordan where they received basic 
training in urban guerrilla warfare from the Palestme Liberation Organisation 
(Aust, 2008: 65·75). On their return to West Germany the group undertook a 
number of bank robberies (79·80), and it wasn't until April 1971 that they t•clcascd 
their key ideological tract The Urban Guerrilla Concept (RAF126). T n May 1972 
the U.S. mined Nonh Vietnamese harbours and it was this action that spurred the 
RAF into a number of attacks on U.S. Army faciltues within Germany <Aust, 2008: 
159·161 ). At the end of l\lay the West German police launched their biggest ever 
operation (164·5) and by the following month all of the RAF leadersh ip were 
apprehended (170·6). The 'first generation' of the RAP was imprisoned in a 
specia lly constructed high·security gaol in Stammhcim (200). 
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Although unconnected with the RAF, the Munich Massacre in September 1972 
elicited a pamphlet in support, written by Meinhof(RAF102). The RAF's own 
violent actions turned inwards at this stage and they conducted several hunger 
strikes in protest at the conditions in gaol <Aust, 2008: 190). It wasn't until May 
1975 that theia· trial commenced, and it was during this time that the second 
generation of the RAF turned to violence (218·220). One key member, Brigitte 
Mobnhaupt, had served part of an earlier sentence in the same wing of 
Stammheim as the RAF leadership (263). On completion of her sentence she 
returned underground, and was a leadea· of both the second and third generations 
of the RAF until her arrest in 1982. 
The second generation was motivated by a desire to secure the release of their 
'leaders' from gaol. Additional motivation was provided by the death of Holger 
Meins (a founder member of the RAF) in February 1974. following a hunger strike 
(208·9). 2000 protestors attended his funeral and his death gave a boost to RAF 
membership, increasing fa·om about 40 to 300 members with an estimated 10,000 
sympathisers (209·19). 
In April1975 the second generation of the RAF undertook their highest proftle 
attack (to date) when they stormed the West German embassy in Stockholm (223· 
227). By the end of the action two hostages and two RAF members wea·e dead. 
In May 1976 the perceived murder of Ulrike Meinhof. in Stammheim. acted as a 
further catalyst to RAF members and sympathisers . Over 400011 protestors 
attended her funeral and in some quarters there remain nagging doubts to this day 
about whether she com mined suicide or was murdered (Bauer, 2008: 89). 
The kidnapping of the prominent German capitalist Hanns Martin Schleyer in 
September 1977 (305·11) and the subsequent hijacking of a Lufthansa jet carrying 
a large number of German tourists (372··108). marked the period known as the 
Deutscher Herbst (German Autumn). Following the successful freeing of the 
passengers, the Stammheim prisoners committed suicide - Baader, Ensslin and 
Raspe successfully- while a fourth prisoner survived her wounds (409·412). The 
"Varon (2004: 234) states that 7000 attended her funeral. 
146 
following day the second generation killed Schleyer. as their intended aim of the 
release of the RAF leadership was no longer attainable (417·8). 
Varon (2004: 234) suggests that the second generation lacked the ideological 
motivation of the fll'st, lacking any cause other than 'free·the·leaders'. Certainly 
their turn to violence seemed as much motivated by the continuing imprisonment 
of the Stammheim prisoners as it was by the anti·imperialist ideals that drove the 
first generation, as recalled by one of the members. Karl· Heinz Dellwo (Aust, 
2008:432·3): 
For years, evct·ything revolved around the t·clease of the prisoners. 
Some of us had died for that, others ended up in jail. or there were 
other consequences .... the entire mot·ality of the RAF was 
overturned- and all the time their release was at the centre of 
everything. 
The violence of the second generation had broadened out beyond the attacks 
against the U.S. (imperialism par excellence accord ing to the RAF) and West 
German state machinery to include civilians such as the 81 passengers on board 
the Lufthansa flight. Even within the RAF. some saw this as a step too far. as 
Aust (414·5) informs us. 
The third generation of the RAF commenced their attacks in 1979, with an 
unsuccessful bombing of a NATO general. in the name of the Commando A11dreas 
Bnader(433·4). It wasn't until May 1982 that they released an ideological 
statement, the RAF's fit·st since Meinhofs Urban Guerrilla Concept. In it they 
claimed that the RAF was as strong as ever (Aust. 2008: 435·6). The group 
surviVed the 1\ovember 1982 arrest of Mohnhaupt. with Birgit Hogefeld and 
Wolfgang Grams taking over as leaders until Grams' death and Hogefeld's arrest in 
a police operation in 1993. Until then the RAF had undertaken a number of 
increasingly sophisticated ntLacks, against prominent capitalists and U.S. and 
German government sites. The last action of the RAF was in March 1993, when 
they bombed a new prison building in WeiterstadL (they had continued to carry out 
acts in support of imprisoned colleagues). In April 1998 the formal dissolution of 
the RAF was announced to the press (Aust: 436·7). 
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Fixing moveable boundaries 
This brief rustory of the RAF offers several important points for consideration. The 
membership and, perhaps more importantly, leadership, of the RAF changed 
distinctly over time. The targets for violence, and the justification of the actions 
also changed- including ideological, financial and political aims. Beyond this, the 
movement also made a conscious decision (within the RAF) to turn to violence, and 
indeed renounce it (which it did once before the final disbandment of the group). 
Within such a movement it is difficult to establish a coherent appraisal of a group's 
beliefs whilst avoiding the dangers of presenting the gi'Oup as a monolithic entity. 
In all the groups I have studied in this research there is a shift in beliefs over time, 
but this is perhaps clearest in this case study. This reinforces the importance of 
addressing this issue as a 'move' to violence, but also stresses the emphasis I have 
placed on understanding the context for the group's beliefs and actions. 
Within the following section I have focused primat·ily on the statements made by 
members of the RAF during the three violent stages of the movement. 1 have not, 
unless otherwise stated, analysed here the comments ft-om before the formation of 
the RAF. which I include in my analysis in Chapter Eight. I have done this in 
order to concentrate on the violent beliefs of the RAF, so that we can understand 
this group better. I have a lso drawn attention to where these are placed within the 
shifting ideological aims of the group. In the brief conclusion I also provide some 
charts showing bow the matrix captures differing priorities across the three 
generations of the RAF. 
Marker Analysis 
As stated above, in this section T have primarily focused on data coming out of the 
statements of the three generations of the RAF. Where such insights arc 
informative or illuminating l have broken down this data further into each of the 
three generations. However. in the main I have left the analysis of the 
intergenerational differences to the discussion in Chapter Eight. 
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As in the other chapters I have dealt with the markers in alphabetical order, apart 
from those into which I had coded little or no data, which are dealt with at the end. 
The six markers that I coded the most data into were: 
(1) Basic Injustice 
(2) Dichotomous World· View 
(3) Wider Struggle 
(4) Involvement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence 
(=5) Context of Croup's Origins/Development 
(=5) Conviction 
Basic Injustice 
The RAF was driven hy a strong sense of injustice over a number of issues. 
Throughout their existence there is a strong sense that the issues which agitated 
them were, as I have also noted withal Qaeda. imported from outside their 
immediate environs. That issues of injustice in Vietnam, Pa lestine. Persia and 
other developing countries were of great importance to Meinhof and her 
contemporaries is partly a sign of the increasing globalisation of ideas and 
information. as well as an indicator of common identification through shru·ed 
normative values. It is important to realise that such tdentification does not have 
to be reciprocal (it is unclear that people in Vietnam. for example, felt an affinity 
with members of the RAF) in order for a group to claim a pparent outsiders as being 
inside their ideological boundartes. This pomt will recetve further development 
when I discuss the Dichotomous World· View marker, but has been highlighted 
here due to the extensive refet·cncing of conflicts and issues, as basic injustices for 
the RAF, from areas and countries that the) rarely. if ever, visited or lived in. 
As an example of their feelings about Vietnam, for example, one need look no 
furthet· than theit· statement explaining their bomb·strikes in retaliation of the U.S. 
minmg of :\orth Vietnamese harbours (RAF40): 
They must understand that their crimes against the Vietnamese 
people have provided them new and bitter enemies. that thet'<' will 
be no more place in the world where they could be safe from attacks 
by revolutionary guerrilla units. 
149 
The issue of Persia had of course played a key role in the development and 
radicalisation of the movement out of which the RAF grew. ln 1967 Meinhof wrote 
a column to the Shah's wife. complaining about the injustices suffered by many in 
Iran (RAF81). and it was the protests surrounding the visit of the Shah and his 
wife that led to the shooting of Benno Ohnesot·g. 
Recent revelations have told us that although it was a n undercover policema n who 
shot Ohnesorg, there were other forces at play.'" However, the theme of police 
brutality was another key claim of injustice for the RAF, in terms of bru tal tactics 
against opposition and protest movements, and leading to the police being 
identified with groups that operated in fascist Germany (RAFIS): 
Resist the police death squads! 
Resist the ss practices of the police 
What is important to note. however, is that there was more change in the sources 
of claimed injustices over time in the case of the RAF than a ny of the other groups 
in this study. Figure 6.1 charts some of the key themes coming out of an 
examination of the data in the Basic f nju.9fice marker (through recurrent wot·ds 
and phrases in their statements) and divided into each of the violent generations of 
the RAF. 
•• 
Figure 6.1 - RAF Themes of injustice 
72 In 2009 information was discovered in Sta.i fileR which showed that the policeman who 
shot Ohnesorg. Karl · Heinz Kurras, was also n Stusi spy (Kulish. 2009). Whilst it is not 
implausible that he could have been actin(: under ordeo·s as an agent provocateur, thco·c has 
not y~t been any evidence that this was the case. 
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Some of the early considerations disappear alwgether in the later statements of the 
RAF. For example. the concerns about the continuing influence of the National 
Socialists on the ruling classes disappears. naturally enough as those tainted by 
Nazi involvement aged and retired from public life. 
The second generation were particularly motivated by the mistreatment of the 
Stammheim prisoners. for example the following statements regarding the 
treatment and deaths of Holger. Baader and ~lemhof (RAF13): 
Holger was purposely murdered on 09·11·74 by systematic 
undernourishmenL and conscious manipulation of the 
transportation time from Wittlich to Stammhcim ... 
The Federal Prosecution hoped to break the prisoners' collective 
hungerstrike agamst destructive imprisonment, through the 
execution of one of the cadre. after the allempt to kill Andreas via 
force feeding failed as a result of the mobilization of public 
pressure ... 
... Uirike was executed in a State Security Hction. Her death was 
staged as s uicide. Lo make the politics that Ulrike had struggled fot· 
seem sense less. 
The th~rd generation contmued this motif with regard to the imprisonment of their 
own generation (RAF52): 
we s hall not stop fighting against the torture, oven and covert 
extermination. the whole institutionalized strategy w destroy our 
identity, which is today being increasingly imposed against us. 
The number of themes relaung to mjustices against their own lends support to 
Varon's (2004: 234) assertion that the second and th1rd generations were less 
adeologically motivated than the first. That said. the injustice of poverty. in 
developing countries pa·imarily. but manifest in discussions of 'metropoles' in the 
Wes t as well, continued to be a key driving injustice from the earliest to the latest 
incamations of the Ri\F. Poa· example: 
F'rom 1970. Build the Red Army(RAF25): 
They are the onPs who must understand the action; those who 
receive no compcnsntion for the exploitation they must suffer. Not 
in their standard of living, not in their consumption, not in the form 
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of mortgages, not in the form of even limited credit. not in the form 
of midsize cars. 
From 1980, Sigurd Debus Commando (RAF94): 
the creeping death of the 24-ho\n· day in the mctropole, the 
destruction in the struggle for existence, the lack of perspective and 
the alienation. 
This ties into feelings of global injustice that received at least lip service in most of 
the RAF statements- for example the following 'sign-orr (RAF25): 
They can grasp that what is beginning to happen here has been 
going on for a long time in Vietnam. in Palestine, in Guatemala, in 
Oakland and Watts, in Cuba and China. in Angola and in New 
York. 
Context of Group's Internal Development 
Perhaps the most significant event in the group's early internal development was 
the students' response to the police violence surrounding the Persian Shah's visit in 
1967 and the shooting of Ohnesorg. These events radic11lised a generation of 
protesting students and was cited in Mcinhofs reaction to the Black September 
attacks (RAF'102): 
Shots which were not just fired by a s ingle private fascist (Kun·as), 
but rather were the result of systt'matic imperia list terror-
directed at Dutschke. cheered on by Springer. 
In the development of the RAF the key eal'iy event was the freeing of Baader, 
which led to Mcinhof joining Ensslin and Baader as fugitives. These two events 
highlight an important point about the internal development of any group. The 
internal developments of the groups in these instances were made as a result of 
conscious decisions following external pressures. For example. in reaction to the 
shooting of Dutschke, the student movement started to t·cact in a violent fashion, 
as shown in some of Meinhofs pre·RAF columns (RAF43: 40): "On June 2. people 
threw tomatoes and eggs: thts time they threw StOnes". Later. after the escape of 
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Baader the new fugitives responded to their externalisation from 'normal' (legal) 
society through violence against property (banks) and then persons. 
In hindsight, it is very easy to see how the RAF developed its violence both within 
the group dynamic a nd in response to external pressures. Key examples arc found 
within statements about the treatment ofRAF prisoners. for example (RAF13): 
"Under Buback's regime, Siegfried was murdered ... Under Buback's regime. 
Ulrike was executed in a State Security action:· Such actions led to a culture of 
revenge within the succeeding generations of the RAF. 
There were not many statements that highlighted deve lopments within the gt·oup 
which were not stimulated by external influences. Whilst this means that I will 
not discuss this marker further at this stage. the development of the group will be 
further investigated in Chapter Eight. 
Context of Group's Origins/Development 
1\ lot of data was coded into this marker. Chief amongst the influencing factors 
was the Nazi past of Germany. and the conflict in Vietnam. 
The spectre of National Socialism hung over the post·war youth of Germany as 
they considered the complicit. active or otherwise. nature of their parents' 
involvement in the a trocities of that period. For the R/\F, the leaders of West 
Germany were guilty of involvement, as the following statement. written by 
Memhof in 1972, reveals (RAFI02): 
The ruling class- and especially the German ruling class-is so 
rapacious that, ...... it hoped to achieve. in conditions that were not 
yet ripe. that which they managed to achieve later anyway. They 
formed a n uneasy al liance with the old. declining petit bourgeoisie. 
and they bought into the irrational and deadly a ntisemitism. 
Instead of relying on their s hareholders. as should have been the 
case. they dcvelop~d the imperialist middle class to meet the 
corporations' extreme demand for capital they formed an alliance 
with the retrograde and ideologically backwards 1\azi Party. 
Instead of waiung to grow strong enough to subjugate peoples and 
countries without military adventures. they started the Second 
World War. 
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Thus, in their struggle with the West German establishment the RAF saw 
themselves as continuing the fight against fascism. Oftentimes, this struggle 
linked with the other major cause celebre for many Leftist movements the 
Vietnam war. For example. in a statement accompanying attacks against the U.S. 
base in Heidelberg. they stated that it was in retaliation for attacks in Vietnam. In 
relation to the search for the perpetrators (sclf·styled "Commandos") of this attack, 
the RAF said that (RAFJS): 
The people in Germany don't support the security services in their 
search for the Commandos because they want nothing to do with 
the crimes of American imperialism and the support which it 
receives from the ruling class here. because they haven't forgotten 
Auschwitz. Dresden. and Hamburg ... 
For the RAF, the violent nature of U.S. actions in Vietnam justified a violent 
response. It is important to note that this justification in itself does not mean that 
I am implying a universal causal relationship between the conflict within a wider 
society and the move to violence of groups interacting with it. However. the above 
issues, and others like the •·ndicalisation of many movement members following the 
death of Ben no Ohnesorg clearly had an effect on the development of violent 
strands within the broader movement. The difficulties of drawing causal 
inferences are discussed in my analysis of the matrix in Chapter Nine, but for now 
it will suffice to note that there were significant extemal pressures that led to the 
RAF developing the way that it did. 
Conviction 
Along with the Context of Croup's Origins/Development marker the Conviction 
marker contained the fifth most coded data for the RAF case study. That the 
members of all the differing generations of the RAF were committed to their cause 
is shown by their actions - they chose to leave mainstream society and live their 
lives on the run from the law. The sense of exclusion that this led to was 
profoundly difficult, as remat·ked upon by Hans·Joachim Klein (Klein and 
Bougereau, 1981). a member of another violent group at the time- the Red Cells. 
In addition. they could not have continued to undertake their violent actions 
without a great level of commitment to their cause. 
154 
In this respect, as in others. the RAF saw themselves as having greater conviction 
than their colleagues in the extra-parliamentary opposition movement. For 
example, in responding to criticism about their action to free Baader they wrote 
(RAF25): 
Don't complain that it's too hard. The action to free Baader was 
hardly a walk in the park. If you understand what's going on (and 
your comments indicate that you do understand. so it's 
opportunism to say that the bullet also hit you in the stomach-you 
assholes), if you understand anything, you need tO fmd a better way 
to organize your distribution. And we have no more to say to you 
about our methods than we do about our plans for action-you 
shitheads ... 
... Stop lounging around on the sofa in your recently· raided 
apartment counting up your love affairs and other petty details. 
Build an effective distribution system. Forget about the cowardly 
shits. the bootlickers. the social workers. those who only attempt to 
curry favor. they are a lumpen mob. Figure out where the asylums 
are and the large families and the subproletariat and the women 
workers, those who arc only waiting to give a kick in the teeth to 
those who deserve it. They will take the lead. 
The conviction to their ideals continued after capture. with the hunger str·ikes that 
led tO the death of Holger Meins. This tactic was repeated at several times during 
the rmprisonment of varrouR RAF members. although as shown in a statement 
from 1981 (RAF52) the reasons for the hunger strike were often beneficial tO 
themselves. even if framed within the wider aims of their struggle: 
having been isolated from one another for· years now, isolated from 
all collective processes and from the outside world. it is our aim to 
break this disconnection by employmg the only effective means we 
have· unlimited collective hunger strike· and to fight for 
conditions whrch would allow us tO take part m a collective learrung 
and working process in order to survive as human beings. 
In all their actions and beliefs, the conviction of the members of the RAF is neatly 
summarised in the following sign·off to one of their statements (RAF40): "Dar·e to 
fight· dare to win". 
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Desire for Social Change 
The RAF had a clear vision about what they felt was wrong with global society. but 
perhaps not such a consistent idea about how it should look once corrected. 
Consequently, a lot of the data for this marker are statements demanding certain 
activities stop, but there are not many constructive suggestions for what should be 
started. These are some examples: 
We demand an end to the bomb attacks on Vietnam. (RAF16) 
... that the Springer press stop spreading lies about foreign workers 
here. (RAF17) 
These statements are very narrow in their subject and do not address problems 
with the wider malaise in social values that the RAF seemed concerned with. 
Consequently. it is easy to see how the RAF could be accused of being focused solely 
on particular negative issues but not interested in engaging in constructive 
criticism of the wider debate. 
This seems at odds with the general message conveyed by the RAP's actions and 
statements, that they were fighting a system that imposed poverty on the majority 
of the population. Howevet·. perhaps it signifies that the RAF saw that their 
struggle was a fight against a particular enemy. success at which would lead to 
social change (which was a secondary aim). Certainly the potentially altruistic 
desire to improve society seemed to figure lower down their priorities. and this is 
reflected in this marker being one of the lower in significance in this study. 
Dichotomous World-View 
The Red Armv Faction demonstrated a clearlv dichotomous world-view in their 
- -
statements. with this marker containing the second highest amount of coded data. 
The battle- lines were drawn along ideological boundat·ies, which imparted clear 
value-judgements on the I>Ositions. groups and people held in relation to those 
boundaries. 
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Working with texts coded into the .Dichotomous World-View marker I have sorted 
some of the key recurrent phrases and ideas into three groupings which show the 
sites and sides of dichotomy as well as the language of struggle used to define the 
relationship between them (Figure 6.2). 
Sides and language of dichotomy 
Figure 6.2 - Sides and language of dichotomy 
In some cases the RAF took itself to be a champion of 'the people'. Leaving aside 
comments about the validity of their Marxist aspirations (or even interpretations), 
these feelings were expressed frequently. such as the following example from a 
statement following an attack O'l l\ATO general Haig (RAFI4): "the people of the 
world are confronted with a new american offensive ... " Statements such as these 
showed a clear line of division between who the RAF saw as the victims - 'the 
people' and the perpetrators: 'the system'. 01' 'government' or other phrases and 
terms l'Cprcscnting those in power. 
The nature of the alleged attacks against 'the people' helps further define where 
the non-negotiable beliefs of the RAF lay. These can be shown, for example, by 
what the RAF (RI\Fl8) stated it was fightmg for: "the struggle for liberation from 
fascism. from capitalist exploitation. and from the oppression of the people" 
(RAFtS). These aims are Oeshed out m greater depth in other statements. such as 
the RAF's statement (RAF25) following the freeing of Baader. the action which 
gave birth to the organisation: 
157 
That's why we're building the red army. Behind the parents stand 
the teachers, the youth authorities, and the police. Behind the 
supervisor stands the boss. the personnel office. the workers 
compensation board, the welfare office, and the police. Behind the 
custodian stands the managet·, the landlord, the bailiff, the eviction 
notice, and the police. With this comes the way that the pigs usc 
censorship, layoffs, dismissals, a long with bail ifl"s seals a nd bi lly 
clubs. Obviously, they reach for their service revolvers, their 
teargas, their grenades. and their semi·automatic weapons; ... 
Obviously, the gis in Vietnam are trained in counterguerilla tactics 
and the Green Berets receive courses on torture. 
The above shows the lines of division even more clearly. The RAF stood to protect 
what they understood as tho powerless and disadvnntaged. Whilst thei r ideologies 
are not necessarily cleat· or even theoretically consistent, they are expressed in 
emotive and non·negotiable ways. and suggest finn sites for conflict between the 
opposmg groups. 
This conflict was. for the RAF. transparently a war between two hostile sides. as 
shown in their statement that (RAF13): 
In the context of the imperialist FRO's anti ·guerilla counter 
strategy, the courts are a weapon of war - used to persecute the 
guerilla operating in illegality and to exterminate the Prisoners of 
War. Buback · who Schmidt called 'an ener~:etic combatant' for this 
State· understood the conflict with us as a war and engaged in it as 
such: '1 have lived through the war. This is a war with different 
means.' 
As already noted, the bound81·ics of the RAF were spt·ead to include those whom 
they perceived as sharing similar values or receiving similar persecution. This 
demonstration of inclusive boundaries does not mean that the lines of non· 
negotiable difference wert> in anyway 'soft'. but rather demonstrated that in an 
increasingly globalised world. the solidarity of sha•·ed ideology could provide 
sufficient grounds for identification with the group. It also helped legitimate their 
case, by claiming greater numbers on 'their side'. 
The RAF claimed this solidarity with the Vietnamese as well as people in other 
developing countries (RAF102): 
Do people think Vietnam is a joke? Guatemala, Santo Domingo, 
Indonesia, Angola are a ll just jokes? Vietnam is an atrocious 
example for the people of the Third World, an example of how 
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determined imperialism is to commit genocide against them if 
nothing else achieves the desired results-if they don't agree to 
being markets. military bases. sources of raw materials and cheap 
labor. 
They also identified their fight with a number of other resistance groups (RAF52): 
with the prisone1·s of the ira and the inla and their long and 
determined struggle for political status. 
with the prisoners of the red brigades in their struggle against the 
strategy of extermination. in which they have seized the political 
initiative. 
with all prisoners from the anti·imperialist resistance in west 
europe, especially in turkey. 
with the struggle of the palestiman prisoners for prisoner of war 
status. 
with all prisoners who have begun to resist in prison and are 
struggling to organize themselves. 
arm the resistance 
organize illegality 
organize armed resistance in west t'urope 
It was not necessary for the people co·optcd by the RAF to reciprocate because the 
cnteria for belonging to the same side as the RAF were set by the RAF it was 
their ideals and reality that were important. Similarly. those the RAF saw as the 
'Other' did not necessarily have to see themselves in the same way (or even 
acknowledge that there was a conflict). The beliefs and the ideologies of the group 
justified its own boundaries and enemies. and required no objective justification. 
l~or the RAP. the economic pressures on workers were a contagion of the ideological 
views of the Capitalist 'Other': the harassment of protesting students by the police. 
the contagion of the Fascist 'Other': the bombing of Vietnam. a contagion by the 
lmpermlist 'Other'. This language of difference and dichotomy remained a strong 
thread throughout the development of the RAF' and expressed a significant aspect 
to the group's character. And so it was wahout irony of their privileged Western 
lives and values that they could frequently say (RAF16): 
SOLIDARITY WTTH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE! 
DISPERSE Al\TD DESTROY THE POHCES OF AMERICAN 
IMPERIALISM 
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Emergency Situation 
Whilst the RAF clearly felt that the quality of life for the majority of the wol'ld's 
population was lessened through attacks on their sovereignty and economic 
independence. they did not. on the whole. suggest that this was an emergency 
situation.'3 
Some comments, like the following, did suggest an urgency to the nature of the 
conflict. for example (RAF14): ''the people of the wol"ld are confronted with a new 
american offensive," and (RAF94) "the people of europe, of the frg, are realizing 
that unless it can be stopped. this development will mean their destruction." Other 
statements also implied that the nature of the struggle with the poHce was 
increasingly taking on the nature of an emergency situation (RAF52): 
the culmination of the hunt against the raf is now to prevent, at all 
costs, militant protest against rearmament, militarization in all 
fields and the deployment of the bundeswehr in the streets, all of 
which are meant to bring germany back to where it was 35 years 
ago. 
The comment about bringing Germany back to the past echoed the RAF's concerns 
about a return to fascism (and was perhaps an att~mptto stir up similar 
sentiments in the general public). Whilst this is suggestive of a dire situation for 
German society the references to such concerns arc not as numerous or plaintive as 
with the Aum Shinrikyo case. for example. Certainly there is no suggestion of any 
obsession with an apocalyptic scenario within the tdt'Ology of the RAF. This may 
be because the RA F, as a noll' religious group. did not juxtapose ideas of a better 
society with post-apocalyptic notions of a utopian future." 
n Although it is not mentioned in any of the texts I studtcd, Bauer (2008= 40) mentions that 
Che Guevara's ·foco theory' had a strong influence on the student protestors- especially the 
idea that one should not watt for revolution. but should brmg It about. 
" Hall (2009) suggests n framework whereby groups may access a "post-apocalyptic 
temporality" (11) that oricntatCij actions in the prcsellttowards a (timeless) future, and. 
whilst ul Qaeda and Amn cou ld be said to take this npproach, l suggest that the RAF's 
considerations did not include u·anscendcnt temporalities. 
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External Legitimating Authority 
Whilst the RAF certainly had a set of values which it believed justified its actions, 
it did not recognise these as emanating from a transcendent authority. Neither did 
it clarify in any of its statements that it saw the values themselves as transcending 
the field of action, though arguably they did at least unconsciously accept this to be 
the case. as these values provided an objective and normative justification of their 
attacks and opinions. 
Where the RAF did make t·eference to some form of external ideologue with a direct 
bearing on their judgement of both their and the 'Other's' actions it was primarily 
to Marx that they turned. I do not intend to provide an analysis of Marxist thought 
or indeed of the validity of the RAF's understanding of it: the validity of their use of 
Marx is less relevant than the possible use of their mterpretation of his tdeas to 
justify violence. 
That said, there is no direct linkage made within thei •· statements to a connection 
between Marx and the justification of violent actions. Marx. Lenin and other 
ideologues only appear as reference points on matters of theory every so often. For 
example. as found in the RAf's statement about the Black September attacks in 
Munich (RAF102): "Functtomng as it does at a very htgh level of Marxist theory 
combined with revolutionary practice, Black September doesn't need to be told 
this ... " and also in their pamphlet 'l'he Urban Guerrilla Concept (RAF126). 
'!'his marker is one where there is a clear difference between the religious and non· 
religious case studies. That a non·religious group maintained a sustained and 
(self·) justified violent campaign without referencing support from an external 
legitimating authority, suggests that the idea of a god (qua a god) functioning as 
the triggering factor to violence in religious groups can be questioned. '!'his is an 
explanation that I explore in Chapter Eight. 
Involvement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence 
'l'he RAFs attacks were justified predominantly as retaliations for the actions of 
others, be that the vague•· notion of'the system', Ot' s pecific foes such as the U.S. 
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Army or the West German police. As such, it is not surprising that this marker 
was one of the most populated markers in this case study. 
Initially the RAF saw itself as participating in a cycle of reciproca1 violence which 
commenced with the West German police's treatment of anti·government 
protestors. However, a deep unhappiness at the U.S. Army's actions in Vietnam 
was also a primary driver right from the beginning and the RAF saw the U.S. 
Army as the agitator in this conflict. both in Vietnam and in the wider ideological 
arena in which the RAF fought. 
For example, the RAF's feelings about the police were unambiguously stated on a 
number of occasions. such as when they said (RAF25): 
Be absolutely clear that the revolution is no Easter March. The pigs 
will certainly escalate their means as far as possible. but no further 
than that. To bring the conflict to a head. we are building the red 
army ... 
... If we don't build the red army. the pigs can do what they want. 
tho pigs can continuo to incarcemte. lay off, impound, seize children, 
intimidate, shoot, and dominate. 'l'o bring the connict to a head 
means that they are no longer able to do what they want, but 
rather must do what we want them to do. 
In many ways it seems that the police w01·e seen as tho •·epresentatives for the 
system that the RAF were fighting against. and that they saw as embroiled in a 
(class) war against the ordinary German people. Likewise. if the U.S. was seen as 
the figurehead of the 'imperialist' system, then the troops in Vietnam were the 
vanguard and the con!lict there the preeminent cause fo•· reciprocal violence 
against the U.S. (RAF40): 
They must understand that their crimes against the Vietnamese 
people have provided them new nnd bitter enemies, that there will 
be no more place in the world where they could be safe from attacks 
by revolutionary guerrilla units. 
However, as the actions of the RAF developed. leading to police action that in turn 
led to casualties on both sides, so the cycle of reciprocal violence became more 
compact and more vicious. By the time of the later generations. a lot of the actions 
were mainly justified through reference to actions carried out against their own 
members (RAF15): 
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On Monday, May 16, 1972, the Manfred Grashof Commando 
carried out a bomb attack against Judge Budden berg of the 
Karlsruhe Federal Supreme Court. Budden berg is the judge at the 
Federal Supreme Court responsible for the arrests and 
investigations in the current political proceedings ... 
.. . We will carry out bomb attacks against judges and federal 
prosecutors until they stop violating the t·ights of political prisoners. 
We are, in fact, demanding nothing that is impossible for this 
justice system. We have no other means to compel them to do so ... 
The above quotation came from the second generation of the RAF, and in the 
naming convention of their attacks was named after their colleague Grashof, who 
had been caught by the police. The following quotation is from the third generation 
and is named after Meinhof, who many people (both inside and outside of the RAF) 
believed had been murdered in prison. 76 This convention of naming actions after 
former members was in itself a form of expressing revenge (RAF13): 
On April 7, 1977, the Ulrike Meinhof Commando executed the 
Chief Federal Prosecutor. Siegfried Buback ... 
... We will prevent the murder of our fighters in West German 
prisons. which results from the fact that the Federal Prosecutors 
Office can't stop the prisoners from struggling except by liquidating 
them ... 
Because the police were required to seek out and destroy the RAF, this cycle of 
actions continued in reciprocal violence until the RAF eventually disbanded. From 
a Girardian perspective I would suggest that the violent reciprocity continued until 
one of the groups was totally consumed. 
No Common Ground 
The actions of the group contribute more to the discussion within this marker than 
the data coded from their statements. This does not invalidate the findings, but 
does need to be highlighted. 
Tt seems that the RAF certainly lacked common ground with those whom they 
perceived as the 'Other'. Their withdrawal from mainstream society into the 
75 Not the core members though. who felt she had committed suicide - a lthough it served 
their purposes to publicly state otherwise <Aust, 2008= 276). 
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underground is one clear indicator. The extreme nature of their actions - the 
intention to maim and kill, is another indicator of a lack of common starting point 
from which to negotiate beliefs and values. 
This is expressed in some of their statements. although what comes through more 
is their unwillingness to communicate. For example, the "blah blah blah" of the 
following quotation is an almost childish non·statement about the chasm between 
their ideas and that of others (RAFl 02): 
The West German establishment has unmasked itself-the more 
they assert themselves, the more the system's inherent 
contradictions have proven what this means in the context of 
developing imperialism: phony campaigns, the social substance of 
which is a lot of blah blah blah ... 
This belittlement of other's opinions is also expressed in their feelings about others 
who could have been argued to sympathise with their views (the ·Left'). This 
quotation suggests that they have t~·ied to engage in discussion about their actions, 
but that there is no common ground due to a failure of the correspondents to 
properly understand the need for direct action. In this case the lack of common 
understanding is down to a failure of the 'Other' to correctly perceive the nature of 
the problem and its correct response (RAF25): 
It is pointless to explain the right thing to the w1·ong people. We've 
done enough of that. We don't want to explain the action to free 
Baader to babbling intellectuals. to those who are freaked out, to 
know·it·alls ... 
Question of Authority 
Building on the previous quotation. the question of authority for the RAF was 
clearly important as it provided an important source of justification for their 
actions to those with ideological sympathies. The RAF clearly saw itself as the 
vanguard of the leftist/protest movement within West Germany and was frequently 
scathing of those 'inferior' colleagues who failed to display the same conviction that 
they did (RA Fl 02): 
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And the opportunistic left in the metropole behaves idiotically-
being the labor aristocracy of imperialism (Lenin) who benefit from 
this theft, they sit on their arses. They only take to the streets if 
something affects them, if the war escalates. if some of them are 
shot· like during Easter 1968 in Berlin Ot' May 1970 at Kent State. 
If the system does something against them like what is always 
being done in the Third World, all of a sudden they get upset. they 
run to the police. they chase after that rat·catcher McGovern, they 
run for a post on the labor council and they write a bunch of poems 
against the war. 
This is in stark contrast to themselves <RAF102): 
In opposition to this stands the raf-as sure of our cause as the 
people of the Third World. because they accept their leadership role, 
because they know that the struggle must be ca t·ried out 
relentlessly, and that is how they carry it out. 
The question of authority. for the RAF as for religious groups, is an important one 
in that they claim the rightful leadership of not just their group. but also of a wider 
population. Furthermore, those who do not accept this authority are placed outside 
the 'true' boundaries and so grouped with the 'Other' - as they wrote about one 
'leftist' (Negt) with whom they disagreed (RAF102): "Negt need only come out into 
the open for all to sec that he is in bed with the fascists his 'qualification,' most 
probably an 'unqualified tool."' 
Symbolic Importance 
The nature of th!' symbolic importance of their actions was contextually different 
for the RAF than for the religious gToups in this study. Whilst the RAF' did assign 
symbolic impot·tance to their struggle the symbols wcr!' consciously this·worldly in 
origin. However. because the RAF created non·rehgious symbols does not mean 
that they were not sacred in natur(' for the group. 
For example, as previously discussed, the nature of the sacred that I am discussing 
in this thesis. and through which I am examining the IU\F. is of things special and 
set apart from the everyday world. In this context. comments such as (RAF16) 
''VICTORY IN PEOPLE'S WAR". suggests a sacred aspect to the idea of the war. 
War is oftentimes a sacred activity. leading as it docs to a rupture in the not·mal 
• 
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existence of its participants. But over and above that the RAF have created a 
symbol out of'the People', a symbol which reflects the values and goals of the RAF 
as well as contributing to the myth of class struggle and the enslavement of the 
proletariat, by which they ordered their world. 
Likewise. their enemies were symbolised as (RAFtS) ·· ... exploiters and enemies of 
the people ... ", and actions such as those of Black September were valorised as they 
(RAF102): 
... simultaneously clarified both the nature of the imperialist ruling 
class and of the anti·imperialist struggle, in a way that no 
revolutionary action in West Germany or West Berlin has. It was 
simultaneously anti·imperialist. antifascist, and internationalist. 
Here we see the ideological lines of conflict symbolised by the positions of the anti· 
imperialist I fascist. against the 'Other' of the ruling class. The symbols here are 
flags of identification. standards that mark the positions of the various for and 
against camps. 
Whether an action is seen as having struck at the powers of evil. or of fascism or of 
the enemies of Allah. each referent to a symbolised 'Other' is of equal importance to 
the respective group. and each action takes on a symbolic importance which raises 
the natlU'e of the action beyond just that of a physical attack. 
Wider Struggle 
As already mentioned in several of the above markers the RAF saw themselves as 
representative of people far beyond the national borders of their homeland. and 
they saw their battle as waged on ideological grounds with sites of conflict around 
the world. 
This marker was the third most populated for this case study, with data coded from 
the RAFs frequent early references to Vietnam and constant claims to represent 
the poor and disadvantaged in both developed and developing countries. 
Sometimes these references did no more than name·check sites of conflict around 
the world (RA F14): 
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smash us imperialism and its bases all over the world! 
organize armed resistance in western europe! 
build the anti -imperialist front in the metropolcs! 
solidru·ity with the palestinian resistance aga inst the imperia list 
final solution' 
solidarity with the anti-imperialist resistance in turkey! 
But other times they represented a deeper engagement wi th issues, framed with in 
a Marxist terminology (RAF14): 
the people of the world are confronted with a new american 
offens1ve. which also marks a qualitative leap forward in the 
development of the relative strength between the forces of 
revolu tion and the forces of counter-revolution: or. as we have 
a lready said: the worldwide ''evolutionary p1·ocess is the 
encirclement of the metropoles by the people of the hinterland. 
The Marxist language and constructs framed the boundaries of the normative 
values by which the RAF judged the actions of itself and its 'Other'. This is not to 
say that the RAF correctly undm·stood or even consistently a pplied Ma1·xist 
principles or theol'ies. But certainly right from the start it was these ideas through 
which they interpreted their world and, regardless of whether they could be 
understood as proper Marxists. the1r world-view was how they identified and 
justified the ideological and actual spaces of conflict. 
The international and ideological placement of these sites is demonstrated in the 
two quotations above. But the RAF also saw West Germany as the centre of this 
struggle. and so JUStifying their struggle against the government. writing in 1972 
that (RAF102): 
The comrades from Black September, who had their own Black 
September in 1970 when the Jordanian armv massacred 20.000 
Palestinians. went back to the place that is the origin of this 
massacre: West Germany- formerly l'\azi Germany-now at the 
centre of imperialism. Back to the site of the power that forced the 
J ews of both West and East Europe to emi!(ratc to IsraeL Back to 
those who had hoped to profit from the theft of Palestinian land. 
Back to where Israel got its reparation payments and, until 1965. 
officially. its weapons. Back to where the Springer Corporation 
celebrated Israel's 1967 Blitzkrieg in an anticommunist orgy. Back 
to the supplier who provided Hussein's army with panzers. assault 
rifles, machine-pistols. and munitions. Back to where everything 
possible was done-using development aid, oi l dea ls, investments. 
weapons. and di plomatic relationsh ips-to pit A1·ab regimes aga inst 
• 
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each other, and to turn all of them against the Palestinian 
liberation movement. Back to the place from which imperialism 
launches its bombc1·s when other means of repressing the Arab 
liberation movement fail: West Germany-Munich- the nato 
airport at Fiirstenfeldbruck. 
It is clear from statements such as these that they saw West Get·many as the 
centre of the struggle- thus placing themselves at tho core of the connict. Th is 
view also suggests an ordering of their world around their own actions and values. 
This latter point is borne out through their citing of the ideology of imperialism as 
the centre of the opposing forces that united the struggle around the world 
(RAF102): "Imperialism unifies North and South as the centre and the periphery of 
a single system ... " 
Markers not populated 
Out of the markers I have been using to code data into the matrix, three did not 
capture any data from the RAF statements. These were: 
• Against violence 
• Followers differ from leader 
• Personal benefit 
The first mlll·ker is unlikely to capture data from the violent groups, but I wanted 
to ensure that the same set of markers was applied to all case studies. 1'hat the 
RAF did not make non·violcnt statements is not surprising given that as 
individuals they were part of the radicaliscd end of the student movement before 
they created the RAF. However. it is wo1·th making that point as we could expect 
groups that started off non·violently to make such statements. or indeed for 
statements and actions to suggest very different outcomes. In this case. though. 
there was no divergence between the RAF"s actions and their statements (at least 
in respect to their commitment to violent means to achieve their ends). 
The second marker from the above list renects two aspects of the RAF's 
development. Firstly is that there was no single leader. While Baader was 
undoubted ly the charismatic face of the RAF, Ensslin and Meinhofboth played 
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significant roles. There is evidence from accounts of the RAF that there were 
significant failings out between these three (and from time to time between others) 
but in the main there was no divergence between the 'party line' and the 
statements and actions of the rank and file. 76 
This could be due to the second aspect. which is that as an underground 
organisation members were highly committed to the group as they had left society 
behind and, legally at least, burned their bridges (made it difficult to return due to 
acting illegally). Where there were cases (and there were) where individuals 
disagreed with the motives or actions of the group and so left their former 
colleagues, those dissenters we1·e unlikely to ever publish rationales for this as they 
still needed to avoid dmwing police and judicial attention to themselves. 
There are some exceptions. Hans ·Joachim Klein. whom I have already mentioned, 
IS one. However. as he was not a member of the RAF I have not analysed his 
statements for this study. There could also be others. but the majority of my 
sources for material were at least partially sympathetic to the aims of the RAF (if 
not the means) and so were less likely to publish dissenting documents. However, I 
don't believe that this detracts from this case study as this marker sets out to 
examine the link between leaders' statements I act1ons and their followers' 
statements I actions (as further discussed in Chapter Nine). The communal nature 
of the RAF tended to mean that their actions were jointly supported and 
statements jointly authored and so were unlikely to provide data in this case. 
The last marker from the above list, Persomu Benefit, also received no data. This 
marker and what it intends to capture is discussed in Chapter Nine. However, at 
thiS stage it is fair to say that the nature of the RAF's struggle meant that it was 
unlikely to see where the members might derive personal benefit in an immediate, 
01· later. spiritual capacity. This implies a considerable degree of self·sacrifice. 
The1·e were two other markers from the standard list which are not discussed 
above. These received a little data, but not sufficient for a coherent analysis. The 
first was Recourse to Stu:riliciol I Judicial Processes. There was only one statement 
made that fell into this marker and this was in 1972 (RAFl5): 
'" The following are occasion8 where there is evidence of a falling out between Mcinhof and 
the other prisoners <Au st. 2008: 252·7) and disagreements in the second generation after 
tho Stammheim deaths (414·5). 
169 
We demand the immediate application of laws governing remand 
prisoners. the Geneva Human Rights Convention, and the Uni ted 
Nations Charter regarding the use of remand custody for political 
prisoners. We demand the justice system call off the systematic 
destructive attacks upon the lives and health of the prisoners. 
This was the only statement that I found where the RA F appealed to a judicial 
process to resolve (some oO their grievances. Otherwise. the lack of appeals of this 
nature suggests that the RAF felt that there were no judicial processes that could 
be trusted to help them attain their goals. This is perhaps not sut·pt·ising given the 
movement's early references to many judges as former Nazi sympathisCI·s and also. 
for the later generations. the Baaded\1einhof generation's drawn·out and bitter 
trial at Stammheim. 
The remaining marker was the Violent Tmditions marker. While this did return a 
few statements. they tended to refer to myths of violence inherent in the 'Other' 
and not within their own tradition: for example. the history of U.S. aggression 
against othet• countries, or of Nazi Germany. So while there were still references to 
violent traditions within the rhetoric of the group. they were not claiming these 
traditions as within their own beliefs. although I suggest that the latter 
generations of the RAF could have referenced the first generation's actions and 
statements. 
Conclusion 
The non·religious case study was a crucial one to undertake in order to test the 
definition and validity of the markers outside of a purely 'religious' context. As 
discussed above. I have followed others in arguing that it is possible to see 
instances of the sacred in s<.>cular settings. and the matrix should help locate and 
map these instances where they relate to a problematic (and violent) discourse. 
I also expected to find that the markers were similarly populated across the case 
studies. in both religious and non·religious examples. However. this has not 
proved to be the case, with the marker on External Legitimtlting Amhority 
providing the most notable example. The o·esults from the RAF literatuo·e suggest 
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that secular groups might not need to refer to an external legitimating authority 
and indeed do not necessarily use secular ideologues to support their views in ways 
similar to the use of religious ideologies by religious groups. 
This interesting observation will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. At this 
s tage I will merely summarise some of the other key findi ngs from this case study. 
The top five markers for the RAF study can be seen in the following chart (Figure 
6.3). which shows the percentage of total data by each marker, separated out into 
the three generations of the RA F: 
., 
Marker trends by generation 
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Figure 6.3 - RAF Marker trends by generation 
The above chart shows there were some changes in the markers over time. For 
example, more data was coded into the Context ofCroup~s Internal Development 
market· for the second generation of the RAF than for the others and the 811sic 
Injustice marker in this case was also disproponionate in comparison to the other 
generations. This reflects the purpose and background to the second generation. 
the rationale of which was primarily the release of the founders of the RAF. Their 
complaints of torture and maltreatment against the JUdicial system and their 
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deliberate actions with no intention other than the release of the prisoners 
dominated their statements, unlike those of the other two generations. 
As previously mentioned, quantitative representations of the data should only be 
used to provide an overview of the markers as the proper analysis is to be found in 
the qualitative investigation of the representative texts. The discussion in this 
chapter has helped to map out some of the boundaries of the sacred in a secular 
context. These issues will be further discussed in Chapter Eight, as will a more in· 
depth examination of the development of groups allowing for a comparison between 
some of the 'non·violent' and 'violent' data within the movements represented in 
the 'v iolent' case studies. However, before T undertake this compru·ison, I need to 
consider the data from some non·violent groups, as counter·examples to the three 
violent groups T have already presented case studies on. 
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7. Non-violent Groups 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse data from groups with beliefs concerning 
non-violence. which can be used in comparison with data from the previous three 
chapters, on violent groups. This comparison will draw out more information about 
what is special about the non-negotiable beliefs that lead to violence. as well as 
further testing the application of the matrix in mapping instances of the sacred in 
•·eligious and non-religious groups. Themes that will benefit from this comparison 
include understanding how violent and non-violent g•·oups differ. when sharing 
common historical and/or ideological paths. 
In order to provide the best comparisons possible I have chosen groups which 
operated out of similar geographical, chronological or ideological circumstances. 
They are also representative of tensions within the definitions of 'non-violence'. 
•·elating to issues of strategy. timing and ideological commitment. 
The groups presented here are related to the mam case studies in the following 
ways: 
Agonshu (in comparison to Aum Shinrikyo} 
As 'new 1\'ew Religions' Agonshu and Aum fall withm the same era of Japanese 
religiosity."' The application of this label should not be used to mask what are 
important differences between the beliefs of the two !,'TOups. However. there are 
also some similarities and indeed these are not surprising given that Shoko 
Asahara attended Agonshu before leaving to stan Aum Shinrikyo. 
"See my discussion of this classification at the beginning of the Aum case-study. 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan (in comparison to a/ Qaeda) 
Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan (UHiT) is part of the global Hizb ut·Tahrir movement. 
As well as sharing many s imi larities in beliefs withal Qaeda the Uzbek b1·anch had 
contacts with the Tali ban and a l Qaeda in Afghanistan, also sharing regional 
concerns. With thls in mind, and also to apply a natural boundary to the potential 
size of the study. I focus specifically on the Uzbek branch of Hizb ut·Tahrir. 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (in comparison to the Red 
Army Faction) 
It was very difficult to find a non-violent comparison to the Red Army Faction 
within West Germany. Another )jmiting factor was that I needed to chose groups 
that had at least a small number of texts available (in English) for analysis. The 
Student Non-violent Co01·dinating Committee (SNCC) was the best example 
p1·oviding as it did a useful corpus of first and second hand material as well as 
operating within a similar chronological period to the RAP and also sharing some 
of its international concerns (e.g. American actions in Vietnam). Both groups also 
grew out of student protest movements. 
Because this chapter includes three groups, rather than just one, it will follow a 
s lightly different format to the other case studies. In the previous chapters I have 
introduced the group through discussion of some of the key themes that also arose 
out of that case study. In this chapter I will start by providing a very short 
introduction to each of the groups by themselves as it would not be possible to give 
the reader enough of an understanding of the context of each group and at the 
same time do justice to these themes. 
Next, I will discuss some of the problems around labelling groups 'violenl'. 'non· 
violent'. 'pacifist' and so on, and what this means for my study. The second half of 
the chapter, as with the previous studies. will provide an analysis of the texts 
through the markers. I will not discuss each group in each marker, because there 
would not be enough space to undertake this, but I have selected markers and 
groups which provide interesting findings. I will conclude with a very brief 
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summation of the key themes, with pointers to the fuller discussions in Chapters 
Eight and Nine. 
Groups 
Agonshu 
Agonshu claims that it is the legitimate guardian of a 1·eligious tradition that dates 
back some 2500 years to the historical Buddha Sakyamuni (Reader. 1988: 238). 
although itR more recent roots lie in the fou ndation of Kannon Jikoikai by Seiyu 
Kiriyama in 1954. This g1·oup was devoted to worshipping the Bodlusnttva Kannon 
(Goddess of Mercy) through the form of Juncei Kannon. In 1978 Kiriyama changed 
its name to Agonshu. the new name being based on the Agama scriptures around 
which its beliefs are now based (Spier. 1986: 50·1). 
It is important to note that Agonshu shares traits with a number of its rival groups, 
partly due to the intensely competitive nature of the Ja panese religious 
marketplace. For example, like Asaham. Kiriyama's biography details both the 
hardships he endured as well as past bn1shes with the law. Agonshu has been 
gifted authentic relics of the Buddha. although Reader ( 1988: 246 and 243) points 
out that both the rags to riches tale a nd sole authenticity of 'their' re lics are traits 
common to many 'new New Relib>ions'. One of the othe1· shared traits is of more 
immediate interest to this study. and that is the use of the prophecies of 
Nostradamus, to which I will turn shortly. 
Kiriyama claims that the Agama sutras a re some of the very few genuine Buddhist 
sutras. that the majority of Buddhism practised in J apan is false. and that only 
Agonshu practises 'true' Buddhism (Spier, 1986: 52). From 500 members in 1974. 
Shimazono (2004: 236) states that Agonshu had 206,606 members in 1990, with 
Clarke (2006: 16·7) claiming around 1 million in Japan with thousands more in 
several other countries. The primary focus of worship IS the Buddha's relics. 
although the role of the Coma fire ceremony is also stated to be of central 
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importance as well as the teachings of the Agama sutra (Kisala. 1998: 148·9).18 
Kisala (149) acknowledges that Kiriyama has proven very sensitive to the shifts in 
Japanese popular culture, and another sign of this is that he was the first Japanese 
religious leader to take up the prophecies of l\ostradamus which he used to 
validate his own (154), a tactic that Asahara also used. 
In 1981 Kiriyama published a book addressing the prophecies, in which he 
interpreted the '1999 Prophecy' (Leoni, 2000: 435) as saying that it was Agonshu 
which was going to be the saviour of humankind. In 1995 he published another 
work on Nostradamus, entitled July 19.99 is Coming, where he predicted a global 
catastrophe caused by an earthquake under a nuclear installation.,. Kisala (1998: 
149) reports that the book received more attention than normal due to the attacks 
by Aum which occurred at the same time as the book came out. Unlike Asahara 
however, Kiriyama did leave himself with a way out should the prophecy have 
proved to be false (154). 
This eschatological focus and use of Nostradamus does not feature prominently in 
the works that I was able to access. Rather. more was made of the role of angry 
ancestors in the form of spirits and the negative effect they could have on the lives 
of the living. A good example of this is found in the text excerpted in Spier's (1986: 
57·60) article where the negative impact of deceased family members, especially 
children, is spclt out. 
The benefits of helping the deceased to attain Buddha hood are that they remove 
barriers to personal success in the believc•·'s life. and this orientation towards 
personal gain is further demonstrated in the popular Coma fire rite where 
believers burn votive sticks containing peutions for economic success, good exam 
results and so on (Spier, 1986: 56·7). This is discussed further in the marker below 
on Personal Benefic. 
The beliefs of Agonshu have changed over time. from a focus on a Goddess of Mercy 
(Kannon), to the teachings contained in authentic Buddhist texts (Agama sutras), 
'" That said, Header (1988= 250) points out that little substantiv~ teaching is given from 
these sutras and Spier (1986: 61 - fn 30) highlights that despite claiming that the 
,l/ahayono sutras are inauthentic. some of the teachings of Agonshu are based around some 
of these sutras. 
79 This earthquoke·themcd message was written after the Great Hnnshin (or Kobe) 
Earthquake that January, which killed over six thousand people. 
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to relics of the Buddha (Sakyamum), and including legitimisa tion from the 
teachings of a French seer (Nostradamus). Throughout all this there has been a 
theme of world·peace and. in pursuit of th1s, Kiriyama has taken the Goma 
ceremonies to a number of countries a nd met individuals such as Pope J ohn Paul II 
a nd the Dalai Lama. 
Hizb ut-Tohrir al-lslomi in Uzbekistan 
I have used Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan as it provides an example of an Isla mist 
group with a rad ical ideology not too dissimila1· to that of al Qaeda and which also 
has links to the global flow of ideas and info1·mation both from the Middle East as 
well as further afield."" Although enjoying its greatest mfluence in Uzbekistan and 
a mongst ethnic Uzbeks, UHiT has a lso mainta ined a presence in neighbouring 
countries (Naumkin, 2005: 192·3). 
Is lam came to Central Asia after the conquest of the region in the seventh century 
by the Arab Caliphate, by 875·999 CE becoming the official religion of the area. In 
the 1930s. the Soviets imposed a policy of secularisation on Central Asia (Khalid, 
2007: 50·83: Frank and Mamatov, 2006: vi·x). which has led to many of the 'secular 
versus Is lamic' debates still underlying lslamist discourse there today. Following 
the collapse of the USSR these regions formed nation·states. although the 
dissolution of their borders under a Caliphate is part of the appeal of UHiT for 
many inhabitants of the region. 
The majority of Muslims in the area are Sunnis. though in contradistinction to 
Wahhubi and Salafi Sunnis in Saudi Arabia. they still follow many customs of the 
pre· Islamic folk religions (Naumkin, 2005: 6·7: Karagiannis, 2006: 261). 
Most commentators seem to suggest that Hizb ut·Tahrir came to the region around 
the mid 1990s (Naumkin, 2005: 139·142). There is some evidence that the first 
cells were started by Jordanian subjects (141) although from at least the late 1990s 
ao Like ol Qaeda. Hizb ut·'l'ahrir is a global movement. and 11s with Abdullah Azzam, Hizb 
ut·Tahr1r's key early ligures wert' Palestinian (Knragiannis. 2006: 26-1). It is in this regard 
a good comparison. In th1s case· study I have re•trtcted the htt'rature to that of Uzbekistan 
as a udy limiter of the nvailable htcrature (but wh1ch is still based very firmly within the 
centra l ideology of th~ party) . It a lso allows for 11 further comparison on a loca l level. with 
the Is lamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which I will touch upon in the following section. 
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UHiT literature was being published locally (142). The flow of ideas from the 
Middle East clearly made an impression, with reference in local leaflets to the 
oppression of Palestinians and the invasion of Iraq (187). In adrution, the central 
Hizb ut·Tahrir website (hosted in Britain) also contained significant information on 
events in Uzbekistan, suggesting that links were well-maintained (127). although 
fina ncing was probably local (182). Estimates of the pt·e-2001 membership of 
Tahriris in Uzbekistan range from 10,000 (Naumkin, 2005: 158) to 30.000 
(Karagiannis and McCauley. 2006: 316)."' 
As part of the global Hizb ut·Tahrir movement, UHiT campaigns for the 
restoration of the Caliphate. Hizb ut·Tahrir was started in 1953 by a Palestinian 
judge who had split off from the Muslim Brotherhood. In opposition to Arab 
Nationa list movements of the time (Ba'thism, Nasserism. etc.) Hizb ut·Tahrir 
sought to bring Muslims back to an Islamic way of life. in an Islamic pan-national 
state (Naumkin. 2005: 127·132). Rather than seeing itself as a religious group, it 
sees its role as a political group whose ideology is Islam (1\aumkin. 2005: 129: 
Karagiannis and McCauley. 2006: 316). In order to bring abou t the Caliphate it 
seeks to model its plan of action on that of the Prophet Muhammed through three 
stages (Naumkin. 2005: 116): 
1. The stage of culturing: 'finding and cultivating individuals who 
are convinced by the thought and method of the pm·ty.' They 
will then carry on the party's ideas. 
2. The stage of interaction with the umma. in order 'to establish 
Islam in life. state, and society.' 
3. The stage of taking over the government 'and implementing 
Islam completely and totally. a nd carrying its message to the 
world.'., 
These three stages are important to understand in the context of Hizb ut·Tahrir's 
stated commitment to non-violence. While some literature has been presented as 
evidence of UHiT's support fot· violence. Nnumkin (154) points out that some 
experts believe that the authenticity of this e"idence is questionable. Karagiannis 
•• l\aumkin bases his figures on independent observers, but notes that an exaggerated 
figure of up to 60,000 is quoted by some. Karagiunnis and McCauley put the exaggerated 
figure at 100.000, but base their own estimate from Karaginnnis's research in the region 
from 2003·2005. If accurate. this suggestR that Naumkin's assertion that numbers dropped 
after the attacks on the U.S. m September 2001 could also be called into quesuon. The 
clandestine nature of the group and the State'• mOation of numbers by charging people of 
being members on little or no evidence make exact numbers hard to come by (Frank and 
Mamatov, 2006: 240). 
•• Naumkin summarises this from an-Nabhani (1993: 33). 
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and McCauley (2006) provide a closer look at why it seems to be that UHiT has, in 
fact, not moved to violence. They s uggest two central reasons which are based 
around the commitment to following the Prophet's model for achieving the 
Caliphate. and the fact that Hizb ut·Tahrir believe that they are still only at the 
second stage of it- which does not require violence (328). This is despite UHiT 
having the same resources, opportunities and motivation to act violently as the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has pursued a terrorist strategy in 
Uzbekistan and wider afield in the region (320·4). 
Importantly for Karagiannis and McCauley (2006: 328), Hizb ut·Tahrir are not 
necessarily against violence. just that without a Caliph they do not believe it can 
(yet) be legitimated. At this stage, on the basis of research conducted in the region 
(Naumkin and l<aragiannis have both undertaken 1·esearch there ove1· a number of 
years) as opposed to popular opinion about the movement, UHiT does not appear to 
have acted violently. 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
The Student 1'\onviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came into being in April 
1960 (Stoper, 1989: 6). However, it grew out of a hist.ory of protest and direct 
action within the U.S. Laue (1989: 57·74) charts some of the history of these 
protests, which formed what came to be known as the Civil Rights Movement, 
giving significance to the 1954 Supreme Court decision to de·segregate schools and 
the pre·l960 protests with, for example, Martin Luther King Jr. The background 
to these protests was the racial disc1·imination against the Black American 
population, practised through the legal, judicial. political and law enforcement 
agencies as well as in the common culture of (especially Southern) White America. 
This discrimination had led to the crushing poverty and marginalisation of Black 
Americans for generations. 
It was within the context of increasing local protests (Laue, 1989: 75) that some 
students of A&T College in Greensboro, Korth Carolina started a sit·m m the 
White section of the segregated lunch counter in a Woolworths on February 1 ", 
1960 (Zinn. 1964: 16). After an hour of receiving no sei·vice the counter closed and 
• 
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they went home. The next day they returned for two hours. The sit·ins started to 
be reported in the national news and within two months there were fifty·four 
student sit·ins in nine states (Murphree, 2006: 11). 
Tn April 1960, 300 students attended a conference organised by the Southern 
Churches Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Civil Rights organisation headed by 
Martin Luther IGng Jr, where the SNCC was born (Stoper, 1989: 6). Because of 
the energy and vibrancy of its mainly student membership. it was courted by some 
of the more established organisations. However the students chose to maintain 
their independence (Scllet·s, 1990: 36·9). 
An important part of the early movement was its commitment to non·violent 
protest. Key figures such as James Lawson and Baya rd Rustin had travelled to 
India in the 1950s to Jearn from activists who had studied with Gandhi. whose 
teachings had also greatly influenced Martin Luther King Jr .. who in himself had 
come to symbolise the non·violent approach in America <Murphree. 2()()6: 15: Laue, 
1989: 58·9. 74). Other educated protestors involved in the legal struggle leading to 
the 1954 de-segregation decision were what Laue (1989: 59·60) called 'professional 
pacifists' and they too had been heavily influenced by Gandhi. Right from the start 
of the SI':CC there was an awareness of the difference between practising non· 
violence as a principle or as a strategy, a nd King. in a s peech at the opening 
conference. asked students to be "disciples of nonviolCJlce" (Sellers, 1990: 36). 
The initial role of the SNCC was to coordinate the studtmt sit·ins (Stoper, 1989: 7), 
but the following year, May 1961. s uppoo·tct·s undertook a 'freedom ride' on two 
buses from Washington DC to New Orleans to protest about segregation on the 
buses (Zinn. 196.J: 40·61). During this trip one of the buses was set on fire and 
protesters on the other bus were attacked (Stoper. 1989: 7·8). When otheo· 
organisations pulled out at this stage the SNCC canicd on and tried to coordinate 
the activists involved in this struggle. In August the organisation started two 
separate tactics. one included continuance of direct action. such as the freedom 
rides. and the other focused on voter registration. 
These twin aims continued untill964 and large numbers of white northern 
students also got involved in the movement. especially in a campaign to highlight 
the exclusion of Black votco·s from the democratic process (Stoper, 1989: 13·15). 
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Towards the end of this year the movement lost momentum and went through 
significant internal upheaval. In March 1965 members took part in a march 
organised by Martin Luther King in Alabama. Some members stayed on there. 
organising a freedom organisation. which had the symbol of a black panther. The 
explicit goal in thls Black·majority area was power and in 1966 they ran their own 
candidates for local elected positions. This movement, started by Stokely 
Carmichael who was later elected as President of the SNCC. was the beginnings of 
the Black Panther Party (Stoper. 1989: 14·15). 
Within the SNCC there was significant discord over the role of white activist 
volunteers (Sellers. 1990: 157. 193·7). who were encouraged to leave the 
organisation and focus on educating poor whites. The election of Carmichael to 
President of the SNCC led to more militant organisation and groups with guns 
even defended SNCC members on marches (165). In June 1966. speaking to a 
large crowd after he was arrested, Carmichael used the phrase 'Black Power'. 
which became a popular slogan (166). although it insulled fear into many White 
communities (173). In 1967 Carmichael stepped down and Hubert "Rap" Brown 
took the organisation in an increasingly radical direction. Murphee (2006: 145·8) 
states that 1968 was the last year of any kind of meaningful SKCC action 
(although very different from its beginnings) and. while the group re·named itself 
the Student National Coo•·dinating Committee in 1969. this only lasted a few more 
months. F1·om being part of an avowedly non·violent group some SNCC members 
had ended up openly endorsing violent actions. This highlights a more general 
problem about labelling particular groups or movements 'violent' or 'non·violent', 
and it is to this topic that I now turn. 
Biding One's Time or Turning the Cheek: Understanding 'Non-
violence' 
Included within this chapter are two groups whose label of ·non·violent' could be 
seen as p•·oblcmatic to many people. 1 have chosen to include these groups because, 
in addition to the similarities to their 'violent' counterparts that 1 mentioned above. 
they also allow for an exploration around some of the complexities of violence and 
belief which need elucidation beyond a simple violentlnon·violent binary. 
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There are many ctifferent ways a group could be understood as non-violent. r have 
listed the primary reasons here. and will discuss each of these in more depth as a 
means to better understanding this complex area. 
Non-violence can be seen as arising through: 
• Commitment 
• Non·engagement 
• Strategy 
• Timing 
• Perception 
I don't suggest that this list. is exhausl.ive. but it certainly brings out the most 
important factors relevant to such a discussion. 
Commitment 
A good place to start in this category is through comparison of'non·violence' with 
the term 'pacifism'. While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably they are 
absolutely not the same. The former relates to an absence of violence whilst the 
latter is an ideology through which a person or group is committed to the positive 
avoidance of violence. 
As mentioned above. the SNCC was heavily influenced by Gandhian principles of 
pacifism (Murphree. 2006: 15). Gandhi's pacifism did not mean a meek acceptance 
of the prevai ling injustices of the time. but rather that the resistance to these 
should be peaceful. avoicting violence no matter what the provocation. His teaching 
of these principles and their part in the successful struggle for Indian 
Independence had a great influence on many Americans seeking to right the 
wrongs of their own segregated society. Groups such as the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE). Fellowship of Reconciliation (FoR). and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC) which helped start the SNCC. all interacted with 
Gandhi's ideas. All aided in the distribution of Gandhian literature and cited him 
in their ideological statements: CORE gave out an annual Gandhi award and the 
SCLC even stat·ted a 'Gandhi Society' (Laue. 1989: 60-1). 
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This Gandhian pacifist approach found a natural home in the Christian beliefs of 
many, as pe1·haps best shown in the teachings of Martin Luther King (2010: 84): 
Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic 
of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful 
and effective social force on a large scale. 
Unsurprisingly many of the early leaders from the sit- ins followed in this tradition 
(Stoper, 1989: 27) and this was reflected in both the name and statements of the 
SNCC. 
For these people pacifism was an ideological commitment, something they believed 
was right. and which we would expect to see reflected in s tatements from the group. 
Perhaps more than any of the other modes of non·violence in discussion here, this 
is the one that should leave the most obvious trail. 
This commitment is also shown in Agonshu's actions and statements, as discussed 
in greater depth in the Against Violence marker below. In this case the ideal 
comes out of the cultural context other 'new New Religions' also claim to work for 
world peace (Reader. 1988: 256). This in turn is no doubt influenced by the 
experience of Japan during and in the ending of the Second World War, as indeed 
mentioned by Kil'iyama (AGSlO). 
For any group that demonstrates a clear ideological commitment to non·violence 
the chance of acung violently is highly unlikely. As I have argued. beliefs do 
change over time but at least in these cases we would expect to see a quite obvious 
shift in feelings about violence. Whilst this point seems quite obvious, it is worth 
making as non·violence as practised in some of the othe1· forms discussed here does 
not lead to such a clear·cut conclusiOn. 
Non-engogemen t 
One common characteristic of all the groups within this study is that they have 
engaged with tho world around them. Within the non-violent case study it was 
• 
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important to find groups that similarly engaged with the world, so that they 
provided a proper comparison for the markers. 
It is for this reason that I did not choose non·violent groups such as Old Order 
Mennonites, Amish and Hutterites, groups which have commitments to pacifist 
behaviour, but which also limit their interaction with groups whose beliefs are 
likely to conflict with theirs. 
The above groups withdraw from society in a variety of ways, from the refusal to 
use similar technologies and clothing to segregating their homes, schools, places of 
work and communal areas from the wider populace around them. This withdrawal 
from other members of the same nation removes the possibility of their 
engagement in conflict. This is not to say that they have not been involved in 
violence: the above groups all received significant persecution in a number of 
countries, but fled rather than fought their oppressors (Mennonite Historical 
Association, 2001). 
The pacifism of these groups should not be confused with other traditionally 
pacifist groups. for example the Quakers. who have enga~:ed with the world as 
indeed have many branches of the Mennonite faith.~• 
The example of non·engagement is found in other places in history and location-
outside of the above groups which all came out of the European Reformation. For 
example, during the Roman occupation of Palestine. the Zealots and Essenes took 
radically different approaches to coping with the imposition of foreign be lief 
systems. The Zealots fought with the Romans. losing and eventually bringing 
about persecution on all the remaining Jewish sects. Meanwhile the Essenes 
withdrew from worldly society to create a separate community (Hall. 2009: 25·6). 
The important point to take forward from these examples is that, as argued 
throughout this thesis, violence occurs at the points of contact and conflict of non· 
negotiable beliefs. Where a group actively avoids contact with 'Others', the 
"" In keeping with my emphasis on the fluidity of beliefs in relation to violence. It IS worth 
pointing out that both the Hutterites and Mennonites (from whom the Amish separated) 
arc descended from the Anabaptist movement, which itself wns involved (both ns aggressor 
and victim) in many violent episodes during the Reformation. 
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possibility of such contact is greatly dimirushed and with it, the possibility of 
violence. 
Strategy 
In Martin Luther King's opening statement to the SNCC he made a distinction 
between a commitment to pacifist principles and the usc of non·violent tactics. 
Sellers (1990: 35) passes on recollections of moments of his speech: 
Dr. King also told the students that nonviolence was not a tactic. 
but a way of life. ·our ultimate end must be the creation of the 
beloved community. The tactic of nonviolence without the spirit of 
nonviolence may become a new kind of violence.' 
King's point is very important. because holding pacifism as a belief is very different 
to using non-violence as a strategic aim. and this will obviously have a significant 
difference to the data that the markers capLUrc. For example, the Af!llinst Violence 
marker would. it is expected. be more likely to capture data where non-violence 
forms part of a broader ideolo~,rical commitment. as OPt>Osed to a (potentially 
temporary) strategic aim. Likewise, it would not be incompatible to find reference 
to violent mythology within the Violent Traditions marker. where a group is using 
non-violence as one tactic amongst a number of means for achieving its goals. 
King's comments also suggest that he saw an ambiguity in the students' 
commitment to noll'violence. and this seems borne out when one looks at how the 
group developed. From the records of discussions at some of the meetings, it does 
seem that whilst some of the leadership and group were pacifists. others saw non· 
violence as a tooL and it was this element wh1ch later abandoned non-violence 
when it was no longer expedient to their cause. Stopcr (1989: 26·30) charts how 
the usc of non-violent tactics became less useful as their opponents stopped using 
violence to counter them. Another strategic element to non-violence was the 
necess1ty to ensure continued funding, which was harder to attract when the group 
was seen as more militant. 
As seen in the SNCC case study. there was a turn from non-violence as a belief to 
non-violence as a sto·Rtegy. Once th is was mnde, it was entirely possible that non· 
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violence could be abandoned altogether. This element of non·violence is, therefore, 
an important distinction to recognise as it has a significant impact on the violent 
potentialities of a group, something which is captured in the discussion of the 
markers. 
Timing 
The distinction between commitment to noll'violence as a belief and as a s t•·ategy is 
further nuanced by Hizb ut·Tahrir which is ideologically committed to non·violence, 
as shown by Karagiannis and McCauley (2006) in their discussion of Hizb ut· 
Tahrir in Uzbekistan, but only for the present time. 
Karagiannis and McCauley looked at many other theories as to why groups may 
turn to violence and found that they do not apply in this case. They suggest that it 
is because of UHiT's ideological commitment to non·violcnce that it has not acted 
violently. However. Karagiannis and McCauley are also at pains to point out that 
the UHiT approach to non·violence is not one of pacifism. but of timing. 
Hizb ut·'l'alwir does not exclude violence as having its place. but it will not act 
violently until such a time as the Caliph allows it. Karagiannis and McCauley 
(2006= 328) put forward two ways of summarising UHi1"s relationship to violence: 
The first is to say that they have been committed to non-violence 
for fifty years . The second is to say that they have been waiting for 
fifty years for the right moment to begin violent struggle. 
This complex approach to violence perhaps also explains the strong feeling in some 
circles as to whether Hizb ut·Tahrir is a Lel'l'orist organisation. In some quarters 
UHiT has been condemned as a dangerous organisation (e.g. Baran, 2004). 
although 1t could also be suggested that the strong lobbying by President Islam 
Karimov of Uzbekistan. an early key ally in the U.S.- Ied invasion of Afghanistan, 
led to the blacklisting of Hizb ut·Tahrir O<a•·agiannis and McCauley, 2006: 329; 
Naumkin. 2005: 183). 
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Another argument is that Hizb ut·Tahrir radicalises young Muslims and sets them 
off on a path that makes them more nmenable to acting violently. This 'conveyor 
belt' argument can also point to contact between UHiT and known terrorist 
organisations such as the Taliban (Baran, 2004: Karagiannis, 2006: 271). However, 
this does not change the fact that individuals have bad to leave UHiT to pursue 
violent means with other groups (so suggesting that it is not allowed within UHiT 
itse!O, nor does it take into account the criticism of UHiT by the IMU for their non· 
violent approach (Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006: 325). 
Certainly some UHiT members have turned to violence. Within Uzbekistan two 
groups have been known to splinter off from UHiT: Akramiya, whom Naumkin 
(2005:160) says has suffered persecution and the arrest of its leader, and Hizb an· 
Nusra (Pru·ty of Victory), which did not smvive state rcpt·cssion (Karagiannis and 
McCauley. 2006: 330). This might suggest that. whilst Hizb ut·Tahrir shares many 
of the traits of violent groups (and teaches its members accordingly). its crucial 
ideological commitment to non·violencc has forced members to abstain from 
violence."' 
This type of non·violcnt ideology will show up in different ways in the markers to 
many of the other categories I have d1scussed here. For example, in UHiT's case, I 
would still expect to see greater evidence of violent traditions. external 
developments indicating violent pressures as well as more ambiguous statements 
against violence. The markers that capture all of these at·eas should be closely 
examined to note the differences. Because the commitment to non·violence is one 
of timing. it also suggests that. should the group develop in certain ways, they 
might more proactively seek the external legitimation they need to act violently. 
l<aragiannis and McCauley (2006: 329) suggest that. to this end, they have in the 
past approached the Ayatollah of Iran about accepting the title of Caliph. This 
tdeological. but limited. commitment to nowviolence suggests that this group has a 
higher probability of leading to violent action than those with an unconditional 
acceptance of non·violence. 
"' However. Herbert (2009: 398·401) notes that there is a conflict between the m~ans and 
ends of Hizb ut·Tahrir's ideology, and argues that this necessarily forces disaffected 
members to seck other channels, including violence. 
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Perception 
Whether a group is seen as pacifist or not can sometimes be down to the perception 
of what counts as a violent action. Leaving aside discussions as to the validity of 
violence, I focus more narr·owly here on tho types of targets and tactics used. 
For example. whilst one element of the Weathermen claimed that they did not use 
violence. they based this assertion on their targeting of property and not persons 
(Varon , 2004: 121). The assumption here being that violence is something done 
only to other human (or living) beings. Their claim is contested elsewhere (193), 
but the targeting of property as opposed to people can sometimes be seen as 
evidence of a non·violent form of protest. There are problems of gradation here. for 
example, is gt·affiti non·violent but strucnu·al damage violent? 
Likewise. some violence against humans is cast within the realm of non-violent 
protest, when it is enacted against the perpetrator's own body. Hungcr·strikes. 
whilst often used within the context of violent campaigns (e.g. the RAF and IRA), 
have also been seen as peaceful modes of resistance (but note the connation of 
'peaceful' that can sometimes occur with 'non·violent'), Again. the possibility of a 
scale of violence could be open for debate, for example. in a comparison of hunger· 
strikes to se lf-immolation. 
I don't intend to answer these debates here as my focus i.; centred on violence 
against other persons. However, whilst this category of non·violence is the most 
contentious, it contains questions which should be kept in consideration when 
talking about non·violent movements and actions. 
The above categories problcmatise a simple understanding of 'non-violence'. 
Likewise, the inclusion of Aum Shinrikyo in this research could also be seen to 
problematise the labelling of a group as 'violent', because it precludes the 
possibility of it adopting non-violent beliefs (which Aum has undertaken since the 
sarin attacks, despite fi nding it nearly impossible to shake off the 'violent' label in 
the eyes of the Japanese public). Therefore 1 suggest that, whilst the violent/non· 
violent binary is a useful distinction for simplifying everyday communication about 
groups. it should be used with awareness of the complexity of each concept. 
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Marker Analysis 
As discussed in the introduction to this chaptet· I will not be discussing each group 
under every marker, as this would lead to an unwieldy discussion. Instead I have 
focused on the most salient facts coming out of the data, and have therefore only 
discussed one gt'Oup in relation to some markers. The following chart (Figure 7.1) 
provides the reader with a comparative picture of how much data was coded for 
each group, within each marker. The markers with the most coded material being: 
(1) Basic Injustice 
(2) Dichotomous World· View 
(3) External Legitimating Authority 
(4) Wider Struggle 
(5) Question of Authority 
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As with the previous chapters the markers are discussed in alphabetical order, 
with those that had little or no data coded into them discussed at the end. 
Following this, T summarise some of the key points before moving onto my analysis 
of the themes arising from a ll the studies. 
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Against Violence 
Following the earlier discussion on the differences between not a~ting violently and 
pacifism, it is interesting to note that for AGS and SNCC this marker was quite 
well populated. However, there were only a couple of passages within the UHiT 
texts. Moreover, the statements populating this marker from the SNCC were 
primarily from the founding statements and speeches from its early lead01·ship who, 
as discussed above. were committed to non-violence in pl'inciple, as opposed to the 
more strategic commitments of the later leadership and membership. 
Agonshu makes very specific statements against violence and in support of world 
peace. It is fair to say that some of these arise out of the role of Japan in World 
War II. For example, reference is made to the founder. Kiriyama, having 
witnessed the Pacific theatre of the war and the influence that this had on his 
desire for world peace (AGSlO). 
As well as speaking of this desire, some of Kiriyama's actions to help ach ieve it are 
also listed. including a prayer service for world peace with the Dalai Lama in 1984; 
in 1986 a similar service held as part of a Japan·China friendship mission in China: 
and in 1988 an Islam· Buddhist forum on world peace (AGSlO). 
The above list shows a number of important distinctions. The meeting with the 
Dalai Lama shows a desire for peace within the Buddhist community (undoubtedly 
by using the influence of the Dalai Lama to promote the superiority of Agonshu 
over other Buddhist sects). The meeting in China demonstrates a willingness to 
1·each across secula1· national boundaries. this boundary being one traditionally full 
of tension. The final meeting, the Islam· Buddhist forum, shows the desire for 
peace across religious boundaries, there being other examples mentioned in the 
texts. such as Kiriyama's meeting with Pope John Paul II. This philosophy was 
further spelt out in Kiriyama's interview with some Taiwanese journalists (AGS56): 
Philosophically speaking, religion knows no national borders, races 
or tribes. It is for everyone. With this in mind, we sincerely pray 
that people worldwide will unite as one and live a peaceful life in 
harmony. This is our philosophy. 
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What is important about the above examples is that. whilst we see clear evidence of 
Agonshu identifying and protecting its ideological boundaries. the examples give 
clear evidence of an approach to potential transgressions of these boundaries that 
is conciliatory in tone. It would be interesting, in further research, to see how this 
concil iatory approach holds up in dealings with other 'new New Religions'- which 
might provoke a different response. Within the high ly competitive nature of the 
Japanese religious marketplace there is often tension and discord between groups. 
However, the above evidence demonstrates that it is also possible to approach such 
competition in an open and non·violent manner. 
Basic Injustice 
As well as being the most populous of the markers within this case study this was 
also the most populous for the SNCC sub-set. The injustices referred to within 
their documents related to the treatment of blacks by white people in the general 
populace and the local and national government. As Ella J Baker pointed out, the 
desire was not just to challenge racism in particular a r·eas of everyday life. but to 
challenge the underlying pr·oblem in \vider American society (SKCC24): 
Whatever may be the difference in approach to their goal. the 
1\'egro and white students. North and South. are seeking tO rid 
America of the scourge of racial segregation and discrimination-
not only at lunch counters. but in every aspect of life. 
The injustices of racial discr-imination informed every action that the SNCC 
undertook. The above quotation refers tO the discrimination at lunch-counters that 
sparked some of the initial protests of the SKCC movement. But this 
discrrmination was also recognised tO be rooted in the way that people. blacks and 
whites, were taught. and the evidence of this very basic injustice also exercised the 
SNCC students (SNCC85): 
In the books that children read. whites m·e always 'good' (good 
symbols are white}. blacks are ·evil' or seen as savages in movies. 
their language is referred to as a 'dialect.' and black people in this 
country are supposedly descended from savages. 
Important tO recognise IS the fact that these injustices were not just acknowledged 
by the victims themselves. Sympathy for these issucs was found outside the target 
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communities, and many whites also joined the early SNCC movement. These 
volunteers were also on the receiving end of persecution and violence (SNCC42). 
The spread of the movement outside of the core black membership was not 
unproblematic, as I mentioned above. Questions of authenticity were raised as to 
whether the movement could truly be seen as a black p1·otest movement whilst 
whites were involved. The legitimacy of white involvement was challenged 
through arguments such as the following, presented in a position paper on the 
basis of black power (SNCC85): 
Jt must be pointed out that on whatever level of contact blacks and 
whites come together. that meeting or confrontation is not on the 
level of the blacks but always on the level of the whites. This only 
means that our everyday contact with whites is n reinforcement of 
the myth of white supremacy. 
Why this is particularly interesting is because. in many of the other case studies 
the question of legitimate membership was not discussed so openly. Within the 
SNCC, the problem was eventually settled on grounds of race, so that the causal 
identifier behil1d the basic injustice that created the boundaries of the group was 
also used to 'other' a section of its membership. 
These weren't the only issues of prejudice that drove the group- the t1·eatment of 
women was equated with the harmful effects of the white/black dichotomy 
(SKCC86). but this wasn't a driving concern of the membership as a whole. As 
with the other groups that I have studied here, we also see a shift in the ground 
that these markers cover over time and. ns with many of the other movements, this 
included the co-opting of other struggles as the group's own. In this case the U.S. 
war in Vietnam was. as with the RAF. invoked (SNCCSI): 
The murder of Samuel Young in Tuskegee. Alabama. is no different 
than the murder of peasants in Vietnam. for both Young and the 
Vietnamese sought. and are seeking. to secure the rights 
guaranteed them by law. In each case. the United States 
govemment bears a great part of the responsibility for these deaths. 
The difference between the SNCC and RAF. on their co·option of the Vietnamese 
into their own struggle, was that the RAF saw it as further justification for violent 
action. How this move is made cannot be understood just by looking at the 
existence of basic injustices. As can be seen from the above discussion, there was 
192 
no shortage of injustices. fuelled by racial hatred, to motivate the followers of the 
SNCC. However. as with many other elements of the wider Civil Rights movement, 
they chose not to act violently. 
Context of Group's Internal Development 
Out of the three groups only the SNCC self-consciously wrote about the 
developments within the movement that defined how the group matured. That the 
SNCC wrote about such issues and events was undoubtedly due to the democratic 
and discursive nature of thcit· power structures. 
These power structures themselves came out of the development of the 
organisation as a student-led movement. separate from 'adult' groups and the 
potential interference of their leaders (SNCC24). Because it was a student 
movement the internal development grew out of a typically youthful approach, as 
evidenced in one volunteer's (SNCC42: para.l2) recollection of the hard pat·tying 
during the training stages for the Freedom Summer. 
An tmportant internal development. from early on. related to tensions between 
whites and blacks within the movement. The following paragraph relates to these 
tensions (SNCC42: pat·a.l6): "' 
Later that night 11 discussion of the conflict between staff and 
volunteers began, and, becoming more and more emotional, ran on 
until 2 a.m. The discussion was resolved -- as the bitter personality 
con11icts that came up in the ~lovement so often are -- when the 
S~CC Freedom Singers came into the room. and with the singing of 
freedom songs remmded everyone that there was a bigger battle to 
be fought. 
What is particularly impot·tant to note here is the way in which the connict was 
resolved. Instead of focusing on the differences. which were deep-set and heat'l·felt 
(SNCC85), they focused on their shared identity. Of course. this example relates to 
an inter-group dispute. so there would presumably be more to unite the differing 
facttons than separate them. However. the way tn which they resolved the issue 
points to a group with a non-violent ethos apparent in its own development. which 
~~ The volunteers were mostly white. coming from Nonhcrn colleges (SNCC42: para. II), 
whct·cos the staff were mostly black. 
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might also colom how it approaches the 'Other'. This is in stark contrast to how 
Aum, for example, dealt with some of its internal difference which, as mentioned in 
Chapter Four, resulted in violence towards members. 
Context of Group's Origins/Development 
'l'he historical context that the SNCC worked within, of slavery, segregation, and 
the civil rights movement. is well·known. Whilst steps had been taken to right 
many of these wrongs, the SNCC was clear about the limitations of these efforts 
and in writing about these also gave a clear insight into theia· concerns about the 
wider society in which they lived (SNCC63). 
The history of violence visited on the black community, and especially the civil 
rights protestors, played an important role in influencing how the group developed. 
even in the more practical matters its members were instructed in (SNCC42): 
Under the shade trees of this sedate girls school, lessons were given 
in how to protect your vital organs while being beaten and what 
happens when a mob gets out of hand. 
However, in contrast to an engagement in reciprocal violence that Giraa·d argues is 
more common in social conflict. the SKCC specifically avoids violence and teaches 
its followers how to protect themselves as opposed to aggressive defence. This non· 
violent approach was maintained even under extended harassment and threats to 
their lives. Some of these threats were recorded by volunteers in the Mississippi 
voter registration drive (SNCC42): 
White men in cars. some carrying guns. followed the voter 
registration workers as they canvassed in the Negro neighborhoods. 
What we sec from these examples is that the SNCC was the recipient of more 
sustained violence than two of the violent groups (Aum and the RAF) and yet this 
did not lead to violence. Whilst the SNCC eventually disbanded, with some of its 
members tuming to violent altel'l1atives, they did so after the a uthorities had 
stopped using violence against their protests (Stoper, 1989: 26·30). What this 
demonstrates is that. whilst it is useful and important to know the context out of 
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which a group developed. we cannot assume that because this context was violent, 
that any nascent group will also develop violently. 
Conviction 
Building upon the comments in the last marker. it is clear that the members of the 
SNCC knew the risks of what they undertook. both from the well documented 
violence against their community and from first·hand experience. However. this 
did not deter them (SNCC24): 
We want the world to know that we no longer accept the inferior 
position of second·class citizenship. We are willing to go to jail. be 
ridiculed. spat upon and even suffer phystcal violence to obtain 
First Class Citizenship. 
In this quotation the reasons for their conviction are clear- their desire for racial 
equality. Additionally they are also quite clear on U1e differing kinds of suffering 
that might be visited upon them. They also made sure that their volunteers knew 
what they were letting themselves in for (SNCC67): 
In addition it is important to realize that civil rights work in 
Mississippi presents certain risks. Thosl' who apply must be aware 
that they may face physical danger and jail. 
This demonstrated a deep conviction not only amongst the SNCC staffers, but also 
among the volunteers . many of whom came from outside the movement and only 
volunteered during the summer holidays. 
This conviction is shown in many movements. both vtolent and non·violent. 'Nhilst 
it seems unlikely that a member of a group would carry out a violent action without 
being committed. the presence of conviction alone is not enough to suggest a violent 
potentiality. What it docs demonstrate is a greater likelihood of members acting 
according to the group's beliefs. 
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Desire for Social Change 
The SNCC set out clear goals for social change, and this was reflected in its ethos. 
Clear statements, such as (SNCC63) "We march today for jobs and freedom" left 
people in no doubt as to what they hoped to achieve. 
They had a broader aim too, such as to change what they saw as the basic 
injustices facing their communities. In this case as in others. it is interesting to 
note that their methods of tackling these injustices were still entirely non·violent 
in concept and application (SNCC67). 
Whilst they were very much focused on their own community, the SNCC later on 
also broadened the scope of its concerns. The Vietnam War was a concern to many 
groups at the time who to some extent 'owned' the conflict as a source of 
justification (or cause) for anti·American sentiment. For the SNCC the cause was 
more personal as many members were likely to be called up to fight. In this case. 1t 
is not surprising to sec Vietnam as the solitary cause which was external to the key 
aims of the movement. However, as shown in the following quotation, the SNCC 
demonstrated that there was a non· violent way of opposing the draft, reflective of 
their non·violent beliefs (SNCC84): 
We believe that work in the civil rights movement and with other 
human relations organizations is a valid alternative to the draft. 
We urge a ll Americans to seek this altemative, knowing full well 
that it may cost them their lives··as painfully as in Vietnam. 
Dichotomous World-View 
A significant amount of data from the UHiT case study was coded into this marker. 
In the first and most obvious instance this is shown in their opposition to the 
elections in Uzbekistan when they talk about the Republican system (UHIT59): .. it 
is a democratic infidel system that i~ absolutely contrary to Islam." In this 
instance the world·view ofUHiT. Islam, is placed in dichotomy with a diplomatic 
'world·view'. This is reinforced further when they speak about the differences 
between their religion and the Uzbck President - Karimov's (UHTT59: 269): 
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If your religion points to Heaven. his drags [others) to Hell. U you 
turn away from him, the Jew will be humbled. 
While the first quotation inferred a moral judgement on the democratic system 
through its opposition to Is lam, the second quotation specifies a s piritual element 
to the dichotomy. Heaven and Hell embody the polarisation of the two systems in 
UHiT's eyes. 
Most of the ·other's' world view as understood by UHiT is embodied in the policies 
of Karimov. However. he is also seen as a representative of a broader evil 'Other', 
that of the capita list/democratic system outside of Uzbekistan. The following two 
quotations point to this dichotomy within Central Asia (UHITll9: 259) and also 
the rest of the world (U HIT 118: 253). 
It's not based on a single source or idea: ideologically it's a 
bankrupt poliucal system, not only Kar1mov's political system. but 
in all Muslim countries today, and especially all of the political 
systems that rule in Central Asia. arc political systems that at·e 
just as ideologically bereft. It's known that the creed, which is the 
belief that people in Muslim countries have, is the creed of Islam, 
which came about because this system comes from God: in all the 
world only it is suitable to rule over humanity. 
Since the capitalist infidel system that is upon you exists. it's 
unsuitability has become obvious now, the Mmocratic system that 
is filling the world with evil deeds is being exploited. 
So far we have seen 11 wol'ld view that focuses on a dichotomy within one country as 
a n example of a wide1· conflict, and in the next quotaLion we see that this account 
extends through time as well, through its historical roots (UHIT119: 259): 
The reason that Karimov is inflicting such oppression is that his 
ancestry is Jewish and infidel. This is because the Jews are the 
ones who are the most fiercely hostile to Islam and Muslims. 
The recent animosity between Mus lims and J ews over the land of Israe l runs 
alongside a deeper historical awareness of the separation between Islam (according 
to UHiT) and the 'Other· (UH IT148: 277): 
Remember! Before Islam the peoples of Central Asia were base 
fire-worshipping nations who bowed to the Zoroastrian religion. 
When Islam arrived they came out of the darkness and into the 
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light, and joined the ranks of the powerful peoples of the world as 
an inseparable pru·t of the great Islamic world community. 
The above quotations demonstrate an excellent example of a dichotomous world· 
view, tht·ough national, regional, political, religious and historical dimensions. 
Some of the language used is similar to that seen within al Qaeda tracts, and it is 
difficult to point to any indication that such strong and imbedded hatred (which is 
certainly contained in the emotional tone overlaying the world·view expressed 
above) would not lead to violent action. 
Perhaps such evidence could be found in the absence of threatened violence, where 
in its place the suggestion that the creed of Islam is offered as part of a revelation, 
but that this isn't done through force or violence (UHIT!t9: 259). The broader 
context of this suggestion is placed within a wider discourse of the extreme 
dichotomy between Muslims and America and also the pet·secution received by 
UHiT members despite their non·violent methods. These two dichotomies seem 
perfectly poised to motivate violent action but. unlike the case of al Qaeda, they 
haven't. This suggests that this marker in itself cannot be seen to act as a trigger 
to violent action. 
Emergency Situation 
The sense of an emergency situation did not come across strongly in any of the 
three groups within this case study. However. that is not to say that this kind of 
tension was not present in thetr thought. For example, within the goals of 
Agonshu stated on their website. they mention (AGSIO) that a religion needs to 
have both compassion and wisdom "in order to save the earth from proceeding into 
disaster." 
Although that statement is made in relation to both Christianity and 1\gonshu, it is 
clear that they believe that it is their own religion which can avert this global 
disaster, as claimed in the followmg quotation (AGS132): 
We believe that Agon Shu. having these three special methods of 
practice, is the sangha that has the mission of the messiah who 
saves the human race from the Earth's crisis and prevents the 
destruction of the human race. 
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This theme of the destruction of the human race echoes Asahara's teachings. A key 
difference is found in how this fate is avoided. through the alternative strategies of 
'poaing' non·believers (Reader, 2000: 194), as opposed to Coma fire ceremonies. 
UHiT also do not make much reference to an impending disaster. and when they do 
1t is to a more immediate and mundane matter impending financial disaster 
(UHIT118: 249). This k111d of disaster (the disastrous consequences of an 
opponent's economic policies), is of the type more commonly used by politicians the 
world over in order to crea te a fearful climate. It suggests a more pragmatic 
approach to what motivAtes their audience than pe1·haps the far·off concerns of the 
annihilation of the human race (in general. or their group in particular). 
Fu1·thermore. the absence of a stress on the need for immediate action is to be 
expected in UHiT. where they feel that they still have not arrived at the correct 
stage for violent action. Within this context. I would suggest that an increase in 
statements coded into this marker would be evidence of UHiT moving closer 
towards violent action. 
External Legitimating Authority 
Significant amounts of data from both Agonshu and UHiT were coded into this 
marker. The references within UHiT texts were broadly s imilar to those of al 
Qacda so I have mainly focused on Agonshu here. 
From the Agonshu texts we can derive that the Buddha is a source of external 
legitimating authority (AGS21): 
One sect is not merely an idol worshipping religion, a nd that is 
Agon Shu. Agon Shu venerates the authentic Buddha. who is not 
an idol. This one Buddhist order amongst the numerous Buddhist 
groups in Japan venerates the actual Buddha, who is not an idol. 
The above statement is made within the context of Agonshu's desire to avoid a 
charge of idolatry. wh1ch could be levelled at 1t by monotheistic religions such as 
Islam or Christianity. However, this focus on the Buddha is also born out th1·ough 
indi1·ect qualifications such as the following examples (AGS44): 
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lt was truly the Buddha's intention. 
That is the Buddha's will . 
With the Buddha's decree ... 
The teachings of the Buddha which Agonshu abide by are argued to be different 
from those followed by other Buddhists sects within Japan. In this way Agonshu 
does not just claim to follow an external legitimating authority, but also a unique 
and authentic external authority (ACS56): 
This sutra is the only scripture which contains the teachings of 
Cotama Buddha. Agon Shu was established on the basis of this 
sutra. It is a form of Buddhism which integrates the Mahayana. 
Tibetan Buddhism. and the ancient sacred dharma of Japan. 
Within this quotation we see the creation of a non-negotiable boundary around 
their idea of the authenticity of their teachings. Despite sharing a historical and 
ideological identity with millions of other Buddhists. they have claimed an 
interpretation which is unique a nd this is an essential part of their be liefs and 
identity. 
This question of authenticity is prominently stated elsewhere. and is an indication 
of the competitiveness of the J apanese relibrious market place. For example, an 
important object and symbol of worship within Agonshu are the Buddha's relics. 
In many cases it seems that Kiriyama himself is the arbiter of authenticity in cases 
of the Buddha's relics (ACS23; ACS 90) and. indeed. whilst he does not appear to 
receive the same level of worship that Asahara did within Aum. there are some 
parallels between the roles that they play. Fo•· example, l(iriyama states that 
(ACS29): "If I look at someone's character. I can see what karma they have before l 
even see it through my clairvoyance." 
As with Asahara. Kiriyama's authority is also fou nd in his explanation of spiritual 
influences. in this case through the negative influence of ancestors (ACS115). 
However, in contrast to Asahara, Kiriyama's message has more consistently been 
focused on bringing about world peace (AGS56) and therefore abou~ avoiding global 
catastrophe. not helping a select group to be saved from it. Whilst Agonshu's 
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message might not always have been so positive, there is a definite bias towards 
this positivity in all the sources I analysed. 
Personal Benefit 
This marker attempted to catch the data relating to beliefs that might motivate 
followers in a particularly individualistic way. However, only Agonshu had any 
data that fell into this marker, and then it was only seven occurrences. 
Partly the concept of personal benefit was found within ritual mantras such as the 
following <AGS3): 
I'm going to do it! 
I'm going to succeed' 
I'm a very lucky person' 
Everything's going to work out fine! 
l'm definitely going to win! 
This received the response: 
Good luck on your way to victory. 
This mantra was led by Kiriyama and •·epeated by the crowd. and appeared in 
several sources that! read (AGSIOO and AGS29). Within such statements 
personal benefit can be found in the implication of both the text and the fact that it 
followed a motivational talk that also suggested the benefits of Agonshu's teachings. 
There were also more direct benefits referred to. such as the increase m 
intelligence and health of followers (ACS56): 
Our shugyo is based on meditation. Specifically, the Gumonji 
Somei·ho. wh1ch is ~likkyo's esoteric method for making a person 
more intelligent. It makes a person about three times as intelligent. 
This is what we make our followers to practice. Because you cannot 
understand the Buddha's shugyo unless you arc this intelligent. 
The Gumonji Somci·ho is also accompanied by better physical 
health. A genius with a weak constitution won't do any good. 
The this·worldly benefits of increased intelligence and health are found within 
many Japanese religions. However. I suggest that the nature of these benefits, 
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intelligence and health, rathe1· than the ability to withstand nuclear attacks (as in 
Aum) point to a key difference in how these two groups approached the benefits of 
membership. As with so many of the differences between the violent and non· 
violent groups that I have so far highlighted in this chapter, this is a subtle 
difference as opposed to a simple trigger that could be easily formulised. 
Question of Authority 
The question of authority was very important to Agonshu largely because of the 
competitive nature of the Japanese marketplace. Part of Agonshu's authenticity 
comes through their argument that they are not an idol-worshipping religion, 
unlike other Japanese groups. Their's is the true religion. a true Buddhism 
(AGS2t): 
~ly heart desires that Japanese Buddhists amend this mistake [of 
idol worship] and return to true Buddhism as soon as possible, and 
1 appeal so to society. However, most Japanese Buddhist followers 
are not even aware of this issue. 
While Agonshu claims it is the true authority within Buddhism, it is interesting to 
note that they wish their 'Other' to 'amend their mistakes' and do not hint at more 
forceful methods of conversion. 
There is also a curious concern within Agonshu about how Christianity and Islam 
view Japanese religions as idol·worship. and Agonshu is quick to be apologetic 
about (and therefore acknowledge) this trend (AGS90). However, the explanation 
for this may lie within a furthe1· claim to authenticity, which in itself is tied to the 
more established monotheistic faiths. For example, Agonshu claims that (AGSI27): 
The center of the Catholic Church, the Vatican, is aware that Agon 
Shu is the only different order of Japanese Buddhists. 
Even more importantly, Kiriyama met Pope John Paul II. a meeting which in itself 
confers some legitimacy, as Kiriyama is keen to make clear in his account of the 
meeting (AGS127): "" 
86 Reader (1988: 25) points out that many 'new New Religious' leaders have similar 
'meetings' with the Pope. 
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One day, I stood in a throng of 300.000 people at St. Peter's Square. 
I saw the august personage of the Pope walking towards me. As he 
neared, he broke ranks with his entourage and came up to me. the 
leader of a different religion. In an unprecedented move. he shook 
my hand. 
Apparently, in the thousand year history of the papacy, this has 
never happened before or since. I think he greeted me this way 
because. even though Agon Shu is a relatively small organization. 
the Catholics feel it represents the real Buddhism. 
Again. what is interesting here is that Agonshu are as capable of deriving positive 
benefit from their relauonship to the 'Other' - through gaining authenticity from 
other religions. as they are to the more commonplace use of the 'Other' (i.e. idol· 
worshipping ·fake' Buddhism)- to define their boundaries in relation to. This 
(selective) bilateral relationship. inclusive of an acceptance of the 'Other', is not 
found in any of the violent groups 1 studied. 
Recourse to Sacrificial I Judicial Processes 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was litt le data for this marker within the violent 
groups. but within the SNCC there wea·e quite a few references. For example. they 
stated that (SNCC24): "We are willing to go to jail." Even when dealing with more 
mundane matters. such as adminislratton. they showed how they were specifically 
orientated towards cooperating with the judicial system within the U.S. (SNCC42): 
Specifically. my duties included. handling the press, FBI. Justice 
Dept. and local law enforcement officers: keepmg a daily log: 
handling telephone communications with the Jackson, Greenwood 
and Atlanta offices: sending a claily written report to Jackson a nd 
weekly reports to the Justice Dept. 
Their liaason with the -Justice Department and the FBI arose because part of their 
approach was to take information about their complaints to the establishment, 
despite the lack of response to them. Furthermore they a lso tried to make theil' 
claims further up the power structures, through involvement in the democratic 
process (SNCC42): 
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'!'he next step in the campaign was to elect delegates to the 
Democratic convention in Atlantic Cily with a procedure as closely 
parallel as possible to the procedure used by the MDP. 
In this way, rather than through the bombs of their near contemporaries the Red 
Army Faction, or indeed within the U.S. the Weathermen, they sought to subvert 
the system by participating in it. not sabotaging it. 
Their protest with ill the democratic process also involved encouraging people to 
become involved in it. empowering them through voter registration and education 
(SI\'CC67: para.5). Legal challenges were also made, again demonstrating a desire 
to work within the original system, as opposed to attacking it (SNCC67: para. G): 
Law students will be dispersed to proJects around the state to serve 
as legal advisors to vote•· registration workers and to local people. 
Others will be concentrated in key areas where they will engage in 
legal research and begin to prepare suits against the state and local 
officials and to challenge every Jaw that deprives !\egroes of their 
freedom as American citizens. 
The above data are excellent examples of what 1 was looking for within this marker. 
As I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, I do not believe that any one marker 
demonstrates the definite eventuali ty of violence or non-v iolence. However, it does 
seem highly unlikely that a movement that is as committed to working within the 
system against which it is protestmg could undertake violent actions in attempted 
sabotage of it. That would be counter-productive. Where evidence could be found 
within this marker it seems that the possibilily of violenL action is accordingly 
lower, but. at the same time. if this commitment wanes (perhaps due to the 
ineffectuality of such a pproaches) then the possibi lity of violent action outside the 
legislative process correspondingly increases (as we saw in the eventual demise of 
the SNCC). 
Wider Struggle 
This marker was the fourth most populated for the combined data coming out of all 
the non· violent groups. and was second most important for UHi'l'. As discussed in 
the marker on dichotomous world-view. UHiT saw its struggle as having a moral 
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and spiritual element on several levels of social organisation- in their country, 
their region a nd around the world. 
As with many Isla mist groups, the state of Israel is recognised as a source and 
focus for the forces of the 'Other' (UHIT59: 267): 
Among all the peoples of the worlds, Jews are known for the 
fatthlessness of their promises. their treason. their avarice. their 
immorality, and their cowardice. As for their state. Israel, as an 
enemy to Muslims. acts as a teacher to international Jewish 
organizations, and to all the world's J ews. 
The battle with Judaism takes on cosmological proportions and the Jews are seen 
as being behind many of the enemies of Islam (UHIT59: 268): 
While Russia is s laughtering Muslims in Chechnya, China is 
murdering Muslims in Eastern Turkestan ...... This is because all 
of the world's Jews strongly fear the fact that Muslims are 
returning Islam. which they love ... 
That Islam is the holy ideology. originating from and justified by Cod. is centrally 
important to UHiT's claim that it is the only system suitable to rule over humanity 
(UHIT!J 9: 259). Therefore any other system is a negation of the sacred truth of 
their beliefs and therefo1·e part of the wider struggle against their non· negotiable 
ideals. 
It is because of this that other countries are also seen as directly in conflict with 
Islam and therefore with UHiT (UH1Tl 48: 275): 
America intends to undermine Islam, which IS rapidly spreading in 
Central Asia today. and to impede activities concerned with 
establishing the Caliphate. 
This is not just because of their politics, but also because of the immorality of their 
systems. for example their greed agamstthe liberating potentialities of Islam 
(UHIT148: 278): 
At the same time as the Western countries have colonized the 
whole world. and are greedily pillaging it. they are calling Islam. 
which is trying to free humamty from their oppression, 
international terrorism. 
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These quotations demonstrate the global impact of a pan· Islamic identity on the 
actions of a group within a very particular locality. Tho message of a wider 
struggle (and its content) is similar to al Qaeda's. However, I note differences in 
the absence of UHiT's call to arms to counter this. In UHiT's case. there is a 
creation of some of the common motivations for violent actions in terms of raising 
awareness of basic injustices perpetrated by a global 'Other', but no cleat· strategy 
(violent or otherwise) to resolve these. 
Markers not populated 
Within the overall matrix no data was coded into the following markers: 
• Followers Differ from Leader 
• No Justice Available in System 
• Ko Innocent 'Others' 
Given that this was a case study into groups that have not acted violently. it is 
perhaps unsurprising that no data was coded in to No Innocent 'OtheN: Not much 
data was coded into the Followers Differ from Leader marker in any of the studies, 
and some issues around this are discussed in Chapter Nine. However, it would not 
have been unusual to see dissent within the groups just because the groups were 
non·violent. Certainly I noted several references to internal dissent within the 
texts on the SNCC. However. due to the organisational structure of this movement, 
this could not be classified as the followct·s differing from the leaders as the group 
discussed and made decisions as a collective entity. Later on in its history there 
was a clear split between leadership and followers. but the dissenters were either 
expelled or voluntarily left the group and there was no reference to dissent within 
the texts that I analysed. 
It would also not have been beyond the bounds of possibility to see that some of the 
groups felt there was no justice available in the system. However, this was clearly 
not the case with SNCC (as seen in the above analysis) and Agonshu did not 
appear to have any issues with their host society which required them to seek 
judicial assistance. The subtext of many of the UHi1' statements was one of 
206 
frustration with the established system, but there was no explicit mention of it to 
capture within this study. 
The following markers had little data coded into them (Table 7.1). 
Markers with little data No. of OCCUI'l'ences Groupe 
Involvement in the cycle of reciprocal 1 SNCC 
violence 
No common ground 2 SNCC 
Recognition of innocence 1 AGS 
Symbolic importance 2 UHiT & SNCC 
Violent traditions 3 UHiT 
. . Table 7.1 - Markers With little data 
Perhaps the most striking of the above is the Violent Traditions marker. which 
contained three •·eferences for UHiT. Although this is a small number. it is 
interesting to see it within the data for a 'non-violent' group. I don't bel ieve that 
this is problematic for this study- rather it reinforces some of the statements I 
have made about the natu1·e of groups and of nuidity in the moves to and from 
violence. UHiT access s1m1lar reHgious traditions to that of a! Qaeda. so in that 
respect perhaps it is not surprising to see that some of these are violent (given the 
latter group's disposition to violent ideology). However, I say 'similar' rather than 
'same', because although both groups label themselves Islamic and refer to the 
same core texts. their interpretations differ. as does the stress they place on ce1·tain 
violent (or non-violent) elements. 
One of the references coded in to this marker referred to the poHtical tradition 
(democratic) through which UHiT claimed violence was being used. and the other 
two referred to a future (but unspecified) possibi lity of violence to protect thei r 
community. These latter two statements are congruous with the suggestion that 
UHiT is a non-violent group at the present time only. 
We might also have expected to have seen more references to the Recof!nition of 
Innocence, a marker which I deliberately inserted to capture where a group might 
specilically allow that members of the 'Other' could be innocent. However. whilst 
the above groups never advocated or sought unilatera l (violent) action against the 
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'Other'. nor did they tend to recognise a difference between those opposing their 
beliefs, and those just not supporting them. This lends weight to the analysis of 
gt·oups seeing theit· beliefs (and the boundaries they create) as suggesting not jus t 
membership, but also a clear binary with their 'Others'. 
Conclusion 
This chapter further contributes to my argument about the complexity of the move 
to violence. As I have shown, this is partly because the concept of non·violence 
itself has multiple layers. with important differences for how the data is coded into 
the markers. 
It has also served to highlight that the markers do not act as indicators of triggers 
to violence. With many of the markers I demonstrated how much of the data coded 
needs to be analysed within the context of the groups' histories and beliefs in order 
to properly ascertain their relationship to potential violent action. This linding has 
been proven through contrasting some of the data coded through these case studies 
with the findings from the case studies on violent groups. I will now build on this 
comparative analysis in the following chapter. where I concentrate on some of the 
key themes that have arisen during the course of this research. 
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8. Evaluation of The Move to Violence 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will evaluate the data that was coded inoo the markers in the case 
studies. Samples from this data were included and discussed in each of the above 
chapters dealing with these groups. though there were also cohorts of data that 
have not received significan t attention thus far."' For example, T coded data from 
statements made by Ulrikc Meinhofbefore the stan of the RAF, which d id not 
feature in the markers discussed in the RAF chapter·. All the data will be br·ought 
to bear in this chapter. in order to provide some additional comparisons both over 
time in the same groups and between groups. 
The first section of this chapter will address the most populated markers. 
comparing the range a nd differences of data from the different groups. This will 
then be followed by sections addressing some of the more prominent themes that 
arose during the course of the case studies: 
• Religrous versus secular groups 
• Violence versus non·violence 
• The move 1.0 violence 
These will be followed by a look at some other less prominent themes befor·c l 
conclude by demonstrating what the discussion has contributed oo our 
understanding of the move 1.0 violence. 
Through linking these themes back oo the theoretical discussion outlined in 
Chapter Three, I will not only point to the relevant data, but also demonstrate how 
it fits within the broader theoretical framewor·k I adopted. This will a lso contribute 
to showing how these themes relate to a map of the sacred beliefs of the groups. 
This final part of the picture also overlaps to a certain extent with the following 
chapter {Chapter l\ine), in which I will evaluate how the matrix performed in 
organising and analysing this data. 
"' All the cohorts of data ar·r I is ted in Appendix Two. 
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Most Populated Markers 
In order to introduce and frame the discussions in this chapter I will use a variety 
of charts. These have the benefit of providing the reader with an overview of the 
data T have collected as well of the peaks and troughs of data in each comparative 
set. However, as previously mentioned, they also come with a caveat. The nature 
of this study is qualitative and the meaning of the data within these markers is far 
more important than the quantity. Indeed. the absence of data in certain cases is 
also very significant. 
With this in mind. this first section selects markers for comparison on a purely 
quantitative basis. I have adopted this approach because it is not feasible, within 
the limits of this study, to do a comparison of each marker and each group. T have 
also chosen to work this way because it is interesting that some markers 
consistently contained large amounts of data, and a furth er exploration and 
comparison of some of this data helps us further understand what seem to be 
important markers."" 
I will focus here on the most populated markers. To ensure that I use the most 
meaningful comparisons the following tablt' (Table 8.1) shows both the top five 
aggregate, as well as the top five by each data·set ('violent' versus 'non·violent' 
see Appendix Two for which sub·sets of the g't'oups fall into each data·set as well as 
the acronyms I have used to distinguish them from each other). 
r I Se1 I 
I"" i· ' de~ ~ ~ 81 ~ 17 18 •I• ,;, ' IBI IBI ~ CL [l 4 W! 8 w II ICRV IWS ~ 8 ,5 1 ~ 1 1 DSC 4 IWS 5 IOOA 1 
Table 8.1 - Top 5 populated markers 
ss It also suggests interesting findings as to what data was highlighted through the 
application of the mntrtx and how. In this respect the approach. if not the di8Cussion, will 
be repeated in the next chapter, a lthough there I focus on what types of data were coded, ns 
opposed to what the data tells us about a move to violence. 
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From the above table a number of markers stand out. Basic Injustice (BJ) featured 
in the top five in every category as did Dichotomous World· View (DWV), Wider 
Struggle (WS) featured in all but one, while Extemnl Legitimating Authority (ELA) 
was a notable difference between the religious and non·religious groupings. Given 
the consistent importance of these four markers l will look at each of these in 
greater depth to see the variety of data they contained and if any additional themes 
ar1se. 
Basic Injustice 
One of the first things that stands out in this marker is that the complaints that 
were coded into it were predominantly levelled against state actors. For Aum. it 
was the state which had initially declined its application to become a religious 
organisation: for a! Qaeda. frrst the SoVlet state and then the international 
community had been responsible for the situations in Afghanistan and Palestine: 
for the Red Army Faction it was the West German and U.S. governments which 
were primarily responsible for the continued influence of former Nazis. the 
capitalist exploitation of the workmg classes and the Vietnam War. Even in the 
non·violent groups we see that for llizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan (the Uzbek 
government and also the international community) and SNCC (the U.S. 
government and agencies) it was state actors that bo•·c the brunt of most p1·otests. 
While some data within this marker is directed towards non·state actors. the sense 
of injustice generally arises as a result of the actions of those who hold a position of 
power over the groups. This suggests that perhaps the violence comes about 
through a feeling of powerlessness and a need to utilise violence in order to combat 
a stronger 'Other'. 
There are a couple of exceptions to the significance of the Basic Injustice marker. 
Agonshu and Aum Shinrikyo we•·e not 'protest' groups and so their mison d'etre did 
not include any injustice that they sought to right. Civen this it is perhaps not 
surprising that no data from the Agonshu case study were coded into this marker. 
Some were coded for Aum Shmrikyo, as mentioned above, although not much. 
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Clearly, the data coded into this marker points to the importance of perceived 
injustices to any move to violence. Significantly. the only group (Agonshu) where 
no evidence of this kind could be found was also (as suggested in Chapter Seven) 
the clearest example of a 'non-violent movement'. The injustices cited by Aum, 
whilst not repeated as often as in. for example. al Qaeda's statements, were 
nevertheless very significant to the development of the movement - for example, 
recall (from Chapter Four) how Aum significantly withdrew from engagement with 
J apanese society after its humiliation in the Diet elections and the perceptions of 
Aum·bashing which followed. 
Dichotomous World-View 
There are several in teresting points to make when comparing the data for this 
marker across the groups. The first is that in creating a dichotomous world view 
there arc some common enemies shared by many of the groups. Perhaps the most 
obvious is the United States (in some cases more specifically the U.S. government). 
The SNCC and RAI' share a concern over the U.S. war on Vietnam, whilst thjs 
issue is also repeated to a lesser degree in the writings of al Qaeda (who. along 
with UHiT, concentrate on more contemporary U.S. led connicts). The U.S. as flag· 
bearer or vanguard of Imperialism and/or Capitalism is 11 common symbol of the 
'Other' for the RAP. al Qaeda and UHiT. Agonshu makes no reference to the U.S. 
in any capacity and whilst Aum mentions it in relation to a final World War there 
is no clear suggestion of animosity to the U.S. per se (despite the discussion over 
American fighter· jets flying over Aum camps). The identification of the U.S. as a 
significant 'Other' by several groups fits with the recognition of power imbalances 
as a source of conflict in the discussion on the Bllsic Injustice marker, as the U.S. 
has been the dominant world power during the time-frame of all the above 
groups.>·• 
Another common enemy is ·capitalism'. The exceptions to this view were the 
SNCC and the Japanese groups. Their interactions with their host-societies were 
predominantly based around issues of racism and spit·itual salvation t•cspectively. 
"'On this basis, I would expect to .cc former im1lerial power. cast as villams m past epochs 
- (or example Great Ontain durin!( the Victorian era. We also sec this reflected m Biblical 
texts, for example the negative connotations of the 'Great Babylon' or the llCrvasive usc of 
Rome as a symbol for secular/profane power. 
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This could be because their struggle was not framed within an adverse reaction to 
modernity, a reaction which has been argued to be the case with Isla mist 
movements.'"' This argument could conceivably be extended to the case of the RAF. 
Interestingly, a lot of the data pointed to the co-option of struggles and issues 
beyond the geographical proximity of the groups into thcil· own discou•·ses. 
Examples of this were found with the cause of Vietnam for the RAF, as well as 
Palestine, Bosnia and Chcchnya for al Qaeda and UHiT. For the RAF the 
boundaries of membership on their side of the divide were based on an 
identification with the Vietnamese as victims of global Capitalist ideals and 
Imperialist expansionism. For al Qaeda and UHiT there was a common ideological 
belief. Islam, which for them justified a shared identity. It is also fair to point out 
that, whilst most members, and indeed most core members of both a t Qaeda and 
UHiT had never been involved in these adopted struggles, there is evidence to 
suggest that they had sought and possibly even established links with actors in 
these other conflicts, unlike the RAF who never had any links to the Vietnamese. 
The co-option of wider issues and peoples within the ideological boundaries of a 
group's dichotomous world-view contnbuted to a further legitimation and 
clarification of their own identities. This is a tactic undertaken by all groups 
regardless of whether they act violently O l' not. For example, recall f1·om Cha pter 
Seven how Agonshu implied a connection with the Vatican, a tactic which sought 
legitimacy by associat1on with the internationally recognised Pope. but which also 
implied that the Pope approved of their beliefs and so was on their 'side'. 
Indeed. it seems fair to establish £rom the data that defining a dichotomous world· 
view is. to a greater or lesser extent, a common feature in the foundauon of any 
group. On a basic level. you are either a member or not. Where we can see a 
distinguishing factor is in the power •·elationship between the two sides of the 
divide, as well as the level of anger towards the ·Other' and the amount of 
exclusivity claimed for membership. Where groups perceive that they are without 
power (or at least on the lesser half of the equation) then their complaints will 
90 Akhtar (i!l90) amongst others makes th1s cilum specifically in relation to Islam. whilst 
the Fundamentalism Project (see, for example. Almond. 2003. and :\lany and Appleby, 
1991: 1993a: 1993b: 1991: 1995) situates fundamentalisms more generally as n reaction 
against modernity. I am not suggesting that Capitalism and modernity are indivisible but 
rather that, in Weberian {1965) parlance. the•·c is certainly enough of an elective affmity 
between the two concepts for this argument to hold. 
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manifest as basic injustices (as mentioned above). The increasing levels of anger 
directed at the 'Other' arc also indicative of violent potentialities. The level of 
exclusivity (or how porous the dichotomous divide is) also could be a key indicator: 
those groups with little or no common ground with their 'Other· are also more 
likely to make the move to violence. These issues and how the markers interact 
will be discussed in greate1· depth later on, but it was important to highlight the 
importance of this marker here to show how the data coded into it linked into the 
wider picture. 
External Legitimating Authority 
One of the most interesting findings is that almost no data from the non·religious 
groups were coded into this marker. despite it being defined in such a way as to 
include secular ideological legitimation as much as that from religious authorities. 
This finding will be discussed further below as part of an examination of the 
differences between religious and non-religious groups. At this stage Twill focus on 
what data was coded. 
Looking at the data across the groups. extemallegitimattng authorities could be 
loosely gathered into three types: 
• External outside of the group 
• External but within the group 
• External as the group 
The first of these is also the most obvious and plenty of the coded data related tO a 
deity or significant religious symbol (bones of a Buddha, the Buddha himself. Holy 
Scriptu1·es, etc.) This was certainly where most significant discussion took place 
and is perhaps also the most obvious kind of external legitimating authority. The 
role of these authorities varied. from issuing clear directives (through a particular 
translation of scripture, for examplcl91 to providing a figurehead around which a 
group identified itself (fot· example. Agonshu around the Agama Sutra~ or 
Buddha's relics). 
•• Another translation, or non-believer's translation. might not see the directive as so clear. 
But the groups I studied did not express any sense of doubt in the divine directives they 
received. 
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'External but within the group' relates to symbols which, whilst belonging to the 
group itself, arc seen as transcending the group (and so also, in a sense, external). 
The distinction could be seen as a contradiction in tcm1s, so I will illuminate it 
with an example from the case studies. 
For al Qaeda, Allah is an external legitimating authority. His role as authority is 
in no way re lated to the group and •·egardless of the objective truth of his existence 
his authority relates equally to believers and non·believers whether or not at 
Qaeda continues to exist. Allah is an authority outside of the group. 
For Aum Shinl'ikyo. Shoko Asaha1·a is also an external legitimating authority. 
However. as the founder and leader of the group his role of authority is linked to 
the group and he can be seen. both by believers and non·believers to be part of the 
group. However. for believers his authority also transcends the reality of this 
plane of existence, as his powers and actions transcend those of the bodily realm 
that members of the group inhabit. Asahara is. therefo1·e, an external a uthority 
within the group. with an immanent and transcendent spiritual presence. 
The final type perhaps helps explain why no data were coded intO this marker for 
the RAF and SNCC. the two non·religious groups. The Durkheimian (200 I: 154, 
314) theory 1 outlined within Chapter Three includes the explanation that what 
societies may see as their god is. in fact, society itself. The upshot of the 
boundaries which protect the sacred beliefs. space and structure of the group is 
that they confirm the reification of the group itself. This explanation would be 
challenged by believers themselves. but my assertion is that it provides the clearest 
explanation for the differing socia l Sti'Uctures (in t·elation to ·gods'). whilst a lso 
providing a consistent explanation for the role that the sacred plays within these 
groups. The absence of reference to an objectified symbol of the group (an external 
'God'. or 'Allah') explains the lack of data coded into the marker. but does not 
necessarily mca11 that the group lacked the justification this external symbol 
provides. The group justified its own actions by drawing legitimation from its own 
beliefs and values in and of themselves. With this in mind, perhaps we can state 
that in this respect the difference between religious and non·religious groups is 
that the former objectivise the role played by the group, whilst the latter do not. 
This of course nlso reinforces the idea that 'Gods' don't kill, people do. 
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This suggestion is an academic and theoretical construction, and as such we would 
not expect to see it referenced within the statements of the groups. The lack of 
data fot· this marker from these groups is because the groups have not identified 
any external authot·ity as legitimating their actions. Tn doing so, they suppor t the 
above suggestion by unconsciously seeing the symbolic value of their group as 
external to the everyday field of action. Tf we accept this explanation, then, in 
addition to helping us explore the nature of the external legitimating authority and 
what it legitimates. it also helps us understand the gap between religious and 
secular groups and perhaps even explore the values that bridge it. 
Wider Struggle 
In many ways this marker is closely linked to the Dichotomous World-View marker. 
The difference comes from the Wider Struf(f(le marker focusing on a wider symbolic 
conflict of good versus evil and so capturing lhe normative aspects of a struggle 
that the J)WV marker misses. Within the data in this marker it is clear that the 
'Othering' of non-members of the group takes place as much on the basis of their 
values as it does on their suppot·t (or lack of it) for any particular gt·oup. By this 1 
mean that for al Qaeda. for example. their values are seen as representative of the 
'good' position and that a wider struggle is underway in 11//places where these 
ideological values (Islam as they interpret it) are not followed. This marker, then, 
adds texture to some of the findmgs of the DWV marker in that. whilst we can 
work out the nature of the dichotomous and oppositional world view that a group 
holds, the Wider Struggle marker helps us understand more about the anger (and 
the values that cause it) with the group's opposition to the 'Other'. 
For example, an indication of the wider struggle from UHiTcomes from their 
claims of the immorality of the West (their 'Wide Other).•• This immorality is also 
found within their '!'arrow Other' President Karimov. It is through learning 
what the morals arc that they feel are ignored and transgressed that we better 
92 Jn th~ process ofOthcnng, we can often sec two types of'Other'. For example. in the 
UHiT case the ·:-;arrow Other' 1s Kartmo''' the immediate enemy of the group m the 
location they are ba>ed: the 'Wider Other' are non ·UHiT actoro outside of the immediaw 
site of conflict, for example the U.S., or Western countries m general. The distinction 
largely rests on a question of proximity to the group. 
216 
understand where there could be sites of contestation between their beliefs and 
that of their 'Other'. Agreeing with their morals, or their construction of the 
'Other', is not necessary for using this marker in order to understand where 
nashpoints and potential violence may occur. So, from the RAF case study, we see 
that capitalist values, American expansionism and the denial of Palestinian 
independence are all areas which are evidence (to the RAF) of a wider struggle 
between ·good and evil'. and knO\ving this allows the external observer to map out 
some of the areas of belief of the group. The following table (8.2) shows how this 
could be used to help determine potential new areas of conflict had the RAF' not 
disbanded. 
Evidence .. the people or the world ··smce cnp&tnlt~ now ·'This imperiahsm only 
from are confrontt'd wath a new creating tht• rondittons reveals its fo.sc&st 
atatement • amerac.a.n offt•mHve ... (Or itS OWO ag5P"'('l'>$1V(' character when at 
<RAF14l reconstructton on o • encountcn; re~1stance ... 
world scale" (RAF52l (RAF102) 
Value Anger ago mat Amencan Anti·capatolu1m Anger at opprt•ssave ncuon 
tm>reued exn&OSIOOISm 
Application It •s not dtrl"atuh to it('(> The current l"CCI'IOinJC Likewise. the pollex• 
to other that were.• the HAF' m a crisu; and 1t.8 ('OUS('R m handling or the C20 
situation position to comm(•nt on the abuses of lhc cnpitnlist protests in London in 
current U.S. led mvnsion system would 1>rovid4: a April 2009 who"' o mon 
of Afghumstnn nnd Iraq. rich source of mntcr1al was killed would hove 
they would be ogtunst it. for the RAF. jusllrymg supported thc1r fet•hngs on 
However. os the anger its (ear that C.Opltnlism this point. \Ve would 
seem• al-o to IX' don.'<ted further tmpc>vt•ns:hes expect to find the RAF 
at aggress10n by a the poor equally 10 support or the 
powerful country. 1t ~ms Xo,·ember 2010 Student 
plausoble thot tht•y would protests on ~hllbonk, 
ha\'e had sumlnr concerns London. 
about. for t'XOinJ)I«.•, 
Russia's wtu· w1th Geor&'r1a 
in 200M. 
Table 8.2- Examples of the RAFs values 
Although this marker was not amongst the top five for the SKCC (the only group 
for which it was not) this could in part be because. whilst their protest focused on 
the U.S .. the U.S. was also where they were based. However. there was still data 
within the texts which pointed to the wider struggle for the rights of human beings 
(seen as a ·good' value), for example with the U.S. state (as ·evil' actor) denying 
these rights in the case of the Vietnamese people. The correlations were made 
between their own struggle (and the murder of some protestors) and that of the 
Vietnamese people. and this suggests the positionmg of their struggle within what 
they clearly understood as a broader fight between 'good and evil'. 
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Religious versus Secular Groups 
As discussed in Chapter Three I have not privileged religion in this research, 
rather, 1. have focused on the role that the sacred plays and have argued that we 
are as likely to see instances of the sacred within secular groups, as we are in 
religious groups. My assertion is that with this understanding we are better able 
to comprehend the similarities between religious and secular beliefs, and the move 
to violence provides an excellent context within which to frame an example of this 
discussion. 
The role of the sacred and the way in which I have mapped instances of it form the 
theoretical basis of the matrix. I will be discussing how the matrix worked in the 
next chapter, so here I will focus on some of the key differences (within the context 
of violence) between re ligious and secular groups. as suggested through my 
mapping of the sacred. 
Tn Chapter Three T built on Knott's ( 2005:217·8) a1·gumcnt that the boundary 
between the religious and secular is a second·order distinction which divides a 
single epistemological field. and that instances of the sacred can be seen on both 
sides of the divide, for example in the creation a nd renewal of groups' boundaries 
through their engagement with other groups. Learning where those boundaries 
are, and how they are constituted and maintained. is the key purpose of my matrix. 
The following diagram and discussion help to show how this is achieved. by 
demonstrating differences in sacred beliefs between groups a nd across the religious 
and secular division."' I have also used the d1scussion to explore some of the key 
differences and similarities between these camps in the da ta that I gathered. 
93 Figure 8.1 is an adaptation of the model 'The religious/secular field and it• force 
relationsh ips' presented in severa l of Knott's publications, one example of which can be 
found in Knott. 2010: 121. 
Violent 
Non· 
violent 
Religious 
2 
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Secular 
4 
- --- - - -
__ D1rfcrcncc 
Figure 8.1 - Diagram of the religious/secular field 
Figure 8.1 shows the division between the religious and secular camps. Within 
these camps are the groups on which I have undertaken case studieR, positioned 
accot·ding to whether 1 utilised them as a violent or non·violent case. These groups 
demonstrate some of the different positions that can be taken up within the same 
religious/secular camp. The lines between the groups represent shared or differing 
values - instances of sacred potentiality which could. if in conflict, lead to violence. 
The diagram demonstrates how such values can be shared or contested across the 
religious/secular boundary. and between groups which share their position within 
these camps.94 
I have numbered the shared/contested relationships so that I could provide 
examples of how the matrix provides data that helps us map occurrences of the 
sacred and therefore be attentive to differences and commonalities between how it 
influences potential actions of the groups. Table 8.3 provides a summary of these 
relationships and the discussion that follows, based upon those markers where 
there were interesting ctifferenccs between groups. and demonstrates this with 
94 Clearly most of these groups ha,•e ne,•er had direct relauonshtps with each other. The 
diagram is not a suggestion of how they would mteract, but on examinauon, using data 
from the case studies. of how volucs can be shn •·cd and contested between a variety of 
differing ideologies. 
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examples from the case studies. Where relevant I have broadened the discussions 
of these areas to include other examples from the case studies. 
Group 
I Aum 
2 aJQ 
3 alQ 
4 RAF 
5 Aum 
Similarity/ 
difference 
-
-
.... 
.... 
.... 
-
-
Group 
AGS 
UHi1' 
RAF 
SNCC 
SNCC 
Marker 
Personal Benefit 
Violent 1'raditions 
External Lce:itimatine: Authority 
Recourse to Sacrificial and or Judicial 
Processes 
Desire for Social Chane:e 
Table 8.3 - Examples of similarities/differences between groups' values 
(I) Aum = AGS (Personal Benefit) 
That these two groups shared common values in relation to the Personal Benefit 
marker is perhaps not too surprising given the linkages in their history. through 
Shoko Asahara, and their shared national and cultural identity. However. this 
shared history docs not guarantee similarity in beliefs, so this example still 
provides an interesting case for exami11ing shared values. 
Within both groups there was a strong theme of spiritual development through 
ascetic practice. Both believed that through different •·ituals, such as the Coma 
fire ceremony (in Agonshu), or the 'mil·acle pond initiation' (in Aum), as well as 
individual practices such as meditation. that they could resolve problems and 
evolve as spiritual beings. These beliefs were not open to discussion. they formed 
non·negotiable aspects of the groups' beliefs. and as such are excellent examples of 
sacred boundaries. Any groups 01· persons doubting the efficacy of these practices, 
or indeed of the power of spiritual development (and RO also the premises that 
these assumptions rest on, such as the presence of a spiritual realm, the ability to 
control one's progress through it, and so on>. comes into conflict with these beliefs 
and boundaries. 
This marker was also one of those that showed a Rtrong difference between 
religious and non·•·eligious groups. Within the religious groups it picked up on a 
theme of spiritual betterment, either through the immediate personal benefit (in 
this life) suggested by Agonshu and Aum Shinrikyo, or in the afterlife as shown in 
the texts of, for example, al Qaeda. The differences between when this benefit is 
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experienced (now or the afterlife) perhaps reflect a tendency within Japanese 
religions to focus on "hct·e and now relier' (Reader. 1995: 8). But of more interest to 
us here is the distinction between the religious and non-religious groups. The lack 
of immediate reward (or promise of it m the future) in the statements of the non· 
religious groups suggests that these groups are, in some ways at least. more 
altruistica lly inclined than their religious counterpat'ts- their sel f-sacrifice is made 
without hope of reward ... Whilst this could lead to a suggestion that their desire to 
commit wholeheartedly to their cause would be weaker as a result (no personal 
gain is de•·ivcd) quite the opposite seems to be the case, with many in the RAF and 
the SNCC t·isking death (and indeed many dying) for their cause. Whilst having no 
effect on the violent potentiality of a group, this marker does appear to be one of 
those which show some distinction between religious and non-religious groups. 
(2) o/0 - UHiT (Violent Traditions) 
Although at Qaeda and Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan (UHiT) share a common 
religious tradition. their interpretation of this collective religious histot·y is often 
different. From the case studies we see that al Qaeda drew upon the violent 
traditions of its religious ancestry and appeared to interpret key spiritual lessons 
and historical events through a violent lens far more often than UHi'l' did. The 
difference in the adoption and use of violent traditions by these groups was also 
reflected m their beliefs and actions and this marker can be seen as an excellent 
frame to examine this aspect of the non·ncgotiable differences between these 
groups. The strength of this non-negotiab ility was demonstrated, as I mentioned 
in Chapter Seven. in the criticism between UHiT. the Taliban (supporters and 
hosts of at Qaeda in Afghanistan) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, on 
their differences regarding the use of violence (Karagiannis and McCauley, 2006: 
325). 
Using this marker as a frame. we see that only one of UH i'l"s statements showed a 
similarity to the many identified in the al Qaeda study. this being (UHI1'118): 
"When the time comes to unite your community as a single person, if someone 
wants to break up your unity. strike htm on the neck with a sword". The other 
•s This IS not to say that members of the rehf(lous groups did not act altruisucolly- their 
actions stil l entailed personal suffering and were stil l undeo·tnken in suppot·t of a group that 
they felt wus oppressed by their 'Other' (Bcijt, 2010) 
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significant statement captured by this marker talks about the need to .. uproot the 
system enemies imposed", but docs not suggest that this has to be done through 
any form of physical violence. So. whilst UHiT have access to the same religious 
texts and teachings as aJ Qaeda, they choose not- in the main- to accept or 
interpret these as evidence of violent traditions. 
The Violent Traditions marker was. interestingly. also one of those that showed a 
marked difference between religious and non-..eligious groups and the amount of 
coded data. The RAF only contributed a little data to this marker, and no data was 
coded into the marker from the statements of the SNCC. This is despite the SKCC, 
and a lso the later traditions of the RAF, having some access to violent narratives, 
formed through the earlier history of their own groups, on which they could have 
drawn. For example. the SNCC could have drawn on episodes of violence in the 
anti·slavery or civil•·ights movements, and the RAF could have drawn more upon 
the episodes of violence within the parliamentary opposition movement and its own 
early history. That they did not could feed into the theory suggested by Hervieu· 
Leger (2000) that one of the aspects that makes a group religious is the narrative 
thread. the shared history that binds its present believers with its past and future. 
In the cases of Aum Shinrikyo and Agonshu (although the latter did not access 
violent traditions) we do see evidence of the creation of such traditions, tying the 
believers into a shared chain of religious mt'mory. even though these chains could 
be argued (by outsiders) to be a contemporary fabrication. Although this thesis is 
not unproblematic. it does appear to be a constructive explanation fo•· the 
difference in data present in this marker between the re ligious and non-religious 
groups. 
(3) a/Q ..... RAF (External Legitimating Authority) 
This example is one where the two sets of data were diametrically opposed. Whilst 
al Qaeda showed a very strong belief in an external legitimating authority (Allah) 
the RAF demonstrated no strong adherence to any authority with this kind of role. 
For al Qaeda any system of belief that does not observe the authority of Allah is 
completely anathema to it. and this is one of the key areas of belief which are 
protected with a non· negotiable boundary. As well as understanding the non· 
negotiability of this area of belief. we can also use this marker to understand what 
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kind of legitimation the external authority performs for the group. In the case of al 
Qaeda, the actions legitimated are clearly violent and point most forcefully towa1·ds 
enemies and the rules for engagement with them. 
Similar values seem to be legitimated in the case of the RAF but. as discussed 
above, there is no evidence of this being performed by an external legitimating 
authority. Whilst this suggests a clear difference in the nature of sacred 
boundaries between religious and non·religious groups, the Durkbeimian 
explanation for this difference, that I previously discussed. allows us to see 
similarities in the values unencumbered by the relative re ligiosity of the 
legitimation. 'ro this end. it is interesting to note that amongst the symbolisation 
used by the RAF was the process of ascribing authorship of public statements 
(about attacks) to Commnndos (cells within the RAF) nnmed after recent martyrs 
for the cause. For example. the attacks in Augsbm·g and Munich (121h May, 1972) 
were claimed by the 'Thomas Weissbecker Commando'. Weisshecker having been 
killed by the police in March the same year (RAF18). This self-reference appears to 
reinforce the inward gaze of the group, with no need for external s upport. 
{4} RAF .... SNCC (Recourse to Sacrificial and or Judicio/ Processes} 
Both of these groups operated within the secular cam1> and, although they both 
engaged with what they saw as deep injustices in their host societies. they had a 
different approach to thP mvolvement of sacrificial or judicial processes. 
The RAF did not believe that they would receive any level of satisfaction from the 
authontu~s. political. legnl or judicial. Lmle data from tht' RAF case study was 
coded into this marker and. where it was, this related to demands for justice, 
seemingly made with little expectation of a positive response. The SNCC, however. 
went to g•·eat lengths to take their complaints to the pi'OPCI' authorities. even 
assigning volunteers specifically to liaisl' with law enforcement agencies. This was 
despite the poor record of these agencies in responding f11irly and I>Ositively to their 
complaints. 
In both cases this data paints an important picture about the nature of the struggle 
of the groups, their understanding of the relationship with the state nnd. as a 
223 
result, the likelihood of their conducting their activities outside of the respective 
legal framework. This, in itself, does not have to lead to the possibility of violence 
many of the SNCC protests fell foul of local, state. or national laws but still avoided 
violence - but the decision to refuse to engage with judicial processes at least 
focuses the investigator's attention to how the group might choose to protest 
outside of the law. 
More data was coded into this marker from the secular groups than from the 
religious groups. However. the majority of this data came from the SNCC study, so 
I would be cautious about extending any lessons from this too widely. The 
performance of the marker will be judged in the next chapter, but it is useful to 
include it here as an example not just of a difference (between groups) within the 
secular camp but also because it shows how the absence of data, in this case in the 
RAF's statements, can affect our understanding of the sacred boundaties of the 
group, in this case of their interaction with the judicial system. 
(5) Aum = SNCC (Desire for Social Change) 
This marker demonstrated a similar belief in the possibility and desire for social 
change by these two groups, but. by focusing our attention on the data coded into it, 
also showed important differences in bow they felt this was possible. The SNCC 
believed that social change was possible through political protest against, and 
interaction with, the authorities. The data captured their desire to provide 
cultural programmes and literacy drives. Aum Shinrikyo. however. believed that 
global change was possible through spiritual intervention. and the data highlighted 
their desire to open branches around the world to spread the Aum tt·aining system. 
The data gave further pointers to the nature of their beliefs. Whilst the SNCC 
spoke of a future where one man could receive one vote (S!\CC63). Aum warned of 
a future nuclear war which they hoped to avet·t (AUM97). These beliefs about the 
future further delineate their sacred boundaries. giving us an idea of how 
constructive (or negative in the case of Aum's apocalyptic beliefs) their content is. 
At least some data was coded into this marker from all the groups I studied. 
however. proportionally more for the secular groups. Because of the amounts (of 
data) r would not suggest that the presence of data in this marker would in itself be 
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suggestive of any difference between the characteristics of religious or secular 
groups and also not of any potential move to violence. However, it is clear from the 
analysis of the data, that this marker, as shown through the above examples, does 
allow us to see differences between religious and secu lar groups. A broader 
qua litative assessment of the common di fferences shows that, in genera l. the 
nature of the social change desired by the religious groups related to the saving of 
humanity on longer term moral and political grounds (e.g. the establishment of a 
caliphate, dar el·Islam. or the aversion of an apocalyptic event). whereas the social 
change desired by the secular groups related to improving the present conditions of 
society (e.g. racial equa lity. or the overthrow of the capitalist state). 
The above diagram (Figure 8.1) helps demonstrate how instances of the sacred are 
found within both religious and secular groups. and also shows how focusing on the 
groups through the use of the markers helps to identify shared areas of values and 
to understand where significant differences can be found, as well as demonstrating 
areas for potential connict. I will now develop this latter point in more detail. 
Violence versus Non-violence 
As I have argued at several points during this thesis, it is misleading simply to 
reduce the labelling of groups to either ·violent' or 'non·violent'. However. leaving 
this problematic binary to one s ide, at least within stages of the development of 
movements we can sec definable non·violent or violent periods. Within the groups 
that I analysed was data from non-violent periods of three groups (that are 
commonly considered as non-violent groups) namely. Agonshu (AGS). Student 
1\onviolent Coordinating Committee (Sl\CC). and Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan 
(UHiT). Additional data was coded from statements from non-violent periods of 
two movements (that a •·e commonly considered as violent) namely, Aum Shinrikyo 
Oabelled as 'AUMb') and Ulrike Meinhof of the Red A•·my Faction (labelled as 
'pRAF'). I have grouped this data together as 'non-violent' and analysed it in 
comparison to the data coming from the violent stages of the movements I studied. 
In order to see where some of the clear differences were in terms of the markers, I 
have produced the following stacked bar chart which compares the two sets of data 
(Figure 8.2). 
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From this comparison we can see that there arc some markers which contained 
significantly more data for the violent set than for the non-violent sel. However. 
some of these, such as the No Justice Available in the System marker contained 
very little data overall, so although it shows that 100% of the data coded into it 
came from the violent set there was not enough data from which to draw a useful 
conclusion. To help show which markers provide both significant data and 
significant differences between the two sets I have also produced the above chart 
(Figure 8.3), which shows the percentage of data caught by each marker and, 
within each marker. the split between the violent and non-violent sets as discussed 
above ... 
From comparing the markers in the above two charts it is clear we need two 
distinct strategies to help determine what might be the significant differences 
between the violent and non·violcnt sets. Fit·st, we need to consider how the data 
is different in the most significant markers: for example, the Basic Injustice 
marker contained roughly similar relative amounts of data for both the violent and 
non-violent sets. Because we are not interested in the amount but the content, we 
need to establish if the kind of basic injustice that this marker highlighted differs 
at all and to sec if any common themes arise in the data m the violent set. 
Secondly, we need to look at those markers which, whilst not containing as much 
data, nevertheless contained significant amounts which almost wholly came from 
the violent category. These markers could be those which act more clearly on their 
own as indicators of violent potentialities. 
Within those markers that contained the most data, the differences between the 
violent and non-violent groups are largely to do with the semantics of the message. 
Within the texts ft·om the violent groups a more violent lex icon is employed. So, 
whilst we often see similar themes and indeed problems. there is an underlying 
description of violence. using words such as death. attack. blood. destroy. massacre, 
murder, weapons. /\II of these mat·kers shm·e this distinctive language. This is not 
to say that the non-violent scL does not contain any violent language, but it is 
significantly less and used mainly within the context of persecution or violence 
received. The following table ('!'able 8.4) demonstrates this point, in which I have 
drawn words used within violent discourses from a list of the top 100 most 
oo 'J'o ensure that the data from Mch set is shown as a relative comparison, Figure 8.3 
shows the percentage of data in coch marker as a percentar:c of the data in each set. 
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frequently used words in all of the texts for the relevant sets U omitted structure 
words from the list - pronouns. conjunctions, etc.)•1 
RAF ALO UHiT 
Violent <RAF1·3) Non-violent Violent Non·violent 
(pRAF) 
Struggle/sling (0.56%) War (0.26°o) KiWsling/ed Infidel (0.34%) 
(0.38) 
Revolution/a ry/a r ics J ihad (0.35%) 
(0.46%) 
War/fare (0.35%) War (0.300o) 
Attack/sled/ing Fightling (0.23°o) 
(0.30%) 
Bomb/slersling Crusadelr (0.21 %) 
(0.29%) 
Resistance (0.24%) Infidels (0. 18) 
Commando.ls (0.22%) Mujahid in 
(0.15°o) 
MiHtarv (0.22oo) 
Guerilla/guerrilla 
(0.21%) 
. . . . Table 8.4 - Difference m vtolentlnon·vtolent use of language 
In consideration of this. it seems that one significant difference between the sets, 
as an indicator of violent potentiality. is the use of violent language. This is a 
subjective assessment, as it requtres measuremem against non·violent examples. 
But it seems that an increase in frequency and specificity is a good indicator of the 
presence of violent beliefs. 
Looking at those markers which contained a sigmficam amount of data from the 
violent dataset, a lot was coded into the Violent TrndiiiOns marker. which in itself 
was weighted heavily (over 90°o) towards the violent set. Interestingly, whilst it 
contained large amounts of data from Aum Shinrikyo (up to the time of the attack 
in Tokyo). and also from al Qaeda. little was coded into it from any of the RAF 
stages. Whilst we might not expect to see much data for the first stage of the RAF. 
l would argue that the example set by Baader, Ensshn, Meinhof and their 
colleagues did construct a violent naJTI\tive that informed the later stages. 
However, this demonstrates the differences between the Violent Trnditions marker 
and the Context of Group's Intemn/ Development marker. The latter marker 
"' The values 8hown m Table 8.·1 repre•~nt. as a percentage. th~ usage of those words out of 
the total words ust>d in all of the documcnu categorised mto that data ·set. For example. 
"struggle" and tht• associated words "struggles" and "strugghng" together made up 0.56% of 
the total words used in all the documents authored by the tlu·ec violent generations of the 
RAP. 
• 
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contains the kind of data which is more relevant to the latter stages of the RAF, as 
it relates to events which impacted on how the group evolved. 
The Violent Traditions marke1·. meanwhile, contains data that relates to. for 
example, the interpretation of foundational myths and/or of instructional scripture. 
This includes where such myths were (re)created. Understanding the development 
of these traditions is difficult: we1·e they created or remembered because the group 
is violent, or did their presence encourage the violence within the group? In the 
absence of a definitive answer to this question. the marker does still seem a 
reasonable indicator of violence: whilst Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan shares a 
common religious heritage with a! Qaeda there was not much data in the UHi'l' 
study relating to violent traditions. 
These traditions play an important role, demonstrating a history (and so precedent) 
and justification for violent action. They can also normalise violent activity, 
placing it within ·acceptable' moral parameters by making it appear as part of a 
more o1·di nary series of events. 
The following markers also contained data of which the majority (at least 70%) 
came from the violent rather than the non·violent datascts (number of instances 
occurring in the violent sets listed in brackets): 
• Symbolic Importance (ll5) 
• Involvement in the Cycle of Recip•·ocal Violence (73) 
• l'\o Innocent 'Others' (51) 
• Emergency Situation (106) 
• No Common Ground (84) 
• l'\o Justice Available in System (5) 
Some of these markea·s lend themselves to suggesting violent potentiAlities more 
easily than others. For example. Jnvo/veml'nf in the Cycle of Reciprocul Violenre 
taking revenge for violence (or perceived violence) received -is quite clearly a 
markc1· of violent action. Less clearly, the idea that there are No Innocent 'Others· 
involved in the wider struggle suggests that people not directly involved in the 
dispute could equally be targeted. However. it does not necessarily follow that the 
dispute has to be violent. Similarly. if it is felt that there is no justice available to 
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a group, that legal and/or judicial channels for resolving perceived injustices are 
closed to them (No Justice Available in the System), then it is possible that a group 
could tw·n to violence, but it does not necessarily have to. 
The Symbolic Importance marker contained more data from the two religious 
violent groups, al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo, than from the RAF. Where there was 
evidence of this marker within the RAF data, it related to the present action 
having symbolic importance within a wider struggle, s uch as the class struggle, or 
the fight against imperialism. Both the current action and the symbolism it 
related to were very much situated within the period contemporaneous to the 
statements. 
However, in al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo, the actions were often linked through 
the symbol ism to a future (or at least predicted) event. Within Aum much of the 
symbolic importance of their actions was tied up with the prophecies of 
Nostradamus. So, for example, the need to excel at spiritual practises within Aum 
was tied to the desire to survive the impending (prophesied) world·wide disaster. 
For many of the references in the al Qaeda study, the future event was related to 
personal benefit (for example the heavenly rewards for pious behaviour in the 
present) or the eventual victory of global Islam over the 'Other'. This is shown in 
the following quotation <ALQu: 12:41.1- 13:08.1): 
0 youth of my Ummah! Say we prefer death over humiliation. And 
facing death is greater than running away from it. Evil has 
prevailed, and the wounds of AI Aqaaa are deep but, 0 heroes of 
Palestine, 0 Muslim Warriors, 0 protectors of AI Quds be patient in 
the field of death . For Allah has promised you victory and you have 
promised him to remain firm. So fulfil your promise and He will 
fulfil His. 
The present action, linked openly to the Palestinian struggle, but also implicated in 
a broade1· fellowship of Muslim 'warriors'. is laden with symbolism redolent of 
heroism, good and evil, and warrior virtues as well as the promise of future 
rewards. 
So, whilst the Symbolic Importance marker, in terms of its definition, does not 
automatically suggest a violent potentiality within a group, its content can, and it 
is interesting to see that much more data was coded into this marker for the violent 
set of groups than the non·violent set. 
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The Emergency Situation marker was most strongly represented within Aum and 
indeed did not contain nearly as much data (proportionally) from either of the other 
violent groups. As discussed in the case study on Aum (Chapter Four) this is 
perhaps because of the situation within Aum where the leadership was forced to 
raise the stakes in order to stem the potential loss of believers. Outside of the Aum 
data·sct. there is not strong enough evidence to suggest that this marker could be a 
distinguishing factor between violent or non·violent belief systems. We could 
expect to see data here that is suggestive of an increasing desperateness about the 
current situation or field of action. and thet·efore legitimating more extreme action. 
But, whilst there is evidence of this within the violent sets, there is not enough foa· 
it be an easily identifiable indicator of violent potentialities. 
The No Common Ground market· is another which, in and of itself, does not have to 
be representative of violent action. For example. T would expect to find plenty of 
data within this marker if I studied pacifist world·renouncing groups such as the 
Amish. The difference between the violent and non·violent 1:roups relates to how 
this absence of commonality is constructed and maintained. In the case of the 
violent groups there is a desire to ensure that the distance with the 'Other' is 
maintained, and this is achieved through violent belief and action. For example, 
the following quotation is from al Qaeda (ALQ57: 212): 
f<now that we are counting our dead. especially in Palestine, where 
your allies the Jews murder them. We are going to take revenge for 
them from your blood, as we did on the day of N<'w York [9/111. Re· 
member what I said to you about that day regarding our security 
and your Sl'Curity. Baghdad·the seat of the Caliphate·will never fall 
~o you, by Allah's grace. and we will fight you as long as we cany 
om guns. If we fall. our sons will replace us. May oua· mothea·s 
become bat·ren if we leave any of you alive on our soil. 
This quotation demonstrates the complete absence of any form of opening for 
dialogue. It is rept·csentative of the dichotomous world·view we saw come across so 
strongly m the al Qaeda case study (Chapter Five). but also reinforces the notion 
that the only intea·action between the two sides will be one of violence. This is 
quite a different kind of evidence to that found from the /\urn Shim·ikyo case study, 
where most of the data came ft'Om the biographies of believers. Here the lack of 
common ground was shown through the self·realisation of the complete disparity 
between worldly values and those of Aum (AUM93): 
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I found myself being at ease and looking at worldly desires from the 
outside, which had worried me much until then. I did not think 
a nything but just saw worldly desires. At this point my value 
system changed enti rely. I lost interest in what I had liked and 
had been interested in, and my mind was not affected by anything 
but what J really needed to do. 
And the speaker goes on to say: 
It was painful to speak with and contact people. I felt idle talks to 
be a loss of a lot of energy. Before the s ingle·cell practice. T thought 
the world T lived in was very good, but after the practice T felt 
everything T had been thinking as good was actually sufferings. r 
a lso thought that this life would bring about only sufferings. 
Through his religious practice, the speaker had reached a level of spiritual 
realisation which closed off avenues of dialogue w1th those outside Aum. even 
restricting his desire to speak with outsiders." 
I have presented these two examples (data from the RAF is similar in nature to the 
above a l Qaeda example) because they demonstrate the broad range of data within 
this marker and two different ways of looking at it. The first is that it seems that a 
lack of common ground is a necessary element in the beliefs of a violent group. 
However, on its own it IS not sufficient for violent action because. as ment1oned 
earlier, this characteristic is common to many non·violent groups. Additionally, 
the Aum quotation does not in itself suggest any violent potentiality, but •·ather is 
just evidence of the presence of a lack of common ~:~·ound. The al Qaeda quotation, 
however, shows both a lack of common ground and also clear e"i.dence of a violent 
mmd·set. 
A further point to consider iA that, of the non·violent set. only AUMb had a 
s ignificant amount of data relating to No Common Ground. Therefore, 1 might add 
that, notwithstanding my comments that presence of data in this marker cannot be 
seen to indicate violent potentialities. it certainly seems that non-violent groups 
are less likely to refer to thiA theme as often (perhaps because they want to see 
"' This complete change m fcx:u• need not be md1cauw of a move towards v1olcnC(' - M 
S1mmel (1997: 137) wnws. lliR not unusual for a per.on to change "the whole of exlst<:'nce" 
around a new ideology, but he •uggcsts that th1s could also happen for a new "amorous 
affection". Barker (1998: 12) also points out that a degree of separation from the rest of 
society is common in ned!( li n~ l'Ciigious groups - which Aum was- although the severity 
and success of the separation it promoted was. as mentioned in Chapter Four. unusual. 
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themselves as reaching out to their 'Other'). The Aum exception is probably at 
least partly due to the public and official persecution of Aum members. as well as a 
continuing culture of separation from the pre-sarin attack days. 
Out of the three markers that perhaps more obviously demonstrated violence, the 
lm'Q/vement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence marker contained data from the 
RAF and al Qaeda and. interestingly. from the pre-violent stage of the RAF (pRAF), 
though not a substantial amount. No data from Aum was coded into it. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that, whilst Aum did feel it was subject to some basic 
injustices, it had not been on the receiving end of any sustained violence or 
persecution (although there is reasonable evidence to say that many of its members 
were nfierthe Tokyo sarin attacks). Both the RAF and al Qaeda grew out of a pre-
existing conflict and saw themselves. to a certain extent, as avenging wrongs 
committed by the 'Other' before they commenced their activities. Given that no 
data from the Aum case study was coded into this marker. I would suggest that the 
presence of this kind of data suggests violent potentialities. but that the absence of 
it docs not preclude this outcome. 
Likewise. the No Innocent 'Others'marker contained large amounts of data in the 
al Qaeda case study, but very little for the RAF and Aum studies. Its presence 
suggests a likelihood of violent potentialities. not least in the way that the evidence 
for this marker suggested a broadening of violence to all those who are not 
members of the group. Interestingly. while there was little data for Aum or the 
RAF, it could be sa id that both demonstrated a lack of regard for the innocence of 
others. despite this not being reflected in their statements."" I will discuss this 
disparity in the following chapter. but I do not believe that it changes the strong 
link bc~ween the presence of data in this m!Hker and the likelihood of violent 
action. 
The non-violent set of Aum data (AUMb) also contributed a small amount in a 
limited way to this marker. Interestingly this related primarily to questions about 
the morality of releasing the gas, and the answers suggest that some of Aum's 
teachings that a llowed the attacks still held sway . 
.. The RAF (RAFI7) stated that they had tried to a''Oid injury to workers and staff in the 
attack on the Springer press in May. 1972, but in general thear methods suggested this was 
not a strong or consistent commitment. Aum's actions were clearly indiscriminate in who 
was ta rgcted. 
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The above discussion looked at some of the key differences between the violent and 
non·violent data·sets that I examined in this research. Next, I will examine the 
move to violence. Together these two sections address the principal question out of 
which this research grow. 
The Move to Violence 
[n the above discussion I looked at some of the differences I found between violent 
and non-violent stages of groups. Understanding these differences is essential if 
we are to understand how certain characteristics might be suggestive of violent 
potentialities. In this section I take the lessons learned from the analysis in the 
rest of this chapter. and apply them to some samples of data taken from specific 
generations of the groups. 
I will focus principally on two groups. the RAF and Aum Shinrikyo. Both these 
groups had significant events that forced substantial change on the leadership and 
membership. primarily due to the imprisonment of leaders. The data·sets I will be 
using to compare these changes are listed in Appendix 1\vo. These two groups 
provide interesting comparisons. The secular RAF will allow us to track the data 
ft·om the stages before and during violent action, whilst looking at the case of tho 
religious Aum Shinrikyo will focus our gaze on the move from violence to non· 
violence. 
The Red Army Faction ond the move to violence 
The data I gathered on the RAF started with the writings of Ulrike Meinhof in her 
columns for konkrct. 1\lemhofs close involvement with the protest movement 
before she helped Baader egcape and her prominent. if not leading. role in the RA F, 
makes her a reliable source. 
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The following charts (Figures 8.4 - 8.7) show the volume of data, by marker, for 
each of the RAF generations, which give us a rough indication of the differences 
between them. The RAF labels 1·3 refer to the generations of the RAF and the 
pRAF label refers to the statements coded prior to Baader's escape and the 
formation of the RAF."'" 
It is interesting to see that the Conviction and Involvement in the Cycle of 
Reciprocal Violence markers for the pre-RAF (pRAF) generation were s ignificantly 
different to the violent generations of the RAF. The Conl£>xt of Group's Origins I 
Development marker contained much more information that for the other 
generations - this being filled with s tatements relating to the problems with the 
present establishment's links with Germany's Nazi past. That there were not more 
differences in the markers is not surprising, as the time that Meinhof was writing 
these columns was ve1·y close to when the RAF was formed. They were written 
during a period of social upheaval when the state had already begun to use some 
heavy-handed tactics against the protestor~. In this per1od we start to see the 
escalation of the conflict towards the unapologetic violence of the RAF. 
The relative lack of data in the bwolvement 1i1 the Cyc/t> of Reciprocal Violence 
marke1· is best explained by the fact that, before the fo1·mation of the RAF. there 
was limited violent 1·evenge. Limited, not 110ne. because as Meinhof mentions 
(RAF•13: 239·40) there were some incidents where protestors acted out of revenge 
(for example in attacks on Sp1·mger Press buildings) and these actions. highlighted 
through this marker. a re an indication of things to come. 
""' The lubcls and corl'CKponding l(cnc rations of the RAF a •·e ulso laid out in Apt>cndix Two. 
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The change in conviction from the pre· RAF stage to the violent stages of the RAF 
deals with who has the conviction. In her column ·from protest to resistance'. 
Meinhof (RAF43: 242) writes that "there are people" who have the conviction to 
take a stand against terror and violence. but this changes after the RAF had been 
formed, to say that she (as part of the RAF) bad the conviction to take this stand 
(e.g. RAF25). The lack of conviction in the pRA.F stage perhaps renects her own 
prevarication. f01· example as noted by Aust (2008: 35) of the occasion when she 
was not keen for her car to be used as part of a protest blockade she was attending. 
In addition to the amount of data for the various stages not being that different. 
the content of this data also remained relatively consistent. In the violent stages of 
the R.<\F. the markers captured statements that expressed stronger feelings and 
harder beliefs than the pre·RAF stage. This diffcr·ence of degree is exceedingly 
hard to measure. due to the difficulty of establishing an objective frame of 
reference. What I can say with some confidence is that, from the analysis already 
completed. we have an idea of which markers capture significant amounts of data 
suggesting violent potentialities. We also now have some examples of the kind of 
data that suggests a hardening of the sacred boundaries within the group's 
ideologies. If we tie this up with what we see from the pre·RAF data·set (pRAF). 
which shows what we expect to see just before a group moves to violence, then we 
have some idea of what to look for in assessing violent potentialities. 
A further analysis we can apply to the question of the move to violence is of 
findings from the Aum Shimikyo data. Tn addition to coding the data from Aum 
before it carried out its attacks on the Tokyo underground Oabelled 'AU1-Ia'). I also 
coded some data from after that period. when the group was still called Aum 
Shinrikyo. and also from the time when it had renamed itself Aleph (labelled 
'i\UMb'). In the case study in Chapter Four I focused on the data from the pre· 
attack stage. but an interesting contrast comes from looking at the statements of 
the group made when they had had to confront their· violent beliefs, and also after 
the core leadership had been imprisoned. The following charts (figures 8.9 and 
8.10) show differ·ences in markers between these two sets of data. 
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Unlike the RAF comparison. we can see quite clear differences between the Aum 
generations. Partly this is due to difference in sources of data (which I will discuss 
in the following chapter), where the data for AUMb was gathered mostly from 
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audio-visual sources as opposed to textual sources (which provided most of the 
AUMa data). Because of these differences in sources I do not want to make too 
much of the variation between the amounts of data that the markers gathered. For 
example, the Basic Injustice marker contained a large amount of data for AUMb 
relating to the persecution and. in some cases, violence that the members of Aum 
received (from members of the public, the media and law enforcement agencies). If 
we stripped that persecution out of the Basic Injustice category (an analysis I 
achieved by creating sub-codes of the Basic Injustice marker specifically to 
differentiate this data) then we would see that proportionally half as much 
remaining data was coded dut·ing the AUMb study as was coded during the AUMa 
study. Tn order to demonstrate this difference, I have separated out (from the 
Basic Tnjustice marker) the data relating to these two sub-codes of Receiving 
Persecution and Receiving Violence in the above charts (Figures 8.8 and 8.9). Of 
course, part of the Basic Injustice data for AtThla was related to their perceived 
treatment by the wider Japanese society, but by no means as much as the amount 
forAtTh1b. 
It is within this qualitative analysis of the data that we start to see some useful 
findings. For the members in the post-sarin attack Aum (AU1\1b), there was still 
some concern about the apocalyptic predictions made by Asahat·a, although the 
sense of an emergency situation was much dimimshed from that felt before the 
sat·in attack. 'l'herc were no references to violent traditions within the group either. 
Both of these elements were reliant on the teachings of Asahara and the leadership, 
and their removal and the reasons for it were substantial factors in the increasing 
prevarication of the remaining members about these teachings. 
It is in this area of doubt that we sec some significant changes. Whilst the 
remaining members of Aum seemed to have a stronger sense of conviction. this was 
in part due to having remained in the group despite the persecution and public 
derision of their beliefs. and this refusal to leave i\um also boosted the sense of a 
lack of common ground. However. when analysing the data in these markers. we 
sec bridges be1,-i.nning to be built between Aum communes and the local 
communities. including one touching example of former anti·Aum protestors 
exchanging food and books with Aum renunciates (AUM9: 49:03.1 49:28.5; 
1:07:42.1- 1 :oi:49.2). While there is still strong evidence of a desire to maintain a 
separation from the outside world (which we would expect to see in a group where 
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members are cloistered together , violent or otherwise) and a Jack of common 
ground, it is the exceptions to this which we did not see before the Tokyo attacks 
which confrrm the move to non·violence. 
Some of these findings are specific to the development of Aum Shinrikyo, which we 
might not expect to see in other groups which have moved from violence to non· 
violence but not had to renounce their leader or had such a public battering of their 
beliefs. However, the findings still reinforce the need to question the kind of data 
in the markers, in order to see the differences between violent and non·violent 
potentialities. With the Aum case we see that, as with the RAF. the non·violent 
stage suggests 'softer' boundaries, ones that allow for dou bt, in areas where for the 
violent stages there was no such ambiguity. 
This movement, seen by comparing one stage of the group with another, is where I 
suggest that close attention needs to be paid in order to assess the shifting of 
beliefs from violence to non-violence, and vice versa. Although J did not carry out 
the same generational analysis of the SNCC and Hizb ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan (in 
the former case because of a lack of primary data and in the latter case because 
there has not yet been a move to violence), we can see similar tendencies in some of 
the a uthoritative scholarship on these groups. Within the SNCC there was a 
gradual lessening of commitments to non·violence, and an increased discussion of 
trends that s uggested a move to violence (for example the debate about the 
carrying of guns for self· protection (Sellers, 1990: 162)). Likewise, in Karagiannis 
and McCauley's (2006: 328·331) discussion mention is made of some of the criter ia 
which could see Hizb ut·Tah1'ir (in Uzbekistan and internationally) make that 
move to violence. such as the appointment of a Caliph. 
Conclusion 
During this research 1 have been exploring the move to violence in religious and 
non-religious groups. I have applied the matrix to several groups and in each 
chapter have analysed the data to explore some of the significant themes around 
this move. 
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In this chapter I have drawn the key themes together and evaluated what they 
contribute to understanding the move to violence. I demonstrated how an analysis 
of the data coded into the mm·kers conta·ibuted to this understanding. I focused on 
the four markers into which most data was coded, but I also highlighted how a ll of 
the markers were impor tant, even where little or no data was coded. Using Figure 
8.1, I demonstrated how a comparison of the role of the sacred in each of the groups 
enables greater attentiveness to the differences and commonalities between 
religious and non-religious groups as well as those groups that have, or have not 
undertaken violent actions. 
I highlighted how the semantics of messages was important in discerning a move 
from non-violence to violence - I expect to see greater use of violent imagery and 
language in a I,>TOup that has strong potential to act violen tly. I also evaluated 
markers in which the presence of data did not necessarily confirm the move to 
violence, but. which suggested a strong potentia l to do so. 
I also demonstrated how the data presented through the application of the matrix 
could be mapped onto other areas which had not been covered by the statements of 
the group to·date (Table 8.2). By establishing the important markers on which to 
concentrate and which values. highl ighted by the matrix, can be mapped onto other 
areas of potential conflict, I suggest that I have given a clear indication of how we 
might pred ict the move to violence in religious and non·a·el igious ga·oups. This is 
also demonstrated in the following table (Table 8.5) which lists the markers that 
contained significantly more data for the violent groups than the non-violent. The 
table also lists the markers which contained tht> most data, a nd in which we could 
see evidence of violent potential in the semantics of the messages. A brief 
summary of the relevant data is given for each maa·ker, alongside a suggestion of 
the kind of indications that should be looked for when assessing the violent 
potentiality of all the groups. 1u1 
As discussed in Chapter Two. in the case of these indicators my aim is to make 
qualified generalisations rather than to assert watertight predictions. The 
markers did not contain similar amounts or kinds of data for all the violent groups. 
101 In all ofahese markers. I would refer a he reader back to the caveats included in the text, 
above. !-'or example. that whilst KCG did not in and of ttself suggest a vtolent potentiality, 
the non-violent groups did not stress this aspect as strongly in their statements as their 
violent counterparts. 
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so Table 8.5 suggests 'familia l chamcteristics' which I maintain should be used as 
an ideal·type for future assessments of any move to violence. 
Whilst I have highlighted the key points in the move to violence in this conclusion, 
T have, throughout all the chapters. reinforced the point that the context of the 
group, and the wider picture suggested by all the markers are vitally important to 
the proper functioning of the matrix. 
With this in mind. it is important that I evaluate the application of the matrix in 
its entirety, a task 1 undertake in the following chapter. 
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9. Evaluation of The Matrix 
Introduction 
Having evaluated some of the key themes within the move to violence in religious 
and non-religious groups, I now turn to evaluating the form and function of the 
matrix. 
First, I will evaluate the markers. Using the list of markers, as it stood at the 
conclusion of my research, I will provide a brief summary of the kinds of data each 
captured and how this contributed to the overall picture. As already mentioned, 
this list should not be seen as definitive. I commenced my research with a list 
drawn up during the Home Office literature review (Knott eta/. 2006) and adapted 
this iteratively during my subsequent reseru·ch. While the present markers 
provide an informative and productive insight into the nature of the move to 
violence, I leave open the possibility that future research could add new markers to 
the list. 
This possibility is discussed in the second section of the chapter, which looks at 
some broader comments about the matrix. These include issues surrounding 
interpreting the data the matrix produces. the nature of the source data it is 
reliant on, and the coding process, including the selection and use of the markers. 
I will build on this evaluation in my concluding chapter, where J highlight the 
usefulness of the matrix. There, in addition to summarising some of the key 
themes in the move to violence, 1 will address questions about what new insight 
this model has contributed to the work already extant in the field, as well as 
considering the predictive potentiality of the model. I shall conclude by signalling 
some of the areas where the marker could be applied. 
Evaluation of the Markers 
In this section I look at the kind of data coded into the markers, and how the 
market'S 'performed', by which J mean what kind of analysis they aided and how 
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this fits inoo wider theoretical discussions. Five of the markers were investigated 
at length in the previous chapter: Basic Injustice, Dichotomous World· View. 
External Legitimating Authority, Violent Traditions and Wider Struggle. I will 
therefore focus solely on their place within the broader analysis, and will not 
repeaL a discussion of the kinds of data coded into these five. 
Because this analysis of the markers can only be illuminated through examples 
from the current research. the examples will relate to the central research question 
of the move to violence. I will. however, avoid repetition of examples used in the 
previous chaptet·. 
Against Violence 
Actual statement renouncing violence 
'l'his marker was introduced during the course of the research in response to some 
of the themes and data I was expecting to come out of the case studies on the non· 
violent groups. As the very short description of the marker suggests. it was 
intended oo simply capture remarks renouncing violence. and was applied to all the 
case studies. 
Not surprisingly, it did not capture much information from the violent groups. 
Some examples of where it did capture data came fo·om the Aum Shimikyo case 
study. For example, there were statements from members of Aum (after the gas 
attacks) reaffirming their beliefs in non·violence, although this should be put into 
the context of their wish to assert their distance from the violent actions of Auon. 
and of what they perceived as the likelihood of such events ever occurring (they 
wouldn't wish oo be known as people who had known Aum was capable of violence). 
That said, Aum's leadeo·ship also made some statements (before the gas attacks) 
which suggested a clear line on non·violence (AUM97). This demonstrates that 
statements which run counter oo the prevailing trends (and in this case to the 
reality of their actions) can also be captured by the markers. This does not 
diminish the functional usefulness of the marker. which should be considered in 
the context of the other markers and discussed in the analysis of the data. It also 
demonstrates the danger of pinning predictive statements onto too little evidence, 
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and throughout this analysis I will be reiterating the need to consider the model 
holistically and not with isolated reference to individual markers. 
Overall, this marker was one constituted very s pecifically for the study at hand and 
would not necessarily be useful in studies into different topics. It was useful to 
focus on attitudes to non·violence within the groups. Understanding in what 
contexts and in relation to what issues the groups made these statements further 
illuminated the nature of their beliefs. 
Basic Injustice 
A sense of some basic injustice, which is non-accidental G.e .. it 
expresses the core values, t rue nature of society and is 
irredeemable), and which reinforces the sense of 
opposition/dichotomy - 'clash of worlds' 
This marker was one of the top live markers in terms of the amount of data coded 
into it. In Chapter Eight I discussed the nature of the data it contained, and will 
not repeat that discussion here. However. it is worth recalling some of the 
information that can be derived from this marker. 
Less data was coded into the marker from Aum Shinrikyo and Agonshu than the 
other groups. \Vith this in mind. I suggest that this marker provides us with an 
indication of whether the group is a 'protest group', that is, whether their core aims 
set about to resolve a pa rticulm· concern with the society they operate within. 
Because so much data was coded into the marker, it could be argued that it would 
serve more purpose if disaggregated into smaller markers which could capture 
more specific trends. In the course of analysing the data for the case studies I did 
utilise some sub-categories. For example, I tried separating out cases of 'receiving 
persecution' from the broadm· Basic Injustice markc1·. However, this did not 
contribute any significant new findings, and the nature of the data was suitably 
different between the cases for the marker to remain in its broad form and also 
remain useful as a comparative tool to apply across a lithe cases. Within each case 
I was able tO identify specific trends and compare these across the range of groups 
under study, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Context of Group's Internal Development 
Evidence of confrontation within the development of the !,'TOup, 
either accidental or intentional. 
After the first case study, which I undertook on Aum Shinrikyo using the list of 
markers largely suggested by Knott et 11/. (2006), I recognised the need to add 
several markers capturing statements relating to the context of the development of 
the group, both internal and external. This marker is one of those two new 
markers, and would be applicable to any study to which this matrix might be 
applied. The internal development of a gt·oup has a clear bearing on its beliefs and 
the nal.ure of its interactions with wider society. In the Aum case sl.udy l drew 
attention l.o the accidental death of a renunciate, a death which came about due to 
the harsh (and some would argue, violent) practices that A urn required for its 
members, but which never theless had in itself a huge impact on the dit·ecl.ion that 
Awn took in its broader use of violence. 
Whether it is competition for leadership, re-assessments of theological teachings, or 
accidental developments. the internal trajectory of a group is a n important part of 
the overall data and needs to be properly mapped and discussed to understand 
their beliefs and actions. l n the cases studied for this proJect. most of the data (in 
this mat·ke~·) related to developments which were not accidental, and rather which 
could be seen as expected developments consistent with the earlier beliefs a nd 
statements of the groups. That the majority of this data suggested a trajectory of 
development consistent with earlier beliefs lends confidence to the predictive 
potentia l of findings based on the analysis of the groups. What is important to 
remember, however, is thai. these developments were not assured, nor were they 
planned. In all cases there were particular moments that seem notably significant 
to the progression of the group. It is generally only possible to know which were 
the more significant with the benefit of hinds ight, but the close ana lysis of all 
events provides an insight into the beliefs of the group, and even its possible 
reaction to certain developments. 
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Context of Group's Origins/Development 
Evidence of confrontation within the wider society within which the 
group originated and with which it interacted. 
The inOuence of the wider society within which the group develops is of similar 
significance to the internal development of the group. Differing historical and 
cultural pressures can be seen in some of the statements a group makes. Some of 
these are highlighted by the Violent Traditions marker. which I will discuss in 
more detail later on. However, the Context of Croup's Origins/Development 
marker is more focused on the interactions between the group and its wider society 
(as opposed to the broader historical inOuence- although in some cases groups do 
claim a common heritage with others that have been around for long enough that 
this history impacts on the p1·esent, and is claimed as part of the confrontation 
between the group and the wider society).•<Xl 
The data collected by the marker reflects these themes. There is some discussion 
of the historical context within the a) Qaeda case btudy alongside the more recent 
context of their actions (for example. in relation to historical and current Western 
involvement in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan). This kind of discussion is also 
found in statements by Awn Shinrikyo, the SNCC, the Red Army Faction and Hizb 
ut ·Tahrir in Uzbekistan. Some of these instances ovel'iap with data captured by 
the Basic Injustice marker. but for this marker I am specifically interested in their 
inOuence on how the group developed as opposed to claims of injustices per se. 
That the group saw fit to make these statements demonstrates that they were both 
aware of these events and that the events had some influence on their thinking 
(even if the group was not conscious of what this influence was). The nattu·e of 
these influences has an impact on how the group deve lops, whether in tenns of the 
increasing withdrawal fi'Om society due to media·bashing <Aum Shinrikyo) or the 
funding and creation of a guerrilla movement to resist non· Islamic invaders (a l 
Qaeda>. The role of external events on the group is a key consideration in 
'"' For example. see the development of Agonshu in Chnpwr Seven, where they claimed a 
clear lineage back to the historical Buddha. Additionally, a l Qneda and Hizb ut·'l'ahrir ai!IO 
claim a common heritage with the ea rly, and appa•·ently mo•·c pious, i\•l uslims, although 
they do also •·ecognise a group identity distinct from that Nll'iy period. 
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understanding any move to violence as well as in the development of a group's 
beliefs. This marker has a central role in the matrix regardless of the question it is 
used to investigate, although the limitations of its predictive contributions are 
recognised: in hindsight it is easy to explain how an external event changed a 
group: however, predicting which events might take place and how they might 
affect a group can be significantly more difficult. 
Conviction 
A deep and incontestable sense of conviction. 
A straight·forward marker, the idea of a strong sense of conviction can be a useful 
indicator in understanding the strength of a group's identity and hold over its 
members. Difficulties can arise (and did during the research) in that, while many 
actions can suggest conviction (for instance leaving one's family to become a 
renunciate), they are not necessari ly repeated in the written statements of the 
groups. 'l'herefore, in the absence of clear actions by n group the data for this 
marker might not be forthcoming. 
A fw·ther consideration (also made in regard to some of the other markers) is that 
it is difficult to suggest a sense of scale to the level of conviction. especially a scale 
that could be used comparatively across groups. In the absence of an objective 
scale of conviction, I have applied common·sense notions. For example, joining a 
movement by paying money to them could be seen as an indicator of a deep sense of 
conviction in one group (as in some cases in Aum Shinrikyo). as much as leaving 
·normal" society to join a group which is actively pun;ued by law enforcement 
agencies in another (as witnessed in the RAF). In both cases there might later be 
prevarication by members, or a repudiation of previously strongly· held ideas (as 
indeed there were in the above two examples). However, this does not challenge 
the incontestability of the sense of conviction at the time it was demonstrated. The 
matrix allows for the analysis of statements made at a particular point in time. and 
that such conviction was felt at that time is at least as significant as subsequent 
changes. Additionally, I made sure that dates (where available) and the wider 
context of the marked texts were made clear in the analysis, so that the 
development of beliefs. and my analysis of them, could be confirmed and placed in a 
context of later variation of convictions, where appt·opriate. 
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Desire for Social Change 
The intended aim of actions for social change. either in a specific 
area or globally (this does not mean the end of the world. but could 
mean global conversion to a particular faith or way of ruling.) 
Only a little data was coded into this marker from the al Qaeda study, but a fairly 
consistent amount was coded in the other case studies. The definition was bt·oad 
enough to encapsulate the aims and desires of all of the groups, as it allowed for 
social change through both spiritual and material means. These distinctions are 
shown through analysis of the data in the marker: for example the RAF wished to 
change the imperialist (and largely U.S.) control of modern society, whereas Hizb 
ut·Tahrir in Uzbekistan wished to counter the immoral (and largely U.S.) innuence 
on Musl ims and non·Mus lims alike. In both of these cnses the means to achieving 
this change was this·woddly: through political pressure and force. However. in 
some cases the change was to be brought about through other·worldly means: 
Agonshu believed that. through the observance of certain spiritual practices. the 
world could become a happier place. 
The marker drew attention t.o Lhese differences, and this is important for futut·e 
app lications of the matrix. However, having completed the analysis of the data, I 
can also see that there is t'OOm for a potential disaggregation of this marker, to 
differentiate between a desire for social change that would be forced on others (for 
the greater good. for example) and a desire for social change that would be 
implemented with the cooperation of others (non·members of the group). This 
would, for example, have led to a more nuanced analysis of the UHiT case study. 
whct·e some stages of their ideology related to bottom·up social change (i.e. 
convers ion). From a more general perspective. it might also have provided a 
potentially useful and clear distinction between the analyses of the violent and the 
non·violcnt groups. While my intention was to allow for markers that were broad 
enough to provide data for an informative comparative analysis. the further 
distinction of data in this marker may have yielded more focused results. 
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Dichotomous World-View 
An oppositional and dichotomous world ·vicw (cosmology). 
1'his marker was discussed in Chapter Eight as one of the top five in terms of 
quantity of coded data. One of the interesting features of this data was what it 
revealed about the way in which groups were seen to co·opt outSiders into their 
own world-view. 1'his demonstrated that. whilst they saw their ideological 
boundaries as impermeable. they were satisfied that their interpretation of some 
other groups' beliefs demonstrated that their net of be longing could be cast wider. 
As with the Basic Injustice marker. this marker captut·cd a lot of information. but 
aside from the tone of the language used. there was no clear and easy distinction 
between the differing groups I studied in terms of their relationship to violence. 
Furthermore. as with most of the markers the statements highlighted in this one 
demonstrated a mixed approach to the conscious and unconscious creation of 
boundaries. Statements in some cases clearly denoted !I 'them' and 'us' distinction. 
but the marker also captured statements which bctrnycd this view without 
suggesting a conscious intention to do so. Because this marker dealt with one of 
the basic devices for constructing a group identity and also because it captured a 
significant range of information. I would suggest that it would be useful to include 
it in future applications of the matrix. 
Emergency Situation 
The field of action takes on the character of an emergency situation. 
through real or a conflation of symbolic and real pressures. leading 
to the suspension of normal moral codes which regulate and limit 
action and the justification of emergency f01·ms of action. 
The sense of an emergency situation in some groups that had acted violently 
became apparent in the literature review that preceded this research (Knott et nl. 
2006). In many ways. it corresponds particularly well to those groups with 
millenarian concerns. such as Aum Shinrikyo. However. the definition of the 
marker was broad enough to allow it to relate to those cases where, for example, an 
understanding of being at war could lead to the suspension of normal moral codes. 
It is this suspension, along with the justification of cmet·gency forms of action ('all 
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is fair in Jove and war'), that this marker was particularly interested in capturing. 
In addition, statements relating to the emergency pressures that led to s uch moral 
developments contributed to this analysis. 
Interestingly, all the groups, violent and non· violent, made some statements 
implying a sense of emergency. The nature of these varied from apocalyptic 
concerns (voiced by Aum Shinrikyo and Agonshu) to statements suggesting a time 
of war (al Qaeda, Red Army Faction). There were several statements by SNCC, 
couched in the language of revolution, that were relevant, relating to the desire for 
their struggle to achieve its aims immediately. However, in this instance, there 
was little indication that this urgency validated any call for violent action. Hizb ut· 
'l'ahrir in Uzbekistan referenced a wider emergency situation within the context of 
the Western fight against Islam, but also included concerns about an impending 
national financial disaster. 
The marker captured information from all these groups because it did not specify 
that violent action would take place, only action outside of the 'normal' moral 
spectrum. In this instance, deliberately flaunting laws in protests at restaurant 
counters (e.g. SNCC) is as valid an example as the kidnapping of a prominent 
capitalist (e.g. RAF). Whilst this marker may perhaps be less relevant in future 
uses of the matrix, it was undoubtedly essential to my analysis of the groups for 
this study, helping me to frame exceptional periods of action. 
External Legitimating Authority 
World view justified by appeal to legitimating authority external 
to/transcending the situation (God. re]jgious scriptures, traditions. 
fundamental human rights or values). 
This marker a lso contained a significant amount of data, but only for the religious 
groups. The absence of data collected for the secular groups is in itself significant, 
and was discussed in depth in Chapter Eight. Despite this one·sided contribution 
to the analysis, the marker nevertheless provided a rich vein of information. It 
also provided a good example of the strength of the model in providing data in 
segments that were easily comparable across sources. In this case, whilst I 
expected to see all groups making clear references to external legitimating 
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authorities of some form or other. this marker made clear that some did not, and 
allowed me to compare the examples across the groups. Such findings (even in 
those cases where data was absent) allow for greater focus on questions raised, and 
further our understanding of some of the differences highlighted. 
During the course of the research I specifically re·worded the definition of this 
marker to its present form to enable it to capture information from non·religious as 
well as religious groups. Whilst this did not yield the results I expected, I would 
maintain that this approach should be retained in future applications of the matrix. 
as it allows for a fair comparison of the data that is captured. 
Followers Differ from Leader 
Where a follower consciously (or otherwise) expresses an idea that 
differs from (or disagrees with) a leader. 'l'o show where beliefs 
expressed by leade1·s are not necessarily all taken on by followers. 
T will discuss some of the findings from this marker later, as it raised some 
interesting points about what kinds of data the matrix captured. and the relevance 
of who authored this data. Therefore. I will limit my discussion here to two brief 
comments. 
This ma•·ker was introduced to captUl·e my concerns that the matrix was too 
heavily skewed towards an un·critical acceptance of the idea that the beliefs 
expressed in statements normally by leaders of the movements - were wholly 
accepted by their followers. This was an important point to consider as the 
acceptance and indeed interpretation of beliefs in a group can vary from member to 
member. If I had not examined this area then the matrix could be said to be less 
effective due to its leadeJ"bias. 
My assessment of this marker is that it did not contribute much to the matrix 
overall. The principle behind it might be better served by labelling the data with 
indicators to signal whether the statements were made by followers. leaders. 
heretics. and so on. Statements by these groupings could then be compared. across 
all the markers in the matr·ix, in order to see where divergent opinions arise. This 
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method would also allow for the capture of differences in beliefs, over time. by the 
sa me persons. 
Involvement in the Cycle of Reciprocal Violence 
A clear awareness of the need and/or desit·e to frame actions within 
a discourse of 'revenge'. 
l developed this marker during the process of coding the groups' statements in 
response to my concern that little significa nt data was being coded into the 
Recourse to Saclificial/Judicinl Processes marker. By t-c· framing the approach to 
this C irat·dian concept from the opposite point of view T aimed to collect data 
relevant to it, to ensure that l could still utilise and investigate this interesting 
theoretical suggestion. 
Significant amounts of data were coded for both the al Qaeda and Red Army 
Faction case studies. Both of these groups demonstrated a conscious and 
deliberate intention to act in revenge for perceived ills. In addition, and in support 
of Cirat•d's thesis. both also perceived that actions made in response by the 'Other' 
constituted additional injustices that necessitated further reprisals. This marker 
is. therefore. a good example of how a specific theoretical construct can be brought 
to bear on the nature of the matrix. 
Utilising the matrix l have been able to draw out dtlta that supports Girard's (2005: 
27) contention that "reprisa l can thus follow reprisal without a ny true conclusion 
ever being reached." This marker is a useful addition to the matrix for capturing 
this information in respect of the move to violence. In other applications. other 
problem·specific theoretical constructs could be eq\tally valid. 
No Common Ground 
An absence of common w·ound with 'Others' allowing meaningful 
dialogue with other world views. 
The lack of a common ground, of common values on which to base meaningful 
d ia logue. was shown to varying degrees in all of the violent groups in this study. 
The marker captured statements which both exhorted followers to maintain at 
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least an indifference to 'Others' and an opposition to their ideologies. It also 
highlighted illustrative statements of how this separation worked, for example 
through testimonials (in the Aum case study) and recounting of martyr's lives (al 
Qaeda). 
Just as important as these practical examples of separation were the ideological 
boundaries which were reinforced by these statements. and the explicit references 
to the gulf in moral values. The absence of common ground denoted in these 
statements is a useful indication of the beliefs of the groups. and highlights points 
of conflict between these and opposing ideologies. 
This marker fulfils an important role in capturing and mapping the sacred 
boundaries of a group. However. although it was a marker significantly populated 
by data from groups that had moved to violence. it may have a more limited 
function when applied to research on other topics. It might nevertheless merit 
inclusion given the quality of data it can capture. 
No Innocent 'Others' 
A sense that all members of the 'Other' group arc involved and 
implicated in the opposition to the good. and so legitimate targets: 
there is no 'innocence'. 
This marker was suggested in the list presented as pat•t of the Home Office 
literature review (Knott et nl. 2006). However, it collected relatively little 
information. J\lost of its data came from al Qaeda. who made statements relating 
to the legitimation of attacks even against non·combatants. The problem perhaps 
lay with the use of 'innocence' in the marker. For example. al Qaeda had (it 
believed) good grounds for seeing non·combatant American civilians, because they 
had voted for the President (Clinton), as implicated in the President's decision to 
attack Muslim lands (ALQ5: 70). This highlights that ' innocence' is very much a 
subjective definition. 
The idea that those people outside of the group arc in opposition to it seemed 
genera lly accepted in all the groups I studied. The more pertinent question is 
whether this opposition took violent forms or not (and did or did not desm·ve vio lent 
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retribution}. Additionally. the marker suggests a distinction between combatants 
and non·combatants that is perhaps more recognised by international law and 
actors than non·state agitators. 
In addition to the above qualifications, this mm·ker a lso highlighted a difference 
between the data from the statements and the actions of the group. For example, 
whilst the actions of the RAF and Aum did not suggest that they recognised 
potential innocence in members of the 'Other·, I found little evidence of this 
attitude in their beliefs. This raises an important point about the use of the matrix. 
Account should be taken of the wider context of the beliefs, and any analysis should 
be undCJ·taken with as much backg1·ound information as can reasonably be 
gathered. Whilst this he lps in addressing potential gaps in the data. it also points 
to the difficulty of operationalising lessons from the matrix to future events. For 
example. it would have been difficult to preilict the mdiscriminate nature of Aum's 
actions in Matsumoto in 1994, when they sprayed sarin gas at residential buildings. 
There was no evidence of 11 disregard for 'innocent others' in their statements that 
would have been suggestive of violence on this scale. So, whilst the matrix uti lises 
belief statements to understand how they might motivate violent action, it can only 
make general predictions on the basis of the available data. 
No Justice Available in System 
Statement claiming that the group has no rccou,·se to judicial 
protection 
This marker was introduced to capture data related to complaints about the 
inadequacy or absence of JUdicial protection or support vis·a·vis the group's 
gnevances. Very little data was coded into it (for the RAF and al Qaeda case 
studies), and the data that was coded was of little significance. On the basis of this, 
I would not use this marker in future applications of the matrix. 
Personal Benefit 
Explicit statement of benefits for followers such as heightened 
physical or mental abilities. salvation, sense of righteousness. etc. 
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Overall. little data was coded into this maker, but what data there was suggested 
some interesting differences between the groups as well as some of the potential 
motivations for joining them. For example, for al Qaeda members there was the 
potential of rewards in the after· life, for Aum members the benefits of enhanced 
physical abilities (e.g. to withstand certain kinds of attacks) in this life, and for 
Agonshu there were benefits in this life (better promotion. results in exams, and so 
on) which were linked to the influence of ancestral spirits. 
These personal benefits were benign enough, but they provided useful information 
about the focus of the groups and some of the enticements for would·be members. 
In this light, T would recommend that this marker could provide interesting 
information (if in small quantities) for future studies. 
Question of Authority 
Dispute within an ideology over who has the authoa·itative view of 
its historical and contemporary practice. 
This marker drew attention to areas of difference with outsiders to the group who 
nevertheless claimed to belong to the same ideological heritage. It was particularly 
useful in mapping the sacred boundaries of beliefs, because it highlighted nuanced 
areas of ideological dispute as understood by the group itself. Tn discussing how 
they saw themselves as diffe rent to other groups within the 'same' tradition, these 
statements gave much ga·eater detail about the nature of their beliefs and in 
particular about those which they felt were particularly significant. 
For example. in the a! Qaeda case study. this marker captured information relating 
to interpretation of holy texts and influential teachers that suggested quite specific 
interpretations of the concept of jihad. In Agonshu's case, it provided evidence on 
the aa·eas where they felt they encapsulated the 'true' Buddhism, in contra· 
distinction to the many other Buddhist ideologies available in Japan. 
Many examples. such as in the Red Army Faction case study. suggested a 
difference based on whether the ideology legitimated action or not, with the RAF 
dismissive of those who prefel'l'ed 'to talk the talk', but lacked the commitment to 
the ideology to act on their beliefs. This data points to information found within 
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the Conviction marker. but was also captured here as it raised questions about 
whether a group's actions were consistent with their ideology (the RAF would say 
that in the case of those who did not join them, the answer was 'no'). 
This was a constructive marker to include in the mat1·ix, and would be a useful 
addition in other potentia l uses of the matrix where it might also demonstrate 
nua nces within ideological traditions. 
Recognition of Innocence 
Recogn.ition that the~·e ARE innocent 'Others'. and that they should 
not be targeted. 
I created this marker and applied it to all the groups. violent and non·violent. in 
response to the kind of data the No Innocent 'OtheJ:~·marker set out to capture. In 
this case J felt it was also important to provide an example of how I could capture 
exacLiy the opposite pos ition. and whether I could track a change in pos ition in 
some of the groups. As it was, this marker captured ve1·y little information. The 
analysis was still valuable. but in future a pplications the marker might more 
usefully be merged with the .Vo Innocent 'Ochen;'marker to form a frame focusing 
on questions of innocence. or levels of guilt by association. There remains a need to 
concentrate on this area in research addressing the move to violence but the 
adjustment, as suggested above. from the present focus could lead to a more 
constructive contribution to the output of the mat1·ix. 
Recourse to Socrificioi/Judiciol Processes 
Evidence of an a ttempt to conclude a cycle of violence through a 
sacrificial/judicial act. 
This marker was specifically worded to capture data from both sets of groups in 
support of the Gira1·dian thel!is that sacrifice (and in its modern form. justice) is an 
attempt to halt the cycle of reciprocal violence. In particular I expected to 
'"" It could be argued that sacrafic~ is not just (or even at oil) 11bout concluding a cycle of 
violence. However. Cira1·d (2005: 280·1) is clear that in his understanding. which I have 
0111lied here, even ritual •tltl'ifice u ltimately fulfils this function. 
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capture data which would help understand the group's relationship to the legal and 
judicial apparatus of the country it operated in. 
'!'he vast majority of data captured related to the SNCC. This was not surprising 
given that it was a protest movement, and one that either operated within the law, 
or within a deliberately defined and limited opposition to the law. None of the 
other groups met both these criteria. 
'!'he lack of information capLUred by this marker suggested that either the groups 
being studied did not •·ega~·d the legal processes as relevant (which is the most 
likely explanation for most of the groups) or that they did not see a necessity to 
challenge the law (e.g. in the case of Agonshu. which was not a protest group). Tn 
cases where the former explanation holds true. this could be understood partly 
through reference to data captured by the Emergency Situation marker. and 
perhaps more strongly through the No Common Ground marker. 
'!'he lack of evidence in this case does not necessari ly disprove the Girardi an thesis. 
as in all bar the Agonshu case there was the potential for a cycle of reciprocal 
violence. Tn terms of the wider value to the matrix, the marker could benefit from 
a slight change in focus to address the group's involvement (or attempted 
involvement) in excernnlly validated legaUjudicial processes. This would capture 
attempts (or refusals) to be involved in methods to solve their complaints or 
protests outside of their own legitimated rules. Removing the reference to 'sacrifice' 
would clarify this aim, but need not lead to the Gil·a•·dian reading of the data being 
discarded. Whilst this shift in focus would help to highlight the data relating to 
engagement with external processes. it could still capture the possibility of 
internally validated attempts to halt violence. l\ly rea~;on for suggesting a shift of 
focus to externally validated efforts is that none of the groups showed attempts to 
embrace internal measures to halt violence and it seems unlikely that they would. 
However. as in the case of SNCC. attempts to usc external measures show a clear 
desire to frame action in a context which docs not lead to an uncontrollable 
escalation of violence (even if that was not always the reality - e.g. police brutality 
towards protestors). 
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Symbolic Importance 
A sense of symbolic importance given to the present action. 
This marker highlighted a s ignificant amount of detail from across the violent 
groups, but not so much from the non·violent groups. Despite this difference, it 
should still play an important role in any future use of the matrix. Relevant data 
in this study related to actions undertaken by the group as well as their 'Other', 
with the symbolic importance of their actions varying from the invocation of action 
on behalf of symbols such as 'the proletariat' (Red Army Faction) to the wider 
struggle that sit·ins in lunch counters symbolised (SNCC). 
In some cases large sections of the coded statements were written using symbolic 
language, accessing symbols that the author's target audience would understand 
and which would carry an emotive (and in some cases also spiritual) significance. 
The al Qaeda statements were good evidence of this. with references to sacred 
places. imagery such as false maidenhood, and past conflicts such as the Crusades. 
In other cases, such as those statements made by Aum Shinrikyo. I found examples 
where the importance and symbolic meaning was not assumed to be readily 
understood by the audience. and so the interpretation was provided along with the 
reference. for example in the usc of l\ostradamus's prophecies. 
In all cases, these symbols invoked powerful emotional1·esponses from other 
believers, and their use served to unify the identity a nd purpose of the g•·oup. By 
focusing a marker on these symbols Twas able to draw attention to some of the key 
areas of beliefs. and by trying to understand the intentions behind these references. 
I could better allude to the violent potentiality of the groups. Furthermore. by 
focusing on the symbolic element, this marker draws attention to the importance of 
the role of collective emotion in religious beliefs (in motivating action) as 
e mphasised in Durkheim's work. 
Identifying and signifying the symbols of a group are of central importance to 
understanding the sacred landscape within which they operate. To do so requires 
placing these statements within the broader context of the particular discourse, as 
well as the history and broader events within which they are made. The example 
of this marker, pe1·haps mo•·c clearly than othet·s, demonstrates the context·centric 
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utilisation of the matrix, as the symbols themselves are difficult. if not impossible. 
to comprehend out of context. 
Violent Traditions 
Evidence of specifically violent traits/influences (imagery/myth) 
within the traditions/beliefs of the group. 
The nature of the data coded into the Violent Traditions marker was discussed in 
the previous chapter, so l will limit my comment here to its function in any further 
use of the matrix. 
The marker was clearly important for this particular research question, as the role 
of violent traditions was something that became increasingly pertinent dul'ing my 
case studies. Whilst the formation of this market· might change for future uses of 
the matrix. I would argue that a marker relating to the traditions of the group is 
an essential frame with which to focus attention on an important aspect of the 
groups' beliefs. 
To a large extent, this is captured through the use of the Context of Group's 
OrigJiJs!Development market·, although any analysis of this would need to attend to 
the subtle difference between the group's reference to the origins of its context, and 
the use of some of these origins as formative imagery or myth in relation to their 
bl'liefs. 
Overall. this marker pt·ovided an essential function in understanding the move to 
vio lence and, in a broader context. is a good example of how the matrix can (and 
needs to) accommodate market'S which can focus on vct•y specific elements of a 
group's statements. 
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Wider Struggle 
The present condition/field of action is situated within a wider 
struggle infused with normative value (good vs. evi l; right vs. 
wrong}. 
As discussed in the previous chapter. this marker contained a lot of statements 
relating to the wider struggle, with particular reference to the United States. The 
SNCC was the exception to this rule, but, as I mentioned, this could well be 
because it was situated within America, and so did not identify with the U.S. as an 
actor in a wider struggle (although there was some evidence of this in regard to the 
Vietnam War). 
'l'he significant amount of data relating to the close correlation between the idea of 
a wider struggle infused with normative value. and the common positioning of the 
U.S. as an 'evil' and powerful. actor in this struggle is an important fmding. As the 
dominant world·power since World War II, and the only superpower since the 
collapse of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. has enjoyed a position of unparalleled influence 
on the world stage. Closely coupled with U.S. ideals have been economic theories of 
capitalism. 'l'he pervasive influence of this economic model. whether or not coupled 
with military force, has led many people to accuse the U.S. of expansionist policies. 
So J would suggest that the findings of this marker point to the groups I studied as 
reacting against the dominant symbol in an uneven powet· struggle. 
This resonates with the understanding of many scholars. for instance Almond ec al 
(2003) and other scholars working m The Fundamencn!ism Pmject, who believed 
that many 'fundamentalist' groups were reacting against modernity. Whet·e the 
U.S. is seen (rightly or wrongly) as gu iding the modem project (synonymous with 
Western 'progress') then it appears that the findings from my research suggest a 
similar reaction against modernity. 
However, understanding contempot·at·y violence as a reaction to modernity is an 
oversimplification of a move to violence that encompasses and is driven by a 
number of factors. For example. members of the Red Army Faction were often at 
the vanguard of modern ideals. for example in their discussion of women's rights 
(RAF156). In spite of this, their violent acts against U.S. anny bases were still 
pt·imarily about Lhci t· disagreement with U.S. foreign policy and its support of 
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capitalist economic policy. and they identified the U.S. as their primary enemy 
(after the West German government). Similar issues with capitalism and U.S. 
foreign policy are found in the statements by al Qaeda. UHiT and to much lesser 
extents by the SNCC and i\um Shinrikyo. For Agonshu, the problem of a wider 
struggle is also seen as one relating to contemporary society eroding traditional 
ethics and morality, but they make no linkage between this erosion and any 
particular state or ideology. 
This brief discussion demonstrates how the matrix. and this marker in particular, 
can bring the comparison of data from a number of different groups into a 
discussion of a popula•· or innuential theory. '!'he •·ole of modernity in the move to 
violence is more complex than can be assumed from a small number of case studies. 
however this marker allows us to bring a very specific set of data to bear on this 
discussion. and to help determine its validity. 
Re-coding the markers 
As discussed in Chapto:~•· Two, one of the potential issues about the application of 
the matrix is the accuracy of any future replication of the study. Any researcher 
will bring their own questions and issues to their study of this subject and, as 
suggested above, I have also allowed for new markers to be added to the above list 
in studies of other research topics. The matrix, and the way in which I have used it, 
suggests a method of analysis utilising an understAnding of the sacred and the •·ole 
it plays in society. 
In order to aid in the valid replication of this topic. I have set out the theory of the 
sAcred I have utilised. and explained the process of applying the matrix. For those 
researchers seeking to replicate this study, T have also provided titles, short 
explanations, longer explanaLions and evaluations fo1· each of the markers. As 
such, J would expect any replication of the resea•-ch to take into account the 
evaluation of the markers that I have just completed. and adjust or add to these 
where necessary. 
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Evaluation of the Matrix 
I will now turn to four areas of discussion that raised important questions about 
the functioning of the matrix. The first relates to analysing the coded data, 
including dealing with the absence of data and also some discussion of the relative 
merits of qualitative versus quantitative analysis. I will then look at questions 
surrounding the reliability of the ideologies. before moving onto the process of 
choosing and defining the markers. 
Analysis of the dolo 
The first point to raise regat·ding the analysis of the data is the difference in how 
this was undertaken in relation to the textual and audio· visual sources. As 
mentioned 10 Chapter Two. three films were included amongst the sources for my 
study. One was what can best be described as a ·recruitment video' for al Q.aeda. 
Featuring speeches by bin l.aden and other· ideologues it was a rich source of direct 
statements about beliefs. The other two films were documentaries about Aum 
Shinrikyo/Aieph, in the months and years after the Tokyo sarin gas attacks. An 
important point for consideration here is that in these cases some of the markers 
captured not direct statements made by the believers. but data that was evident 
from non·vcr·bal sources in the film. For example. I was able to watch scenes of 
devotion to Asahara as believers prayed. even though this was not a direct 
statement made by the believer. I treated this data in exactly the same way as the 
written statements. as 1 feel it nevertheless contributed to understanding the 
beliefs of the ~:roup. 
Throughout this study, analysis has been carried out on data that I coded from 
these textual and audio-visual statements. within the context of broader studies of 
the groups in question. However, in some cases the markers contained little or no 
data. Because of the comparative nature of the matrix this focused my attention on 
why there might be no data captured. In some cases, there would be quite straight· 
forward explanations. but in others this absence raised interesting questions. One 
of these was discussed in the case study on the Red Army Faction in which I 
pointed to the lack of data for the External LegitJiJJating Authority marker, and 
then discussed some theor·etical explanations focusing on the question of 
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'externality' in legitimation (see Chapter Eight). The matrix also focused attention 
on coded data in such a way that I could see interesting differences between 
religious and secular groups, and from this think about how such differences might 
have occurred. In highlighting themes in the data in these ways, the matrix aided 
a rich analysis of the groups and topics that I investigated. 
Reliability of ideology 
In the course of this thesis I have made several references to the fluidity of beliefs, 
and how beliefs change - for individuals and fo•· groups- over the course of time. 
If I had applied the matrix to the beliefs of the yoga study group at the time when 
Aum Shinrikyo started out. I could not have predicted the possible denouement to 
their activities 11 years later. The matrix can only be applied to beliefs at 
particular points in time. and this in itself raises questions about the reliability of 
using ideology as the subject of the matrix's study. 
These beliefs are not fixed. but are situated in •·elation to the wider world of the 
believer. and can change over time whilst still being regarded as immutable. The 
believer does not necessarily recognise what an outsider might see as change. This 
arises because there is a thread of narrative consistency to the beliefs (for example. 
see my discussion of po11 in the case study on Aum Shinrikyo). In this case, the 
p1·oblem of the death of a renunciate was assimilated into a new variation of the 
group's beliefs, within the extant explanatory framework. In my use of the matrix, 
I have attempted to account for this wider narrative within my analysis of the 
markers. by setting them in the context of a broader picture of beliefs. 
However. this still does not change the fact that. by taking my source material out 
of the here and now of their inception. I have fixed them in time, and so divorced 
them from their original ch•·onological place in the ideological development of the 
group. This is a necessa•·y part of the research proct>ss, but at the same time l have 
needed to be sensitive to the ongoing development of the believer and the g•·oup. 
and work this into my analys1s. I have accounted for this by carefully labelling the 
source material. attaching categories such as dates of authorship. and also 
accounting for the relative position of the statements in relation to the 
deve lopment of the group. l"or example, in the RAP case study, I separated the 
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data into three distinct stages of the movement. These labels allow future 
researchers to question my intra-group analys is and the corresponding statements 
l have made about the trajectory and change in the beliefs of the groups. 
Finally. there is the thorny issue of whether the followers agree with everything 
that the leadot·s say. Within the Aum Shinrikyo case study, I identified data from 
followers of Aum, in distinction to that directly from. or sanctioned by, the 
leadership. Some of this data demonstrated, at best. a relaxation of the ideology 
laid out by the leadership, and some was clearly contradictory to it. For exa mple, 
within an J\um Retreat 1 could see 'Hello Kitty' rosaries. a nd one renunciate had 
been doing origami. which suggested an attachment to 'things' in contradistinction 
to Aum's teachings (Atn,[g: 11:40.6-12:36.8: 25:34.0-27:03.8).1"' Even more 
strongly, in one interview a believer states that no·one rea lly cared about 
Nostradamus's prophecies. This clearly contrndicted the many references made to 
them in officia l Aum publications (AUM49: 221).106 
My solu tion to this problem was to create a marker which captured diffet·onces 
between leader's a nd follower's ideologies - as this also provides interesting data 
on the ideological coherence of the group (and raises questions about the potential 
conviction of its followers). But it is not always possible to discern where these 
differences lie, so I also labe lled all the source material with who authored the 
statements (where known). This allowed me to analyse the statements by different 
authors. and to look for divergent beliefs. 
However, it is also the case that statements ft·om believers are ha1·der to come by 
than statements from the leadership.'"" In the absence of'follower' data. there are 
some reasonable, common-sense assumptions that we can make about the 
correlation between the two sets of beliefs (in the absence of data pointing to large-
sca le defections, etc.) lf the gt·oup is growing, or maintaining a sizeable number of 
followers. then it is reasonable to assume that the followers agree with the leaders. 
104 'Hello Kitty' is a trademarked cartoon cat which features on a number of products, from 
sleeping bags to pens. Japanese in origin, it docs have internncional popularity. 
10.' The context of this statement is important this interview, though sti ll with n believer 
(not an ex-believer) took place after the gas attacks, when it might be more convenient to be 
seen to question some aspect~ of the group's behcfs. 
'"" Because of the stakes invoh•ed m the various struggles. and 111 claiming membership of 
most of the groups, it is not surprising that I was unable to find a lot of dissenting views. I 
deliberately excluded ex-bclwvcrs/membcrs as they, by definitton. are likely to have clear 
agendas about groups' beliefs. Still, the data I did capture (primarily from Aum Shinrikyo) 
suggested that differences were by degree. not absolute. 
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at least in the main. All of the groups had defectors. which suggests some level of 
internal dissent. however we might again reasonably assume that the majority of 
those remaining were agreeable with the orthodox position. The relationship 
between believers and leaders can be as lluid as the content of the beliefs 
themselves but, through the careful labelling of sources and data I was ab le to 
ensure that I could account for and investigate these shifting positions. 
Selection/judging process 
ln the discussion on methodology (Chapter 'l'wo) I brought up the iterative nature 
of the markers and how they were constructed. I think it is instructive, at this 
stage. to demonstrate how this worked in practice. with a couple of examples. 
Figure 9.1 gives an example of how some of the markers were amended during the 
process of conducting the case studies. 
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Figure 9.1 - Re·definition of markers 
When these markers were re·defined. I then re·vistted all of the source material 
and re·coded it with these 'new· markers in mind. 1'his ensured that all of the 
material was coded consistently. One example is my re·definition of the SJ'mbolic 
Importance marker which was disaggt·egated, as shown in Figure 9.1. In its 
original form, the markN· captured a significant amount of information which was 
too broad for useful analysis. By disaggregating it into two markers. l was able to 
collect more focused information on these areas. which provided me with a better 
basis from which to compare the findings between the different groups. 
By making these definitions clear and available to the reader, it is my intention 
Lhat future researchers could add to. or further modify these markers. The 
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structure of the matrix is not fossilised. indeed one of its strengths lies in the 
Oexibility of the markers to be reappraised for new (or old) s ubjects. 
Evaluation of generalisation 
The nexibility of the markers in this regard is one issue which might bring into 
question the validity of generalised statements made on the basis of the application 
of the matrix. In this study I have, as already discussed, taken pains to provide a 
transparent account of the processes involved in the construction and application of 
the matrix. 
Notwithstanding these efforts there are broader concerns. as mentioned in Chapter 
Two. about the generalisability of findings based on qualitative research (e.g. Bruce. 
2009). I have taken care to ensure that. where I have generalised findings from my 
research (as in the previous chapter) I have coupled these with caveats about 
potentia l limitations. Whilst I accept that qua litative research can lead to more 
limited generalised findings than quantitative research. I suggest that it is possible 
and desirable to generalise from my research. Furthermore, I suggest that it would 
be difficult. if not impossible. to undertake quantitative research in this field that 
would meet rigorous statistical standards in relation to mndomisation and 
adequate sample size. In light of this, I propose that my moderatum 
generalisations (Williams. 2000) provide a useful and necessary function in 
understanding recognisable features of the role of the sacred in modern life. If 
future app lications of the matrix ar e u ndet·taken wi th the same rigour. then there 
is no reason why valid generalisations could not be made on other subjects. 
Conclusion 
In this chaptl'r I have evaluated and discussed the utility of the matrix within this 
study, whilst also focusing on its potential for future reseat·ch. I will now wrn to 
some concluding comments regarding this and make some recommendations 
arising from my research on the move lO violence. 
269 
10. Conclusion 
Introduction 
In the Introductory chapter I set out my aims for this research: 
• 
• 
to understand the move to violence in religious and non·religious 
groups: 
to define an analytica l model for mapping instances of the sacred in 
society. 
The second of these aims was developed as it became clear that I needed to 
operationalise a concept of the sacred to explore the move to violence. In order to 
meet these aims I set out a number of objectives: 
• To provide a case study based analysis of statements (and other 
primary material) from selected groups. with a particular focus on 
issues of collective belief and the move to violence: 
• In light of the current literature and case studies. to present a 
matrix of causal markers suggestive of the move to violence apparent 
in the relevant cases: 
• To provide a theoretical explanation of the markers and how these 
are determined by belief and lead to violent potentialities: 
• To produce a model- the matrix - which could be applicable to 
further studtes. both within the present field (of violence and religion) 
and in the broader subject areas of the Sociology of Religion and 
Religious Studies. 
• To develop the matrix as a tool for usc outside of academia, by 
governments. law-enforcement agencies and other organisatiotlS 
In this final chapter. I will summarise some of the key findings from the preceding 
chapters, which demonstrate how I met the above aims and objectives. I will 
conclude with some observations about the relevance of this research to the field of 
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violence and religion, to the wider study of religious and non·religious groups in 
society. and to some suggestions for future research. 
I will start by highlighting my findings in relation to the move to violence, 
addressing the significant markers and the potential for predictive statements. I 
will then turn to some policy suggestions made in light of these findings. before 
considering more broadly what this research has brought to the study of violence 
and religion. and what marks it out from similar studies in the field. 
My conclud ing remarks will address the futu1·e development of the matrix, 
including its utility in operationalising a concept of the sacred in relation to areas 
of sociological interest beyond religion and violence. and potential areas for future 
research. 
Key Findings in the Move to Violence 
In my conclusion to Chapter Eight. evaluating my findings on the move to violence. 
I presented a table listing the key markers that contained data which could signal 
a move to violence (Table 8.5). These markers were separated into those wherein 
the presence of data suggested a potential move, and those which contained 
significant amounts of data and where the semantics of this data could be 
suggestive of a move. 
1 n highlighting these sets of markers, I generalised from the characte1·istics of the 
groups T studied to suggest that, if we sec these characteristics in other groups. we 
might assume that they too have violent beliefs that could lead to violent action. 
These characteristics are ideal·t.ypes of the beliefs of violent groups. In Table 8.4. I 
also showed how the lan!,•twge of violent g1·oups, used in expressing these beliefs, 
differed from that of non·violcnt groups. 
In both these cases my research led to clear findings. In Table 8.2, I demonstrated 
how we might extrapolate from values expressed by a group in one situation to how 
they might react in different circumstances. This involved taking these values out 
of the context in which they were originally expressed and applying them to a 
hypothetica l state of affa irs. This useful application of the matrix has limitations: 
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as Bruce (2005: 8) suggestS, for cases of comparison it reHes on the caveat of "other 
things being equal", and to the law of unintended consequences. 
The findings (as highlighted in Table 8.5) suggest some policy recommendations for 
the prevention of violent actions arising from 'violent' beliefs: 
(1) Tackle the basic injustices (shown in the Bi marker): 
(2) Encourage integration across the conflicting world-views (DWV): 
(3) De· mystify traditions and myths which contain violent origins or lessons 
( 11'1). This could be done through sponsoa·ing alternative traditions or 
interpretations: 
(4) Understand the boundaries around non-negotiable beliefs, and watch for 
likely 'incursions'. 
(1) Tackle the basic injustices 
The idea that British foreign policy has had a causal effect on Isla mist violence is a 
controversial assertion that has been support.cd through my research. In the 
groups that I have studied. the data contained in the Bnsic injustice marker 
showed the issues that drove the groups' engagement with the world and some of 
the centra l assumptions in their negotiation with their 'Other'. In the data in my 
a l Qaeda case study were direct references to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan 
(for example, ALQ137: ALQ70) and the feeling that these were part of a broader 
conspiracy by al Qaeda's 'Other': in this case the West (e.g .. ALQ76: 146: ALQ3t: 
135). Countering the effect of these policy decisions could take a couple of 
approaches: ftrst. this could involve removing the cause of the basic injustice, which 
in the above example would be the withdrawal of Western troops from Iraq and 
Afghanistan: or second, countering the idea that this is an injustice, which could be 
achieved through education and legitimation of Lhe acLion in the idiom of. and with 
reference to, the language and values of al Qaeda. In this case the latter option is. 
given questions about the legitimacy of the Iraq War. extremely unlikely t<> succeed. 
However. I include it as an option to highlight that the data coded into the BMic 
injustice marker is a belief about an injustice and. as such. in any attempt to 
negate the effects of these propositional attitudes. it is as valid to change the belief 
as it is to change its cause. 
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(2} Encourage integration across the conflicting world-views 
Seeking to explore and highlight values which bridge the dichotomous world-view 
would help to create common g•·ound for discussion. For example, the sanctity of 
life and the right to live without fear of impingement through the actions of the 
'Other' are commonly held values regardless of the system . .More specific (and 
limited) examples exist around areas of morality. Whilst the differences often 
prove to be non-negotiable, this should not discourage a 'long game' highlighting 
and promoting similarities rather than differences. 
(3} De-mystify traditions ond myths which contain violent origins or lessons 
This recommendation could appear controversial- consider the difficulties and 
c1·iticisms surrounding the creation of a moderate/extremist Islam dichotomy107 -
and runs the •·isk oflegitimising an 'extreme' form oflslam. (by essential ising a 
'moderate' form Watas. 2005: 43·4: Spalek and Lambert. 2008= 265·6)). Rather 
than targeting religions - "a unified system of beliefs" <Durkheim, 2001: 46) - I 
have focused on what these beliefs are relative to: the sac•·cd. In so doing I am 
neither concerned with moderate nor extreme forms of any religion. no matter how 
formulated. but am instead interested in instances of the sacred which have the 
potential to lead to violence. These instances. which share characteristics with the 
ideal·types I suggested from my studies (e.g. Table 8.5), could suggest a move to 
violence and may- but not necessarily - be found within forms of violent 
extremism. In targeting just violent translations of a particular myth. for example. 
it could be possible to undermine this element of a move to violence. 
An example of the above has been seen in the practice of some groups. such as the 
Brixton Salafist community, to counter violent interpretations of lslamisl ideology. 
This community, whilst holding beliefs that are popularly recognised as 
'fundamental', have nevet·theless demonsL•·ated that these at·e unlikely to lead to a 
'"' Haddad and Golson (2007) and Geaves (2004) discuss the move to create a 'moderate' 
Islam and some of the problcmij with this. Some of the problcmR are high lighted by an 
insider's account about who exnctly could be considered 'moderate' (Saeed. 2004). 
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move to violence (Lambert, 2008). This undermines the argument for limiting 
government or wider public support only for certain proscribed 'moderate' groups. 
(4) Understand the boundaries around non-negotiable beliefs, and 
watch for likely 'incursions' 
All the above recommendations relate back to the manner in which the sacred 
beliefs of groups can be transgressed, and ways of mitigating these transgressions. 
By applying the matrix it is possible to learn about the non·negotiable values of 
groups and to map these out, as I have done in the case studies in this research. 
Doing so facilitates an unde•·standing of where possible conflicts might arise 
between the sacred values of groups and their 'Others'. 
The above are brief examples of how these recommendations could be put into 
practice. Through the application of the matrix I have operationalised the sacred 
and, I argue, demonstrated its value fo1· exploring violence in religious and non· 
religious groups. 
How the Matrix differs from other Analyses 
The idea of the sacred. as suggested through my introduction of the theorists in 
Chapter 'l'hree, is not a new concept. However. by introducing the concept of the 
sacred to this research area and utilising it in association with the matrix, I have 
developed a new tool for analysing the move to violence. 
In Chapter Three I highlighted some of the problems with contempo•·a •·y accounts 
of terrorism which either ignored religion, or which ovcr·emphasised the role that 
it played. The former assumed that religion could not be seen to play a causative 
role in violence (for example, Ranstorp. 2007b; Wilkinson. 2007), and the latter 
essentialised certain understandings of religion in ways that undermined what 
such accounts could usefully lell us about the move to violence <ror example, 
Juergens meyer. 2003). I am not the first person to recognise these difficulties: see, 
for example. the comments by the editors of a special issue of Numen (2005). Bruce 
(2005), another academic who was awa•·o of these pitfalls. successfully navigated 
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them in his research on Northern Irish Protestant fundamentalists and violent 
action. However, his resear·ch ultimately tells us little about ei ther where the 
similarities and differences were between Jan Paisley's church and the terrorist 
loyalist organisations with which Paisley had occasionally shared a platform or, 
more importantly, how and why these differences existed. 
Precisely because it docs not start with an assumption of religious characteristics 
but focuses instead on the sacred, my research helps us seek out commonalities 
between these kinds of groups (such as Paisley's chlU'Ch and loyalist terrorists) and 
understand why, although they share aims, they use different methods to obtain 
them. By concentrating on the sacred values of both groups I can present richer 
analyses of this problem than research which, whilst sensitive to concerns of 
cssentialising r·eligion or· imagining it has little benefit, still struggles to explain 
why one group may be violent and another not. 
Whilst I have used Bruce as a good example of an awareness of these twin issues, I 
should point out that it is not his intention to explain why one group is violent and 
the other is not. My at·gt~~nent, though. is that his approach could not explain this. 
His thesis. that Protestantism is less likely than Islam to lead to violence because 
it is more tolerant of opposing views, neglects both those Protestant sects which are 
not tolerant of opposing views, for example. the Reformation Lutheran Chut·ch 
(J uergensmeyet·, 2003: 19·43).1"" and the opcn·minded and fair behaviour of many 
Muslims in Islamic countries and l\luslim diasporas throughout the ages. By 
focusing on how and where groups defend non·negotiable values, I avoid 
conclusions bllSed on broad religious labels. 
Another aspect of my research wh.ich develops new insights is the focus on the 
collective construction of the sacred. As I outlined in Chapter Three. building from 
the ideas of nco· Durkheimian theorists 1 argued that instances of the sacred are 
collective boundaries. which r·eflect collective realities. In using the sacred to map 
out the contours of a group's beliefs I have illuminated group dynamics in a way 
that has predictive potential in relation to the move to violence. 
10
" The founder of this church has acted as a spokesperson for activists who have murdered 
abortion·clinic staff and has t)OI'ticipated in some violent actions against clinics himself 
(,Juergensmcyet·. 2003: 21 ·2). 
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By group dynamics. 1 mean the way that a group interacts with the world around it 
its collective reality - and also how we could predict that it will interact in 
certain situations, based on the beliefs it has expressed about its reality. This 
focus leads to two further benefits. The first, which I will explore in my final 
section. is that this method of examining the role of the sacred in groups hints at 
broader explanations of global group dynamics. The second. which I discuss here, 
is that it could also have something useful to say about the move of individuals to 
violence. 
Predicting which individuals make the transition from non·violent to violent action 
is difficult. Whilst some accounts hint at a clear transition from believer to violent 
bel iever (for example. Malik, 2007), it is clear that there are problems with these 
accounts. Githens·Mazer and Lambert (2010) argue that theories which suggest 
that such predictions can be based on ideology ignore evidence which suggests 
otherwise, and they cite the example (amongst others) of Rahman Adam (a.k.a. 
Anthony Garcia) who was convicted of conspiring to cause explosions in the U.K. in 
2007 (BBC, 2007). Whilst populsu· accounts focused on his ideology as the cause for 
his violent behaviour. they failed to account for his older brother (La mine /\dam). 
who was a member of the same movements and also. Githens·Mazer and Lambert 
(2010: 893·4) assert. more committed to the ideologies of the movement than 
Rahman. 
1 agree with Githens· Mazer and Lambert's summation of the problem. Just 
because I have suggested that a group's beliefs have violent potentialities does not 
necessarily entail that all follower,; of those beliefs will act violently. However, I do 
argue, through my research. that the move to violence is a collective move and, as 
such. individunl members of the g•·oupnre strongly innucnced by it. This innuence 
occurs through the impact that the collective has on the social side of the homo· 
duplex (DurkhCJm. 2001: 18): whilst we may. as individuals. choose to act. the 
choices are presented through socinlly constructed frames. For example. whilst the 
Adam brothm·s may have chosen differently, the decisions of both were still framed 
within the context of the values and beliefs of the group of which they were a part. 
Therefore. if an mdividual is already part of a group wh1ch sees the world in 
dichotomous terms. feels wronged by injustices which arc felt to be part of a wider 
struggle, and which can be placed within the context of violent interpretations of 
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teachings which legitimate violent reprisals, then it is not such a big step for that 
individual to make the move to violence. The important point to remember is that 
not all believers will act on their beliefs in the same way. Some may be hangers·on, 
some may be deeply committed. Some may have the opportunity to act violently 
and others may not - there is room for other va1·iables and serendipity to play their 
part. 
However, whilst it is difficult to make judgement calls about individuals. I suggest 
that the matrix focuses attention on aspects of ideology - in this case. sites of 
potential sacred conflict- which can suggest violent potentialities. This 
information is better than no information, although further data on individuals 
and their beliefs about these sacred boundaries (i.e. how much they differ from the 
group's beliefs) could aid more accurate inductions. For example, whilst the Adam 
brothers both subscribed to the same ideology. we could assume that there were 
some aspects about the beliefs of Rahman where he believed more strongly about 
the need or legitimacy for violent action than his brother. Of course, we could also 
assume that it was due to serendipity that Rahman was offered the opportunity 
that his brother was not, or indeed that he was seen as an easier target for 
involvement in such an action. Even with these caveats as possible variables. 
there still remains an underlying motivation, based on ce1·tain reactions to the 
transgression of sac•·cd beliefs. No·one can account for all the variables, but that 
shouldn't stop us from doing the best job we can. 
There is an additional concern about this suggestion- and that is about the ethical 
considerations of the application of the matrix. I suggest that the matrix could be 
used to assess the beliefs of groups and, through an operationalisation of the sacred, 
make modc1·atum predictions about their violent potentiality. Used 
unscrupulously. the matrix might be more specific than profiling based on race or 
essentialised ideological constructs, but could still discriminate against people who 
would never have acted violently. Barker (1995) talks of the difficulty of using 
knowledge that we. as academics, have constructed and applying that to situations 
outside of the 'Ivory Tower'. Whilst acknowledging the dangers and pitfalls she 
also asks whether we might not also have a duty to do so. 
In considering my answer to this, I would point out that the matrix is a value· 
neutral model that could be applied to good effect as much as to disci; minatory 
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ends. Because it does not. in its essence, pertain to morally questionable ends, I 
believe that it is right to suggest its usage beyond the walls of academia, and to 
trust that both the intention and the rigour of any applications are sincere and 
morally useful. 
Future Applications 
With these ethical considemtions in mind. 1 now turn to my last section, in which T 
give an example of an application of the matrix with contemporary pol icy 
implications as well as its potential within academic research. 
The pol icy applications seem, to a large extent. to be reasonably cleaa·. Statements 
from groups can be coded into the markers and the resultant data analysed for 
signs of violent potentiality. 
By utilising the sacred (tl11'ough the application of the matrix) one can build a 
picture of what. in paa·ticular. groups count as their non·negotiable boundaries. 
For example. the English Defence League's (EDL) mission statement (EOL: 2011) 
states that it is concerned about threats to human rights. democracy, public 
education and English tradition, from "religiously·inspired intolerance and 
barbarity that are thriving amongst certain sections of the Muslim population in 
Britain". By focusing on the sacred boundaries within these themes. we can both 
better understand the potential sites of conflict and, where appropriate. apply the 
recommendations T listed above to disabuse and avert the reasons for, and threat of, 
potential conflict. 
This example can also be used to highlight the global dynamics of the sacred that 
the matrix explores. Fm·. whilst the EDL situates its values within a discourse of 
'Englishness·. it is clear that similar values exist in movements in other countries. 
This can be seen in the EDL support of the Dutch politician. Geert Wilders. when 
he screened his film in the House of Lords and their initial invitation to the 
American. Pastor Terry Jones. to speak nt a rally (BBC. 2010a; 2010b). The sacred 
is not limited by national boundaries. and focusing on instances of the sacred helps 
explain the cohesiveness of groups organised on trans·nationallines. even via the 
internet and in sma ll groups which have not had physical contact with each other. 
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Further research into the how the sacred could be seen to explain and underpin 
global group dynamics would be an interesting and potentially significant 
deve lopment of this project. Likewise, the matrix can a lso be used to explore 
subjects, such as religious norms (Francis and Knott. 2011), to see their genera l 
influence upon and interaction within the wider societies of which they are a part. 
Understanding the sacred boundaries of groups need not be about understanding 
violence, but could instead be about discerning a greater insight into what is 
important to groups and our fellow citizens. 
I contend that the matrix can be applied to any situation where there is a desire to 
know more about what really matters to groups: the nature and relation of their 
sacred beliefs. I suggest that in mapping the contours of the sacred in relation to 
the groups in this study. I have been able to shed light on the move to violence in 
religious and non·religious groups, and that in doing so I have also developed a 
model which can have a broader application both for the academic study of groups 
and the c•·eation of useful knowledge further afie ld. 
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Appendix 1 - Markers 
Abbr. 
Name Definition 
Against AV Actual statement renouncing violence 
Violence 
Basic BI A sense of some basic injustice, which is non-accidental 
Injustice (i.e., it expresses the core values, true nature of society 
and is irredeemable), and which reinforces the sense of 
opoosition/dichotomy - 'clash of worlds' 
Context of CGID Evidence of confrontation within the development of the 
Group's group, either accidental or intentional 
Internal 
Development 
Context of ceo Evidence of confrontation within the wider society within 
Group's D which the group originated and with which it interacted 
Origins!Devel 
opment 
Conviction CON A deep and incontestable sense of conviction 
Desire for DSC The intended aim of actions for social change, either in a 
Social specific area or globally (this does not mean the end of the 
Change world, but could mean global conversion to a particular 
faith or way of ruling.) 
Dichotomous owv An oppositional and dichotomous world-view (cosmology) 
World-View 
Emergency ES The field of action takes on the character of an emergency 
Situation situation. through real or a con nation of symbolic and real 
pressures, leading to the su~pension of normal moral codes 
which •·egulate and limit aclion and the justification of 
emergency forms of action 
External ELA World view justified by appeal to legitimating authority 
Legitimating external to/transcending the situation (God, religious 
Authority scriptures. traditions. fundamental human rights o•· 
values) 
Followers FOL Where a follower consciously (or otherwise) expresses an 
Differ from idea that differs from a leader (or disagt·ees with). To show 
Leader where beliefs expressed by leaders are not necessarily all 
taken on bv followers. 
Involvement ICRV A clear awareness of the need and/or desire to frame 
in the Cycle actions within a discourse of·rcvenge' 
of Reciprocal 
Violence 
No Common NCG An absence of common ground with 'Others' allowing 
Ground meaningful dialogue with other world views 
No Innocent NIO A sense that all members of the 'Other' group are involved 
' 'Others and implicated in the oppOsitiOn to the good, and so 
legitimate targets: there is no 'innocence' 
280 
Abbr. 
Nome Definition 
No Justice KJA Statement claiming that the group has no recourse to 
Available in judicial protection 
System 
Personal PB Expl icit statement of benefits for followers- such as 
Benefit heightened physical or menta labilities, salvation, sense of 
righteousness. etc. 
Question of QA Dispute within an ideology over who has the authoritative 
Authority view of its historical and contemPOrary practice 
Recognition RT Recognition that there ARE innocent ·Others'. and that 
of Innocence they should not be targeted 
Recou1·se to RCJP Evidence of an attempt to conclude a cycle of violence 
Sac1·ificial/ through a sacrificiaVjudicia l act 
J udicia l 
Processes 
Symbolic ST A sense of symbolic imPOrtance given to the present action 
ImPOrtance 
Violent VT Evidence of specifically violent t raits/influences 
Traditions (imagery/myth} within the traditions/beliefs of the group 
Wider ws The present condition/field of action is situated within a 
Su·uggle wider struggle in fused with normative value (good vs. evil: 
1·ight vs. wrong). 
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Appendix 2- Group Names and Subsets 
Groups Abbr. In Abbr. in Sub·set VIolent I Noles text~ R•ferences, to bets Non-viol•nt 
Data eolltcted from tourcu created bt.fore the Tokyo 
Al:~ia \C underpound an.cb ()Jarch 1995) Dt.xu5.:1C'd tn eue·stud;y m 
Aum Shinrikyo Aum At.~! Ch.DtU ~ O.to "'IIKtH from oft.r tho atuoeks El!'ocuv•IJ ~lar<h 1995 
At.~lb X\' onwardt Data \1lof'd. m com,pan:10n &,r ch«UN~Cn on ~e 
toifrom \'lOitlle'e m Cba_ptu 8 
Oau from ttl'*aaot.a &om al Qaeda tndudtnc Ld.to&o,uu 
ol Qo•do a!Q ALQ ~o·subsets v Pnmanly •ttrtbuted. to lu.n Laden, but alto atatemenll from al Zawahm •nd others lmked to the orcamunon Oacutltd. m 
eue·study m Chapter 5 
Data !rom Vlnke Munhofs columnt J.n k1Jnkret t.:pto :May 
pRAF ~'V 1910 lncludtd m d.ucusl10o on mO\'t to/from vaolt:net m 
ChoottrS 
The 6>undu renuauon of th~ RAF From Mar 18i0 to Oc:tobu 
RAFI \' 19ii A.IW1th th~ othu two ~nenuons of tht RAF ducu.sxd 
Red Army FacHon R.-\F R.-\F m c.ut stu~!)· m ChapU:r 6 and m the cluc:ullJon on the mon 
tor'from \'lOitn« m CbaDtu 8 
The za4 etneranon of RAF acontsu Co\'us &om June 1972 to 
RAF2 v Oetober 1877, which 0\'erlaps chronolo~~eally wub tM founder 
la:eneranon who were tn onson dunna: tln.s Dtnocl 
RAF3 v The 3" rtnerauon From June 1979 to Apnl 1998 
Agonshu AOS AOS ;-.JV Data from offitaa.l 10un:e.s o! movtment, 1at.hered m 2009 D•seutsed tn caM atucly on non .. noltnt J .roupt m Chapter 7 
Student Nonviol&nl 
Data collecttcl from .ou.n::u au ted 1~ M OlK"UJ.Jitd m. cue· Coordinating 5:-.ICC sxcc ~orsubsct.s ;-.JV 
ttud;y on QOQ"'\-.,Ltnt aroups m Chapter 7 
Committee 
Hilb ui·Tahrir in l.."HtT nuT X\' Data collected J\Ut from t;zi>eb authot-ed matt.nal. 1~ Uzbekistan 01.s<:uuedm cue studs O:D oon-nolent l'l"'UP' m Chaptu 7 
" For <>Xample, when wntmg about Aum Shinrikyo I often refer to 'Au.m' When cmng a statement by Au.m Sbinnkyo (that I have 
coded) I reference usmg (AU]IIthl#) See the table m the Btbhography for the hst of coded statements 
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